Karnataka High Court
Syndicate Bank vs G. Venkataramani on 29 August, 2000
Equivalent citations: (2001)IILLJ483KANT, 2001 LAB. I. C. 1140, 2001 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 653, (2001) 4 SCT 95, (2001) 2 LABLJ 483
Author: Manjula Chellur
Bench: Manjula Chellur
JUDGMENT
1. The Syndicate Bank is the appellant in this intra Court appeal. It is aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge, who though did not find any occasion to interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority and quantum of punishment awarded, has quashed its order merely on the ground that non-payment of subsistence allowance to the respondent strictly in accordance with the Regulations amounts to denial of principle of natural justice resulting in nullification of the entire disciplinary proceedings.
2. At the relevant time, the respondent was working as Grade-II officer in the appellant-Bank. In 1992, it came to light that while respondent was working at the BWSSB Branch, Bangalore, he had committed serious acts of misconduct like falsification of records, misrepresentation of facts in the books of accounts of the Branch and acting in excess of his authority. Accordingly, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him with passing of an order of suspension dated August 7, 1992. Subsequently, articles of charges were issued to him on February 1, 1993. Pursuant thereto, the respondent submitted his explanation but since the same was not found satisfactory, departmental enquiry was initiated. During the enquiry, the management produced 30 documents and examined two witnesses and the respondent was effectively defended by his defence representative who closely cross examined the management witness. But, since ultimately he was found guilty of the charges levelled against him, disciplinary authority awarded punishment of dismissal. The respondent thereupon preferred internal appeal but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, the respondent filed writ petition questioning the orders of the appellate authority as well as the disciplinary authority in which the impugned order has been passed.
3. The learned single Judge, as found in para 10 of the impugned order, has rejected the contentions of the respondent raised regarding merits of the charges by relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager, Canara Bank v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, wherein it has been held that:
"The High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the conduct of the respondent did not amount to misconduct or that it did not amount to constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24 of the Central Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1975. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. It is wrong to characterise those acts as errors of judgment."
4. The learned single Judge has not found any good ground to interfere with the finding either of the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. But nonetheless he has quashed the orders impugned by accepting the plea of the respondent that he was not paid the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension as per the rules and therefore there was violation of principles of natural justice. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning given in the impugned order.
5. The impugned order had been passed primarily relying on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. . In this case the delinquent was facing a disciplinary enquiry at Kolar Gold Fields in Karnataka, whereas during the period of suspension he was residing in Kerala and he was required to travel all through to the place where the enquiry was conducted. The Supreme Court found that due to non-payment of subsistence allowance the delinquent was unable to participate in the disciplinary proceedings which had led to passing of an ex parte order. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court interfered with the order on the ground that non-payment of subsistence allowance amounted to denial of right of participation in the disciplinary proceedings.
6. Coming to the facts of the present case, admittedly, during the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings the respondent was residing in a premises at Bangalore, which had been hired by the Bank. The proceedings had been conducted only at Bangalore. The respondent effectively participated in the proceedings. At his request, he was also allowed to avail the assistance of one of his colleagues. The disciplinary order was passed after giving the fullest opportunity to the respondent, which was, fully availed by him. He had also the opportunity of preferring the appeal. At no point of time he had raised any grievance before the Departmental Authorities that because of the paucity of funds or non-payment of subsistence allowance payable to him as per the Bank's regulations, his right to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings, was defeated.
7. The records of the appellant-Bank, which have been placed before us, clearly show that the respondent was being paid subsistence allowance. The only grievance which he raised at a belated stage before the learned single Judge was that subsistence allowance which was paid to him was less than what was admissible to him as per the Regulations, which seems to have weighed with the learned single Judge to pass impugned order quashing the orders of the disciplinary and the appellate authorities.
8. In our considered opinion the issue with regard to non-observance of principles of natural justice in conducting a departmental proceedings is independent of the issue regarding less payment of subsistence allowance. In the present case those facts could not have been mixed up so as to interfere with the duly held disciplinary proceedings. We are of the considered opinion that in the present case there was no violation of principles of natural justice since the respondent had the fullest opportunity of defending himself in accordance with law.
9. Accordingly we set aside the order of the learned single Judge. The appeal is allowed. The parties to bear their own costs.