Delhi District Court
Sh. Raju Tomar @ Rajbeer vs Smt. Kamlesh Ors on 1 February, 2025
DLET030000702015
Presented on : 07-08-2015
Registered on : 10-08-2015
Decided on : 01-02-2025
Duration : 9 years, 5 months, 25 days
IN THE COURT OF
ACJ/CCJ/ARC AT EAST DELHI
Presided Over by Sh. Vinik Jain
RC ARC/23/2016
Shri Raju Tomar
S/o Late Deepa Tomar @ Deep Chand,
R/o 86, Shakarpur Khas,
Delhi-110092 ....Petitioner
VERSUS
1. Smt. Kamlesh
W/o Late Om Prakash,
R/o 93-A, Gali no.1,
Shakarpur Khas, Delhi-92
2. Ms. Versha
D/o Late Om Prakash,
R/o 93-A, Gali no.1,
Shakarpur Khas, Delhi-92 ......Respondents
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Advocate for the petitioner: Sh. D K Sharma
Advocate for the respondents: Sh. Pankaj Chawla
RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 1/20
APPLICATION FOR EVICTION OF TENANT UNDER
SECTIONS 14 (1 ) & (e) READ WITH SECTION 25 (B) OF
DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
JUDGMENT:
1. Vide this judgment, I shall dispose off the present application under Sections 14 (1) & (e) Read with Section 25 (B) of DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT filed by the petitioner.
2. For better appreciation, the brief facts of the petition as alleged by the petitioner in his petition is summarized as follows:
The suit premises is shop no. H-31/1, Main Market, Shakarpur Khas, Delhi-92 which was let out to the husband of the respondent no.1 about 25-30 years back. The agreed rate of rent was Rs. 225/- per month. Husband of respondent no.1 passed away in the year 2011 and thereafter, the respondents are in possession of the premises as successors of the tenant. The petitioner has two sons namely Sunder Singh, aged about 31 years and Ashu Tomar, aged about 33 years (at the time of moving the present petition) and the premises is required by the petitioner to settle his sons. Hence, by way of present petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act. The petitioner seeks eviction of the respondent from the premises.
3. The application of the respondent seeking leave to defend was allowed vide order dated 23.11.2016.
4. On merits, the respondents have made the following averments in their WS:-
RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 2/204.1 The premises was let out to the husband of respondent no.1 namely Om Parkash by Deepa Tomar-deceased father of the petitioner and consequent to death of Om Parkash, the tenancy was inherited by his successors which include the respondents and two other daughters of Om Parkash namely Indu and Kiran. Indu and Kiran have not been made party to the present petition and therefore, the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.
The petitioner has at his disposal, adequate reasonable alternate accommodation to satisfy the alleged need and therefore, the premises is not required by him. The sons of the petitioner are not dependent on him. The respondent had instituted a suit claiming that they not be dispossessed from the premises otherwise than in due course of law which was disposed off upon statement of petitioner not to do so. An application moved by the respondent under Section 44 of DRC Act was allowed, on an earlier occasion. 4.2 One of the sons of the petitioner named Sunder Singh conducts his business of repairs and services of air conditioners from 84, Shakarpur, Delhi. His place of work is a shop at the ground floor at this property which is owned by the petitioner. The other son of the petitioner named Ashu Tomar @ Bittu Tomar is employed with M/s R.S Motor Garage at 9/10, Karkardooma Village, Delhi-92 for more than 10 years.
4.3 Petitioner has at his disposal, a property of which he is the owner and is identified as 84, Shakarpur Village, Delhi-92. The said property is constructed three floors and the entire ground floor of the said property is available to the petitioner to satisfy the need of any commercial enterprise he wants to take up. Sunder Singh Tomar is in possession of one shop for his business at the ground RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 3/20 floor of this property. Apart from the said shop, the entire ground floor is vacant and available to the petitioner. 4.4 In the past, petitioner had attempted to dispossess the respondents from the premises by extra judicial means and aggrieved thereby, when the respondents instituted a civil suit in that regard, the petitioner undertook not to do so thereafter. The petitioner wants to evict the respondent by all means and therefore, had also omitted to effect necessary repairs to the premises, so as to keep it in habitable state. Aggrieved by this omission of the petitioner, the respondents had moved an application under Section 44 of DRC Act and consequent to the said proceedings, effected necessary repairs. The petitioner had also on an earlier occasion, moved an application under Section 14 (1) (f) (g) DRC Act, which was later on withdrawn. The only intend of the petitioner is to harass the respondents to such an extent that they evict the premises. Both the sons of the petitioner are not dependent on him and the need raised by him in bogus.
5. Replication was filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein the averment pleaded in the written statement were denied.
6. PW1 Sh. Raju Tomar, tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW-1/1 and deposed on the same lines as stated in the petition. He relied upon the documents:-
(a) Copy of Aadhar card of the petitioner is Mark A.
(b) Copy of Election Id card of the petitioner is Ex PW-1/B.
(c) Copy of GPA, agreement to sell and receipt, all dated RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 4/20 27.02.1998 is Ex PW-1/C (colly).
(d) Site plan is Mark B. He was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondents.
7. Respondent did not lead evidence.
8. I have already heard the final arguments and perused the entire record. It is pertinent to note here that vide judgment dated 26.02.2018 the petition was dismissed and thereafter revision was preferred against the judgment on which the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide order dated 22.03.2024 remanded the matter to hear the final arguments afresh and adjudicate upon all the contentions raised by both the parties by way of fresh order.
9. In the WS, the respondent has following preliminary objections have been raised by the respondent:-
(a) Firstly, the respondents has claimed that the suit premises were let out to Sh. Omprakash and after his death , the tenancy of the premises devolved upon the respondents and other daughters of the deceased namely Indu and Ms Kiran, who are necessary and proper party in the present matter. The daughters of the deceased are not made respondents in the present matter and hence the petition is bad for mis-joinder of parties.
It is noteworthy here that the respondents in their written statement has admitted in para 18(a)(4) that the present respondents were the one who instituted a petition against the current petitioner u/s 44 DRC Act . It was the same set of respondents who instituted a petition u/s 44 DRC Act against the RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 5/20 petitioner and thus respondents have themselves purported to be the only tenants of the suit premises and no one else. If the daughters of Om Prakash were also the tenants, they should have also been made party to the said petition u/s 44 DRC Act . Thus, this preliminary objection is dismissed.
(b) Secondly, the respondents have claimed that the sons of the petitioner are not dependent on him and thus the petition is liable to be dismissed. This issue being of a nature which warrants evidence, this preliminary objection is dismissed too.
(c) Thirdly, in passing reference the respondents have claimed that the petition is liable to be dismissed as no title document is placed on record by the petitioner to show his ownership in respect to the tenanted premises. The tenancy is not disputed in the present matter and no averments have been made that the suit premises is not owned by the petitioner. Thus, this preliminary objection also stands dismissed. Reliance can be placed on Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450.
Points of Determination in the present petition
1. Whether two married sons namely Sunder Singh and Ashu Tomar of the petitioner can be called 'dependent' of the petitioner for the purposes of section 14(1)(e) ?
2. Whether the petitioner has a bonafide need of the rented premises for his two married sons namely Sunder Singh and Ashu Tomar ?
3. The petitioner has no other alternative and reasonable space except the rented premises for his two sons ?
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO.1.
RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 6/2010. Section 14(1) (e) is reproduced hereunder for better understanding :
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
(e) That the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.
Thus for whose benefit the petitioner files the petition should be 'any member of the family dependent on him '. This aforesaid expression has been interpreted by higher court in catena of judgments which are discussed below herein and on which the reliance has been placed by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner.
Anil Kumar Gupta vs Deepika Verma RC. REV. 138/2015, DHC :
"12. Customarily or in common parlance a dependent would be defined as any person who is reliant on another either for financial or physical support for sustenance of life. It is pertinent to note that the word dependent or as to what constitutes a family has nowhere been defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act. Rather, the legislators consciously and deliberately have used the words "any member of family dependent on the landlord" instead of defining a clear degree of relations so as to construe a wider meaning to the aforesaid words as man is a social creature and part of a complex societal system involving myriad of relations from which he cannot be isolated. It is significant to understand that the dependency is not restricted to financial or physical but will also include emotional reliance on another person. Reliance in this regard is placed on the findings of this court in M/S. RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 7/20 Jhalani Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs B.K. Soni; AIR 1994 Delhi 167, wherein the court observed that the social set up of our society is such where a married daughter continues to enjoy a place of pride in her maternal home and therefore while considering the requirement of the landlord her married daughter and her expected visits cannot be lost sight of. Similarly in Sain Dass v. Madan Lal; 1972 Ren CJ (SN) 8 (Delhi), this Court has acknowledged that the word "himself"
has to be construed to mean "himself" as cohabiting with his family members with whom he is normally accustomed to live. Therefore, contrary to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner financial or physical incapacitation cannot be the sole premises for determining dependency on another."
Corporation Of The City Of Nagpur vs The Nagpur Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd on 7 December, 1962 1963 AIR 1192:
"But the expression 'family' has according to the context in which it occurs a variable connotation. It does not in the setting of the rules postulate the existence of relationship either of blood or by marriage between the persons residing in the tenement. Even a single person may be regarded as a family,and a master and servant would also be so regarded. The word 'occupy' used in rule 10 (a) is not restricted either expressly or by anything contained in the context of the rule suggesting that the occupation is to be only for residential purposes, and in the absence of any such implication the rule must be deemed to be of general application i.e., it applies to uses non-residential as well as residential. The expression 'family' must therefore take colour from the expression "occupy' used in the same rule. In our view the expression `family' in the context in which it occurs, means no more than a person or a group of persons."
Dina Nath(now deceased) v. Sh Manohar Lal Kapoor (DHC,CM No. 11729/2012) :
" I need not dilate on this aspect too much because now it is settled law in view of a chain of judgments of the Supreme Court that children do not cease to be family members merely because they are financially independent RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 8/20 or are living separately from the parents in view of the social conditions which exist in this country. Consequently, the expression 'family' has been liberally interpreted in a series of judgments to include children who are both financially independent and living separately from the parents.."
11. In the present case, the Ld. Counsel for the respondent has tried to assail the dependency of two sons of the petitioner by asking questions as to the income of two sons, the expenditure incurred by the family of two sons etc. In my opinion , the same will not be have much impact in view of the law laid down as discussed above. Even if the respondents were successful in proving that two sons of the petitioner were financially independent, this factum will not obliterate them to be emotionally dependents on the petitioner for the purposes of section 14(1) (e) of DRC Act.
Points of Determination no .2 & 3
12. At the cost of repetition, the bonafide need averred in the petition para 18(a)(7) is as follows:
"That the petitioner is having three children i.e two married sons Sunder Singh , aged about 31 years , he is having two minor children and Ashu Tomar aged about aged about 33 years and having two minor children, the petitioner have no any other shop or accommodation for doing any work or livelihood of his family , so the premises/ shop is required bonafidely with intend to settle them for the purpose of their work as well as for their livelihood."RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 9/20
13. In contrast to the plea raised by the petitioner as above said, the respondent in his written statement averred the following important points :
1. The petitioner has come to the court with unclean hands as even if the petitioner wants to settle his sons, he already has alternate accommodation.
2. The petitioner has not disclosed what kind of business requirements his sons have.
3. The son of the petitioner namely Sunder Singh is already engaged in the business of repairs and service of air conditioners at ground floor of the property bearing No. 84, Village Shakarpur, Delhi owned by the petitioner.
4. Other son of the petitioner, Sh. Ashu Tomar, is gainfully employed with M/s R.S Motor Garage at 9/10, Karkardooma village, Delhi-110092 for the last 10 years.
5. The petitioner owns and possess a built-up property bearing No. 84, Shakarpur Village , Delhi-110092 beside the rented premises and this property comprises three floors out of which other than the ground floor, the rest of floors are lying vacant.
14. Now, in reply to the written statement, the petitioner filed his replication wherein he specifically denied all the aforesaid specific averments. It is important to note here that the averments in the written statement were very specific in nature, but the petitioner nevertheless denied it generally.
RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 10/2015. During the cross-examination of the petitioner (PW-1) certain facts came to light for which it is necessary to reproduce the relevant extract of the cross-examination which are as hereunder :
"My son Sunder is doing his business of Air-Conditioner from the last 2 or 3 years. My son Sunder is doing his business from his shop situated on the ground floor of property no. 86, Shakarpur, Delhi. When the present petition was filed, Sunder Tomar was learning the said business. I cannot tell the name of the person from whom my son Sunder Tomar was learning the aforesaid business."
"My son Ashu Tomar was doing the work of repair, denting, painting of cars. My son was doing the said work at Karkardooma with one Shri Subhash. There was no name of the workshop. I cannot tell the name of the said workshop as I never visited the same. My son was doing the said work around 2 or 2 ½ years back from today. He was doing the said work from the last about 10 years. Now-a-days, he is doing the said work on his own as and when he gets the said work."
16. Both the sons of the petitioner are admitted to be employed. Sunder is admitted to be doing the business of air- conditioners from the shop situated at 86 , Shakarpur Delhi and that too from last 2-3 years. Other son of the petitioner namely Ashu Tomar is also admitted to working in a garage from last 10 years. It is noteworthy here, that the petition was filed on 10.08.2015 and cross-examination was conducted on 11.12.2017. The dates here are relevant because in the light of cross- examination reproduced before, on the day of filing of petition, both the sons of the petitioner were employed and still the petition is absolutely silent about it. Also, in this paragraph itself, I have observed that there were admissions on the part of the petitioner during the cross-examination. They are addressed as admissions RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 11/20 because though the petition was silent about the employment, the respondents averred in their written statement specifically about the nature of the employments of the sons of the petitioner but still the petitioner blatantly denied it.
17. In addition to this, the petitioner in his cross- examination has also admitted that property bearing no 86, Shakarpur, Delhi is owned by him. He has further deposed that property bearing no. 84, Shakarpur, Delhi is owned by his brother. It is also admitted that son of the petitioner namely Sunder is running the shop from property bearing no.84 and other son of the petitioner Ashu Tomar is working from the shop in property bearing no .86. It is also deposed that son of the petitioner Sunder resides at property no 86 but his aadhar card shows his address at property no 84. So, one of the son of the petitioner works at property no 84 but resides at property no 86. So, what comes out of this part of deposition is that the petitioner has atleast two properties at his disposal i.e property no 84 and property no. 86 other than the suit property. The petition is also silent about these facts which are deposed in cross-examination.
18. Before going forward, it is necessary to understand the term 'bonafide requirement' appearing in section 14(1)(e) DRC Act which has been elucidated in the following judgment.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR 1999 SC 2507 in following terms :
"Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bonafide to mean 'in good faith : genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural; not spurious; real: pure: sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 12/20 and Whit ley define bonafide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bonafide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bonafide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra- distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited .for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice Of the landlord by holding that not one. but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against."
19. So, the impending question is whether the need of the petitioner in the present matter stands good on the anvil of the law laid down as above. The answer to this question appears to be RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 13/20 negative. It was the bounden duty of the petitioner to disclose the real facts in the petition itself and should not have waited for the respondent to plead the same. Nevertheless, even the same was not disclosed in the petition, at least the petitioner should have been courteous enough to have brought the facts to the knowledge of the court at the time of filing of replication when the real facts were specifically pleaded in the written statement but still the petitioner decided to withhold the real facts for the reasons best known to the petitioner. This act has been done by the petitioner when the petitioner has to prove his bonafide need which raises additional burden on the petitioner to come to the court with even cleaner hands than in the normal suit.
20. If all the pleadings/ documents/evidence in the petition are read together, there exists no need at all leave aside bonafide need. It is not the case of the petitioner that the sons of the petitioner are employed and they want to start their new business. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the sons of the petitioner are employed and the premises where they are employed is insufficient for the businesses intended to be run by the sons of the petitioners. For seeking judicial assistance, the petitioner should have atleast come with a clear picture of the reality. Diametrically opposite to it , half baked facts have been put forth by the petitioner which in no way helps the case of the petitioner. By doing this, the petitioner has himself made his need look like least bonafide. Manifestly, a lot of material facts have been put under the carpet and thus It can be said with lot of certainty at this stage that the petitioner has suppressed the material facts from this court.
RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 14/2021. The suppression of material facts and its consequences have been explained by the higher courts in the following way:
Shiju Jacob Varghese & Anr. vs Tower Visiion Ltd. & Ors CS(OS) 150/2012: , Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held that :
"The question thus arises is that whether such half - hearted disclosure by the plaintiffs can be considered as fair and honest disclosure or whether it will amount to suppression of material facts. It is a settled legal position that the litigant who approaches the court is bound to disclose all material facts and produce all the documents which are relevant to the litigation and if he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. Here it would be worthwhile to refer to the celebrated and often quoted judgment of the Apex Court, S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853, wherein it was held as under: "7. ...We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property- grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation."
The court went on to say that "...A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage... A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 15/20 he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party."
59. ....... A person approaching the court must come with clean hands and a person not disclosing the correct and true facts is not entitled to seek justice. I am also astounded to find that the plaintiff had not even placed on record the copy of the order passed by the District Court of Tel Aviv, Israel at the time of filing of the present suit, although the said order was in support of the plaintiffs. So far as the order of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Israel is concerned, this court finds that disclosure made by the plaintiffs in the averments of the plaint is a faint and a feeble attempt to suggest the said order but the said averments do not transparently declare that any order of the highest court of Israel was passed against them and on the contrary is a vague pitch. It also cannot be lost sight of the fact that the order of Supreme Court of Israel was passed on 24.10.2011 and the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 17.1.2012 and thus the translated copy of the same could be easily filed by the plaintiffs at least before the appearance of the defendants in the present case. The plaintiffs could have also taken leave of this court to file the said order of the Supreme Court of Israel if there was any difficultly coming in their way in getting the judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel translated into English language. This court is thus of the view that half-hearted and perfunctory disclosures by the plaintiffs in the averments made in the plaint, by not even mentioning that there was an order by Supreme Court of Israel against them and also by not placing on record copy of the order of the Supreme Court Israel, is certainly an act of suppression on the part of the plaintiffs.
Kishore Samrite vs State Of U.P. & Ors 2012 AIR SCW 5802, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that :
Now, we shall deal with the question whe ther both or any of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 111/2011 and 125/2011 are guilty of suppression of material facts, not approaching the Court with clean hands, and thereby abusing the process of the Court. Before we dwell upon the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, let us refer to some case laws which would help us in dealing with the present situation with greater precision. The cases of abuse of the process of court and such allied matters have been arising before the Courts consistently.RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 16/20
This Court has had many occasions where it dealt with the cases of this kind and it has clearly stated the principles that would govern the obligations of a litigant while approaching the court for redressal of any grievance and the consequences of abuse of the process of court. We may recapitulate and state some of the principles. It is difficult to state such principles exhaustively and with such accuracy that would uniformly apply to a variety of cases. These are:
(i) Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the Courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts and came to the courts with 'unclean hands'. Courts have held that such litigants are neither entitled to be heard on the merits of the case nor entitled to any relief.
(ii) The people, who approach the Court for relief on an ex parte statement, are under a contract with the court that they would state the whole case fully and fairly to the court and where the litigant has broken such faith, the discretion of the court cannot be exercised in favour of such a litigant.
(iii) The obligation to approach the Court with clean hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court.
(iv) Quests for personal gains have become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and suppress facts in the court proceedings.Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have over-shadowed the old ethos of litigative values for small gains.
(v) A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
(vi) The Court must ensure that its process is not abused and in order to prevent abuse of the process the court, it would be justified even in insisting on furnishing of security and in cases of serious abuse, the Court would be duty bound to impose heavy costs.
(vii) Wherever a public interest is invoked, the Court must examine the petition carefully to ensure that there is genuine public interest involved. The stream of justice RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 17/20 should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants.
(vii) The Court, especially the Supreme Court, has to maintain strictest vigilance over the abuse of the process of court and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted "visa". Many societal pollutants create new problems of unredressed grievances and the Court should endure to take cases where the justice of the lis well-
justifies it."
22. It cannot be disputed that the factum of the employment of the sons of the petitioner is a material fact. Also, that they are employed and are working from Property No.84/86 Shakarpur Khas, Delhi is also a material fact. To bring these facts to knowledge of the Court through eviction petition was a bounden obligation of the petitioner. In light of the law laid down above said, it can be said that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri and if this is the case then whether the need of the petitioner can be taken to be bonafide. By any stretch of imagination, the same cannot be assumed. When the petitioner himself is hiding material facts from the Court, how can the need of the petitioner in that case be termed as genuine or bonafide. Per contra, it can be assumed that there was no bonafide need of the petitioner and the present suit is an attempt to recover the possession of the suit premises purely based on the whims and fancies of the petitioner.
23. To support its case for bonafide need, the petitioner has relied on some case laws :
● Anil Kumar Verma v. Shiv Rani & others R.C Rev 522/2011 , DHC RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 18/20 ● Seth & Sons Private Limited v. Arjun Uppal & Another R.C Rev 116/2016 , DHC ● Puran Chand Aggarwal v. Lekha Raj R.C Rev 291/2012 , DHC
24. I have gone through the judgments and in my opinion the factual matrix of the aforesaid cases can be distinguished from the facts of the present case. In Anil Kumar (supra), Hon'ble Delhi High Court has dealt with leave to defend wherein the present case , the evidence has been led and is fixed for judgement. Seth & Sons (supra) deals with the case where the petitioner wanted to open a restaurant but the same was contested on the ground that the rented accommodation would not be suitable for the restaurant purpose and the petitioner does not have experience in the business of restaurant whereas the facts in the present case are different. Puran Chand (Supra) also deals with the issue of dismissal of application for leave to defend. It is submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that even if it is proved that the petitioner's sons were employed, still the petitioner can have bonafide need for his sons. I agree with the argument of Ld. Counsel and it is no more res-integra but the issue at hand is different as narrated in the preceding paragraphs. The need does not appear to be bonafide and real facts have not been brought forth by the petitioner in the petition. Had the factum of the employment been a subsequent event, the outcome could have come differently.
25. The same line reasoning also applies as far as the question of the alternation accommodation is concerned. As repeatedly discussed, the petition is silent that the present RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 19/20 accommodations in which the sons are employed are insufficient for the work which they have been carrying on. The petition is silent as to what is the work the sons of the petitioner intends to do. The court can only assess the reasonableness and suitability of other accommodation when the unsuitability of the present accommodation is pleaded. The facts pleaded in the petition are absolutely vague and cannot be relied upon. It appears to be a dire attempt on the part of the petitioner to seek judicial assistance to vacate the suit premises without any need whatsoever. Even if any need existed, the same has not been pleaded and the court cannot give relief when the true picture has not been placed before it.
26. Concluding, the petition is devoid of any bonafide need mandated u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act and petition stands dismissed accordingly.
27. File be consigned to the record room.
Digitally signed by VINIK JAINVINIK JAIN Date: 2025.02.01 04:57:28 +0530 (VINIK JAIN) ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC (East) KKD Courts, Delhi/01.02.2025 RC/ARC No. 23/16 Page No. 20/20