Madras High Court
Bmic Limited vs Chinnakannan Sivasankaran ... on 12 December, 2016
Author: M.M.Sundresh
Bench: M.M.Sundresh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on: 02.12.2016
Date of Verdict: 12.12.2016
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.M.SUNDRESH
E.P.No.62 of 2016
and
A.Nos.473 and 2164 of 2016
and
O.A.No.50 of 2016
BMIC Limited,
Ebenes Skies of 4th Floor,
Rue de Lmnstitut, Ebene Mauritius .. Petitioner
Vs
1.Chinnakannan Sivasankaran (insolvent)
rep. By Official Receiver and Manager
Bernard Pool
2.Siva Limited (in liquidation)
rep. By its liquidators
KPMG, Bermuda
3.R.Chinnakannan @ R.C.K.Vallal
4.Chinnakannan Chandrammal
5.S.Jayalakshmi
6.K.V.P.Baskaran
7.Nityavathi Venkatesan
8.Srinivasa Enterprises,
Chennai 28.
9.Siva Compulink Limited,
Chennai 28.
10.Sterling Computers Limited,
Chennai 17.
11.Sterling Futures and Holidays
Limited, Chennai 28.
12.Saravana Engineering,
Chennai 28.
13.Senthil Products Agencies
Limited, Chennai 28.
14.Siva Industries and Holdings
Limited, Chennai 28.
15.Hi Tech Housing Projects
Private Limited, Chennai 28.
16.Chennai Properties and Investments
Limited, Chennai 17.
17.Hemangini Finance and Leasing
Pvt. Limited, Chennai 17.
18.Tata Teleservices Limited,
New Delhi 110 001. .. Respondents
Execution Petition filed under Order XXI Rule 22 C.P.C. r/w Order XXXIX Rule 12 of Original Side Rules.
For Petitioner .. Mr.H.Karthik Seshadri
for M/s.Iyer and Thomas
For Respondents .. Mr.R.Srinivas
for Mr.S.Mohan for R1
Mr.V.Raghavachari
for Mr.A.Shamsudeen Raja
for R3, R4,R6 and R12
Mr.C.Jagadish
for R5 and R8
Mr.S.Premauxilaraj
for R14 to R17
Mr.Vikram Ramakrishnan for R7
Mr.Shivakumar and Suresh for R18
in E.P.No.62 of 2016
Mr.P.Suresh for R9 to R13
Mr.P.T.Rakesh for R5 and R8
in A.No.473 of 2016
ORDER
The case has got a chequered history. The cause of action starts from here, goes to United Kingdom, then to Seychelles and now once again reverted back to the original place. Thus, this case has completed a circle, which is inclusive of two legal proceedings before the Foreign Courts.
2.Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
3.The background facts surrounding the case required for the proper narration are as follows:
(i) The petitioner is the wholly owned subsidiary of the Bahrain Telecommunications Company B.S.C. (Batelco). Batleco is an international telecommunication provider having its headquarters in Bahrain.
(ii)The first respondent is the successful Indian entrepreneur. He is the non-executive Chairman of the Siva Group of Companies (Siva Group) and the ultimate beneficial owner of the second respondent (Siva Limited) which is a member of the Siva Group. The Siva Group is an industrial conglomerate with headquarters in India. The Siva Group has been arrayed as second defendant before the Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London. In the year 2009, the petitioner subscribed US$174,489,797 to acquire 42.7% of S Tel Private Limited, a telecommunication company registered in India. In the year 2008, the Government of India has awarded 2G mobile telecommunications licences to S Tel. S Tel was a joint venture between Batleco (minority partner) and Siva Group (majority partner).
(iii)An option agreement was executed on 08th May 2009 between the petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 to purchase the petitioner's 42.7% shareholding in S Tel for the same amount subscribed by it. This is to be done by the respondents 1 and 2. It was accordingly sought to be exercised by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner served two liquidity event notices on Siva Group. It was denied by respondents 1 and 2. Once again the liquidity event notices were served, which has resulted in the same denial.
(iv)In the month of June 2011, the parties commenced negotiation as the petitioner threatened to refer its claim to the arbitrator. Accordingly, three agreements were signed on 30.11.2011. On 02.02.2012, a decision was given by the Honourable Apex Court of India on a claim challenging the validity of 2G licences. Among others, S Tel licence was also cancelled. Under those circumstances, a revised proposal was offered by respondents 1 and 2. Accordingly, an agreement was once again reached on 20.06.2012. Claiming that respondents 1 and 2 have not complied with their part of the agreement entered into between the parties, Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London was approached. After contest and after consideration of the respective cases of the parties, judgment was delivered by Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London on 12.06.2014 in Claim No.2012 Folio No.1439.
(v)The first respondent is the citizen of Seychelles. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London, the first respondent and 5th respondent, who was his wife filed a petition for divorce in the Supreme Court of Seychelles. The proceedings initiated was quickly concluded with the first respondent showing his benevolence and fairness to the 5th respondent by doling out substantial consideration, perhaps believing the maxim Charity begins at home. The order of divorce being conditional was passed on 27.03.2014 followed by a final one on 30.04.2014. On 12.06.2014, the judgment was passed by Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London, which was followed by Worldwide Freezing Order. On 21.07.2014, the first respondent filed an insolvency petition before the Supreme Court of Seychelles. However, it was not disclosed before the Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London.
(vi)The following are the dates and events thereafter, which are not disputed by the respondents and as furnished by the petitioner:
The English Court had passed a world wide freezing order on 16.07.2014 and 05.08.2014 in respect of assets that were disclosed on affidavit by the 1st respondent. After the order of alleged compromise on 18.01.2016, the 1st respondent wrote to the English Court by letter dated 08.02.2016 seeking to vacate world wide freezing order. No order to that effect has been passed discharging the 1st respondent or recording satisfaction of the decree by the English Court. Even English Court has not recognized the compromise entered into in Seychelles.
4.Though an agreement has been entered into for a sale of the prime property with the 19th respondent, the accounts would show that no money has been retained in favour of the 19th respondent company and in any case, sale is yet to be concluded.
5.The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the first respondent has treated all the properties of the other respondents as that of his own at the time of initiation and completion of the transaction with the petitioner. Reliance has been made on the assets shown by him. The first respondent has acted on behalf of the other respondents. Respondents 8 to 17 are none other than the shell companies of the other respondents. They are manned by his own men, who are none other than the family members and friends. Thus the question as to whether he is holding any shares therein or not is immaterial. The conduct of the said respondent also would strengthen the case of the petitioner. The divorce order is nothing but a futile attempt to escape from the rigor of the judgment of Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London. The document executed in favour of the 5th respondent also lends credence to it. The first respondent was having complete control over the foreign companies, who in turn control respondents 8 to 17. These companies have not raised any objection when the first respondent acted on their behalf. The facts narrated by the Honourable High Court Queen's Bench Division, London would amply demonstrate the above said fact.
6.Learned counsel has made reliance upon the documents to substantiate that the properties belonging to respondents 8 to 17 have been dealt with by the first respondent as that of his own. These documents also indicate that the first respondent has acted as a promoter. The properties were interchanged between respondents 8 to 17.
7.The certification given by the English court is a conclusive proof. Under Section 44 A C.P.C. r/w Order 21 Rule 22 and Section 60 C.P.C., sufficient power is available to the Court to examine the allegations made by the petitioner. Section 13 C.P.C. does not have any application to the extent of depriving the petitioner from getting the fruits of the decree. The first respondent having brought before the English Court about the insolvency proceedings cannot go against the same. The English Court itself records the factum that the first respondent was having absolute control over the other respondent companies Siva Group. The decision of Supreme Court of Seychelles has got no bearing. The said decision was rendered on the application filed by the first respondent. It would not nullify the finding of the English Court. There is no judgment in rem qua the insolvency order. Not all the properties have been included in the aforesaid proceedings. Seychelles changed the rules of the commission in the midstream. As there is no reciprocity between the countries, such a decision is not binding on this Court. Section 44 A C.P.C. has to be read in consonance with the definition under Section 2 (4) of C.P.C. Therefore, this Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction would be deemed to be a District Court and thus the execution petition is maintainable. Though the learned counsel made the aforesaid submissions also on merits, it is submitted that he is ready and willing to go for trial to substantiate the case of the petitioner especially as against respondents 3 to 19.
8.Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 submits that the decision of Supreme Court of Seychelles would be binding. The appeal filed by the petitioner was also closed. Once the insolvency is obtained after due participation of the petitioner, it cannot wriggle out of the same and contend to the contrary. The divorce order is valid in law. The property which is the subject matter of the divorce was subsequently transferred, taking note of the contingencies. Therefore, the petition will have to be dismissed as against respondents 1 and 2.
9.Learned counsel for the other respondents submits that merely because some of them are relatives of the first respondent, they cannot be roped in. The companies have got their independent existence. The first respondent does not have any role apart from the fact that he is not a share holder. Few of them have been in vogue for quite a number of years. Lifting of corporate veil shall not be done for the mere asking. The judgment of the English Court is not on merits. It does not include the other respondents. The worldwide freezing order does not include the schedule mentioned properties. The petition filed under Section 44 A C.P.C. is not maintainable. The High Court is not a District Court. There cannot be a decree beyond the judgment. Thus what is not available before the English Court cannot be included through the execution petition.
10.To buttress his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following decisions:
(1)Raja Soap Factory and Others Vs. S.P.Shantharaj and Others (AIR 1965 SC 1449) (2)Dallah Albaraka Investment Co. Ltd., London Vs. Ajitabh Bachchan and Another (2000 (1) Bom CR 805) (3)Epoh, Indian Overseas Bank Vs. S.M.Mohamed Musthaba Sahib ((1977) 1 MLJ 349 (DB)) (4)SBI Home Finance Ltd., Vs. Credential Finance Ltd., (AIR 2001 Bom 179(DB))
11.Learned counsel for the first respondent relied on the following decisions:
(i)Magadhu Pillai Rowther Vs. Asan Muhammadu Rowther (AIR 1920 Madras 934)
(ii)B.Veeranna Sha and Another Vs. The Official Receiver (AIR 1940 Madras 47)
12.To substantiate their case, learned counsel for respondents 3, 4, 6 and 12 relied on the following decisions:
(1)Goyal MG Gases Private Ltd., Vs. Messer Griesheim Gmbh ((2014) 142 AIC 668) (2)The British South Africa Company Vs. The Copanhia De Mocambique and Others ((1893) A.C. 602) (3)Bacha F.Guzdar, Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay ((1955) 27 ITR 1) (4)M/s.Ganga Ram Dhanpat Rai Vs. Shri Mahesh Aggarwal (1984(6)SRJ 244) (5)Vijaychandra Prahatilal Sharma and Another Vs. Manek Metal Syndicate (AIR 1990 Guj 190) (6)Mukesh Hans and Another Vs. Smt.Uma Bhasin and Others (R.F.A.No.14 of 2010)
13.Learned counsel for the 16th respondent relied on the following decisions:
(1)Singer India Ltd., Vs. Chander Mohan Chadha and Others ((2004) 7 SCC 1) (2)Balwant Rai Saluja and another Vs. AIR India Limited and Others ((2014) 9 SCC 407)
14.The Execution Petition has been filed under Order 21 Rule 22 C.P.C. Order 21 Rule 22 C.P.C. does apply to the original side of this Court as seen from Order 39 Rule 12 of the Original Side Rules. Order 39 Rule 1 of Original Side Rules speaks about all applications for execution of the decrees before this Court. Order 21 Rule 23 C.P.C. deals with the procedure after issue of notice. Under Order 21 Rule 23(2) C.P.C., the Court, after considering the objections can make such other order as it thinks fit. That is why discretion is given to this Court qua the procedure.
15.Though very many contentions have been raised, this Court is not willing to go into the merits at this stage. As rightly observed by in O.S.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2016 dated 13.04.2016, it is for the petitioner to prove the allegations made, especially against the respondents other than respondents 1 and 2. Therefore, this Court, though is tempted to go into the merits, desists itself from doing so at this stage. Suffice it to state that the issues of fact and law would be considered after the completion of evidence. This Court is of the prima facie view that the documents filed by the petitioner especially the one between the petitioner and the first respondent at the time of entering into an agreement initially, followed by other documents indicating the role of the first respondent over the others and their properties, it is suffice to consider such issues at a later point of time. It is not as if the corporate veil can never be lifted at all under any circumstances. Such an exercise has to be done sparingly fixing the onus on the petitioner to prove. The facts involved in the case would clearly indicate a cat and mouse game. Thus this Court is of the considered view that both the issues of law and fact can only be decided at a later point of time qua the petitioner on the one side and the respondents on the other side. This not only includes the question of arraying respondents 3 to 19 as party respondents but also the defence pertaining to respondents 1 and 2 as well. After all, it is the specific case of the petitioner that respondents 3 to 17 and 19 are none other than the stooges of the first respondent wearing different masks which is to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.
16.The only other issue to be considered is on the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition. Section 44 A C.P.C. deals with execution of the decrees passed by the Court in a reciprocating territory. There is no dispute that United Kingdom is a reciprocating territory. Section 2(4) C.P.C. defines District. It is apposite to reproduce the above said provision, which reads as under:
Section 2(4) district means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a District Court), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court.
17.The above said provision is a definition clause. It is contended by Mr.V.Ragahavachari, learned senior advocate for respondents 3, 4 6 and 12 that under Section 44 A C.P.C., the execution petition would not lie before this Court but only before the District Court. This Court is unable to accept the said contention. By the very definition itself, one can see with clarity that a High Court, which is having ordinary civil jurisdiction would be deemed to be the District Court. As discussed above, Order 39 Rules 1 and 12 of the Original Side Rules would certainly provide for such a course. These provisions have been followed, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, for more than 100 years. Of course, that alone cannot be a ground to sustain the jurisdiction. When the provisions are very clear, this Court cannot indulge in either a judicial legislation or touch the principle of cause of action. The Apex Court in Raja Soap Factory and Others Vs. S.P.Shantharaj and Others (AIR 1965 SC 1449) was pleased to hold as under:
3.In this appeal with special leave, counsel for the defendants argues that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action instituted by the plaintiffs and had no power to make an order issuing a temporary injunction. The action, as framed, could properly be instituted in the District Court. The expression District Court has by virtue of Section 2(e) of Act 43 of 1958 the meaning assigned to that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 2(4) of the Code defines a district as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Principal Civil Court called the District Court and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. If therefore a High Court is possessed of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it would, when exercising that jurisdiction be included, for the purpose of Act 43 of 1958 in the expression District Court.
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6. . . . . . . . .Jurisdiction of a Court means the extent of the authority of a Court to administer justice prescribed with reference to the subject matter, pecuniary value and local limits.
18.Thus the legal position is very clear that in a case, where the High Court is possessed of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it would be deemed to come within purview of District Court under Section 2(4) C.P.C. The aforesaid decision has been quoted with approval by the Bombay High Court in Dallah Albaraka Investment Co. Ltd., Vs. Ajitabh Bachchan and another (2000(2) Mh.L.J.) and the following paragraphs would be apposite:
The Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 as its Preamble shows established an Additional Civil Court for Greater Bombay. Section 3 of the said Act reads as under:
"The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, establish for the Greater Bombay a Court, to be called the Bombay City Civil Court. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such Court shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising not exceeding fifty thousand rupees in value, and arising within the Greater Bombay, except suits or proceedings which are cognizable."
The words "Not exceeding fifty thousand rupees" were sought to be deleted by an amendment. The said amendment is a subject matter of a challenge and has presently been stayed. The section therefore as it now stands is that the City Civil Court exercises pecuniary jurisdiction over suits not exceeding fifty thousand rupees. There is also a Court of Small Causes which exercises pecuniary jurisdiction in respect of suits of a particular value. All other suits of the pecuniary value exceeding Rs. 50,000/- are cognizable and triable by this Court. Therefore, within the original territorial limits of this Court, the Court of Small Causes exercises jurisdiction over matters which it has pecuniary jurisdiction, the City Civil Court exercises jurisdiction over matters which it has pecuniary jurisdiction, and this Court exercises original jurisdiction in all suits exceeding pecuniary jurisdiction of rupees fifty thousand. In this context, therefore, the expression in section 44-A will have to be understood.
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Apart from the High Courts, which have Ordinary Original Jurisdiction, and in Presidency Towns where City Civil Courts and Small Causes Courts are set up, in the rest of the country, suits are tried by the hierarchy of courts. In this Hierarchy of courts, the District Court normally is the Appellate Court over those subordinate courts. Decrees are therefore normally executed by the subordinate courts. However, in so far as section 44-A is concerned, a special jurisdiction is carved out by which the power of execution of foreign decree is conferred on the District Court and the Foreign Decree is to be executed as if it has been passed by the District Court. Therefore, section 44-A has conferred a separate and special jurisdiction on the District Courts. In High Courts exercising Original Jurisdiction we are restricted to answer the question whether whilst executing Foreign Decree, it is the City Civil Court alone which would be the District Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction ? The judgments cited may now be considered. Let me say in due humility that I would have been more at ease in discussing the issue considering the language of the various statutes. I am however constrained by the doctrine of 'precedents' which forms part of our judicial process apart from Article 141. Bound as I am by the precedents, let me consider the judgments cited.
9. In Raja Soap Factory v. S.P Shantharai & others, , a suit was instituted in the Mysore High Court as the District Court of Mysore was closed for vacation. The suit was under the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The suit was entertained by the High Court of Mysore as also an application for interim relief. The interim relief in the form of temporary injunction was granted and that is how the matter reached the Apex Court. I need only re-produce the following observation of the Apex. Court from paragraph 3 of the said judgment:
"The expression "District Court" has by virtue of section 2(e) of Act 43 of 1958 the meaning assigned to that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 2(4) of the Code defines a "district" as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court called the District Court and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. If, therefore, a High Court is possessed of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it would, when exercising that jurisdiction be included for the purpose of Act 43 of 1958 in the expression "District Court".
In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs And Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. & others, 1991(3) Bom.C.R. 481 : 1991(71) Com.Cas. 360, the Apex Court was considering filing of applications for recovery of loans advanced to industrial concerns and in presidency towns who would have jurisdiction to entertain such applications. After considering the provisions of sections 31 and 32, the Apex Court observed as under:
"In the instant case, the extent of the liability of the surety being more than rupees fifty thousand, the application could only have been filed and was rightly filed in the High Court and the finding in the judgment under appeal to the contrary holding that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application cannot be sustained."
In Khetan Industries Pvt. Ltd. & others v. Manju Ravindraprasad Khetan, also the issue arose under the Indian Trust Act as to the meaning of the expression "Principal Civil Court". A learned Single Judge of this Court held that a City Civil Court was an Additional Court which was set up and thePrincipal Civil Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction is this Court and not the City Civil Court. The matter has been elaborately considered considering the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 31.
A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in The Daily Calendar Supplying Bureau, Sivakasi v. The United Concern, was considering the expression "District Judge" as set out under section 2(17) of the General Clauses Act. The Court was considering the term "District Court" in section 62(1) of the Copy Right Act, 1957. After considering the matter, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held in order to find out the meaning of term 'District Court' in section 62(1) reliance on section 2(17) of the General Clauses Act for the expression 'District Judge' would not be proper as in certain cases a 'District Judge' may not be equivalent to the Presiding Officer of a District Court. The Court then proceeded that in so far as the Copy Right Act is concerned, the High Court can be deemed to be the District Court within the meaning of section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
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Even otherwise, as pointed out earlier, in so far as the suits are concerned, the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction is exercised, based on pecuniary limits. It would be impossible to read into section 44-A that for the purpose of execution only, even though the pecuniary jurisdiction City Civil Courts is restricted, for the purpose of execution of a foreign decree it becomes the District Court in respect of those matters which fall within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Section 2(4) will have to be given effect. So read, the expression "District Court" for execution of foreign decrees, will be this Court in so far as its pecuniary jurisdiction is concerned. Having said so, I must reject the said contention that proceedings have not been instituted in the competent Court having jurisdiction to execute a decree.
19.Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned senior advocate appearing for some of the respondents made reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Goyal MG Gases Private Ltd., Vs. Messer Griesheim Gmbh ((2014) 142 AIC 668). The said decision in the considered opinion of this Court deals with Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act and Section 24 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. Further more, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Raja Soap Factory and Others Vs. S.P.Shantharaj and Others (AIR 1965 SC 1449) has not been taken note of therein. We are also not concerned with the application of Section 39 C.P.C. nor is there any attempt to interpret Section 44 A C.P.C., through the aforesaid provision. As rightly observed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, it dealt with the peculiar provisions contained in the two enactments. Thus the said decision does not have any application to the case on hand.
20.This leaves us to the other applications filed. As this Court has already decided to take up the execution petition after the conclusion of the trial, there is no detailed enquiry required in the interlocutory applications at this stage. Thus the applications in A.Nos.473 and 2164 of 2016 and O.A.No.50 of 2016 are disposed of with the observation that any alienation or encumbrance henceforth by the respondents would be subject to the result of the execution petition. There is one more reason for adopting such a yardstick. This Court does not want to deal with the execution petition in a piecemeal manner. Once it is felt that the matter requires examination of the parties, there is no need to decide some of the issues leaving the other to be decided at a later point of time. This will also makes this Court to dispose of the execution petition at an earlier point of time.
21.A submission has been made by the learned counsel for the 18th respondent that the shares which are the subject matter of the execution petition would not be alienated or dispossessed of in any other manner. The said submission is hereby recorded. Therefore, any sale in his favour also would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. Accordingly, the following order is passed:
1.E.P.No.62 of 2006 is maintainable before this Court.
2.All the contentions, issues both on fact and law are left open to be decided at the time of deciding the execution petition.
3.The petitioner is at liberty to proceed with the trial by examining the parties and so are the respondents, both chief and cross.
4.This order would not have any bearing on the respective contentions raised by the parties except the question of maintaining the execution petition before this Court as against any other district court.
5.The applications stand disposed of holding that any alienation of encumbrance would be subject to the final decision in the execution petition.
6.The undertaking given by the learned counsel for the 18th respondent stands recorded.
7.The matter stands posted before the Additional Master I on 23.12.2016.
8.Learned Additional Master I is directed to conclude the trial within a period of eight weeks from 03.01.2017.
9.The statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no more documents are required to be marked, is recorded.
No costs.
.12.2016 Note to Office:Issue order copy on 19.12.2016 Index:Yes/No mmi M.M.SUNDRESH, J.
mmi Pre-delivery order in E.P.No.62 of 2016 and A.Nos.473 and 2164 of 2016 and O.A.No.50 of 2016 12.12.2016 http://www.judis.nic.in