Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Sh. Ajay Kumar Bhardwaj vs Delhi Transport Corporation Through on 28 September, 2012
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi.
OA-1167/2012
Reserved on: 20.09.2012.
Pronounced on: 28.09.2012
Honble Dr. Veena Chhotray, Member (A)
Honble Sh. A.K. Bhardwaj, Member (J)
Sh. Ajay Kumar Bhardwaj,
S/o Sh. Bhagwati Prashad,
R/o C-1/36, DDA Flats,
Hastsal, New Delhi-110059. . Applicant
(through Sh. D.S. Choudhary, Advocate)
Versus
1. Delhi Transport Corporation through
Its Chairman-cum-Managing Director
Head Quarter, I.P. Estate,
New Delhi-110002.
2. The Deputy C.G.M. (W),
DTC Peera Garhi Depot,
New Delhi-110056.
3. The Depot Manager,
Hari Nagar Depot-III,
Delhi Transport Corporation,
New Delhi. . Respondents
(through Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat with Sh. N.K. Singh, Advocate)
O R D E R
Sh. A.K. Bhardwaj, Member (J) The applicant has filed the present Original Application questioning the order dated 24.02.2012 passed by the Regional Manager (West), Delhi Transport Corporation rejecting his appeal against the punishment of dismissal from services of the Corporation imposed upon him in terms of order dated 11.02.2011. Initially he had filed OA-580/2011 questioning the show cause notice dated 17.01.2011. The said O.A. was dismissed vide Tribunals order dated 14.02.2011 as infructuous for the reason that he had already submitted his reply to the show cause notice. Subsequently, when he was dismissed from service and the appeal preferred by him to the Appellate Authority against dismissal order was rejected, the applicant filed another OA-1793/2011 questioning the orders of dismissal and rejection of the appeal dated 11.02.2011 and 04.05.2011 respectively. The said O.A. was disposed of in terms of Tribunals order dated 03.11.2011 by directing the Appellate Authority to pass a detailed, reasoned and speaking order keeping in view the provisions of DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Services Rules) Regulation, 1952 extracted in the appeal i.e. paras 10(d) 4 and 5 of the said Regulation and other relevant provisions of rules and law. Facts of the case delineated in the said order dated 03.11.2011 read as under:-
The applicant, an Assistant Fitter under the DTC, alongwith one Sh. Tala Ram, J.T.O., R/o A-1, 8/9, New Gurgao Road, Mahipalpur Extn. New Delhi was found involved in committing wrong of providing unauthorized meters of STD/ISD resulting in financial loss to MTNL department and concealment of facts from the Organization. He was charge sheeted vide Memo No. NHD.2/AI(T)/99R/366 dated 26.11.99 for his act of dereliction to duty.
2. Since he was found involved in conspiracy of cheating the MTNL for an amount of Rs. 67,27,000/-, a criminal case for committing offence under Section 420 read with Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention and Corruption Act was registered against him. Being convicted the applicant was sentenced in terms of the order dated 4.8.2010 passed by the Court of Special Judge. Trial court granted him interim bail for one month. For committing offence under Section 420 IPC, applicant was sentenced with RI for three years and fine of Rs. 20,000/- in case of default in payment which he was to undergo further SI for one year. For committing offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention and Corruption Act applicant was further sentenced with Rigorous imprisonment of two years with fine of Rs. 10,000/-. In the event of default in payment of fine of Rs. 10,000/-, he was to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. AS can be seen from legal opinion of learned counsel for respondents (Annexure A-4 colly), another penalty of S.I. for six months with fine Rs.10,000/- was also imposed on applicant.
3. Against the order dated 4.8.2010 passed by the learned special judge, Delhi, applicant preferred Cri. Appeal No.987/2010 before the Honble High Court of Delhi. It is admitted by the applicant that the Honble High Court was pleased to decline the suspension of sentence inflicted on him during pendency of criminal appeal, as a result he was taken into custody on 6.9.2010. Seeking suspension of his sentence during pendency of trail before the Honble High court, applicant approached the Honble Supreme Court. Honble Supreme Court passed order dated 15.11.2010 granting him interim bail. As a result the applicant was released from custody on 16.11.2010. In the meanwhile respondents issued Memo NO. NHD-3/A.N.(T)2011/14 dated 17.01.2011 asking the applicant to show cause, why he could not be dismissed from service in terms of provision of regulation 9 (B) g and 10 (c) a of Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952. Having received aforementioned show cause notice, applicant submitted a reply thereto. A copy of said reply date4d 31.1.2011 is placed on record as Annexure A-6 to the original application. In the said reply applicant pleased as under:-
(i) Since the order of his conviction has not attained finality no disciplinary action could be taken against him.
(ii)In Rule 19 of CCS (CCA) Rules the Central Govt. has prescribed special procedure to deal situation line one in the case of the applicant, but DTC had not made any such procedure. Relevant excerpt of reply dated 31.1.2011 reads as under:-
The Central Govt. has prescribed special procedure in such cases under Rule 19 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 for all the employees. Unfortunately, DTC has neither made any procedure nor it follows any procedure.
iii)In terms of Rules 11 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 no order imposing the penalty on an employee of Delhi Police can be passed till outcome of first appeal preferred against the order of conviction of concerned employee.
iv)The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Capt.M.Paul Anthony (AIR 1999SC 1416) viewed that till the decision of criminal court on a particular set of charges, disciplinary action initiated against an employee for same set of charges, should be kept in abeyance.
4. Having considered the reply to show cause notice, submitted by the applicant, Depot Manager, DTC (Hari Nagar Depot-III) passed an order dated 11.2.2011 dismissing him from service of Corporation with immediate effect. The relevant portion of said order reads as under:-
He is hereby dismissed from service of this corporation with immediate effect under Clause 15(2)(vii) of the D.R.T.A. (Conditions of appointment and Service) Regulations 1952 read with paras 9(B)g &10(C) a of the executive instructions. Against the aforementioned punishment order dated 11.2.2011 passed by the Depot Manager, DTC, the applicant preferred an appeal dated 28.3.2011 to CGM(W),DTC, New Delhi taking the plea that in terms of Regulation 10(4) of DRTA (Conditions of appointment and Services) Regulations, 1952 departmental action against applicant on being convicted by court could be taken only after decision on his appeal by the first appellate court. The relevant paras of resolution as extracted by the applicant in his appeal reads as under;-
10(d) the provisions of paras (4) and (5) of the office order No.201 dated 14th November 1954 in regard to the procedure fro dismissal cases in which the D.T.C. employees are prosecuted while on duty, should be strictly followed. The provisions are reproduced below for ready reference:-
4. The question of taking department action against an employee convicted by Court, will be taken up only after the employees appeal has been decided by the Appellate Court. In cases where the employee does not file an appeal, the question of taking department action wil be considered on the expiry of the period fixed for filing an appeal. If an employee, who has been convicted by a court, desires to perform duty in this Organizatoin during the period between the decision of the Lower Court and the Appellate Court, he will be put on such duties as might be considered suitably by the General Manager. If during this period he is unable to attend duty on account of lock-up etc, or otherwise desires to take leave he will be granted such leave including leave without pay as may be due to him, in accordance with the provisions of D.R.T.A. (conditions of appointment and service) Regulations, 1952.
5. The serious departmental action of termination of service will not be taken against a driver, if he is convicted by the Court for an offence which is committed by him for the first time during his service in this Organization. This conviction will, however, be taken into action while deciding the nature of departmental action to be taken against him for a subsequent offence. No departmental action will be taken against a driver, who is convicted in an offence which is due to some defect or lack of some equipment in a bus.
5. The applicant made further representation dated 8.3.2011 addressing the same to Depot Manager, Hari Nagar Depot-III New Delhi requesting for cancellation of order dated 11.2.2011 in terms of which he was dismissed from service. In the said representation applicant had reiterated the grounds raised by him in the appeal. The Depot Manager, DTC Hari Nagar Depot-III issued a communication dated 22.3.2011 informing the applicant that he could prefer an appeal against dismissal order dated 11.2.2011 to Deputy CGM(W) (Annexure A-9). Vide communication dated 4.5.2011 applicant was informed that his appeal had been examined by Dy. CGM(W) and was rejected. The said communication dated 4.5.2011 reads as under:-
Reference appeal dated 28.3.2011 against the orders of dismissal from services of this corporation w.e.f. 11.2.2011 vide momo No. HND.3/AT (T) 11/485 dated 11.2.2011. sh. Ajay Kumar Bhardwaj, Ex-Asstt.fitter B NO. 9460, T.No. 42490 is hereby informed that his appeal case has been examined by the worthy Dy. C.G.M.(W) and found not satisfactory, hence the appeal has been rejected.
2. In compliance of the aforementioned order passed by this Tribunal, the Appellate Authority has taken fresh decision in the appeal of the applicant in terms of the speaking order communicated to applicant vide Order No. RM(West)/12/Appeal/222 dated 24.02.2012. In the said order, the Appellate Authority has taken a view that the provisions of Paras-4&5 of the Standing Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 are applicable only to drivers who are involved in criminal cases in accidents etc. as the said instructions are framed keeping in mind the involvement of the drivers in criminal cases due to accident or lack of some equipments and defects in buses and for non of their fault. In other words, according to the Appellate Authority, the applicant, who was involved in conspiracy of cheating the MTNL for an amount of Rs.67,27,000/- and has been convicted for committing offence under Section 420 read with Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention and Corruption Act cannot seek the benefit of the aforementioned Executive Instructions issued vide Office Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 and No. ADMI-3 (18)/53 dated 05.08.1955. Questioning the said order passed by the Appellate Authority communicated to him vide Communication No. RM(West)/12/Appeal/222 dated 24.02.2012, order of dismissal dated 11.02.2011 and seeking reinstatement in service with full back wages and other consequential benefits, the applicant has filed the present Original Application.
3. Sh. D.S. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently relied upon the aforementioned Instructions dated 24.11.1954 and 05.08.1955. He submitted that Para-10 of the Instructions dated 05.08.1955 does not distinguish between the prosecution or court proceedings against an employee for the offence committed by him while driving a DTC vehicle on duty and other offences. To buttress his said submission, he also made reference to Office Order No. ADMI-8(1)/55 dated 30.06.1955 and Office Order No. ADMI-8(1)/55 dated 06.01.1956 and submitted that the Office Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 is applicable not only to convict of the offence of accident alone but also to the employees who are convicted by the Court of first instance for other kinds of offences also.
4. On the other hand, Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel appearing for DTC reiterated the view taken by the Appellate Authority while passing order dated 24.02.2012.
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.
6. The short question arises to be determined by us is:-
Whether in terms of provisions of Para-10 (d) 4 of the Executive Instructions on procedure regarding disciplinary action and appeals issued on 05.08.1955, during the pendency of the appeal against the order of his conviction by the Trial Court, no departmental action could be taken against the applicant?
7. Consequent upon the conviction by the Court of Learned Special Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi and the imposition of punishment of imprisonment and fine of Rs.40,000/- upon the applicant for being involved in a racket with Sh. Tala Ram, JTO and having considered his reply to show cause notice dated 17.01.2011, the Disciplinary Authority had passed the Order No. HND3/AIT/11/485 dated 11.02.2011 under Clause 15(2)(vii) of the DRTA (Conditions of appointment and service) Regulations 1952 read with Para 9(B)g&10(C)a of the Executive Instructions dismissing the applicant from service of the Corporation with immediate effect. In terms of said Clause 15(2)(vii) the penalty of dismissal from service of the Delhi Road Transport Authority may for misconduct or for good and sufficient reason be imposed upon an employee of DRTA. Para-9(g) of the Executive Instructions on procedure regarding disciplinary action and appeals issued vide Order No. ADMI-3(18)/53 dated 05.08.1955 provide for dispensation of the detailed procedure laid down in Paragraph-1,3 and 5 of the said instructions before taking disciplinary action against the DRT employee in a case where the order of punishment is based on facts established before a criminal court. However, in Para-10(d)4 of the Executive Instructions dated 05.08.1955, it is provided that the question of taking departmental action against an employee convicted by Court, will be taken up only after the employees appeal is decided by the Appellate Court. On the basis of the said sub-clause of Para-10, learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that once the applicant has preferred an appeal against the order of his conviction, no departmental action should have been taken against him and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. A careful perusal of Para-10(d) of Executive Instructions would reveal that the said clause is extract of Office Order No. 201 dated 24.11.1954. For easy reference the same is extracted herein below:-
10(4). The question of taking departmental action against an employee convicted by Court, will be taken up only after the employees appeal has been decided by the Appellate Court. In cases where the employee does not file an appeal, the question of taking departmental action will be considered on the expiry of the period fixed for filing an appeal. If an employee, who has been convicted by a court, desires to perform duty in this Organization during the period between the decision of the Lower Court and the Appellate Court, he will be put on such duties as might be considered suitable by the General Manager. If during this period he is unable to attend duty on account of lock-up etc. or otherwise desires to take leave he will be granted such leave including leave without pay as may be due to him, in accordance with the provisions of D.R.T.A. (Conditions of appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952.
8. From the heading of the Office Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 itself it can be seen that the said order provide for procedure for disposal of cases in which DTC employees are prosecuted while on duty. In terms of the said order, while the legal defence will continue to be provided by the management in all cases upto the lower Court in accordance with the prevalent practice, in cases where drivers are challaned, on account of some defects or absence of some equipment in buses legal defence would be provided upto the appeal stage. In continuance of provisions of such assistance to the drivers contained in Para-2 of the said order, the DRTA dealt with the question of taking departmental action against an employee convicted by the Court. It is in this process only that in Para-4 of Office Order No. 201 dated 24.11.1954 it is suggested that the question of departmental action against an employee convicted by Court will be taken up only after the appeal has been decided by the appellate Court. The word employee used in para-4 in question need to be understood with reference to the term driver used in paragraphs preceding and following said para. It is a portion of Office Order No. 201 dated 24.11.1954 only which has been incorporated as Clause(d) in Para-10 of Executive Instructions on Procedure regarding Disciplinary action and appeal issued vide No. ADMI-3(18)/53 dated 05.08.1955. In Para-9(g) of said Executive Instructions it is provided that where the order of punishment is based on facts established before a criminal court, procedure laid down in Paras 1,3 & 5 of the said instructions may be departed from. In Para-10(a) also it is reiterated that no detailed procedure is required for taking disciplinary action against persons who are convicted by the Criminal Courts. Neither in Para-9(g) nor in Para-10(a) it is so indicated that the disciplinary action against a D.T.S. employee can be initiated only after outcome of the appeal preferred by him against his conviction or only after expiry of the period of 30 days i.e. the prescribed period of limitation for filing the appeal. It is settled principle of statutory interpretation that a Statute/Rule/Regulation/Order/Instructions or any other instrument need to be read as a whole and all part of a piece of legislation must be construed together so as to avoid inconsistency and conflicts between various provisions contained in it. To ascertain the meaning of a section, it is not permissible to omit any part of it and the entire section need to be read together and an attempt should be made to reconcile both the parts. All paragraphs of an order/instruction must be read as its integral part being interdependent. An attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile and to avoid repugnancy. No part of a piece of legislation statute should be construed in isolation for the reason that the intention of the law-maker is to be found not in one part of the statute or another but in the entire enactment and the intention can be best gathered by viewing a particular part of the statute not detached from its context in the statute but in connection with its whole context.
9. As has been explained herein above in the present case the Office Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 broadly deal with the criminal prosecution of the drivers and the question of taking departmental action against them. The said order runs into five paras. Para-1 is only introductory and in all other paras except Para-4 the said order deals with the provisions for legal defence to drivers, payment of fines imposed on them and the seriousness of departmental action to be taken against them. In Para-4 of the said order wherein the question of initiation of departmental action after conviction is contemplated instead of the term driver, expression an employee has been used. Beside, the nature of the offence to which the said Office Order No. 201 is to be applied has not been specified. In such a situation, reading the entire order together the word employee used in Para-4 of the order need to be understood as driver on duty only. Beside, after incorporation of Paras 4 and 5 in Executive Instructions dated 05.08.1955, the same need to be understood with reference to other paras of said instructions particularly Clause-g of Para-9 and Clause-a of Para-10, which provide for departmental action/punishment based on the facts before a Criminal Court in departure from the procedure laid down in Paras 1, 3 & 5 of the said Instructions. If the interpretation attached to Para-10(d)4 given by learned counsel appearing for the applicant is accepted then the provisions of Para-9(g) and Para-10(a) would become repugnant as the provisions contained in said paras/clauses do not envisage/contemplate the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal or disposal of the appeal before issuance of order of punishment based on facts established before a Criminal Court. The collective construction of Office Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954, excerpt of which is incorporated in Clause-d of Para-10 of the Instructions dated 05.08.1955 and also its heading/title i.e. (Procedure for disposal of cases in which DTS employees are prosecuted while on duty) would lead to the interpretation of the term employee used in Para-
10(d)4 as Driver or at best an employee on such duty in bona fide discharge of which he is vulnerable to criminal charges and not to an employee who commit an offence not connected with discharge of official duty in any manner. It is by now well settled that the heading or title prefixed to a piece of legislation can be referred to in construction of such legislation and is regarded as preamble to the same.
10. Intrinsic or Internal Aid may also be applied in construction or interpretation of an instrument e.g. the surrounding circumstances which led to the legislation of Act or issuance of instrument in question. It is generally accepted position of law that a government employee convicted for committing an offence may be penalized on the basis of such conviction by departing from the procedure laid down for departmental action. Such legal position is also envisaged in Para-9(g) and Para-10(a) of Executive Instructions dated 05.08.1955. However, keeping in view the nature of duties performed by the drivers in DTS and their vulnerability to criminal charges in bona fide discharge of such duty particularly on account of defects or absence of some equipment in buses, Office Order No. 201 dated 24.11.1954, a part of which is incorporated as Clause-d of Para-10 of Instructions dated 05.08.1955 was issued. Thus keeping in view all conditions and circumstances regarding performance of duties by a driver and the reference of the said post alone in the Office Order in question the inevitable inference which can be drawn is that Para-10(d)4 of the Executive Instructions dated 05.08.1955 is applicable only in respect of the conviction of drivers entitled to the legal defence in terms of Para-2 of Office Order No. 201 or if construed more liberally to the employees whose nature of duty makes them vulnerable to criminal charges like drivers. Even if we go by the objective and reasons for issuance of the aforementioned Office Order No. 201, there cannot be any other justification or objective to be achieved by issuance of said order except to give certain benefits in cases where drivers are challaned on account of some defects or absence of some equipments in buses. The extension of benefit of said order to a person like applicant involved in committing wrong of providing unauthorized meters of STD/ISD resulting in financial loss to MTNL department, would be a far fetched interpretation and application of the same which by no stretch of imagination seems to be the objective and reason behind its issuance. While interpreting any rule/order/instruction, a Court or Tribunal needs to keep in view the public policy and the Constitution. The legislation is based on the established principles of public policy and not to circumscribe them. Thus, if the Statute tends itself to double interpretation, the interpretation that achieves the object of public policy should be preferred. While interpreting the piece of Legislation the facts and consequences have to be examined and after such examination reveals that one of the proposed constructions goes against the particular public policy and other does not, the reasonable and beneficial interpretation is to be accepted. The understanding of the Office Order No. 201 crept into Executive Policy dated 05.08.1955 to the effect that the question of departmental action against a DTS employee convicted by the Court for any offence can be taken up only after his appeal is decided by the Appellate Court cannot be considered in the interest of acknowledged principles of national policy. In Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution it is clearly provided that a person convicted for a criminal charge can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct led to his conviction without an enquiry provided i.e. departing from the procedure suggested in Article 311(2). For easy reference, Article 311(2) of the Constitution is extracted herein below:-
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those Charges;
[Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply-] where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security o the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Any interpretation or understanding of the clause-10(d)4 of the Instructions dated 05.08.1955 to the effect that no employee of DTS can be subjected to departmental action till expiry of the period prescribed for appeal against the order of his conviction or disposal of appeal would be contrary to aforementioned provisions of the Constitution in terms of which in case of a Government servant convicted for criminal charge, departmental action can be resorted to even by disregarding the normal procedure required for the same.
11. Honble Supreme Court in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose and Another Vs. Arabinda Bose and Another, AIR 1952 SC 369 ruled that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statue are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. Para-55 of the judgment reads as under:-
It is one of the settled rules of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. Mr. Justice Chakravartti of the Calcutta High Court laid very great stress on the opening clause of section 2 of the Act which excludes the operation of certain statutory provisions, and this negative part of the section constitutes, according to the learned Judge, the measure and criterion of the right which the positive part formulates. The first question is, to what extent the provisions of any existing law have been eliminated by the opening clause of S.2. The language of the clause is as follows:-
" Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bar Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926), or in any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that High Court......................."
In the said case it was also held that the title of the Statute is an important part of that and may be referred for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and throw light on its construction although it cannot over ride on clear meaning of enactment. Para-75 of the judgment reflecting the said view is extracted below:-
Turning now to the text of the Act, one cannot but be impressed at once with 'the wording of the full title of the Act. Although there are observations in earlier English cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from consideration in construing the statute, it is now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light its construction, although it cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment.(See Maxwell the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn.P. 44 and the cases cited therein). The full title 'of the Act now under consideration runs thus: "An Act to authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise as of right in any High Court." One cannot fail to note the words " as of right and the words " in any High Court " which follow immediately. Those two sets of words at once convey 57 to my mind that the act is directly and intimately concerned with the disability imposed by a High Court advocates not its roll in the way of their appearing and pleading in such High Court without the permission of the Chief Justice and without satisfying other conditions if any, and that their purpose is to remove and supersede that disability, so far as the Supreme Court advocates are concerned, by authorizing them to do so as of right. The words " as of right " are quite clearly indicative of an independent statutory right as opposed to the conditional right dependent the sweet will of the Chief Justice concerned. Those words are used byway of antithesis and bring out prominently the object of the Act. In view of that well-known disability which naturally was irksome, those words cannot fail to convey to one's mind the conviction that the purpose of the Act, as indicated by its title, is to confer the advocates of the Supreme Court a right which was denied to them by the Rules of the High Courts referred to above. The language in which the title of the Act has been, expressed appears to me to be a good and cogent means of finding out the true meaning and import of the Act, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it. Also in the case of Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, M.P., Bhopal and another, AIR 1986 SC 484 the Honble Supreme Court held that the principle that fiscal statutes should be strictly construed does not rule out the application of the principles of reasonable construction to give effect to the purpose or intention of any particular provision as apparent from the scheme of the Act, with the assistance of such external aids as are permissible under the law.
Again in the case of A.A. Haja Muniuddin Vs. Indian Railways, AIR 1993 SC 361 the Honble Supreme Court held that the provisions of an Act and Rules must be accessed to justice. The interpretation which denied justice must be avoided. Para-5 of the said judgment reads as under:-
5. It will be seen from the scheme of the Act that on its coming into force from the appointed day, all suits pending in the civil court would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal if the cause of action of the suit would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after the appointed day. Therefore, even a suit filed under the provisions of Order XXXIII would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal would be required to dispose it of as such. That is because Section 13 specifically provides that the Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on or from the appointed day all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any civil court provided the same relates to the recovery of compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery of goods entrusted to the railways for carriage by railway. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain and try such suits on and from the appointed day. In other words after the appointed day the Claims Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction to entertain and try claims referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Section 18 then sets out the procedure to be followed by. the Claims Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall have powers to regulate its wn procedure. It is true that sub-section (1) of Section 18 in terms states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but that does not mean that it is precluded from invoking the procedure laid down by the Code even if the ends of justice so require. The sub-section further states that the Tribunal shall Save powers to regulate its own procedure and sub-section (3) of Section 18 enumerates the matters in respect whereof the Claims Tribunal is permitted to exercise the same powers vested in a civil court under the Code while trying a suit. Rule 44 in terms states that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Nowhere in the Act is there any provision which runs counter to or is inconsistent with the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code. Although the Act and the Rules do not specifically provide for the application of Order XXXIII of the Code, there is nothing in the Act or the Rules which precludes the Tribunal from following that procedure if the ends of justice so require. If the view taken by the Tribunal is accepted as laying down the correct law, the result would be that a claimant who has a genuine claim for compensation under the provisions of the Act would be denied access to the Claims Tribunal if he is an indigent person and does not have the means to pay the fee required on the claim-application. Before the establishment of the Claims Tribunal he would have been able to file the suit invoking Order XXXIII of the Code as an indigent person. Now that a Special Claims Tribunal has been established under the Act, can it be said that indigent persons who do not have the means to pay the fee required on the claim application are altogether debarred from seeking compensation from the railway administration for the wrong done to them? Access to justice cannot be denied to an individual merely because he does not have the means to pay the prescribed fee. Such a view would leave indigent persons without a remedy. It is, therefore, essential that the provisions of the Act and the Rules must be broadly interpreted to ensure access to justice. If a claimant is left without redress even if he has a valid claim against the railway administration merely because he is an indigent person; it would be a sad day and the poor will lose confidence in the system. No one can be heard to say, much less the railway administration, that even though the claimant has a genuine claim for compensation against the railway administration, he must forgo the same if he does not have the means to pay the requisite fee. Such an interpretation which denies justice must be avoided. Section 18(l) only says that the Claims Tribunal 'shall not be bound' by the procedure laid down by the Code but does not go so far as to say that it shall be precluded from invoking the provisions laid down by the Code even if the same is not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules. Since the Claims Tribunal is empowered to regulate its own procedure, there is nothing in the Act and the Rules which precludes the invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. A view which advances the cause of justice must be preferred to the one which defeats it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal adopted a narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act in coming to the conclusion that the Act as well as the Rules did not permit invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. The view taken by the Tribunal results in a person not having the means to pay the fee prescribed for preferring a claim being left without a remedy. Such a view would result in gross injustice. The Tribunal has the power to lay down its own procedure and as stated earlier Section 18(l) does not preclude it from invoking the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code if the ends of justice so require. When an indigent person approaches the Tribunal for compensation for the wrong done to him, the Tribunal cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because he does not have the means to pay the fee. In such a situation we think the ends of justice require that the Tribunal should follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIII of the Code to do justice for which it came to be established. Also in the case of C.B.I., Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni, AIR 1992 SC 1768 the Honble Supreme Court has held that it is an accepted rule that an interpretation which furthers the ends of justice should be preferred.
12. In view of the aforementioned interpreting the Office Order No. 201 dated 24.11.1954 and also Para-10(d)4 of the Office Order No. ADMI-3(18)/53 dated 05.08.1955 with the intrinsic aids and extrinsic aids i.e. title/heading, object of the said orders their reading as a whole, circumstances warranting issuance of the same and public (national) policy, it is held that the provisions of Office Order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 and Para-10(d)4 of Executive Instructions dated 05.08.1955 would apply only to the drivers involved in commission of an offence on account of some defects or in the absence of some equipments in buses. The applicant involved in commission of an offence of providing unauthorized meters of STD/ISD resulting in financial loss of Rs.67,27000/- to MTNL would not be entitled to the protection of the aforementioned order/Para 10(d)4 of Executive Instructions dated 05.08.1955. Thus, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. O.A. is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
(A.K. Bhardwaj) (Dr. Veena Chhotray)
Member (J) Member (A)
/Vinita/