Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Between vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 17 December, 2025
APHC010070412020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF DECEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 987/2020
Between:
KANAKAMEDALA RAVINDRA KUMAR, S/O LATE CHAKRADHARA
RAO, INDIAN, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, OCC SENIOR ADVOCATE,
MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, RAJYA SABHA, R/O H. NO. 29-12-22/1,
VENKATARATNAM STREET, SURYARAOPET, VIJAYAWADA-2,
KRISHNA DISTRICT
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AMARAVATHI, THROUGH
SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, SURYARAOPET P.S.
2.K SARALA INDIAN, AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS, W.S.I. OF POLICE,
SURYARAOPET POLICE STATION, VIJAYAWADA CITY. (DEFACTO-
COMPLAINANT)
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1.KUMARI G K V D
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)
The Court made the following:
2
ORDER:
Criminal Petition No.987 of 2020 has been filed challenging the chargesheet filed in C.C.No.949 of 2021 on the file of the learned I Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 188, 353, 341 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 and Section 32 of the Police Act, 18612 in Crime No.08/2020 of Suryaraopet Polic Station, Vijayawada City.
2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.
3. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
4. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is:
"Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.949/2021 on the file of the learned I Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada are liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,'/Section 528 of 'the BNSS'?"
5. It is not out of place to mention that a petition was filed vide Crl.M.P.No.394/2025 in C.C.No.949/2021 on the file of the learned I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Vijayawada seeking for withdrawal of prosecution against Accused Nos.2 to 54. The learned Magistrate has allowed 1 the I.P.C 2 the Act 3 the petition filed under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733 permitting the learned prosecutor concerned to withdraw the prosecution against Accused Nos.2 to 54. Petitioner is Accused No.1 in C.C.No.949/2021. Petitioner was a Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha. The Station House Officer registered an FIR for the alleged offences punishable under Section 143, 188, 353 and 341 read with 149 of 'the I.P.C.,' and Section 32 of 'the Act.' Except for the Petitioner/Accused No.1, the prosecution against all the other accused was withdrawn. This Court in Crl.P.No.1616 and 1755 of 2025, by relying on several judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court including the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni4 and C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,5 quashed the criminal proceedings. The case of the Petitioner is on similar footing. It is apposite to refer to these judgments hereunder.
6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan supra at paragraph Nos.28 & 29 held as under:
"28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set 3 the Cr.P.C 4 (2020) 20 SCC 1 5 (2010) 9 SCC 567 4 the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 329, Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat (1971) 2 SCC 376, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh (1996) 3 SCC 533, State of Punjab v. Raj Singh (1998) 2 SCC 391, K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy (2005) 7 SCC 352 and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370.
29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. (1953) 1 SCC 637 and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa AIR 1966 SC 1775, this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it."
7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar6, at paragraph No.12 it is held as under:
"12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :
(1967) 1 SCR 520 : 1967 Cri LJ 528] . The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein."6
(1971) 3 SCC 329 5
8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh7, at paragraph No.6 it is held as under:
"6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 :
1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935] the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1- 1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable."
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh8, at paragraph No.2 held as under:
"2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and 7 (1996) 3 SCC 533 8 (1998) 2 SCC 391 6 the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy [(1983) 4 SCC 240 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 822 : AIR 1983 SC 1053] on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC."
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy9, at paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under:
"3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the prosecution of the respondents, which was launched under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code (for short "IPC") on the ground that the complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CrPC"). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document or after its filing. A Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] has categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground that provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC were applicable.
4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not relate to falsity or otherwise of the complaint before the Deputy Registrar; rather according to the prosecution case, the accused persons are said 9 (2005) 7 SCC 352 7 to have forged the document. This being the position, in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents."
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B.,10 at paragraph No.12 held as under:
"12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code."
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh11, at paragraph Nos.15 & 16 held as under:
"15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression 'public servant concerned'. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is 10 (1953) 1 SCC 637 11 (1994) 4 SCC 95 8 under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by the public servant concerned.
16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1422 : 1969 Cri LJ 4 : 70 Pun LR 1131] we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression 'public servant concerned'.
The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed."
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy12, at paragraph No.8 held as under:
"8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld."
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh13, at paragraph No.5 held as under:
"5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be filed by the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken. He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 reads as follows:
"559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in office.
(2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any 12 (1981) 2 SCC 185 13 1968 SCC OnLine SC 253 9 proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in office of such Magistrate."
This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara Kanon Manjhi v. Gopi Manjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re Subramaniam Chettiar [AIR 1957 Mad 442] . This section applies to all Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section 559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section (2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh "Karangarhia", Magistrate."
15. A learned single judge of this Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P.,14 at para No.86 held as under:
"86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to the settled law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts (referred supra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint of any other person other than a public servant and any other person, who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime against the petitioner is vitiated by irregularity."
16. This Court in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P15 at Parag Nos.10, 11, 12, 13 held as under:
"10. Section 339 of 'the I.P.C.,' defines wrongful restraint as the voluntary obstruction of any person so as to prevent them from proceeding in a direction in which they have a legal right to proceed. The provision contemplates a specific and targeted impediment to an individual's lawful movement. As per the allegations in C.C. No. 1152/2020, the Petitioners were part of a public demonstration, forming an assembly and raising 14 2020 SCC OnLine AP 726 15 2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870 10 slogans on a public road, which allegedly disrupted the general flow of traffic.
11. However, such obstruction, being indiscriminate and affecting the public at large, does not satisfy the essential ingredients of Section 339 of 'the I.P.C.' There is no assertion that the complainant was individually and intentionally restrained from proceeding in a particular direction. The inconvenience caused appears to be incidental to the protest and not the result of a deliberate act aimed at curtailing the complainant's personal liberty. Consequently, the offence of wrongful restraint under Section 341 of 'the I.P.C.,' is not attracted, as the requisite element of specific intent to restrain a particular person is absent.
12. The Petitioners were allegedly obstructing the free flow of traffic, which is not an offence contemplated under Section 341 of 'the I.P.C.' Therefore, Section 349 of 'the I.P.C.,' is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, as per Section 195 of 'the Cr. P.C.,' there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, 'the I.P.C.,' unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned.
13. In the two instant cases, there is no 'complaint' by the public servant, and there was only chargesheet filed under Section 173 of 'the Cr. P.C.' The 'complaint' as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of 'the Cr. P.C.,' was not filed. When such a complaint was not filed, but based on the police report, the learned Magistrate was not authorised to take cognizance of the alleged offences, inasmuch as, under Section 195 of 'the Cr. P.C.,' there is an embargo for taking cognizance."
17. In the instant case the allegation against the petitioner and other public representatives is that they were conducting a rally at Bandar Road RTA venture with slogans that 'Save Amaravathi, Save Andhra.' As the Petitioner did not heed the request of the Women Sub Inspector of Police, Petitioner and other Accused were all shifted from the place of rally. Later, as mentioned supra, a case in Crime No.8 of 2020 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 188, 353 and 341 read with 149 of 'the I.P.C.,' and Section 32 of 'the Act' at Suryaraopet Police Station, was registered. Later, a charge sheet was filed wherein Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' was withdrawn from the charge sheet.
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this regard in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. supra at para No.48 unequivocally enunciates the legal position that where, in the 11 course of the same transaction, two distinct offences are disclosed, one falling within the ambit of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and the other outside its purview, and such offences are so inextricably interwoven that they cannot be compartmentalised, the statutory bar contained in Section 195(1)(b) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' cannot be circumvented. In such a situation, the prosecution of the accused can be initiated only in accordance with the procedure mandated under Section 195(1)(b) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' namely, upon a complaint by the competent Court, notwithstanding that one of the offences independently may not require such a complaint. Even though the Investigating Officer has deleted Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' from the array of the sections of law, yet the alleged offence cannot be separated from the incident since all the accused including the Petitioner are the Public Representatives for a political cause they were conducting a rally. The intention of the Petitioner and other political leaders was to conduct a rally to ventilate their grievance politically, but not to cause any inconvenience to the public. The inconvenience though perceived by the police is rather an incidental one to the protest and not a outcome of the deliberate act aimed at commission of the alleged offence. There was no intention on the part of the Petitioner and others to commit an offence under Section 353 of 'the I.P.C.,' even as per the statement of the de-facto complainant. Section 341 of 'the I.P.C.,' deals with wrongful confinement.
19. In this regard, it is relevant to refer order of this Court in Kollu Ravindra supra at paragraph No.8 held as under:
"8. In the two chargesheets the alleged offences are Sections 341, 188 read with Section 34 of 'the I.P.C.,' and Section 3 of 'the Act.' Ms. 12 M.Nikitha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied on the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in T.Jeevan Singh v. State of Telangana16 wherein at paragraph No.6 while referring another judgment of the High Court of Telangana in Kodela Siva Prasad v. Koritala Venkata Ramanaiah17 it was held that obstruction in the free flow of traffic would not amount to wrongful restraint under Section 341 of 'the I.P.C.'"
20. When, in the course of a single transaction, multiple offences emerge, one falling within the ambit of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and another outside its purview, and such offences are so inextricably interwoven that they cannot be segregated, the statutory embargo under Section 195(1)(b) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' cannot be circumvented. Mere deletion of Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' from the charge sheet does not efface the bar, as the substratum of the alleged act remains integrally connected with the offence contemplated under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' thereby attracting the procedural mandate of a complaint by the competent authority. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the ingredients under Section 341 of 'the I.P.C.,' are not made out. When the above-mentioned offence is not made out, there is no meaning to fasten the liability on the Petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 149 of 'the I.P.C.'
21. For the above reasons, Criminal Petition is allowed. Accordingly, the proceedings in C.C.No.949/2021 on the file of the learned I Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada are quashed.
_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 17.12.2025 VTS 16 Crl.P.No.2069/2023 dated 01.03.2023 17 2006 (3) ALT (Crl.)49 (A.P) 13