Karnataka High Court
High Court Of Karnataka vs Y.K. Subbanna And Ors. on 23 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990CRILJ1159, ILR1989KAR3572, 1990(1)KARLJ201
JUDGMENT Navadgi, J.
1. The proceedings in the top noted matter have been registered on the basis of the order dated October 11, 1984 made by a Division Bench of this Court in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80. The proceedings came to be registered and initiated against Y. K. Subbanna, Kamaiah, K. Jayaram, Y. K. Ramakrishna, Smt. Marakka and Smt. Shantamma - Accused Nos. 1 to 6 respectively - who would be hereinafter referred to as accused with reference to their respective array, under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the following circumstances :
2. Accused Nos. 1 to 6 are related to each other. Their relationship inter se is as under :
Accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are to sons of accused No. 2. Accused No. 5 is the wife of accused No. 2. Accused No. 6 is the wife of accused No. 4.
3. Accused No. 1 was the plaintiff in the original suit No. 20 of 1972. The suit was for partition and separate possession of his (accused No. 1's) share in the properties, the subject-matter of the suit. Kamaiah, accused No. 2; K. Jayaram, accused No. 3; Y. K. Ramakrishna, accused No. 4 and Smt. Marakka, accused No. 5 were defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively in the suit.
Accused No. 1 as plaintiff had impleaded one Nanjappa as defendant No. 5 in the suit alleging that the sale stated to have been made in respect of one of the items of the subject-matter of the suit by Smt. Marakka, accused No. 5, herein who was defendant No. 4 in the suit in favour of the said Nanjappa was also partible joint family property and that the sale was not binding on him (accused No. 1).
4. The learned IV Addl. Civil Judge, Bangalore City, who tried the suit, dismissed it on the ground that the suit being one for general partition, the family members, who were entitled to shares at a partition, were necessary parties to the suit and that Smt. K. Vimala, daughter of Kamaiah, accused No. 2, who was unmarried at the time of the suit, had not been impleaded as a defendant in the suit, though she was a necessary party.
5. Accused No. 2, feeling dissatisfied with the dismissal of his suit, preferred Regular First Appeal No. 206/80 to this Court against the judgment and decree dated July 30, 1980 passed in Original Suit No. 20/72.
6. In the appeal, accused No. 1, as appellant, filed Interlocutory Application, numbered as I.A. No. II, to implead Vimala as a respondent. It appears that notice of I.A. No. II was directed to the proposed respondent-Vimala and that one B. Narasimha Murthy a practising Advocate filed Vakalatnama purporting to be executed by Vimala and submitted that I.A. No. II may be allowed and Vimala be impleaded as a party in the appeal. Learned Counsel appearing for the other respondents viz., accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 and Nanjappa too submitted that I.A. No. II may be allowed in terms of the prayer made therein.
7. The Division Bench of this Court allowed I.A. No. II and impleaded Vimala as respondent No. 6 in the appeal.
8. There were two interlocutory applications numbered as I.A. Nos. XI and XII in the appeal pending consideration. On September 30, 1983 accused No. 1 as appellant, accused Nos. 2 to 5 and Nanjappa as respondents 1 to 5 respectively filed a compromise application styled as 'Rajinama' under R. 3, O. XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure (The 'Code' for short). This compromise application was numbered as I.A. No. XIII. In view of the filing of I.A. No. XIII, it appears a submission was made by the learned Counsel representing the parties to the appeal, that I.A. Nos. XI and XII which stood superseded by I.A. No. XIII had become infructuous and that they may be dismissed as withdrawn. The Division Bench of this Court placing on record the submissions made, dismissed I.A. Nos. XI and XIII as withdrawn.
9. I.A. No. XIII filed before the Division Bench on September 30, 1983 also contained the signature purported to be that of Vimala impleaded as respondent No. 6. On September 30, 1983, accused No. l, as appellant was present before the Court and was identified by his learned counsel. He admitted the execution of the compromise application. Kamaiah accused No. 2, K. Jayara accused No. 3, Y. K. Ramakrishna accused No. 4 and Nanjappa impleaded as respondent No. 5 in the appeal were also present before the Court. They were identified by the learned counsel representing them and they admitted the execution of the compromise application. Marakka accused No. 5 respondent No. 4 in the appeal and Vimala impleaded as respondent No. 6 were not present. Representation was made by their respective learned counsel that they had executed the compromise application. Added to that, the learned counsel representing Marakka accused No. 5 and Vimala respondent No. 6 admitted the execution of the compromise application on behalf of their respective clients.
10. The Division Bench placed on record the compromise application, set aside the judgment and decree under the appeal and directed that there shall be a preliminary decree in terms of the compromise application. Regular First Appeal No. 206 of 1980 stood disposed of by the orders made by this Court on I.A. Nos. II, XI, XII and XIII on September 30, 1983.
11. On 12-4-1984 K. Vimala, impleaded as respondent No. 6 in the appeal, fled an interlocutory application which came to be numbered as I.A. XIV, with a prayer to recall the order dated 30-9-1983 made on the basis of the compromise application contending she had not been served either of I.A. II filed by Accused No. 1 to implead her as a party respondent in the appeal or in the appeal that someone else had impersonated her in the proceedings and I.A. XIII, the compromise application, in so far as her signature was concerned, was a forged document.
12. In the affidavit filed in support of the prayer made in I.A. XIV, she averred that when the notice of I.A. II was sent for service on her, Accused No. 1, the appellant in the appeal; Accused Nos. 3, 4 and 5, respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the appeal respectively; and respondent No. 5 colluded and managed to serve the notice on some other person by calling herself as K. Vimala; that the said some other person signed the postal acknowledgment and received the notice of I.A. II; that the said some other person calling herself as K. Vimala, engaged a counsel to appear in the appeal and signed the Vakalath as K. Vimala by impersonating her and forging her signature as K. Vimala. She further stated that she did not engage the counsel and sign the Vakalath as notice of I.A. II was never served upon her; that she did not sign the postal acknowledgment of the registered post under which the notice of I.A. II had been sent; that the person calling herself as K. Vimala changed several counsel and in none of the Vakalaths filed by those counsel she had signed. She further stated in the affidavit that as soon as all the facts, the fact of a preliminary decree having been passed on the basis of the compromise application and the fact of the appeal by Accused No. 1 having been allowed in terms of the compromise application came to be known, she filed an application in Court Hall No. 17 of the City Civil Court in F.D.P. No. 10002/84 to stay the Final Decree Proceedings till she obtained necessary stay from this Court in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80.
13. It appears from the record, the notice of I.A. XIV filed by K. Vimala was served on Accused Nos. 1 to 5 and none of them came before the Court denying the allegations made in I.A. XIV. Sri B. Narasimha Murthy, who had filed Vakalath and had entered appearance for the person who had described herself as K. Vimala and who had signed the compromise application and who had admitted the execution of the compromise application by K. Vimala before the Court on 30-9-1983 was asked to file his affidavit. He filed two affidavits.
14. The Division Bench of this Court on going through the affidavits filed by Sri B. Narasimha Murthy and taking into consideration the silence on the part of Accused Nos. 1 to 5 with regard to the allegations made in I.A. XIV, concluded that the applicant of I.A. XIV Smt. K. Vimala was the real respondent No. 6 and that she was not a party to the compromise application.
15. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the Division Bench of this Court by the Order dated September 13, 1984, allowed I.A. XIV, recalled the Order dated September 30, 1983 made on the compromise application, I.A. XIII, and directed Regular First Appeal No. 206/80 to be heard and disposed of afresh in accordance with law. While allowing I.A. XIV, the Division Bench recalled the Order made on I.A. II, but in view of the submission of No-Objection by K. Vimala to allow I.A. II, allowed I.A. II and directed to implead K. Vimala, the applicant of I.A. XIV, as additional respondent No. 6, in the appeal.
16. The Division Bench, taking note of the fact that the facts in the appeal disclosed a serious and disturbing situation, concluded that it would be expedient in the interest of justice to hold an inquiry under S. 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code for short) into the offences under Sections 205, 120B, 463, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code and other offences which appeared to have been committed by Accused Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 and Accused No. 6 in relation to the proceedings in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80 and in respect of the documents produced in the Court.
17. The Division Bench adjourned the matter to 11-10-1984 and directed Accused Nos. 1 to 5 and 6 to appear before the Court on 11-10-1984.
18. It appears from the record that on 12-4-1984, K. Vimala along with I.A. XIV filed another Interlocutory Application, numbered as I.A. XV, to stay the operation of the order of the preliminary decree dated 30-9-1983 in drawing up the final decree in F.D.P. No. 10002/84 in O.S. No. 20/72 on the file of the Additional City Civil Judge, Court Hall No. 17, Mayo Hall, Bangalore.
19. Accused No. 1 on 8-11-1984 filed an Interlocutory Application, numbered as I.A. XVI, to set aside the Order dated September 13, 1984 passed on I.A. XIV in the interest of justice. He filed affidavit in support of the prayer.
20. On October 11, 1984, when the matter came up before the Division Bench for the purposes of inquiry under S. 340 of the Code, some among the accused persons were present. The Division Bench on going through the two affidavits filed by Sri B. Narasimha Murthy and on perusing the record of the matter, held that they disclosed prima facie that Shantamma, Accused No. 6, had impersonated K. Vimala, the real respondent No. 6 in the appeal, and had signed the compromise application, I.A. XIII, as if she was the said K. Vimala; that Accused Nos. 2 to 5 as respondents Nos. 1 to 4, had instigated, abetted and aided this conduct on the part of Accused No. 1 and thereby had practised a fraud on the Court amounting to interference with the due course of the proceedings in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80. The Division Bench also held that there was a prima facie case to show that Accused Nos. 1 to 6 had interfered with or obstructed the administration of justice and that their conduct prima facie appeared to constitute the offence of criminal contempt within the meaning of S. 2(c)(ii)(iii) of the Act.
21. The Division Bench took cognizance of the matter, directed registration of a case of criminal contempt against Accused Nos. 1 to 5 and Accused No. 6 and issuance of notice in the prescribed form. The relevant portion of the order made by the Division Bench reads as under :
"2. That apart, it appears to us that as disclosed by the two affidavits filed by Sri B. Narasimha Murthy, Advocate, the conduct of the Appellant, respondents 2 to 4 and the said Smt. Shanthamma; and the manner in which the order dated 13-9-1984 on I.A. No. XIII was obtained from this Court, as notice in the order on I.A. No. XIV in R.F.A. No. 206 of 1984, prima facie, show that Smt. Shanthamma impersonated Smt. K. Vimala the real 6th respondent in the appeal and signed the Rajinama, I.A. No. XIII, as if she was the said K. Vimala, respondent-6 in the appeal; that respondents 1 to 4, as disclosed in the affidavit of Sri B. Narasimha Murthy, Advocate, prima facie, instigated, abetted and aided this conduct on the part of the appellant and thereby practised a fraud on this Court and that such conduct on their part tends to interfere with the due course of the proceedings in R.F.A. 206 of 1980 and to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice and that, accordingly, their conduct, prima facie, appears to constitute the offence of criminal contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2(c)(ii)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
3. We, accordingly, take cognizance of the matter and direct that a case of criminal contempt of this Court be registered against Sri Y. K. Subbanna, appellant in R.F.A. 206/80; Sri Kamaiah, Sri Jayaram, Sri Y. K. Ramakrishna and Smt. Marakka, respondents 1 to 4 respectively, in that appeal and Smt. Shanthamma wife of the third respondent Sri Y. K. Ramakrishna; and to issue notices to them in the form prescribed in the Rules; also appending to the said notice, (i) copies of the two affidavits filed by Sri B. Narasimha Murthy, Advocate, in the course of I.A. XIV in R.F.A. 206 of 1980; (ii) a copy of the order dated 13-9-1984 made in the said I.A. XIV and (iii) a copy of this order (Paras 2 and 3); and directing the said parties to appear in person in this Court on 12-11-1984 and to show cause."
22. It was pursuant to the aforesaid order, proceedings in contempt were initiated against Accused Nos. 1 to 6 on 11-10-1984.
23. On July 18, 1985, a Division Bench of this Court before which the contempt proceedings came up, directed to post the matter after the order was made in I.A. XV filed in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80 by the appropriate Bench.
24. It appears from the record that the Division Bench before which I.A. XV filed by K. Vimala was pending, disposed of the said Interlocutory Application on 19-7-1984, granting stay for passing of the final decree pursuant to the preliminary decree made on the basis of the compromise application.
25. The record indicates that Accused No. 1 made a motion on 2-1-1985 to drop the proceedings and filed his affidavit in support of the prayer. Y. K. Ramakrishna, Accused No. 4, made a similar motion supported by his affidavit on 4-2-1985. Accused No. 6 filed her affidavit by way of reply on 12-3-1985 and prayed to dismiss the contempt proceedings for the reasons stated in the affidavit. Accused No. 2 filed his affidavit sworn to on 26-7-1986 stating that he was innocent; and that the allegations made against him were not correct and asking the Court to excuse him if he had committed any offence due to want of knowledge.
26. There is a statement, captioned as "Objection Statement" of accused Kamaiah (Accused No. 2) and accused Marakka (Accused No. 5) dated 16-4-1987 signed by Kamaiah (Accused No. 2) and the learned counsel representing him.
27. Accused No. 1 has also filed an application on 11-8-1988 to post these proceedings after the dropping or disposal of the inquiry ordered in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80. It is in his affidavit filed in support of the prayer that Regular First Appeal No. 206/80 has been disposed of on 5-8-1988 by a Division Bench of this Court comprising the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. A. Swami and one of us (the Hon'ble Mr. Justice D. R. Vithal Rao) that the appeal has been allowed and the suit has been decreed. It is also in the affidavit of Accused No. 1 that the matter has been sent to the Trial Court for Final Decree Proceedings and that their Lordships orally observed that they would consider the case of dropping of the inquiry if the Final Decree Proceedings proceeded smoothly and were disposed of within four months from the date of the preliminary decree.
28. We are informed by the learned counsel for the parties that the inquiry ordered in Regular First Appeal No. 206/80 is still pending. During the pendency of the proceedings, Accused No. 3 and Accused No. 5 died. The report regarding their death was made before the Court and the Death Certificates have been produced. This Court on 11-8-1989 has ordered that the proceedings in so far as they relate to Accused Nos. 3 and 5 stand abated.
29. When the matter was taken up for hearing to decide and determine about the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case against Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6, Sri V. N. Satyanarayana, the learned counsel representing Accused No. 4, inviting our attention to the date 30-9-1983, the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6 and deceased Accused Nos. 3 and 5 and the date 11-10-1984, the date on which the Division Bench of this Court took cognizance of the criminal contempt alleged against the accused persons and initiated proceedings, and reading the provisions contained in S. 20 of the Act, submitted that the initiation of the proceedings against the accused persons on 11-10-1984 was without jurisdiction, as inasmuch as a period of one year had elapsed from the date of the alleged contempt. He, therefore, told us that the order dated 11-10-1984 may be rescinded and the proceedings be dropped, directing the discharge of A-1, A-2, A-4 and A-6. The learned counsel representing A-1 and A-6 and A-2 supported the submissions made by Sri V. N. Satyanarayana. Sri V. N. Satyanarayana also submitted that the preliminary objection raised by him may be decided first before proceeding further into the matter.
30. As against this, the learned Advocate General, while agreeing with the submission that the preliminary point raised on behalf of the accused persons may be heard and disposed of in the first instance, contended that the proceedings have been initiated against the accused persons under Art. 215 of the Constitution for having committed criminal contempt of this Court; that this Court being a Court of Record in view of Art. 215 of the Constitution, has an inherent power to punish for contempt of itself; and that the power having been declared by the Constitution cannot be abrogated by an ordinary law. According to him, S. 20 of the Act has to be read down by restricting its operation to cases other than contempts of the High Courts covered by Art. 215 of the Constitution.
31. We accept the contention urged on behalf of the accused persons that the preliminary objection should be decided in the first instance, rightly and fairly conceded by the learned Advocate General.
32. In view of the rival contentions, the two questions that arise for our consideration and determination are these :
(1) Whether the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act is attracted to cases of contempt of the High Court which is a Court of Record initiated under Article 215 of the Constitution ?
(2) What are the material dates for purposes of Section 20 of the Act ?
33. Article 215 of the Constitution reads :
"215. Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself."
34. This Article declares the special status of every High Court in the Country and states that every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of a Court of Record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. We find no definition of the expression "Court of Record" either in the Constitution or in the General Clauses Act. A Court of Record as is understood in legal parlance is that Court whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony. Its proceedings are preserved in its archives and they afford conclusive evidence of that which is recorded therein.
35. The incidents of a Court of Record are that it has the power to determine the questions about its own jurisdiction and that it has inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily.
36. The power of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary, is inherent in all Courts of Record and it is well established that this is a special jurisdiction. Contempt is a special subject and the jurisdiction is conferred by a special set of laws peculiar to Courts of Record.
37. In 1867 Peacock C.J., In re Abdool and Mahtab (1867) 8 WR Cr 32, laid down the rule, "there can be no doubt that every Court of record has the power of summarily punishing for contempt".
38. The origin of the power in the case of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts came to be traced to the common law of England. (Vide Surendranath Banerjea v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bengal : (1883) 10 Ind App 171. The Charter of 1774 which established the Supreme Court of Bengal, while enacting in Clause 4 that its Judges should have the same jurisdiction as the Court of King's Bench in England, expressly provided in Clause 21 that the Court is empowered to punish for contempt. The Supreme Court of Bengal was abolished, but the High Courts Act of 1861 continued those powers to the chartered High Courts, namely, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts, by Sections 9 and 11. Clause 2 of the Letters Patent of the year 1865 continued them as Courts of Record.
39. The Common Law of England to which the origin of the power of summarily punishing for contempt in the case of the three High Courts is that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is a jurisdiction inherent in every Court of Record.
40. It may not be necessary to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham edition) and the 1884 edition of Belchamber's Practice of the Civil Courts which speak of the inherent jurisdiction to punish criminal contempt etc., vested in the Superior Courts of Record.
41. In our Country, the High Court of Allahabad was established in 1866 under the High Courts Act of 1861 and was constituted a Court of Record. Then came the Government of India Act 1915. Section 106 of the said Act continued in all the High Courts then in existence the same jurisdiction, powers and authority as they had at the commencement of the said Act. Section 113 gave power for the establishment of new High Courts by Letters Patent with authority to vest in them the same jurisdiction, powers and authority "as are vested in or may be conferred on any High Court existing at the commencement of this Act. "The Lahore High Court was established by Letters Patent in 1919 and was duly constituted a Court of Record.
42. In the presence of these developments, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 was passed to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempt of Courts. The Preamble to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (the Act of 1926 for short) reads :
"Whereas doubts have arisen as to the powers of a High Court of Judicature to punish contempts of subordinate courts :
And whereas it is expedient to resolve these doubts and to define and limit the powers exercisable by High Courts and Chief Courts in punishing contempts of courts. It is hereby enacted as follows."
43. A careful reading of the provisions contained in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of 1926 would show that S. 2(1) recognized an existing jurisdiction in all Letters Patent High Courts to punish for contempts of themselves and stated that the High Courts of Judicature established by Letters Patent, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to them as they have and exercise in respect of contempts of themselves. The Act of 1926 did not draw any distinction between the Letters Patent High Court and another though it did distinguish between Letters Patent High Courts and Chief Courts. Under S. 2(3), the power of the High Court to take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt as an offence was punishable under the Penal Code was barred. The Act of 1926 sought to remove the doubt whether a High Court could punish for a contempt of Court sub-ordinate to it and removed it. It was felt at that time that the power of Courts to punish for contempt was arbitrary and uncontrolled as there was no limit to the imprisonment that may be inflicted or the fine that may be imposed, save the Court's unfettered discretion. The Act of 1926 remedied this defect by specifying the limits within which punishments could be awarded in contempt cases by enacting S. 3.
44. The experience of working the Act of 1926 led to the view in some cases that the limit to punishment imposed by it applied only to contempt of subordinate Courts. The Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Act, 1937 was enacted to make it clear that the limit applied to contempt of the High Courts also.
45. In 1950, the Constitution of India was enacted and adopted. As observed earlier, Art. 215 declares that every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shah have all powers of such a Court including the powers to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Art. 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of it being a Court of Record, that is, whether it is a continuation of existing power or whether the Article confers the power as inherent in a Court of Record, that is, whether it is a fresh conferral of power, the jurisdiction is a special one. The Constitution vests the rights in every High Court to punish for contempt of itself and no act of Legislature could take away the jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.
46. The Act of 1926 was repealed and replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act 1952. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, 1954 SCR 454 : (1954 Cri LJ 460), the Supreme Court, explaining the position stated that S. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1952 (The Act of 1952 for short) was similar to S. 2 of the Act of 1926 and far from conferring a new jurisdiction, assumed, as did the Act of 1926, the existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High Court and further assumed the existence of a special practice and procedure. The view held under the Act of 1926 was that the High Court of a State had no power to arrest for contempt of itself a person outside its jurisdiction. The Act of 1952 made it clear that jurisdiction in contempt may be invoked even if the contemner is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and the alleged contempt was committed outside those local limits. The Act of 1952 was enacted to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempt of Courts.
47. It appears, till the enactment of the Act, which came into force with effect from 24-12-1971, the view that held the field was that the High Court has inherent power to deal with contempt of itself summarily and to adopt its own procedure and practice.
In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (1954 Cri LJ 460) (SC), referred to supra, the Supreme Court after an exhaustive review of all the developments in India and the history of the law relating to contempt, referring to S. 2 of the Act of 1926 and S. 3 of the Act of 1952, held that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was not applicable in matters of contempt triable by the High Court and that the High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. The Supreme Court ruled with regard to the procedure to be followed by the High Court in dealing with contempt proceedings as under (at p. 464 of Cri. LJ) :
"...... All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. This rule was laid down by the Privy Council in In re Pollard (1845) LR 2 PC 106 at p. 120 and was followed in India and in Burma in In re Vallabhdas (1903) ILR 27 Bom 394 at p. 399 and Ebrahim Mamoojee Parekh v. King Emperor (1926) ILR 4 Rang 257 at 259-261 : (1926) 27 Cri LJ 1241 at pp. 1242-1243). In our view that is still the law."
48. In the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, the question before the Supreme Court was whether it has no power under S. 527 of the Code of Criminal procedure 1898 or under any other provision of law to transfer from a High Court, proceedings initiated by that High Court for contempt of itself, to another High Court. The Supreme Court, on consideration of the entire matter in the light of the development and history of law relating to contempt in India and the provisions contained in the Act of 1926 and the Act of 1952, held that S. 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not apply to proceedings initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself as the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt of itself and to punish the contemner where necessary was a special jurisdiction inherent in all Courts of Record and S. 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 excluded such special jurisdiction from its scope.
49. In Mrs. V. G. Peterson v. O. V. Forbes, , the Supreme Court held that the Chief Court, as a Court of Record, had the right to punish persons for contempt and for the proper exercise of that power it would have all other powers necessary and incidental to it. The Supreme Court further held that the necessary and incidental power included the power of arrest and of attaching the alleged contemner's property in an attempt to secure his presence, but it had no power to make over the attached property to the Government under S. 88(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court on the authority in the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi (1954 Cri LJ 460), pronounced that the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not apply to the proceedings for contempt.
50. In Kapur, R.L. v. State of Madras, (1972) 2 SCA 90 : (1972 Cri LJ 643), the appellant, who had been charged with the contempt of the High Court of Madras, had made a deposit of Rs. 500/- as security for his appearance at the time of the hearing of the contempt proceedings. He had been convicted on 25th February, 1964, and had been sentenced to six months' simple Imprisonment and to pay fine. He had served out the sentence of imprisonment, but had failed to pay the fine. In 1971, two applications had been filed in the High Court, one by the appellant for the refund of the security deposit of Rs. 500/-, and the other by the State Government for the payment of the said sum towards the satisfaction of the unpaid fine. The High Court had rejected the application of the appellant, but had allowed that of the State Government.
51. The appellant, in appeal before the Supreme Court, contended that S. 70 of the Penal Code applied and that as six years had elapsed since the fine was imposed, the application of the State Government was time barred. The Supreme Court, referring to the authority in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (1954 Cri LJ 466), held that the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is a special jurisdiction, not derived from the Act of 1952 and consequently by virtue of S. 5 of the Penal Code, the application of S. 70 thereof was excluded. The Supreme Court further held that S. 25 of the General Clauses Act had no application.
52. Dealing with the question, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction vested in a High Court as a Court of Record is a special jurisdiction not arising or derived from the provisions of the Act of 1952 and, therefore, not within the purview of either the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Examining the provisions contained in S. 5 of the Act of 1952, the Supreme Court held that it only widened the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a special kind and did not confer a new jurisdiction. As regards the provisions contained in S. 4 of the Act of 1952 relating to the maximum sentence and fine which the High Court can impose, the Supreme Court held that it was again a restriction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of new jurisdiction.
53. Before we proceed to consider the scheme and object of the Act and its various provisions, we feel it necessary to refer to the constitutional provisions bearing upon contempt of Court and the competence of the Parliament to enact law in that regard.
54. The constitutional provisions, which come up for consideration while dealing with the powers of Court to punish for contempt of their authority, are (i) Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2); (ii) Article 129 and Entry 77 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule; (iii) Article 215 and Entry 14 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule; and (iv) Article 142(2).
55. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) of the Constitution provides, with reference to the freedom of speech and expression provided in Art. 19(1), as follows :
"19(2). Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence."
56. Articles 129 and 142(2) and Entry 77 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule pertain to the contempt of the Supreme Court while Art. 215 relates to contempt of High Courts. Entry 14 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule covers contempt of Courts other than the Supreme Court.
57. Article 215, as mentioned earlier, says that every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. It speaks about the position and status of a High Court as a Court of Record. The jurisdiction to punish for its own contempt, which a High Court exercises as a Court of Record, is not derived from any statute. The jurisdiction is clearly traced to the fact of it being a Court of Record. This status has been incorporated in Art. 215. It is specifically mentioned, it appears, by way of abundant caution that the High Court has the power to punish for contempt of itself. It would follow that since the Constitution vests in every High Court with the powers of a Court of Record including the power to punish for contempt of itself, this power cannot be taken away by Parliamentary legislation except by way of a constitutional amendment.
58. Indeed, it is true that by the force of Art. 215, a High Court has the constitutional power to punish for contempt and, therefore, has the ancillary or incidental power to prescribe its own procedure for dealing with a contempt matter. All that is necessary for it is to prescribe a procedure which would be fair, so that the contemner is made aware of the charge made against him and given a fair opportunity to defend himself.
59. It is also true that neither the Act of 1926 nor the Act of 1952 prescribed any procedure and a High Court was free to lay down its own procedure.
60. But, in our considered view, this position will not affect the power of Parliament to legislate about the procedure. Under Art. 246 of the Constitution, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-I in the Seventh Schedule referred to as the "Union List" : Entry 77 reads :
"77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court."
61. Under Art. 246(2), the Parliament has also the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-III in the Seventh Schedule referred to as the "Concurrent List". Entry 14 in this List reads :
"14. Contempt of Court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court."
62. These two Entries, in our opinion, unmistakably give the clear and candid picture of the Legislative power of the Parliament. The Constitution provides for a law being made in respect of contempt of Court by Parliament or the State Legislature to the extent mentioned in Entry-77 in List-I and Entry-14 in List-III.
63. All that can be said in this regard is, with a view to reconcile Arts. 129 and 215 with Art. 246 and the Entries mentioned earlier, the Parliament cannot take away the power to punish without a constitutional amendment.
64. In our opinion, it may not be correct to say that the Parliament cannot prescribe the procedure as to how a contempt matter has to be dealt with by a High Court.
65. In S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow v. Vinay Chandra Misra, , the Supreme Court was dealing with the question, whether a High Court would suo motu take cognizance of a contempt of Court subordinate to it when it was not moved in either of the two modes stated in S. 15(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court referred to Art. 215 of the Constitution and observed that the only limitations upon Art. 215 are those contained in the Act. The Supreme Court observed :
"13 ...... Entry 14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is to this effect : "Contempt of Court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court". A provision analogous to Article 215 is Article 129 which preserves to the Supreme Court all the powers of a Court of Record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule is relatable to Article 129.
14. Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court, respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. The State of U.P., , there are no curbs on the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and 215 do not define as to what constitutes contempt of Court, Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid Entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule, Power to define and limit the powers of the courts in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Indeed, this is what is stated in the Preamble of the Act of 1971."
66. A Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on the 1st April, 1960 by the Hon'ble Member Shri Bibhuti Bhushan Das Gupta to consolidate and amend the law relating to contempt of Courts. The Government, on examination of the Bill, appears to have felt that the law relating to contempt of Courts was uncertain, undefined and unsatisfactory and in the light of the constitutional changes, it would be desirable and advisable to have the entire law on the subject examined by a Special Committee set up for the purpose. In pursuance of that decision, the Government of India set up a Committee by its Order dated 29th July, 1961. The Committee was required (i) to examine the law relating to contempt of Courts generally, and in particular, the law relating to the procedure for the punishment thereof; (ii) to suggest amendments therein with a view to clarifying and reforming the law wherever necessary; and (iii) to make recommendations for codification of the law in the light of the examination made.
67. The Committee submitted its report on 28th February, 1963. The Act is the result of the labours of the Committee and is the outcome of its recommendations. The Act came into force with effect from 24-12-1971.
68. Coming to the scheme and object of the Act, the Act is an Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. The Act consists of 24 sections. Section 1 relates to Short Title and Extent. Section 2 is the Definition Section. Clause (a) defines "Contempt of Court". Clause (b) defines "Civil Contempt" and Clause (c) defines "Criminal Contempt". Clause (d) defines the expression "High Court".
69. Then follow Sections 3 to 7. Section 3 states that innocent publication and distribution of matter is not contempt. Section 4 says that subject to the provisions contained in S. 7, a fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding is not contempt. Section 5 lays down that a fair criticism of judicial act does not amount to contempt. Section 6 mandates that a complaint against Presiding Officers of subordinate Courts does not amount to contempt if the same is made in good faith. Section 7 states except in certain cases mentioned there in, publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or in camera does not amount to contempt. The provisions of Sections 3 to 7 in essence relate to those acts which are not contempt notwithstanding the fact that they have been deemed to be contempt under the repealed law.
70. Section 8, by way of abundant caution, provides that the existing law as to defence to be still open in a contempt action. Thus, while Sections 3 to 7 show special acts that are not contempt, S. 8 by implication indicates that the Act is not exhaustive as to what is not contempt.
71. Section 9 emphasises that the Act will not imply enlargement of the scope of contempt, vis-a-vis, the prior and existing law. Section 10 refers to the power of a High Court to punish contempts of its subordinate Courts. Section 11 confers powers of an extra-territorial nature to try offences committed or offenders found outside the jurisdiction of a High Court. Section 12 deals with the punishment, providing maximum limits. Section 13 says that contempts of a superficial nature are not punishable.
72. Section 14 deals with the procedure in a case where contempt has been committed in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 deals with criminal contempt other than a contempt referred to in S. 14.
73. Section 16 deals with contempts committed by Judges, Magistrates or other persons acting judicially. Section 17 deals with the procedure after taking cognizance under S. 15. Section 18 lays down the manner of hearing of a criminal contempt. Section 19 deals with appeals.
74. Section 20 lays down a bar on the powers of a Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It deals with limitation for action for contempt.
75. Section 21 says that the provisions of the Act shall not apply in relation to contempt of Nyaya Panchayats or other Village Courts by whatever name known, for the administration of justice, established under any law.
76. Section 22, which is declaratory in nature, says that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of Court. Section 23 confers rule making power on the Supreme Court and in High Court. Section 24 is the repealing section.
77. The object of the Act is to uphold, preserve and protect respect to the seat of justice. The Act defines as to what is contempt and lays down as to what is not contempt. It defines the jurisdiction of Courts to punish for contempt, limits the power of punishment and regulate the procedure in relation thereto.
78. The procedural sections are Sections 14, 15, 17 and 18. Section 20, which is also procedural in nature, prescribes the period of limitation to remove the uncertainty and to eliminate the stale complaints.
79. The Act for the first time, by enacting S. 20, introduced a period of limitation. The Sanyal Committee examined the question as to whether any period of limitation should be prescribed in respect of contempt proceedings and observed in Paragraph 8 of Chapter X of its Report, as under :
"8. Limitation :- Contempt procedures are of a summary nature and promptness is the essence of such proceedings. Any delay should be fatal to such proceedings, though there may be exceptional cases when the delay may have to be over-looked but such cases should be very rare indeed. From this point of view we considered whether it is either necessary or desirable to specify a period of limitation in respect of contempt proceedings. The period, if it is to be fixed by statute, will necessarily have to be very short and provision may also have to be made for condoning delay in suitable cases. We feel that on the whole instead of making any hard and fast rule on the subject the matter may continue to be governed by the discretion of the courts as hithertofore."
80. The Joint Select of Committee of Parliament on Contempt of Court (Bhargava Committee) after examining the Report of Sanyal Committee on the question of limitation, thought that the contempt procedures by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as early as possible and considered it necessary and desirable that a period of limitation should be specified in respect of actions for contempt and, therefore, laid down in the new clause (Clause 20) a period of one year at the expiration of which no proceedings for contempt should be initiated. The reasons given by the Joint Select Committee for introducing Clause 20 in the Bill, as reported by it are these :
"The Committee are of the opinion that contempt procedures by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as early as possible. It was brought to the notice of the Committee that in some cases contempt proceedings have been initiated long after the alleged contempt had taken place. The Committee therefore consider it necessary and desirable that a period of limitation should be specified in respect of actions for contempt and have accordingly laid down in the new clause a period of one year at the expiration of which no proceedings for contempt should be initiated."
81. This then is the legislative history of S. 20.
82. We find sufficient indication in the decisions of the Supreme Court to which we will advert presently, that S. 20 of the Act is applicable to contempt proceedings initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself.
83. In Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, C.J. of the Orissa H.C., , the question for consideration was, whether the order of High Court, rejecting the motion made by a Judicial Officer and refusing to initiate proceedings for contempt against the Chief Justice and other Judges, is appealable or not under S. 19(1) of the Act. It was a case of contempt of the High Court. The Supreme Court upheld the objection raised that appeal was not maintainable under S. 19(1) of the Act and while so pronouncing, the Supreme Court referred to the scheme of the Act in Paragraph 7 and observed : ".... Section 20 prescribes a period of limitation by saying that no court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It will be seen from these provisions that the scheme adopted by the legislature is that the Court may initiate a proceeding for contempt suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on a reference made by a subordinate Court ......
84. The reference to S. 20 even though the question of limitation did not arise for consideration in the case is a pointer to the conclusion that the Apex Court has taken the view that S. 20 is applicable to cases of contempts of the High Courts also.
85. In Purshottam Das Goyal v. Justice B. S. Dhillon , the proceedings had been initiated for contempt of High Court. The High Court had issued show cause notice to the contemner (the appellant). The appellant had appealed to the Supreme Court under S. 19(1) of the Act. A preliminary objection had been raised by the learned Solicitor General that the appeal was not competent. The Supreme Court while upholding the objection, dealt with various types of interlocutory orders that may be passed in a contempt case. The Supreme Court held that no appeal can lie as a matter of right from every kind of interlocutory order made by the High Court in the proceedings for contempt and that the proceeding is initiated under S. 17 by issuance of a notice and thereafter there may be interlocutory orders passed in the said proceedings by the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that it could not be the intention of the Legislature to provide for an appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court and that the order or the decision must be such that it decides some contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. The Supreme Court further observed that mere initiation of a proceeding does not decide any question, and that even at an earlier stage of a contempt case, an order may be passed which does decide a contention raised by the contemner asking the High Court to drop the proceedings.
86. The observations that have a bearing on the question are these (para 3) :
"Our attention was drawn by Mr. Mohan Behari Lal to Section 20 of the Act ...........
He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the High Court will be without jurisdiction if it is in violation of S. 20. It may be so, if the alleged contemner in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under S. 20 of the Act but if the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this court under S. 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under Section 19."
87. It is clear from the facts in the case as well the observations, excerpted above, that the Supreme Court has expressly referred to S. 20 in connection with the powers of the High Court under Art. 215 of the Constitution. The observations of the Supreme Court in the two cases cited supra, in our opinion, show that S. 20 would be attracted even in respect of proceedings for contempt initiated for contempt of the High Court.
88. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. (1981 Cri LJ 283), referred to supra; in our view, dispel the doubt on the question. The observations make it clear that the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself is circumscribed by the provisions of the Act. The observations of the Supreme Court, extracted in Para 65 of this Order, make it amply clear that the Parliament has, by virtue of Entry 77 in List-I and Entry 14 in List-III of the Seventh Schedule, power to enact law to define and limit the powers of the Courts in punishing contempt of Court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto.
89. The word "Court" used in S. 20 is of wider amplitude taking within its fold cases of contempt of the High Court as well. Section 20 applies to any proceedings for contempt whether initiated on its own motion or otherwise. The word "any" preceding the expression "proceedings" in S. 20, in our considered view, cannot be restricted to cases of contempt initiated by the High Court for contempt of the subordinate Courts. It connotes a wider generality and is a word which excludes limitation, restriction or qualification.
90. Section 22 of the Act which says that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of Courts, in our view, clarifies that the powers conferred by the Act are in addition to those existing powers. The expression "not in derogation of" is intended to mean that the substantive powers of contempt cannot be abrogated by the Act.
91. As observed earlier, the prescription of a period of limitation is procedural in nature. The Parliament, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. (1981 Cri LJ 283), referred to supra, has power to enact law to regulate the procedure in relation to the powers of the Courts in punishing contempt of Court. We are, therefore, firmly of the opinion that S. 20 does not derogate from the power vested in every High Court under Art. 215 of the Constitution. The section does not intend to abrogate the powers under Art. 215 either wholly or partially. The inherent powers can be exercised in all their scope and ambit within the period of one year prescribed by S. 20 of the Act.
92. In the case of Kapur R.L. (1972 Cri LJ 643) (SC), referred to earlier, on which considerable emphasis was laid by the learned Advocate General, the Supreme Court, referring to the authority in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (1954 Cri LJ 460), held that the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is a special jurisdiction not derived from the Act of 1952 and consequently, by virtue of S. 5 of the Indian Penal Code, the application of S. 70 thereof was excluded. Referring to S. 5 of the Act of 1952, the Supreme Court held that it only widened the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a special kind and did no confer any jurisdiction. With regard to S. 4 of the Act of 1952, the Supreme Court held that it was again a restriction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of new jurisdiction.
93. In our considered view, the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Kapur R.L. (1972 Cri LJ 643) would no negative the power of Parliament under Entry 77 of List-I and Entry 14 of List-III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution to legislate on the subject. They were made in the context of highlighting and emphasising the fact that the jurisdiction vested in a High Court, as a Court of Record, was a special jurisdiction not arising or derived from the provisions of the Act of 1952.
94. In Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. The State of U.P, , the Supreme Court, reiterating the position in law that the High Court's powers for punishment of contempt have been preserved by the Constitution and that they are also inherent in a Court of Record observed that the only curbs on the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself were those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act (The Act of 1952) which limited the term for which a person can be imprisoned to six months' imprisonment.
95. These observations were made in the context of the Act of 1952 which contained no other restriction except S. 4 relating to quantum of punishment. There was no provision in the Act of 1952 similar to S. 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Sarkar Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. (1981 Cri LJ 283), referred to supra, while making a reference to the case of Mohd. Ikram Hussain, referred to supra, did not say that the restrictions other than those relating to quantum of punishment, cannot be imposed On the other hand, the Supreme Court observed that the curbs on the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself are those contained in the Contempt of Courts of Courts Act (that is the 1971 Act). A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta v. Dr. O. P. Chakarvarty, 1975 Cri LJ 164, while dealing with contempt of the High Court and the question where the petitioner had not obtained permission of the Advocate General under. S. 15 of the Act, held that S. 20 limits the period. A single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Advocate General, A.P. Hyderabad v. A. V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 Cri LJ 1171, held that S. 20 of the Act applies to cases of contempt of High Court also. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta's case supra, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Advocate General, A.P., Hyderabad, referred to supra.
96. For all the reasons stated earlier, we hold that the period of limitation prescribed by S. 20 of the Act is attracted to proceedings initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself. We accordingly answer question No. 1.
97. Section 20 of the Act reads as under :
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt -
No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its QWN motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
98. A reading of the section would show that in respect of the limitation prescribed for actions for contempt, the date when the time begins to run or the terminus a quo, is fixed from the point on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
99. In N. Venkataramanappa v. D. K. Naikar, , a Division Bench of this Court in a case of criminal contempt, has taken the view that the starting point of limitation is the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and not the date of the knowledge of the complainant. The same view has been, taken by a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh 1984 Cri LJ 301.
100. The plain and grammatical construction of S. 20 would show that time has to be reckoned from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It is well settled principle that terminus of limitation has to be a fixed and precisely determined one. The principle is in consonance with the object of preventing frustration in the very purpose of the Legislature in introducing a period of limitation.
101. We, therefore, hold that the material date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation of one year would be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
102. The next question for consideration would be, what would be the material date for terminus ad quem, i.e., terminating point for determination of limitation. It would be the date on which the Court assumes jurisdiction and proceeds to initiate action. In the case of Baradakanta Mishra (1975 Cri LJ 1) referred to supra, the Supreme Court observed that the exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by a motion or a reference, may, in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt and that it is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The Supreme Court further observed that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference and that is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in S. 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. We, therefore, hold that the material date to decide as to when the proceedings for contempt have been initiated would be the date on which the Court assuming jurisdiction, issues notice. We answer question No. 2 accordingly.
103. In the instant case, the contempt alleged against A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6 and deceased accused A-3 and A-5 is said to have taken place on September 30, 1983. The cognizance of the contempt was taken and notice was directed on 11-10-1984. It was on 11-10-1984, the Court applied its mind to the facts of the case and decided to take cognizance of the contempt and to issue notice.
104. Having regard to the aforesaid dates, that is, 30-9-1983 and 11-10-1984, we hold that by 11-10-1984, the action, one year's limitation having expired, stood barred.
105. We, therefore, drop the proceedings and discharge A-l, A-2, A-4 and A-6.
106. Order accordingly.