Delhi District Court
Smt. Parveen Kumari vs Smt. Suneeta Narang & Ors on 29 January, 2009
1/27
IN THE COURT OF SHRI RAKESH TEWARI:
ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE: DELHI.
SUIT NO.740/08
Smt. Parveen Kumari
....PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
Smt. Suneeta Narang & Ors.
....DEFENDANT
ORDER
1. By this order I shall dispose of an application of the plaintiff under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.
2. Initially this suit was filed against three defendants and defendant no.3 was M/s Vijaya Bank, whose application under Order 7 R 11 CPC was allowed by my Ld. Predecessor vide his order dated 12.10.2007 and defendant no.3 was ordered to be deleted from the array of defendants.
3. The facts giving rise to the present application as mentioned in the application as well as in the suit are that the plaintiff has filed suit for recovery of Rs. 5 lacs against the defendants who are wife and husband respectively, for the amount given for purchase of property bearing no. 7/6, 2/27 IInd Floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, vide agreement dated 10.3.2006 wherein it was mentioned that total consideration was Rs. 26 lacs and the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs. 2,51,000/- to the defendant no.1 on 10.3.2006, Rs. 1 lakh on 17.4.2006 and another sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 24.5.2006 as part consideration amount for which she executed three receipts and the balance consideration amount of Rs. 21,99,000/- was to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant no.1 at the time of execution of sale deed and the plaintiff has requested the defendant no.1 for showing the original sale deed in her favour dated 12.7.2005 executed by the erstwhile owner of the said flat because the complete particulars qua the registration of the sale deed were not given by the defendant no.1 in the agreement dated 10.3.2006 and after continuous demand of the original sale deed when the same was not produced by the defendants, the plaintiff became suspicious about their conduct and the plaintiff came to know that the defendant no.1 has already created equitable mortgage qua the second floor of the property bearing no. 7/6, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, with M/s Vijaya Bank, Karol Bagh Branch, New Delhi against which 3/27 the defendant no.1 had taken loan from the said bank for the purchase of the aforesaid flat and thus, the defendants have played a calculated fraud on the plaintiff by inducing the plaintiff to part with her hard earned money.
4. It is further averred in the claim of the plaintiff that as per clause 3 of the agreement dated 10.3.2006, the defendant no.1 has assured the plaintiff that the aforesaid flat was free from all sorts of encumbrances such as prior sale, gift, mortgage, litigation and disputes, stay order and attachment, notification and acquisition, charges and liens, surety and security or any other registered or unregistered encumbrances and that if it is so found, the defendant no.1 shall be responsible to indemnify the loss suffered by the plaintiff and that it is further alleged that the defendant no.1 could not have passed a better title to the plaintiff as the said flat stood mortgaged with the said bank and that the defendant no.1 was not competent to enter into the aforesaid agreement dated 10.3.2006 in view of the earlier mortgage of the property in question.
5. It is further averred in the claim of the plaintiff that she subsequently came to know that the defendant no.1 had 4/27 filed a suit for declaration for cancellation of agreement to sell dated 10.3.2006 to be declared as null and void vide her plaint dated 24.8.2006 before the Ld. District Judge, Delhi, which was assigned to the court of Smt. Shailander Kaur, Ld. ADJ, Delhi, bearing suit no. 126/06 where the defendant no.1 did not pay the requisite court fee and after taking the dates in the said case ultimately the suit was withdrawn by defendant no.1 whose statement was recorded to that effect on 4.9.2006 by the said Ld. ADJ, Delhi and the defendant no.1 has admitted in the said plaint filed by her with regard to the execution of the agreement to sell dated 10.3.2006 with the present plaintiff and has also admitted to have received Rs. 4,01,000/- as part consideration but consideration amount was mentioned in the said suit as Rs. 20 lacs whereas it ought to have been Rs. 26 lacs.
6. It is further averred that there is implied admission on the part of defendant no.1 that the defendant has received the said payment and as such the defendant no.1 is liable to return the said amount to the plaintiff along with interest of 24% and a notice dated 7.11.2006 was also served upon the defendants to which the defendants filed reply dated 5/27 15.11.2006 also and that the interest @ 24% from 10.3.2006 to 2.2.2007 comes to Rs. 88,000/- and notice charges are Rs. 11,000/- and thus, the plaintiff is entitled to an amount of Rs. 5 lacs from the defendants and that a telegram dated 30.7.2006 was also sent to the defendants directing them to produce the documents and to receive the balance payment and it is prayed that the suit may be decreed for the said amount and interest @ 24% may also be awarded to the plaintiff for pendentelite and future period and a decree for permanent injunction may be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant no.1 restraining her not to part with possession of the said property in any manner along with the costs of the suit.
7. It is further pleaded in the application that the defendants have admitted the documents at the stage of admission/denial of the documents.
8. The defendants in their written statement as well as in reply to the application have taken a defence that the defendant no.1 is the absolute owner of the flat in dispute and is competent to sell the same after getting it cleared from the said bank and the factum of prior mortgage with M/s 6/27 Vijaya Bank was informed to the plaintiff orally and the same was not mentioned in the agreement as the plaintiff had agreed that the plaintiff was also applying for loan for the purchase of the flat and when the disbursement cheque of the loan amount would be ready the same would be delivered to the banker of the defendant no.1 i.e M/s Vijaya Bank for the clearance of the loan amount against the above said flat and accordingly the defendant no.1 delivered to the plaintiff the loan account number of the defendant no.1 against which she had taken loan which was given to the plaintiff for giving to her bank from where the plaintiff was taking loan in order to facilitate the said bank for preparing the cheque in the name of M/s Vijaya Bank to the tune of loan amount taken by the defendant no.1 and that the agreement to sell was signed at the office of the broker who got prepared the agreement to sell in its standard form and the same was signed by the parties but it was categorically informed to the plaintiff that the original papers of the flat were with the said M/s Vijaya Bank and the defendant no.1 was to pay a sum of Rs. 11,50,000/- to the said bank towards the loan amount whereas the agreement to sell between the parties was for a 7/27 sum of Rs. 26 lacs and it was agreed between the parties that the cheque equivalent to the amount of loan against the above said flat should be directly paid to M/s Vijaya Bank for the release of the documents and that the loan account no. 60080835100011 of the defendant no.1 was given to the plaintiff but the plaintiff applied for the housing loan with M/s ICICI Bank only for a sum of Rs. 16 lacs and insisted upon the defendant no.1 to execute the sale deed for a sum of Rs. 16 lacs in place of Rs. 26 lacs for which the agreement to sell was executed and the plaintiff wanted to involve cash transaction of black money to which the defendants flatly refused.
9. It is further averred in their defence by the defendants that the plaintiff wanted to play fraud by evading stamp duty on Rs. 26 lacs and the plaintiff was never in possession of the funds to purchase the property and the plaintiff in order to cover up her misdeeds, concocted a story and shifted the blame on defendant no.1 and that the plaintiff had already received a sum of Rs. 1 lakh through broker Sh. Raman Chawla in cash towards full and final settlement of the dispute between the parties and that the plaintiff is not 8/27 entitled to any interest nor to the said amount as claimed in the suit.
10. In the replication on behalf of the plaintiff to the written statement of the defendants, the contents of the written statement on merits were denied and contents of the plaint were reiterated and it was further pleaded that the plaintiff applied for a loan through her banker for a sum of Rs. 16 lacs qua the purchase of the said property as the plaintiff had already paid a sum of Rs. 4,01,000/- and besides that loan of Rs. 16 lacs the remaining amount was to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant no.1 at the time of execution of the sale deed and that the contents of the written statement are contrary to the suit no. 126/06 filed by the defendant no.1 against the plaintiff.
11. It is further pleaded in the replication that the defendant no.2 had given and issued two cheques of Rs. 2 lacs each in order to pay the amount taken by the defendant no.1, his wife from the plaintiff qua the sale of the said property and the cheques were bearing no. 683234 dated 16.9.2006 and 683285 dated 26.9.2006 of Rs. 2 lacs each drawn on Bank of Baroda, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi which were presented 9/27 and dishonoured by the bankers of the defendant no.2 with the remarks "insufficient funds" and that the plaintiff had served a notice dated 26.3.2007 regarding dishonour of the aforesaid two cheques given by the defendant no.2 for and on behalf of the defendant no.1 for return of the said amount to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has already filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the defendants wherein they have been summoned by the Ld. MM and that the defendants have taken contrary stand in their written statement wherein on the one hand they have alleged that the earnest money given to them by the plaintiff had been forfeited and the plaintiff is not entitled to the suit amount and on the other hand, the defendants have stated that parties have settled their dispute for a sum of Rs. 1 lakh which was paid to Sh. Raman Chawla and that if the alleged amount of Rs. 1 lakh was paid to Sh. Raman Chawla, there was no question of issuance of cheques by the defendant no.2 for repaying the amount for and on behalf of defendant no.1 and that there was no reference of the said payment of Rs. 1 lakh alleged to be made by the defendants to Sh. Raman Chawla in their reply dated 10/27 15.11.2006 to the notice of the plaintiff dated 7.11.2006 and the said alleged payment of Rs. 1 lakh was also not mentioned in the reply sent by the Ld. Counsel for the defendants dated 28.4.2007 to the notice of the plaintiff dated 26.3.2007.
12. The subsequent developments in the suit were that my Ld. Predecessor on 13.11.2007 have framed two issues and directed the defendants to lead their evidence first and the examination-in-chief by way of affidavit of the defendant no.1 has been filed as DW1 and the affidavit of defendant no.2 of examination-in-chief has been filed and he was produced as DW2 first whose cross examination also took place to a considerable extent but was deferred for producing some documents by him and thereafter he did not appear on many dates and as such my Ld. Predecessor vide order dated 31.7.2008 closed the evidence on behalf of the defendants and the case was fixed for evidence on behalf of the plaintiff for 15.10.2008 when the defendants have moved an application under Section 151 CPC for setting aside the order dated 31.7.2008 whereby the evidence of the defendants was closed and on the same day Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has filed an 11/27 application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and it is in this background that the present application has come for hearing.
13. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
14. Ld. Counsel for the defendants has relied upon the two judgments. The first one is AIR 1988 Delhi 153 titled State Bank of India Vs. M/s Midland Industries and others wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that undoubtedly Rule 6 of Order 12 has been couched in a very wide language but before a court can act under Rule 6, admission must be clear, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal and that furthermore a judgment on admission by the defendant under Order 12 R 6 is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court, no doubt such discretion has to be judicially exercised and that if a case involves questions which cannot be conveniently disposed of on a motion under this rule the Court is free to refuse exercising discretion in favour of the party invoking it and that where the defendants have raised objections which 12/27 go to the very root of the case, it would not be proper to exercise this discretion and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff and that the rule is not intended to apply where there are serious questions of law to be asked and determined and that likewise where specific issues have been raised in spite of admission on the part of the defendants the plaintiff would be bound to lead evidence on those issues and prove the same before he becomes entitled to decree and the plaintiff in that event cannot have a decree by virtue of provision of Order 12 R 6 CPC without proving those issues.
15. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi was dealing with a case while holding so where in the suit by a bank for recovery of loan not only the admission of the defendant as to the sum due to the bank was not unequivocal but further also the defendants have raised certain preliminary objections which go to the very root of the suit and are likely to non-suit the plaintiff if these were found against the plaintiff and the court refused to exercise discretion under Order 12 R 6 CPC.
16. The defendants have further relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court reported as AIR 2003 Bombay 369 titled Western Coalfields Limited Vs. M/s 13/27 Swati Industries wherein Hon'ble High Court while dealing with provision of Order 12 R 6 CPC in para 5 of the judgment held as follows:
"If one examines the pleadings particularly para 9 of the written statement which is in reply to para 6-D of the plaint and paras 20 and 21 of the specific pleadings, the admissions given by the defendant is not absolute, but it is conditional and it has been specifically stated that in term of another contract, the said amount is already appropriated. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that there is an unqualified admission on the part of the defendant which would invite a decree against it for the said amount. The nature of admission made by the defendant cannot be held to be conclusive so as to invite an order under Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC. The nature of admission is such that it is only a statement of the case upon which the defendant intended to rely and would not operate as an estoppel against him as understood under Section 115 of the Evidence Act. As this admission made by the defendant is 14/27 qualified, it is to be read as a whole while considering whether a decree can be passed against the defendant on such admission. As the admission is qualified and it is specifically pleaded that the said amount has been appropriated against another claim under contract between the parties, the Court should not have proceeded to pass the impugned order which would be discretionary. (Dudhnath Pande Vs. Sureshchandra Bhattasalli, AIR 1986 SC 1509). Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, the Court ought not to have passed the impugned order in the manner it has directed the defendant to deposit the amount in Court with a condition that on failure to deposit, the defendant will be liable to pay the interest on the said amount which was to be determined."
17. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi reported as 62 (1996) DLT 386 wherein it is mentioned that the court can on its own motion pass an order under Order 12 R 6 CPC and the defendant cannot be allowed to lead 15/27 evidence to contradict terms of a lease deed and if there is a written document between the parties no party could be permitted to lead oral evidence to contradict or vary the terms of the contract as per provisions of Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.
18. The plaintiff has further relied upon a judgment reported as 66 (1997) DLT 54 of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi wherein factors to be taken into consideration while passing an order under Order 12 R 6 CPC have been discussed qua the lease; 71 (1998) DLT 581 qua the lease, 1999 RLR 166 again qua the lease, 200 RLR 423 again qua the lease and 2000 RLR 27B about mesne profits.
19. In the present case it is quite evident that the defendants have admitted to have received Rs. 4,01,000/- as part consideration under the agreement dated 10.3.2006 and have also admitted the agreement but have alleged that there was an oral agreement between the parties that the plaintiff shall pay the amount of the mortgage directly to M/s Vijaya Bank from where the defendant no.1 had taken the loan against the said property by creating the mortgage of the same 16/27 and the remaining consideration was to be paid to the defendants at the time of execution of the sale deed. They have also objected during the course of arguments, the cuttings with regard to the date of payment of the remaining consideration which was initially 15.5.2006 which was cut, again the date 30.6.2006 was inserted but the same was also cut and subsequently the date was provided as 30.7.2006 when the balance amount of Rs. 23,49,000/- was to be paid and physical, vacant possession of the said flat was to be given to the plaintiff. It is also objected that the said cutting was not signed by the defendant no.1. It is also pointed out on behalf of the defendants that the said cuttings and changing of the dates is in the original agreement on the record but not in its copy which is also on the record.
20. The agreement dated 10.3.2006 further mentions that a payment of Rs. 2,51,000/- was received at the time of executing the said agreement meaning thereby that subsequent payments of Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 50,000/- were also not mentioned in the said agreement though the same have been admitted by the defendants.
21. It is further noticeable in the agreement that details 17/27 of the registration of the sale deed in favour of the defendant no.1 was left blank. Reason for this as alleged by the plaintiff is that the defendant no.1 was not having the knowledge of particulars of registration as she was not having the original sale deed with her and it was deposited with the said M/s Vijaya Bank against which a loan was taken from the said bank and the same was not disclosed to the plaintiff and as such a fraud was played upon the plaintiff with regard to the defective title of the defendant no.1.
22. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the defendant no.1 has interpreted the said term during the course of arguments that details of the registration were left blank because the plaintiff knew very well and was specifically informed by the defendants that the sale deed was with the said M/s Vijaya Bank and that was why the plaintiff was required to pay the loan amount taken by the defendant no.1 directly to the said M/s Vijaya Bank and it was also alleged so in the written statement on behalf of the defendants and defendants have further alleged that the plaintiff applied for a loan of Rs. 16 lacs with ICICI bank and the said bank has also prepared a cheque/draft directly in the name of M/s Vijaya Bank and the 18/27 ICICI Bank from where the plaintiff has taken the loan has also issued a notice of recovery of the loan amount to the plaintiff and the defendants have placed the photocopies of the loan account of the plaintiff as well as copy of the notice issued by the ICICI Bank to the plaintiff and her husband on the record.
23. Now the question arises as to whether oral agreement that the loan amount was to be paid directly to M/s Vijaya Bank by the plaintiff out of the sale consideration of Rs. 26 lacs and knowledge of the plaintiff that the said flat was mortgaged with M/s Vijaya Bank, can be proved by oral evidence. Ld. Counsel has relied upon Section 91 and Section 92 of the Evidence Act wherein it is the command of the law that oral evidence should be excluded in the presence of a written agreement or a document. But at the same time there are well recognized exceptions by way of provisos attached to Section 92 of the said Act wherein the situations have been prescribed by law wherein the oral evidence is admissible even in the presence of a written document between the parties. Proviso (2) of the Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
19/27
"The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a documents is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document."
Proviso (3) of the Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
"The existence of any separate oral
agreement, constituting a condition
precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved."
Proviso (4) of the Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
"The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of 20/27 documents."
24. First taking proviso (4), as mentioned above, it may be argued on behalf of both the parties that agreement to sell such as the agreement dated 10.3.2006 is now required to be registered under the amended Registration Act, 1908 wherein a provision (1A) has been inserted in Section 17 of the Registration Act w.e.f. 24.9.2001 and relevant part of the same reads as under:
"(1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A."
25. From the plain reading of the said amended provision it is clear that if any transfer of immovable property is for the purposes of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act then 21/27 the said document is required to be registered but the agreement dated 10.3.2006 has not been used or claimed under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act because what plaintiff wants in his suit is the refund of the part consideration amount which he has given to the defendants under the said agreement and the claim of the plaintiff is saved in the explanation attached to Section 17(1A) which reads as under:
"A document purporting or operating to effect a contract for the sale of immovable property shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required registration by reason only of the fact that such document contains a recital of the payment of any earnest money or of the whole or any part of the purchase money."
26. Even if this document was required to be registered the amended provision of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 mentions that such a document can be used as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by the registration instrument. Thus, in my considered opinion,. The proviso (4) is also attracted to the present case. 22/27
27. The proviso (2) to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, as reproduced above, requires that the oral agreement must not be inconsistent with the terms of the written agreement. What the defendants want to prove by way of oral agreement is that it was in the knowledge of the plaintiff that the flat in question was already mortgaged with the said M/s Vijaya Bank and that the defendant no.1 has supplied her loan account number to the plaintiff so as to enable her to get the loan of the defendant no.1 cleared from her banker ICICI Bank by giving the amount of the loan directly from the ICICI Bank to M/s Vijaya Bank and for that purpose the plaintiff did apply for the loan with the ICICI Bank and the said bank also prepared the draft/cheque in the name of M/s Vijaya Bank and the remaining amount was to be given to the defendants at the time of execution of the sale deed and it has been further claimed in the written statement that as the plaintiff has failed to carry out the said oral agreement, the amount of Rs. 4,01,000/- as earnest money is to be forfeited.
28. In my considered opinion the said oral terms of a separate agreement are in no way inconsistent with the agreement dated 10.3.2006 because the total consideration 23/27 amount remains Rs. 26 lacs ultimately and the only variation is that who are the recipients of the said amount. The one recipient of the said consideration amount was M/s Vijaya Bank and the other recipient was of course defendant no.1 herself. Mere change of a recipient of the consideration money without changing the amount of consideration money cannot be said to be inconsistent with the original agreement and the case of the defendants of the separate oral agreement is well covered under the proviso (2) of the Section 92 of the Evidence Act. The nearest case in facts of the instant case is reported as Gondu Ramasubbu Iyer Vs. Muthiah Kone and others reported as 1925 Madras 968 wherein it was held that the evidence to prove the knowledge on the part of the buyer of the existence of an encumbrance not disclosed in the sale deed by the vendor does not offend against S.92, for such evidence does not contradict, vary, add to or subtract from its terms and oral evidence with regard to the same is admissible.
29. Similarly in the case titled Parshotam Parshad Vs. Taimur Ali Shah and others reported as AIR (32) 1945 24/27 Allahabad 39 Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad while dealing with a condition precedent attached to the sale and speaking proviso (3) to Section 92 of the Evidence Act held that in the case of a written contract for sale of property which was subject to a mortgage an oral agreement that the ascertainment of the exact amount due under the mortgage was a condition precedent to the execution of the deed of sale can be proved under Section 92, Proviso (3).
30. Further, as I have already discussed that the agreement dated 10.3.2006 between the parties was not required to be registered as such even under the amended Section 17 of the Registration Act and if a document is not required to be registered then the law as laid down by the case titled K. Hutchi Gowder Vs. H. Bheema Gowder reported as AIR 1960 Madras 33 is that the agreement not required to be registered under the law, be validly modified by the oral agreement entered into between the parties.
31. The matter can be looked from different angle also. Section 99 of the Evidence Act reads as under: 25/27
"99. Who may give evidence of agreement varying terms of document - Persons who are not parties to a document, or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document."
The illustration appended to Section 99 reads as under:
"A and B make a contract in writing that B shall sell A certain cotton, to be paid for on delivery. At the same time they make an oral agreement that three month's credit shall be given to A. This could not be shown as between A and B, but it might be shown be C, if it affected his interests."
32. It is alleged by the defendants that record of ICICI Bank from where the plaintiff had taken the loan to purchase the property may be summoned for proving the said oral agreement and the said ICICI Bank was not a party to the said agreement which can also throw light upon the aspect of oral agreement that terms of the written agreement dated 10.3.2006 were varied by the parties so far as payment of part consideration amount to M/s Vijaya Bank was 26/27 concerned. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the contentions raised by the Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff are not tenable with regard to inadmissibility of the oral agreement between the parties as suggested by the defendants and hence the said contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff are hereby rejected.
33. In view of my said discussion, although it is true that in prior suit filed by the defendant no.1 against the plaintiff the contradictory facts were pleaded which were inconsistent with the agreement dated 10.3.2006 and there was no mention of oral agreement between the parties in the said suit and that the defendants have specifically admitted to have received the amount of part consideration, I am of the considered opinion that the said admission cannot be called unequivocal, clear, unambiguous or unconditional and there is no dispute with the premises of the law that passing of an order under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is a discretion of the court and particularly in view of the fact that when the defendants have alleged in their written statement to have forfeited the said part consideration received by them and in view of the fact that in the present case the issues have already been 27/27 framed, I am not inclined to exercise the discretion in passing a decree in the present application based upon the alleged admissions of the defendants.
34. Nothing said herein above shall affect the merits of the case or prejudice the rights of any of the parties. The application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is accordingly dismissed.
ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 29.1.2009 (RAKESH TEWARI) ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE:
DELHI.