Orissa High Court
Anirudha Adhikari vs Amarendra Adhikari on 18 March, 1987
Equivalent citations: AIR1988ORI42, AIR 1988 ORISSA 42
Author: D.P. Mohapatra
Bench: D.P. Mohapatra
JUDGMENT D.P. Mohapatra, J.
1. The two questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are : (i) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain and deal with the application under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code filed by the respondent, and (ii) if the prayer in the application was hit by the principle of res judicata. The first point not having been raised before the trial court has not been answered by him. The second one has been answered in the negative.
2. The gist of the relevant facts leading to the present proceeding may be stated thus :
The respondent filed Title Suit No. 44 of 1980 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Baripada for partition of the suit properties and for allotment of due share to him. The suit was contested by the appellant, mainly on the ground that there was a previous partition of the family properties between the parties and therefore the suit was not maintainable. In the suit a preliminary decree was passed by the trial court awarding to the plaintiff respondent 1/3rd share in the properties in Schedules 'E' and 'F' to the plaint. It is stated at the bar that no appeal has been filed against the said preliminary decree, and also no proceeding for drawing up a final decree has yet been initiated. During pendency of the suit the respondent filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1, C.P.C. for appointment of a receiver which was rejected by the trial court on 16-11-1981. Again on 28-10-83 another application for the self same prayer was filed by the respondent before the court. The application had not been disposed of till 25-11-83 when the preliminary decree was passed. It is stated at the bar that both the parties were heard on the application at the time of placing their arguments in the suit and the application was disposed of by the impugned order on 28-11-1983. The trial court on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case while declining to appoint a receiver of the properties under Schedules 'E' and 'F' to the plaint, directed the defendant appellant to furnish accounts of the income and expenditure of the usufructs from the properties. Being aggrieved by the said order, the defendant No. 1 has filed this appeal challenging the said order mainly on the two grounds noticed earlier.
3. The consideration that appears to have weighed with the trial court while passing the impugned order is that the respondent has been found entitled to 1/3rd share in the properties in question and since he usually remains absent from the village in connection with his service in the Railways and admittedly the appellant is in possession of the entire properties, it is appropriate that he should render accounts of income and expenditure in respect of the same.
4. Taking up the question of applicability of the principle of res judicata, the matter can be disposed of easily by referring to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. T. N. Chatterjee, AIR 1972 SC 1201 wherein it has been clearly laid down that a party is not bound to appeal against every interlocutory order which is a step in the procedure that leads up to a final decision or award and to such an order the principle of res judicata would not apply. This principle is squarely applicable to the present case. Appointment of receiver depends on the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the application. If on consideration of the facts and circumstances existing at a particular point of time the court did not deem it necessary to appoint a receiver, it does not stand to reason to hold that for all times to come the court should be precluded from passing a different order even if there is material change in the facts and circumstances of the case. As noticed earlier, the relevant development on fact bringing about a material change in the circumstances is the preliminary decree holding the respondent to be entitled to a share in the properties in question. In these circumstances, the trial court rightly negatived the contention that the prayer for appointment of a receiver is hit by the principle of res judicata.
5. Regarding the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the application, the contention is that after passing of the preliminary decree and in the absence of a proceeding for drawing up final decree the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for appointment of receiver. This contention, in my view, is not well founded. The position is well settled that in a partition suit the proceeding in the trial court does not come to an end on passing of a preliminary decree. The suit continues till passing of final decree in the case and till then the trial court continues to be in seisin of the matter relating to the subject-matter of the suit. The question in somewhat similar circumstances arose before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Ramchandra Jeetmal v. Jeetmal Ganpat Porwal, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 380, wherein the Court referring to the decisions of the Madras High Court in the case of Chindambaram v. Pethaperumal, AIR 1937 Mad 163 and of the Privy Council in the case of Jadunath v. Parameswar, AIR 1940 PC 11 held that even where a preliminary decree was the subject-matter of appeal, the trial court continued its competence to deal with the application under Order 40, Rule 1 CPC.
6. In view of the principle laid down in the cases referred to above with which I am in respectful agreement, it has to be held that in the facts and circumstances of this case the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C. and dispose of the same.
7. Both the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant having failed, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.