Bombay High Court
Khiyashi Kachara Gosar & Another vs The Bombay Electric Supply & Transport ... on 24 November, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(1)BOMCR693, (1999)1BOMLR488, 1999(1)MHLJ667
ORDER A.V. Savant, J.
1. Heard both the learned Counsel; Shri Patel for the petitioners and Shri Choudhary for the respondents.
2. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to challenge the order dated 12th July, 1994, passed by the learned Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai, in Misc. Appeal No. 203 of 1992. Under the said order, the order of eviction dated 8th May/20th May 1992, passed by the Competent Authority-respondent No. 2 in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1) of section 105-B of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (for 'short, 'B.M.C. Act') has been confirmed. A few relevant facts may be stated.
3. On 18th April, 1966 the premises in dispute belonging to the Bombay Municipal Corporation (for short, Corporation) being Shop No. 11-A block BEST staff quarters, Parel, Mumbai were allotted to one Virji Shah, on leave and licence basis and the compensation was fixed at Rs. 255/- per month. On 11th July, 66, Virji entered into partnership with the first petitioner Khiyashi Gosar, who is the paternal cousin of Virji. The partnership was for the purpose of carrying on business in the name and style of M/s. Mahavir Stores, a general provision stores in the premises. The partnership seems to have been registered on 5th October, 1966. On 27th February, 1968, leave and licence agreement was entered into between the then General Manager of BEST on behalf of the Corporation and allottee Virji for a period of 11 months namely from 18th April, 1966 to 17th March, 1967. Since, Virji retired from the partnership business due to old age on 3rd November, 1975, a deed of dissolution was executed on 18th December, 1975 with effect from 3rd November, 1975 since there were only two partners in the business. On 19th December, 1975, there was a fresh partnership between the two petitioners who are father and son respectively and the partnership was supposed to be with effect from 3rd November, 1975 in respect of the said Mahavir Stores.
4. On 7th December, 1984 a notice was addressed to Virji pointing out that the agreement for leave and licence had expired on 18th March, 1967 after which it was not renewed and, therefore, the occupation of Virji after 18th March, 1967 was unauthorised. The same was, therefore, terminated. The petitioners were called upon to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the premises at the end of the month next after the current month of tenancy in which the said notice was received by Virji. Another notice was addressed to Virji on 22nd January, 1985 reiterating the facts stated in the notice dated 7th December, 1984.
5. On 17th April, 1985, a show cause notice was issued to Virji under sub-section (2) of section 105-8 of the B.M.C. Act calling upon him to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made against him under subsection (1) of section 105-B of the B.M.C. Act. It was alleged that his occupation was unauthorised pursuant to the termination of his licence/tenancy. Virji was, therefore, called upon to show cause why an order under subsection (1) of section 105-B should not be made against him, A notice was given to Virji on 4th September, 1985 calling upon him to attend the proceedings on 17th September, 1985. On 20th November, 1986 Virji expired.
6. On 17th July, 1989 the premises were inspected by the officers of the first respondent and it transpired that the second petitioner Hemant Gosar was present in the premises and was carrying on general stores business in the premises. On 7th November, 1989 notice to quit and hand over vacant possession of the premises was issued to Hemant and all other unauthorised occupants in the premises. The notice categorically stated that the initial allottee was Virji whose allotment had been terminated under notice dated 7th December, 1984 and that Virji had expired. On 14th December, 1990, evidence of Hemant was recorded and on 9th December, 1991, an order of eviction was passed recording the finding that there was no direct relationship between the original allottee Virji and Hemant who was found in the premises at the time of inspection on 17th July, 1989. It was, therefore, held that Hemant and all others who were staying with him were liable to be evicted from the premises of which they were in unauthorised occupation.
7. Being aggrieved by the order dated 9th December, 1991, petitioners had preferred Misc. Appeal No. 25 of 1992 before the Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioners did not get sufficient opportunity of representing their case before the Competent Authority. It was thought necessary to remand the matter giving the petitioners fresh opportunity of representing their case. Accordingly, an order was passed on 27th March, 1992 setting aside the order of eviction and remanding the matter back for fresh enquiry in the light of the observations made in the said judgment dated 27th March, 1992.
8. After remand, petitioners filed their written statement on 9th April, 1992 and raised several contentions. I will refer to the contentions that are raised before me. The Competent Authority by its order dated 8th/20th May 1992 came to the conclusion that the agreement was between Virji and the first respondent and neither the first petitioner Khiyashi nor his son Hemant who was found to be the occupant at the time of inspection, was a party to the said agreement dated 27th February, 1968. Virji had expired on 20th November, 1986. The premises were of the ownership of the Corporation and Virji had no authority to induct anyone in the premises much less to sub-let the same to either of the petitioners. Since Virji had acted in contravention of the agreement dated 27th February, 1968, the occupation of the petitioners was unauthorised and hence they were liable to be evicted under sub-section (1) of section 105-B of the Act.
9. After the above order was passed on 8th/20th May, 1992, the second petitioner Hemant applied to the first respondent on 23rd June, 1992 requesting that the premises be transferred in his name. This request has been rejected by the first respondent on 12th August, 1992.
10. Against the order of the Competent Authority passed on 8th/20th May, 1992 the petitioners had filed Misc. Appeal No. 203 of 1992 which has been dismissed by the learned Principal Judge on 12th July, 1994. It is these two concurrent findings that are challenged before me in this petition.
11. Shri Patel has raised the following contentions.
i) There was no notice issued to petitioner No. 1 under sub-section (2) of section 105-B nor has any order been passed against the first petitioner under sub-section (!) of section 105-B of the Act. The notice dated 7th November, 1989 was issued only to the second petitioner Hemant and consequently the order that has been passed on 8th /20th May, 1992 under sub-section (!) of section 105-B is only against Hemant.
ii) The words "all persons concerned" appearing in sub-section (2) of section 105B of the B.M.C. Act will include the first petitioner and not only the second petitioner who was found to be the actual occupant at the time of inspection on 17th July, 1989.
iii) Having regard to the relationship between the original allottee/ licensee Virji Shah and the first petitioner and the fact that there was a partnership between the two on 11th July, 1966 which was registered on 5th October, 1966, a notice ought to have been given under sub-section (2) of section 105-B to the first petitioner as well, who ought to have been given an opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned order.
iv) Pursuant to the deed of dissolution dated 18th December. 1975, on retirement of Virji on 3rd November, 1975, there was a fresh partnership between the two petitioners entered into on 19th December, 1975 with effect from 3rd November, 1975 which authorised the petitioners to carry on business in the Corporation premises under the name and style of M/s. Mahavir Stores.
12. Shri Choudhary appearing for the respondents has denied the correctness of each of the four contentions and has placed reliance on the evidence on record to support the concurrent findings of the two authorities.
13. The first two contentions can be taken up together. It is necessary to appreciate the scheme of the provisions of Chapter V-A dealing with the "Power To Evict Person From Corporation Premises". Section 105-A is the definition clause which reads as under:
"105-A: In this Chapter:-
(a) "Commissioner" in relation to premises of the corporation which vest in it for the purposes of the Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking, means the General Manager;
(b) "Corporation premises' means any premises belonging to, or vesting in, or taken on tease by, the corporation;
(c) "regulations" means regulations made by the Commissioner under section 105-B.
(d) "Unauthorised occupation in relation to any corporation premises" means the occupation by any person of corporation premises without authority for such occupation; and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired, or has been duly determined."
14. With regard to Shri Choudhary's contention regarding absence of notice to the first petitioner as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 105-B, it is necessary to reproduce section 105-B in its entirety which reads as under.
105-B: (1) Where the Commissioner is satisfied-
(a) that the person authorised to occupy and corporation premises has, whether before or after the commencement of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1960-
(i) not paid for a period of more than two months, (the rent , taxes, fees or compensation) lawfully due from him in respect of such premises; or
(ii) sublet, whole or any part of such premises; or
(iii) committed, or is committing, such acts of waste as are likely to diminish materially the value, or impair substantially the utility, of the premises;
or
(iv) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied under which he is authorised to occupy such premises;
(b) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any corporation premises:
(c) that any corporation premises in the occupation of any person are required by the corporation in the public interest, the Commissioner may not withstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, by notice (served by post, or by affixing a copy of it on the outerdoor or some other conspicuous part of such premises, or in such other manner as may be provided for by regulations), order that person, as well as any other person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice.
(2) Before an order under, sub-section (1) is made against: any person, the Commissioner shall issue, in the manner hereinafter provided, a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made:
The notice shall-
(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, and
(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are or may be in occupation of, or claim interest in, the Corporation premises, to show cause against the proposed order, on or before such date as is specified in the notice.
If such person makes an application to the Commissioner for extension of the period specified in the notice, the Commissioner may grant the same on such terms as to payment and recovery of the amount claimed in the notice, as he deems fit.
Any written statement put in by any person and documents produced, in pursuance of the notice, shall be filed with the record of the case, and such person shall be entitled to appear before the Commissioner by advocate, attorney or pleader.
The notice to be served under this sub-section shall be served in the manner provided for the service of a notice under sub-section (1); and thereupon, the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned.
(3) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the Commissioner may evict that person and any other person who obstructs him and take possession of the premises, and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
(4) The Commissioner may, after giving fourteen clear days' notice to the person from whom possession of the Corporation premises has been taken under sub-section (3) and after publishing such notice in the official gazette and in at least one newspaper circulating in the locality, remove or caused to be removed, or dispose of by public auction any property remaining on such premises. Such notice shall be served in the manner provided for the service of a notice under sub-section (1).
(5) Where the property is sold under sub-section (4), the sale proceeds shall, after deducting the expenses of sale, be paid to such person or persons as may appear to the Commissioner to be entitled to the same.
Provided that, where the Commissioner is unable to decide as to the person or persons to whom the balance of the amount is payable or as to the apportionment of the same, he shall refer such dispute to a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and the decision of the Court thereon shall be final.
(6) If a person, who has been ordered to vacate any premises under sub-clause (i) or (iv), of Clause (a) of sub-section (1), within one month of the date of service of the notice, or such longer time as the Commissioner may allow, pays to the Commissioner the rent and taxes in arrears, or as the case may be, carries out or otherwise complies with the terms contravened by him to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, the Commissioner shall on such terms, if any (including the payment of any sum by way of damages or compensation for the contravention aforesaid), in lieu of evicting such person under sub-section (2), cancel his order made under sub-section (1); and thereupon such person shall continue to hold the premises on the same terms on which he held them immediately before such notice was served on him."
15. I am not concerned with sections 105-C, D and E. Under section 105-F, an appeal has been provided to the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai and the said section reads as under:
"105-F : (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Commissioner, made in respect of any corporation premises, under section 105-B or section 105-C to an appellate officer who shall be the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court of Bombay or such other Judicial Officer in Greater Bombay of not less than ten years' standing, as the Principal Judge may designate in this behalf.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred :-
(a) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 105-B, within thirty days from the date of the service of the notice relating to the order under sub-section (1) of that section, and
(b) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 105-C within thirty days from the date of the service of the notice relating to the order under sub-section (1) or (2) of that section, as the case may be"
Provided that, appellate officer may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the Commissioner, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of that order for such period, and on such conditions as he deems fit.
(4) Every appeal under this section shall be disposed of by the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible.
16. Under section 105-G finality has been given to the orders passed under the said Chapter V-A in the following words.
"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter, every order made by the Commissioner or the appellate officer under this Chapter, shall be final, and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings."
Section 105-H authorises the Commissioner to make regulations for exercise of the powers under Chapter V-A.
17. The scheme of the above provisions of Chapter V-A shows that for evicting a person who is in unauthorised occupation in relation to any corporation premises, notice under sub-section (2) of section 105-B is to be issued to such a person and all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. Under Clause {b) of sub-section (2) of section 105-B, "all persons concerned" would include all persons who are or may be in occupation of, or claim interest in, the Corporation premises. In the present case, power has been exercised under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 105-B namely that "any person is in unauthorised occupation of any corporation premises." Admittedly, the premises belong to the Corporation and allotment was made to Virji on 18th April, 1966. Compensation was being paid by Virji and receipts were issued in his name. The leave and licence agreement has been entered into between Virji and the Corporation. The agreement was not renewed on expiry of the period of 11 months on 17th March, 1967. Notice to quit was issued to Virji on 7th December, 1984 on the ground that his occupation was unauthorised after 17th March, 1967. There was a second notice given to Virji on 22nd January, 1985. At no point of time, Virji brought to the notice of the first respondent that he had entered into any partnership with the first petitioner though the partnership is alleged to have been entered into as far back as on 11th July, 1966. Neither was any permission sought from the first respondent nor was even the first respondent informed of the fact that Virji had entered into a partnership with the first petitioner to carry on business in the corporation premises. Similarly, the fact that under the deed executed on 18th December, 1975 with effect from 3rd November, 1975 the said firm was dissolved as also the fact that a fresh partnership was entered into between the two petitioners on 19th December, 1975 with affect from 3rd November, 1975 was never brought to the notice of the first respondent. No reply was given to the notice issued to Virji on 7th December, 1984 and 22nd January 1985.
18. It was in these peculiar circumstances that a notice to show cause under sub-section (2) of section 105-B was issued on 17th April, 1985 to Virji alone. On 24th February, 1989 the first respondent had addressed a letter to Virji proposing to revise the terms on which he could have continued to occupy the premises. Obviously the first respondent was not aware of the fact that Virji had expired on 20th November, 1986. Though the said notice was received by the first petitioner; a reply has been given through his Advocate on 9th March, 1989 refusing to accept the proposal. The fact of death of Virji was not suppressed in the reply. When inspection was made on 17th July, 1989 only Hemant petitioner No. 2 was found in the premises. It is under these circumstances that a notice has been issued to Hemant on 7th November, 1989. Notice clearly states that the premises were allotted to Virji under leave and licence agreement for a period of 11 months from 18th April, 1966 to 17th March, 1967. Thereafter the agreement not having been renewed, the occupation of the premises was unauthorised. On the death of Virji the agreement stood terminated and the second petitioner was found to be in unauthorised occupation of the premises and, therefore, liable to vacate. It is true that the second petitioner, by his reply dated 23rd Novem-
her, 1989, refused to vacate the premises. This refusal was reiterated in the reply dated 11th December, 1989. It is, however, relevant to note that the notice dated 7th November, 1989 is addressed to "Shri Hemant Khiyashi Gosar and all other unauthorised occupants of Shop No. A-11, BEST Staff Quarters, Dr. S.S. Rao Road, Pare), Bombay 400 012". It is after this that a statutory notice under sub-section (2) of section 105-B of the Act was issued to the second petitioner on 23rd May, 1990 and that is also addressed in the following words.
"Shri Hemant Khiyashi Gosar, and all other unauthorised occupants of Shop No. A-11, BEST Staff Quarters, Dr. S.S. Rao Road, Parel Bombay 400 012"
19. It is significant to note that in the evidence of the second petitioner which was recorded during the course of enquiry on 14th December, 1990, he categorically admitted that the petitioners had not sought permission of the first respondent for entering into the partnership; the first respondent was not informed of the death of Virji and that no reply was given to the show cause notice issued on 23rd May, 1990 to the second petitioner under section 105-B (2) of the B.M.C. Act. In the scheme of the provisions of section 105-B, it is not possible to accept the contention of Shri Patel that the notice contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 105'B must be given to each and every person who claims to be in unauthorised occupation of the corporation premises. Since petitioner No. 2 was found to be in actual unauthorised occupation on 17th July, 1989, notice was addressed to him adding the words "and all other unauthorised occupants of. This is also the address mentioned in the statutory notice issued on 23rd May, 1990 to the second petitioner Hemant. Infact, it would be clear from the facts of the present case that it was Virji Shah alone who was entitled to notice if he was alive. If Virji had entered into any agreement with third persons like the petitioners, who had no claim whatsoever against the first respondent, the first respondent would not be under any legal obligation to issue any notice to persons like the petitioners. Admittedly, there was no privity of contract between the petitioners and the first respondent. The presence of the petitioners to the suit premises was not even brought to the notice of the first respondent and was deliberately suppressed from the first respondent.
20. Similar situation arose before Jamdar, J., in Ajit and others v. General Manager, BEST Undertaking of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, . Relying upon the scheme of the provisions of section 105-B it was held that the persons who occupy the tenement of the corporation under an agreement may be required to be served a notice but a member of the family residing with such a person who is in unauthorised occupation or whose occupation has become unauthorised has no right to be in occupation either against the person who is in occupation or against the true owner like the corporation. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon the corporation to issue a notice under sub-section (2) of section 105-B to all persons residing with the allottee who is sought to be evicted on the ground that his occupation has become unauthorised. A reference was made to the decision of the Apex Court in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Khalil-ul-Rehman, where the word "occupant" used in section 20(b) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (I of 1951) was considered. It was held on page 144 of the report as under :
"In order therefore that a person can take the benefit of section 20 he should have been recorded in occupation of the land in dispute in the year 1356-F. The only limitation that has been placed by judicial decisions on this meaning of the word "occupant" is that the person should be in occupation in his own right and not on behalf of someone else."
21. The second decision of the Apex Court to which a reference has been made by Jamdar, J., in Ajit's case (supra) is of Amba Prasad v. Abdul Noor Khan and Ors., which is also under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 where it was held that the word "occupant" signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is of no consequence. It was also held that "occupation" to be basis of a right must be of a person who claims to be in possession in his own right. While I am bound by the observations of the Apex Court in the two decisions mentioned above. I am in agreement with the view expressed by Jamdar, J., in Ajit's case (supra). Legal possession does not of itself constitutes an occupation. Relations, dependents, or servants residing in the house with the permission of the person who has a right to occupy the house cannot be said to be in occupation of the house. Occupation is of a person with whose permission and on whose account they are residing in the house. There is thus no substance in the first two contentions of Shri Patel.
22. Coming to the third and fourth contention regarding the relationship between the first petitioner and Virji Shah, it is true that the partnership was entered into between them on 11th July, 1966. Dissolution of that partnership is on 18th December, 1975, with effect from 3rd November, 1975. A fresh partnership was entered into- between the two petitioners on 19th December, 1975 with effect from 3rd November, 1975, Admittedly, the leave and licence agreement was only between Virji and the first respondent. There is no privity of contract between either of the petitioners and the first respondent. Under Clause 20 of the leave and licence agreement dated 27th February, 1968 it is specifically provided as under :
"20. The licensee shall not transfer or assign his rights in the leave and licence and part with possession of the shop or any part thereof. The licence will not be transferable to any person whether by the sale of the business carried on in the shop as a concern or otherwise and the licensee shall not so transfer the license or any right therein or attempt to do so nor admit any partners without previous written permission of the General Manager."
All that Clause 21 permits is that a shop keeper with whom an agreement has been entered into can run his shop by giving a power of attorney to his agent or he can give the premises for conducting the business. Clause 21 reads as under :
"21. Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause 20 above a shop keeper shall be permitted;
i) to run the shop by giving a power of attorney to any person as his agent or
ii) to give the shop premises to anybody as an employee for conducting business but retaining the shop in his name and remaining responsible to the undertaking for all the terms and conditions of the leave and licence agreement."
23. There is nothing in the said agreement which would authorise creation of a right in favour of a partner. The premises admittedly, belong to the Corporation. Virji was merely a licensee. He had no right to transfer or assign his right much less to part with possession of the premises. Clause 20 specifically prohibits even an attempt to transfer or to admit a partner without the previous written permission of the first respondent. Admittedly, no such permission has been obtained. It is significant to note that though the partnership was entered into on 11th July, 1966, between the first petitioner and Virji the agreement with the first respondent was entered into only by Virji on 27th February, 1968. In the agreement there is not even a reference to the fact that the partnership had come into existence on 11th July, 1996. Leave alone the permission of the first respondent, there was not even an intimation given to the first respondent in respect of the said partnership dated 11th July, 1966. In view of the clear prohibition contained in Clause 20, I have no doubt that the petitioners had no right whatsoever to be in the premises and their occupation was wholly unauthorised. Conduct of the petitioners in suppressing the fact from the first respondent also shows their mala fides. The agreement dated 27th February, 1968 has been signed by Virji in his individual capacity and not in his capacity as a partner of the firm of which the first petitioner was the other partner. It is difficult to appreciate how unilaterally Virji and the petitioners could have entered into any agreement in respect of corporation premises without even intimation being given to the first respondent. Even the dissolution deed dated 18th December, 1975. In the fresh partnership between the two petitioners under the deed dated 19th December, 1975 was not brought to the notice of the first respondent. Obviously, the first respondent was no way concerned with what arrangement the petitioners and Virji had arrived at for their own personal convenience behind the back of the first respondent. Though notice was given to Virji calling upon him to attend the enquiry on 17th September, 1985, he chose to remain absent. Death of Virji on 20th November, 1986 was suppressed from the first respondent. When the first respondent thought of revising the terms of the agency of Virji under the impression that he was in occupation of the premises, letter dated 24th February, 1989 was replied by the Advocate for the first petitioner without disclosing the fact that Virji expired on 20th November, 1986. In the reply dated 9th March, 1989 death of Virji has been suppressed deliberately.
24. As far as the first respondent was concerned, it had no concern with either of the petitioners. It, therefore, rightly proceeded on the footing that initially it was Virji whose occupation was unauthorised after 17th March, 1967. When on inspection it transpired that the second petitioner was in actual occupation on 17th July, 1989 notice to quit has been given to the second petitioner on 7th November, 1989 followed by a statutory notice to show cause under sub-section (2) of section 105B of the Act which was is-
sued on 23rd May, 1990. Hemant petitioner No. 2 has been given full opportunity of being heard in the said enquiry. His evidence was recorded on 14th December, 1990 from which it is clear that he had not informed the first respondent of any of the arrangements that they had arrived at behind the back of the first respondent in respect of its premises. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the petitioners' contention that merely because there was a partnership entered into on 11th July 1966 between Virji and the first petitioner and another partnership entered into between the two petitioners on 19th December, 1975, on the dissolution of the first partnership under the deed dated 18th December, 1975 the petitioners had any right, title or interest to occupy the premises. In my view, the petitioners are no better than trespassers. Their possession of the corporation premises is wholly unauthorised. There is complete compliance with the provisions of section 105B of the Act. The principles of natural justice have been duly complied with. The second petitioner who was found in actual possession was given a due notice and after giving him full opportunity, the impugned order has been passed. There is neither any illegality nor any perversity in the impugned orders so as to warrant intervention in the limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the circumstances, there is no merit in any of the contentions raised by Shri Patel. The petition must accordingly fail. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs.
25. At this stage Shri Patel prays for some substantial time to vacate the premises. Shri Choudhari opposes the prayer on the ground that the petitioners are in arrears of payment of compensation and property tax even as per the interim order dated 20th September, 1994 passed by this Court at the time of admission of the petition. Under the circumstances, I am inclined to grant time of only six weeks to the petitioners to vacate the premises. Accordingly the petitioners are granted six weeks time from today to vacate the premises.
26. Petition fails.