Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Mrs. Meena vs The Union Of India on 28 January, 2015
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH O.A. No.307/2014 Reserved On:12.01.2015 Pronounced On:28.01.2015 HONBLE MR. G. GEORGE PARACKEN, MEMBER (J) HONBLE MR. SHEKHAR AGARWAL, MEMBER (A) Mrs. Meena W/o Shri Sanjit Kumar Postman (GP. C) Saraswati Vihar pO, Delhi-110034 R/o H.No.89, Village and Post Office Kakroia, New Delhi-110078. Applicant By Advocate: Shri R.P. Sharma. Versus 1. The Union of India M/o Communication and IT, Through Secretary, Department of Posts, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi-110001. 2. The Chief Post Master General, Delhi Circle, Meghdoot Bhawan, Link Road, New Delh-110001. 3. The Director Postal Service (O), Delhi Circle, Meghdoot Bhawan, North Delhi-110001. 4. The Sr. Supdt. of Post Offices, Delhi North Division, Old Sect., Civil Lines, Delhi-110054. Respondents By Advocate: Shri Amit Anand. ORDER
G. George Paracken, Member(J) This is the second round of litigation by the Applicant. Earlier in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her, she was removed from service vide order dated 19.09.2007. Her appeal and the Review Application were also rejected vide orders dated 30.04.2009 and 03.11.2009 respectively. She challenged those orders before this Tribunal in OA No.3693/2000 and it was disposed of by this Tribunal vide order dated 26.10.2010 on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in an arbitrary manner and in violation of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another 1999 (7) SCC 739. Accordingly, this Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the case to the Disciplinary Authority to take up proceedings on disagreement in accordance with law, if so advised. The Applicant was also ordered to be reinstated in service forthwith and to decide the interregnum period after final decision is taken in the matter. Accordingly, the Applicant was reinstated in service and further proceedings were initiated against her later.
2. The brief background of the case is that the Respondents have proceeded against the Applicant under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The statement of Articles of Charges framed against her was as under:-
Article-I The said Ms. Meena Postman, SBRS PO, Temp. attached as Stamp Vender in Saraswati Vihar P.O. Delhi-110034 is alleged to have furnished false information in respect of her intermediate education in the Column No.10 of Attestation Form by submitting forged intermediate mark sheet of the year 1998 bearing Roll No.0799241 and certificate of intermediate examination 1998 issued vide certificate No.D9678410 Private dated 09.06.1998 against the aforesaid Roll No.0799241 in her name by Shri R. Singh, Principal, Ch. Charan Singh Inter College Bhatona, Bulahnshahar UP.
She is, therefore, alleged to have failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant thereby violated the provision of Rule 3 (1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
3. After detailed enquiry, the Enquiry Officer, vide his report dated 21.02.2007, held that the aforesaid charge against the Applicant was not proved. According to the Enquiry Officer, it was established that she had appeared in an Intermediate Examination 1998 as a Private candidate through Chaudhary Charan Singh Inter College Bhatona, (CCSICB for short), Bulandshar, U.P. and passed the intermediate examination in the same year. In the Attestation Form, she has also indicated that she had passed the 12th standard examination and the certificate issued by Achla Khanna, Secretary has been proved to be genuine during the course of the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the aforesaid report of the Enquiry Officer and, vide his order dated 18.07.2007, held that charge has been clearly proved by the deposition of the witnesses and documents adduced during the enquiry proceedings. A copy of the aforesaid report was also sent to the Applicant. She made a representation against the same on 03.08.2007. However, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of removal from service on her, vide its order dated 19.09.2007. The same was upheld by the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 30.04.2009 and the Review Authority vide its order dated 31.10.2009. As stated earlier, she has challenged the aforesaid orders before this Tribunal vide OA No.3693/2009 (supra) but the same was disposed of vide order 26.10.2009 and she was ordered to be reinstated in service with liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against her in accordance with law. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority re-considered the enquiry report and the representation submitted by the Applicant and vide its order dated __/6/2011 and once again disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. She was also given an opportunity to make representation against the said Disagreement Note.
4. Meanwhile, FIR No.169/2004 was filed by the Respondents on the same set of charges against her before the PS Civil Lines under Sections 420/467/468/471 IPC State Vs. Meena. In the said FIR, the Sr. Superintendent of Post Offices alleged that she while filling up the Attestation Form declared her qualification as having 12th pass in 1998 from CCSICB, Bulandshar, UP and she submitted the mark sheet and certificate of 1998 in respect of Roll No.0799241. However, those documents were found to be forged. They were sent to the Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Allahabad, UP vide letter dated 01.06.1999. However, no reply was received by them. But the Kashetriya Sachiv Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, vide their letter dated 10.11.2000, informed that the certificate is totally forged. By another letter dated 12.01.2001 they have again informed that both the certificate as well as the mark sheet is forged. The Learned ACMM-02/North/Delhi, vide his judgment dated 30.06.2011, relying upon the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer, held that the certificate of 12th class was already proved to be genuine. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Rukmini Narvekar Vs. Vijaya Satardekar and Others JT 2008(11) SC 32 wherein it has been held that material produced by the defence at the time of framing of charge can be looked into in very rare case, i.e., where defence produced some material which shows that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. The Learned ACMM has also held that no case has been made out against the Applicant (accused) for framing the charge. According to him, if it is assumed that both the documents are forged still no case is made out because no wrongful gain has been accrued to the accused and no wrongful loss has been caused to the complainant. Accordingly, the Applicant was discharged.
5. The Respondents challenged the aforesaid order in Revision before the Court of ASJ/02/North and the Learned ASJ Shri Vimal Kumar Yadav has also held that the allegations of forgery are not attributable to the Applicant and it could not be claimed that she had made any forgery. She must have used the forged document as genuine but then the guilty intention to use the same is missing as the minimum qualification for the job in question is matric and in that case she could have avoided rather and could not have invited trouble for herself by producing the forged mark sheet/certificate of class 12th when she has nothing to gain from those documents, had she been aware of the status of the documents. Therefore, ASJ has held that the Applicant herself was not aware of the status and was not actually involved in it. He has also held that the private colleges mushrooming all over the city for the convenience of the students who scores less to get a chance to appear through one or the other Board or University are actually to be blamed. Therefore, the Review Petition was dismissed vide order dated 26.10.2012.
6. The Applicant has, therefore, submitted her reply dated 27.12.2012 to the aforesaid letter of the Disciplinary Authority dated ___/06/2011 stating that since the Learned ACMM and the Learned ASJ have dismissed the Respondents case, the major penalty proceedings initiated against her vide the Respondents Memo dated 17/18-05-2004 shall be dropped. However, the Disciplinary Authority, vide the impugned order dated 09.01.2013, decided to impose upon her, one of the penalties specified in Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and ordered that all types of promotion to her be withheld till her retirement from Government service. She has made a statutory appeal against the aforesaid order on 04.02.2013 and the Appellate Authority, vide the impugned order dated 30.10.2013, modified the aforesaid penalty order by withholding all promotion to her for a period of 5 years. The Applicant has now challenged the aforesaid impugned orders in this OA.
7. According to the Applicant, the Criminal Court having ruled out any involvement of the Applicant in the alleged forgery, the Department could not have taken a contrary view and inflicted the penalty on her. Thus, the penalty imposed upon her is by way of colourable exercise of power by the Respondents. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Applicant relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Another JT 2006 (11) SC 36 wherein it has been held that when the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under:-
28. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand.
29. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.
8. In this regard, he has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jasbir Singh Vs. Punjab & Sind Bank and Others 2007 (1) SCC 566 wherein it has been held as under:-
8. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another [(1999) 3 SCC 679], this Court held that if departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on identical set of facts, evidence in both the proceedings are common and employee is acquitted in the criminal case, an order of dismissal already passed may also be set aside.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the decision of this Court has no application. He may be right. But, it is not necessary for us to delve deep into the matter as we are of the opinion that the judgment in civil matter having attained finality, the same was binding on Respondent _ Bank.
10. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [JT 2006 (4) SC 404], it was opined:
"It is, however, beyond any controversy that when a crucial finding like forgery is arrived at on an evidence which is non est in the eye of the law, the civil court would have jurisdiction to interfere in the matter."
It was further observed:
"It is also of some interest to note that the first respondent itself, in the civil suit filed by the firm relied upon a copy of the report of the enquiry officer. The first respondent, therefore, itself invited comments as regards the existence of sufficiency of evidence/acceptability thereof and, thus, it may not now be open to them to contend that the report of the enquiry officer was sacrosanct.
We have referred to the fact of the matter in some detail as also the scope of judicial review only for the purpose of pointing out that neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court considered the question on merit at all. They referred to certain principles of law but failed to explain as to how they apply in the instant case in the light of the contentions raised before them. Other contentions raised in the writ petition also were not considered by the High Court."
12. In a case of this nature, therefore, the High Court should have applied its mind to the fact of the matter with reference to the materials brought on records. It failed so to do.
13. The High Court relied upon a decision of this Court in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [AIR 1985 SC 628 : (1985) 2 SCC 370] where a statement of law was made that criminal law and civil law can be allowed to operate side by side. There is no quarrel with the said proposition.
14. The High Court, however, failed to take note of the decision of the civil court. It could not have refused to look into the materials on record solely relying on or on the basis of clause 19.3 (c) of Bipartite Settlement to hold that the departmental proceedings could have been initiated even after the judgment of acquittal is passed in criminal case. We, therefore, are of the opinion that impugned judgments cannot be sustained.
9. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Honble High Court of Delhi in the case of Jaibir Singh, Ex. HC/GD No.7008200-CISF Vs. Director General, CISF 182 (2011) DLT 430 (DB). The relevant part of the said judgment reads as under:-
16. We find it quite surprising that the Disciplinary Authority has sat over the judgment of the criminal court to arrive at a specious conclusion that the petitioner has not been exonerated honourably and the acquittal of the petitioner was due to lack of evidence. In fact, we find that the criminal court in its order of 9.12.1996 has given a clean acquittal to the petitioner and not by extending benefit of doubt. The aforesaid order of the criminal court has been misread by the Disciplinary Authority as it was not a case of no evidence. In fact the evidence was led which was found by the criminal court not to be incriminating the petitioner.
17. In fact, initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on the second charge after having perused the judgment of acquittal of the criminal court, was an exercise in futility by the Disciplinary Authority. It is being so said because the Disciplinary Authority could not have independently enquired into the conduct of the petitioner of creating nuisance in public in his native village while on leave on 10.8.1995 and simply because the petitioner was arrested in a criminal case pertaining to the incident of 10.8.1995 and had remained in custody, it could not be possibly said that this by itself amounted to misconduct. After permitting the local police to try the petitioner for the aforesaid offence without success, now the Disciplinary Authority cannot legitimately turn around and say that the said incident per se though not proved, reflects upon the conduct of the petitioner. There was no material available with the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to have so independently concluded.
18. In this view of the matter, we find that there was no justification whatsoever with the Disciplinary Authority to have disagreed with the well considered findings of the Inquiry Officer of the charges having been not proved. It is not the stand of the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority that the findings of the Inquiry Officer are contrary to the evidence on record. Rather we find that the evidence on record clearly exonerates the petitioner and the Inquiry Officers report is well founded and has been unduly interfered with by the Disciplinary Authority without any valid justification. Consequently, we hold that the final order of 15.12.1997 Annexure P-1 imposing penalty of compulsory retirement as well as the Appellate order of 13.5.1998 upholding it, are patently perverse and are accordingly quashed.
10. Further he has relied upon an Order of this Tribunal in the case of R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India and Others (OA No.1706/2004) 2005(3) AISLJ (CAT). The relevant part of the said judgment reads as under:-
17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr.P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations:-
7. In any event , the terms acquittal or fully exonerated in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. Rajannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under:-
There is on conception like acquittal in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is one the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guild beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.
Clause(b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.
Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply.
11. He has also relied upon an Order of the co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.3732/2013 Dinesh Singh Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others decided on 24.12.2013. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as under:-
In the instant case, admittedly, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts. The basis for the impugned initiation of the disciplinary proceedings is the involvement of the applicant in a criminal case under Section 498A/304B of IPC, which are admittedly, not related in any manner with the official functions and duties of the applicant. Therefore, the witnesses and the evidence before both the authorities, would be necessarily, one and the same. Further, admittedly, after the investigation into the charges leveled against the applicant in the criminal case, the Investigating Officer found that there were no specific allegations against the applicant, and the learned Magistrate having accepted the same, has not taken cognizance of charges against the applicant, though observed that if any evidence come against him, during the trial he may be summoned. In this view of the matter, after the order dated 29.09.2009 of the learned Magistrate, the basis for the impugned initiation of the departmental proceedings itself gone. Hence, at the first instance, there is no justification for initiation of the departmental proceedings itself. However, in future, since there is a chance of taking cognizance against the applicant in the criminal trial, basing on the evidence to be adduced, and since the applicant has not sought for quashing of the impugned summary of allegations, we are not inclined to quash the same.
12. The Respondents have filed their reply stating that in the Attestation Form it was clearly mentioned that furnishing of false information or suppression of any factual information in the Attestation Form would be a disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit for Government service. However, by submitting the forged mark sheet, the Applicant concealed the factual position in respect of her intermediate examination. They have also stated that one of the documents, namely, the certificate issued to her was found to be genuine whereas the second document, i.e., the mark sheet was reported to be totally forged. As such the information furnished in respect of the statement of marks of intermediate examination in Column 10 of the Attestation Form is false. Therefore, the Attestation Form filled by the Applicant was not in accordance with the rules and this OA is liable to be dismissed.
13. They have also stated that there is no allegation of any denial of opportunity/natural justice to the Applicant and as per the directions of this Tribunal dated 26.10.2010 in OA No.3693/2009 (supra), the Applicant was also reinstated in service and posted as Postman. However, a fresh Disagreement Note on the enquiry report dated 21.02.2007 was sent to the Applicant on 07.06.2011 as per the directions of this Tribunal after taking into consideration of all the relevant documents of the case and the defence of the Applicant. Final order was issued by the Disciplinary Authority withholding all types of promotion till retirement vide order dated 09.01.2013 which has been further modified by the Appellate Authority to that of withholding all types of promotion for a period of 5 years vide order dated 30.10.2013 as the guilt has been established and the Applicant has not been fully exonerated.
14. The learned counsel for the Respondents has also submitted that there is nothing illegal or wrong in proceeding against the Applicant departmentally even when the Criminal Court has acquitted of the charges levelled against the accused as the degree of evidence required in both the cases are totally different. As far as the departmental enquiry is concerned, only preponderance of probability is required and in the present case it is adequately proved that the charges have been proved.
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the Applicant Shri R.P. Sharma and the learned counsel for the Respondents Shri Amit Anand. It is seen that the charge against the Applicant is that she has given false information in respect of her intermediate education in the Column No.10 of Attestation Form by submitting forged intermediate mark sheet of the year 1998 bearing Roll No.0799241 and certificate of intermediate examination 1998 issued vide certificate No.D9678410 Private dated 09.06.1998 against the aforesaid Roll No. in her name by Shri R. Singh, Principal, Ch. Charan Singh Inter College Bhatona, Bulahnshahar UP. The Enquiry Officer has gone into the matter in great detail and held that Certificate bearing S.No.0258348 and the mark sheet bearing S.No.051751 relating to Ms. Meena were sent for their genuineness verification. One document, i.e., Certificate has been informed to be genuine whereas the second document, i.e., marks statement has been reported to be totally forged. But it was confirmed that the Applicant did appear in the Intermediate Examination 1998 as a Private candidate through Ch. Charan Singh Inter College Bhatona, Bulandshar and passed the Intermediate Examination in 1998 itself. Therefore, the Enquiry Officer was of the view that the charge against the Applicant was not proved. However, the Disciplinary Authority was of the view that the charge against the Applicant was proved. The Respondents have also filed a criminal case against the Applicant on the same set of facts. The Learned ACMM has considered the case in detail. The complaint against her in the FIR was also that she while filling the Attestation Form, she has stated that she passed the 12th class from Ch. Charan Singh Inter College Bhatona, Bulandshar, UP and submitted an intermediate certificate and mark sheet in respect of the Roll No.0799241 and those documents were found to be forged. Those documents were sent to the Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Allahabad, UP vide letter dated 01.06.1999 but no report was received from them. The reminders also sent to the said authorities were not responded to. However, Kashetriya Sachiv Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, vide their letter dated 10.11.2000, informed that the certificate was totally forged. They have also informed that the mark sheet was also forged. The Learned ACMM took into consideration of the fact that the Applicant was appointed on compassionate ground and the minimum education qualification for the post of Postman was matric which she was undoubtedly holding. But the dispute is only with regard to the educational record of 12th class. The ACMM has held that even if those documents are forged, only the 10th class pass was minimum qualification for the post of Postman and the Applicant has never derived any benefit by submitting 12th class certificate which was of no use to her. Therefore, the ACMM held that no case was made against the Applicant for framing the charge and accordingly she was exonerated. The Revision Petition filed by the Respondents against the aforesaid order was also dismissed by the Learned ASJ. He has very clearly held that the allegation of forgery was not attributable to the Applicant as she evidently did not make any forgery. He has also observed that she was not even aware about the status of the document whether the same was genuine or forged. Further, the ASJ has noted in its order that the private colleges mushrooming all over the city, where convenience of the students is take care of besides low scoring students to get a chance to appear through one or the other Board or University are to be blamed. All those availing the facility of such Boards or Universities may not be aware of modus operandi, which may or may not be fair, legal and appropriate in all the cases. Therefore, the Review Petition filed by the Respondents has also been dismissed.
16. The issue in the present case is whether in a departmental proceeding, punishment can be imposed when the facts and evidence are the same in criminal case. The said issue was considered by the Apex Court in Captain M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited and Another AIR 1999 SC 1416 and held as under:-
22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are:
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest.
17. In the case of G.M. Tank (supra) relied upon by the Applicant in this case also, the Apex Court held that when the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical or similar set of facts and the charge in the departmental case against the Government servant and charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. The facts and circumstances of the departmental as well as the criminal proceedings being the same, without there being any iota of difference, the petitioner should succeed. The Supreme Court has also held that the distinction which usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in such cases. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry is found to be valid by the Courts below, when there is an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Captain Paul Anthony's case (supra) would apply.
18. Again, in the case of Jasbir Singh (supra), despite acquittal of the petitioner therein by the Civil Court, the departmental proceedings continued and the Enquiry Officer held that the charges were proved against the Government servant therein. The High Court, relying upon the general principle that criminal law and civil law can be allowed to operate side by side, upheld the orders in disciplinary proceedings. However, relying upon its judgment in Captain Paul Anthony's case (supra), the Apex Court held that if the departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on identical set of facts, evidence in both the processing are common and employee is acquitted in the criminal case, an order of dismissal already passed may also be set aside. Therefore, applying the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has allowed the appeal.
19. However, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority in this case has not applied its mind in a proper manner. They have been quite arbitrary in their decisions. The Criminal Court which has gone into the case has held in clear terms that the allegations of forgery were not attributable to the Applicant as she herself was not aware of the status of those documents produced by her. The Disciplinary or the Appellate Authority has also no case that the Applicant has forged any of the documents submitted by her.
20. We, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, are of the considered view that the orders of the Disciplinary Authority dated 19.09.2007 as well as the Appellate Authority dated 30.04.2009 are arbitrary and illegal. Consequently, they are quashed and set aside. The Respondents shall also pass appropriate order in compliance of the aforesaid directions within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
(SHEKHAR AGARWAL) (G. GEORGE PARACKEN) MEMBER (A) MEMBER (J) Rakesh