Delhi High Court
B.K. Gupta vs Shri Sudarshan Chaudhary on 3 November, 1999
Equivalent citations: 2000IAD(DELHI)313, 82(1999)DLT925, 2000(52)DRJ256
ORDER Vijender Jain, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller on an eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord/owner under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the petitioner has filed the present Revision Petition.
2. Mr. Sabharwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, has contended that the respondent was not the owner within the meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. He has contended that as a matter of fact when the premises were let out to the petitioner in the year 1981, the respondent was merely a licensee and he could not have created the tenancy. Mr. Sabharwal has gone to the extent of arguing that as a matter of fact he could not have parted with the possession in terms of the original licence granted by the Delhi Administration in favour of the respondent.
3. Mr. Sabharwal further contended that the Delhi Administration further modified the policy and allotted such kind of premises to such licensees later on. What has been contended before me by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent for the purpose of getting such allot- ment, misrepresented to the Delhi Administration and after getting the letter of allotment the respondent was not entitled in terms of the policy of allotment to part with the possession of the premises in question. Mr. Sabharwal has further contended that there was a subsequent change of the policy by the Delhi Administration and according to that policy the occu- pant of such hire purchase premises were allotted the flats. He has con- tended that the petitioner filed the Civil Writ Petition No. 256/92 which was, however, dismissed on 18th November, 1987 but petitioner was permitted to make representation to the appropriate authority in terms of the policy. In terms of the order of the writ petition aforesaid, the petitioner made various representations to the Delhi Administration. As the petitioner has not heard anything he has filed another Writ Petition No. 639/99 on 8th March, 1999. He has further contended that in view of the totality of circumstances, the contract was voidable at the instance of the Delhi Administration.
4. The next ground of challenge of the petitioner is towards the finding returned by the Additional Rent Controller qua the bona fide requirement of the respondent. Mr. Sabharwal has contended that there was no evidence on record to show that the family of the respondent was to shift from the village to Delhi. He has further contended that at best it could be termed as a mere wish of the respondent to shift the family and on that score has assailed the order of the Additional Rent Controller. He has further stated that he made an oral request before the Additional Rent Controller for leading additional evidence which was declined. He has filed an application alongwith the Revision Petition for the same purpose.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Andley, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that there was enough material on record to show that the prem- ises were allotted to the respondent by the Delhi Administration. There was no evidence on record that the allotment has been cancelled. He has further contended that even otherwise the petitioner has not disputed that he was inducted in the premises by the respondent in the year 1981. Mr. Andley has further contended that in view of the stand taken by the petitioner in the written statement which has not controverted the stand of the respondent that there was no other alternative accommodation available to the respond- ent in Delhi, the number of family members having not been disputed, there was no further requirement of law which was to be met by the respondent to support his bona fides. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent has cited Sushil Kanta Chakravarty Vs. Rajeshwar Kumar 1999 (3) AD (DELHI) 477 = 1999 (49) DRJ, Smt. Parvati Devi Vs. Mahindra Singh 1996 1 AD (Delhi) 819. I have given my careful considerations to arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties.
6. Let me first deal with the arguments regarding ownership of the re- spondent. AW-3 Ram Singh appeared from the Office of Assistant Housing Commissioner who deposed that the flat in question was allotted to the respondent on 16th April, 1971 on hire-purchase basis. A copy of the allot- ment letter was exhibited as AW3/1. In view of Ex. AW3/1, it is not open to the petitioner to say that the respondent was not the owner of the premises in question. It will also be of no help even if the respondent was merely a licensee initially in the year 1971 when originally the flat was licensed to the respondent. The Supreme Court as well as this Court in catena of judgments have held that the language of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act contemplates that in order to establish that he is a owner has to show that he is more than a tenant. In Smt. Shanti Sharma & Others Vs. Smt. Ved Prabha and others AIR SC 2028, the Supreme Court held as under :-
"The word `owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word `owner' has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the person who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Govt. or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term `owner' in the provi- sion of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term `owner' has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which land- lords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term `owner' is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant.
Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the matter as against the tenant it could no be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term 'owner' as it contemplated under this Section."
8. As a matter of fact, the writs filed by the petitioner under Article 226 has no relevance for the present proceedings. These proceedings which emanate under the Rent Control Act, the Court has to interpret the rigours and tests as laid down under the Rent Act. Examining from any angle, the reasoning of the Additional Rent Controller with regard to the finding on the issue of ownership can not be faulted with.
9. Coming to the next ground of attack as to whether the requirement was bona fide or not, I do not see any infirmity with the reasoned order of the Additional Rent Controller. In the eviction petition, the case made out by the respondent was that he was living with one Kamla Singh to which accom- modation he had no right to live. He was also cross examined by the peti- tioner but no suggestion was given disputing either the size of the family of the respondent or that the respondent had any other accommodation in Delhi to live in. Although, while arguing the petition in Court, Mr. Sabharwal has contended that no evidence was brought by the respondent with regard to efforts being made by the respondent for getting the children of the respondent admitted in the school. It was not necessary for the re- spondent to bring any such evidence on record. It is common knowledge that when accommodation is available in the hands of the person then only he will have his family shifted to Delhi and only thereafter efforts could be made to seek admission in a school.
10. I do not see any infirmity with the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller. Eight years have passed since eviction order was passed. The matter has been pending in this Court since then.
11. Petition is dismissed.
12. Interim order stands vacated.