Supreme Court of India
Raja Provision Stores vs Appellate Tribunal (Sales Tax), ... on 20 March, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1997)11SCC751, [1997]105STC325(SC), AIRONLINE 1997 SC 320, 1997 (11) SCC 751 (1997) 43 KANTLJ(TRIB) 317, (1997) 43 KANTLJ(TRIB) 317
Bench: A.M. Ahmadi, K.S. Paripoornan, S.P. Kurdukar
ORDER
1. The short question which arises in this appeal is whether the appellant who carries on business of buying paddy and after getting it husked sell the rice becomes liable to pay tax under Section 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. This question came up for consideration before the High Court of Kerala in M. Narayanan Nambiyar v. State of Kerala . In that case, the High Court held that a process of manufacture was involved in the production of rice by milling paddy and hence rice so produced represents "other goods'' within the meaning of the said provision since rice is distinct in nature and character from paddy. In Ganesh Trading Co., Karnal v. State of Haryana [1973] 32 STC 623 a Division Bench of this Court held that even though rice is produced out of paddy, paddy does not continue to be paddy even after dehusking. Rice and paddy are two different things in ordinary parlance. Therefore, when paddy is dehusked and rice is produced there has been a change in the identity of the goods. This Court, therefore, took the view that the assessee is liable to pay-tax on the goods purchased from the market. The same view was expressed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. B. Raghurama Shetty [1981] 47 STC 369 following the decision in Ganesh Trading Co. . It is thus clear from this decision that rice and paddy are two distinct and different commodities, distinct in nature and character and, therefore, the assessee on the purchase of paddy becomes liable to pay purchase tax. The learned Counsel for the assessee tried to place reliance on the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [1985] 60 STC 213 with a view to persuade us to hold that the view expressed in the aforesaid two cases is not the correct view. We are afraid that we cannot agree with the learned Counsel for the assessee in this behalf. The two decisions referred to earlier are directly on the point whereas the decision on which counsel relies is not and cannot be taken to have departed from the view taken in the aforesaid two cases.
2. For the above reasons, we see no merit in the appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.