Karnataka High Court
C. Yethrappa vs D. Yusuf Khan on 25 June, 1990
Equivalent citations: ILR1990KAR3981, 1990(2)KARLJ437
ORDER Swami, J.
1. These two Civil. Revision Petitions are preferred against the common order dated 10th December 1982 passed in H.R.C. Misc. Nos. 688/1982 and 726/1982 by the IX Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore" City and are referred to a Division Bench as they involve a question of law of general importance.
2. The Civil Revision Petition No. 728/1986 was also referred to a Division Bench along with these Civil Revision Petitions; but it has been separately disposed of without deciding the questions of law involved in these Civil Revision Petitions. The reasons for referring these petitions to a Division Bench are contained in the order dated 21-2-1986 passed in C.R.P. No. 728/1986.
2.1. It may be relevant to notice that the respondents in C.R.Ps.52 and 53 of 1983 were the tenants of the non-residential premises bearing No. 15. The petitioner was the landlord of the aforesaid premises. He filed eviction petitions in H.R.C. 64/1975 and 111/1975 against respondents-1 and 2 respectively for possession of the schedule premises under Section 21(1)(j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for the immediate purpose of demolition and for erecting a new building i.e., new shops in place of the premises sought to be demolished.
3. The respondents-tenants resisted the petitions. However, before evidence could be recorded in the case, the parties compromised and a compromise petition was filed before the Court on 24-5-1978. The compromise filed and recorded in both the cases was similarly worded and it was as follows:
"1. The petitioner has filed the above petition on the ground that the premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the petitioner for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction under Section 21(l)(j) of the K.R.C. Act, 1961.
2. At the intervention of the wellwishers of the parties, the parties have compromised the matter as follows:
(a) The respondent is granted one year's time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the property to enable him to demolish and put up new structure in its place.
(b) The petitioner has agreed to reconstruct the petition schedule premises within six months from the date of respondents delivering possession of the premises referred to in the schedule on the terms and conditions regarding the rate of rents to be paid mutually agreed upon. If the parties do not agree regarding the rate of rent to be paid, the matter would be referred to competent authority for fixing the rents.
(c) If the petitioner fails to demolish and put up reconstruction within six months after taking delivery of the premises from the respondent the respondent is entitled to seek redelivery of the schedule premises in whatever condition it may be and re-occupy the same.
4. Each party bear their own costs.
Wherefore the parties pray that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass orders in terms of the above rajinama in the interest of justice."
4. The order of eviction was passed in terms of the compromise. The landlord did not immediately take possession of the premises and demolish and reconstruct the same. Therefore notices dated 17-1-1980 were sent through a registered post by the tenants to the landlord. The said notices were not served. The same were returned. However, after some time, the landlord took possession of the premises from the tenants and demolished the premises and erected a new building in place of the old one. Thereafter he did not hand over possession of the premises to the tenants. Hence they filed separate applications in H.R.C. Mis.688/1982 and 726/1982 for possession of the new premises erected in place of the old. In these proceedings, the tenants also produced a copy of the notice dated 17-1-1980 and also a registered cover with acknowledgment which were returned as unserved.
4.1. The Court below held that in the light of the order passed in terms of the compromise, the landlord after erection of a new building was liable to redeliver possession of the premises to the tenants; that as he failed to deliver possession of the premises, he was liable to be directed to deliver possession of the same. Accordingly, the Court below allowed the applications and directed the landlord to put the tenants in possession of the newly constructed schedule premises within 15 days. The Court below further held that the tenants were entitled to execute the order and recover possession of the shops if the other persons who were put in possession of the shops by the landlord after reconstruction of the shops failed to vacate.
4.2. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 1-12-1989 in H.R.C. Mis.688 and 726/1982, the landlord has preferred these Civil Revision Petitions before this Court.
5. Sri Sathyamurthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner-landlord has advanced the following four contentions:
1) If pursuant to the order passed under Section 21(l)(j) of the Act, the tenant is not put in possession of the premises after erecting a new building, the only remedy available to him is to seek possession of the new building by filing a regular suit.
2) That the order passed under Section 21(l)(j) of the Act does not in clear terms state that on the erection of a new building, the tenant should be put in possession of the new building by the landlord and as such even if it is held that the remedy is by way of an execution, the order is not capable of execution;
3) That the tenants-respondents had not given notice to the landlord of their intention to occupy the new building within six months from the date of delivery of possession by them as required by Section 27 of the Act, as such it is not open to them to seek re-delivery of possession of the new building; and
4) That at any rate, in equity, the respondents-tenants are not entitled to seek re-delivery of the new building as they have been in arrears of rent.
The correctness of these contentions is disputed by Sri Hosmath, learned Counsel for the tenants.
5.1. We shall now proceed to consider these contentions:
CONTENTION NO. 16. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Act does not provide as to the manner in which a tenant evicted pursuant to an order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act should seek possession of the new building erected in place of the old premises, therefore, in such a case, the only remedy open to such a tenant is to seek a decree for possession from a competent Court. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in M.B. CHIKKA REVANNA v. C.G. RAMASWAMY SETTY, ESA No. 78 of 1977 DD 13-3-1978 and IGNATIUS PEREIRA v. IGNATIUS PEREIRA, ILR (Kar) 1973, 798.
6.1. On the contrary, it is contended on behalf of the tenants that as the exclusive jurisdiction is created under the provisions of the Act for eviction and all other matters connected thereto, that as the possession of the premises is obtained by the landlord by filing an application under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, the re-delivery of possession of the newly con structed premises in the case of an eviction pursuant to the order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act could be by way of an execution of the order passed under Section 21(l)(j) of the Act because the Act itself provides for delivery of possession to the tenant of the new building erected in demolishing the old building pursuant to an order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act; that the suit., is not the remedy for seeking delivery of possession of the new building; that such delivery of possession can be sought either by way of an application before the forum which passed the order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act or if the order of eviction states in clear terms as to delivery of possession of the new building after reconstruction, the delivery of possession of the same can be obtained by way of execution of the very order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. In support of these contentions, the learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in LEELAVATHI @ RANJAN BAI v. SHARADA, and K.C. SAREE EMPORIUM v. ACHAL CHAND K. KOTHARI, . The decision in the latter case is rendered by a Bench of two Judges.
7. It may be pointed out that neither Section 21(1)(j) nor Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Act contain express provisions as to the manner and mode of obtaining delivery of possession by a tenant of the premises erected after demolishing the old one pursuant to an order of eviction obtained under Section 21(1 )(j) of the Act. The Rules framed under the Act also do not contain any provision in this regard. As far as the order of eviction passed under any one of the provisos to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act including clause (j) is concerned, it is a settled position of law that it is executable in the same manner a decree of a Civil Court is executed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See MEENAKSHAMMA v. MODUR RANGAMMA, 1968(2) Mys.L.J. 255, SUBBANNA v. B. SEHTHAMMA, 1970(2) Mys.L.J. 560 and MATHEW M.M. v. PRAFUL CHAND AMRITLAL, 1980(1) KLJ 234. Similarly if an order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act contains the terms as to delivery of possession of the premises by the tenant to the landlord and redelivery of the premises to the tenant by the landlord after erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished, we do not see any difficulty whatsoever in executing such order in the manner the decree of a Civil Court is executed, because apart from Section 28 of the Act, the very order of eviction itself creates an obligation on the landlord to restore possession of the new building on its completion to the tenant which binds the landlord and as such it can be executed just like any other order of a Civil Court or an order of eviction passed under the Act.
8. In K. SRINIVASA RAO v. K.M. NARASIMHAIAH, ILR 1989 KAR 1186 (SC) the Supreme Court considered the right of a tenant who is dispossessed pursuant to an order under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act to seek redelivery of possession of the new building after its completion. In that case, an order for eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act was passed. The landlord, after erection of a new building, did not put the tenant in possession of the same. Therefore, the tenant made an application under Sections 27 and 23 of the Act for permitting him to occupy the shop in the new building. The Supreme Court, after referring to the provisions contained in Sections 21(1)(j), 27 and 28 of the Act, held that under the provisions of Section 28 of the Act, the tenant 'became entitled to occupy a tenement in the new building'. Regarding the nature of the tenement to which the tenant was entitled, it was held thus:
"There is nothing specific in this connection in the language of Sub-section (1) of Sect ion 28. However, a fair commonsense reading of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 28 would show that a tenant against whom eviction decree has been passed under Section 21(l)(j) and who has given notice as contemplated under Section 27 of the Act would be entitled to a tenement in the new building which could be said to be reasonably comparable to or to reasonably correspond to the tenement in respect of which the decree was passed."
The Supreme Court also further pointed out thus:
"The provisions referred to earlier clearly suggest that, at the least, the appellant was entitled to a shop as reasonably corresponding to the original shop occupied by him as the circumstances would permit."
Thus it is clear that after the construction of the new building is completed, the landlord is bound to put the tenant in possession of the building which reasonably corresponds to the old premises occupied by the tenant. If the landlord fails to do so, it is open to the tenant to seek possession of the premises in the new building which reasonably corresponds to the old one occupied by him as a tenant. This relief can also be sought by filing an application under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act and not by way of a suit. The same relief can also be sought by way of execution of the order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act if it contains all the necessary terms as to delivery of possession of the new premises by the landlord to the tenant on its completion.
9. In K.C. Saree Emporium's case the order of eviction was passed by way of compromise under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. It contained all the necessary terms as to delivery of possession by the tenant to the landlord and also redelivery of the premises erected in place of the old by the landlord to the tenant. Therefore, a Division Bench of this Court, after considering the earlier decisions of this Court in RAMAKRISHNA AITHAL v. VARADAPPA, , MANJUNATHA v. BHAVAR-LAL, CRP No. 1919 of 1985 DD 17-4-1986; and Leelavathi @ Ranjan Bai v. Sharada, has held thus:
"We are of the view that the case before us can be decided without examining the abstract proposition of law posed in Leelavathi's case . Here, there is a decree comprising within itself the terms of the compromise. What is sought to be executed is the decree under proviso (j) to Section 21(1). Unless these terms of the decree are held invalid, they are to be held as executable."
In Leelavathi's case, the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act was as follows:
"The respondents are granted four months' time from today to vacate their respective premises. The petitioner shall start demolishing the building for the purpose of reconstruction within one month from the date she actually enters into vacant possession of the schedule premises."
The decree did not further direct re-delivery of possession by the landlord after reconstruction of the premises to the tenant. In that case, redelivery was sought by way of execution in Ex.No. 323/1978. The execution Court dismissed the execution petition and the order of the executing Court was challenged before this Court in C.R.P.No. 3551/1986. The learned Single Judge held that the restoration of possession could be sought only by making an application but not through execution. Accordingly, the C.R.P. was allowed, the order under challenge was set aside reserving liberty to the respondents to apply for restoration to the Court which passed the decree.
10.1. It has already been pointed out that in M/s. K.C. Saree Emporium's case, a Division Bench of this Court has held that if the order contains the necessary terms, it can be executed. But in the earlier two decisions of this Court in Ignatius Pereira's case and M.B. Chikkarevanna's case it has been held that the remedy is only by way of suit. No doubt the decision in Ignatius Pereira's case has been referred in M/s K.C. Saree Emporium's case. But the point decided in Ignatius Pereira's case has not been touched and K.C. Saree Emporium's case has been decided in the light of the terms contained in the order of eviction. The decision in Ignatius Pereira's case proceeds on the basis that neither the provisions of Section 27 nor Section 28 of the Act expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and those provisions do not in unmistakable" terms lay down that the right must be exercised or enforced in a particular manner, therefore, the suit is the proper remedy as the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not ousted.
10.2. In Ignatius Pereira's case? the learned Judge has not taken into consideration the fact that redelivery of possession of the premises after reconstruction by the landlord to the tenant is not in any way independent of, and unconnected with, the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. The provisions contained in Sections 21(1)(j), 26, 27 and 28 of the Act are to be read together. They form one group and relate to the ground of eviction falling under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. They provide that after the eviction of the tenant, if the landlord does not demolish within the time stipulated, it is open to the tenant to seek re-delivery of possession on the same terms and conditions on which he occupied the premises immediately before the eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. Section 27 provides for giving notice by the tenant to the landlord expressing his intention to occupy the new building on its completion. Section 28 further provides that on reconstruction, it is open to the tenant to seek delivery of possession if the landlord fails to redeliver the new building on its completion. Therefore, once an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act is passed, whether Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Act are specifically stated in the order of" eviction or not, they are to be read as incorporated in the order itself because the statute itself provides that the consequences mentioned in Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Act should follow pursuant to the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. That being the position, we are of the view that for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, it is not necessary that there should be a specific provision to oust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Such an ousting may be by way of necessary implications also. When the statute provides for eviction of the tenant on particular grounds by a specified Court and it also provides the consequences of such an order of eviction, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court by necessary implication is excluded. Therefore, we are of the view that if the order of eviction is in clear terms and without any ambiguity which requires to be clarified by way of evidence, the only proper remedy is the execution of such an order in the same manner as the order of eviction is executed.
10.3. However, in a case where an order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act is vague and it does not contain all the particulars necessary for seeking redelivery of the premises erected after demolishing the old one by the landlord to the tenant, an application can be filed before the Court which passed the order of eviction seeking redelivery of possession in terms of the provisions contained in Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Act. Therefore, it is not possible for us to agree with the view expressed in Ignatius Pereira's case that the suit is the only remedy for seeking redelivery of possession.
10.4. M.B. Chikkarevanna's case follows the decision in Ignatius Pereira's case. Therefore, we are of the view that both these decisions do not lay down the law correctly. Hence both the decisions are overruled.
10.5. Similarly in Leelavathi @ Ranjan Bai v. Sharada the learned Single Judge has held thus:
"25. Now coming to the cases cited at the Bar, this Court in RAMAKRISHNA AITHAL v. VARADAPPA, has held that it is executable. But the terms of the compromise are not extracted. Court has proceeded on the premise that there was an agreement for restoration and as such it is executable. As a pure proposition of law, if it has declared, right conferred under Sections 27 and 28 is executable, be it preceded by a decree or otherwise, with utmost possible respect, I am unable to subscribe to that view.
In LAWRENCE MASCREANHAS v. IGNATIUS PEREIRA,[1973(2) K.L.J. 105, this Court without examining the rights and privileges conferred under this Special Act and exercise of powers by the Court, as defined, has proceeded to hold that there is no bar for enforcement of such right by means, of a Civil Suit. With great respect, it does not touch the core of problem, and has no relevance.
In the view I have taken that restoration of possession can only be by making an application but not through execution there is no necessity to express any opinion on rest of the points urged."
It is not possible to agree with the view expressed in the above case because the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, as already pointed out, if it contains necessary particulars for seeking redelivery of posession from the landlord to the tenant, of the premises erected after demolishing the old premises, it can also be executed. In case the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act is vague, the right of the tenant under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act can be enforced by way of a separate application before the Court which passed the order of eviction. Therefore, the decision in Leelavathi's case that restoration of possession can be sought, by a tenant who has been evicted under an order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, only through a separate application and not by way of execution of the said order, cannot be held to be wholly correct. Therefore, to that extent, the said decision is overruled.
10.6. In Ramakrishna Aithal's case the question arose was as to whether the order passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, in the event of the landlord failing to put the tenant in possession of the new building on its completion, could be executed by the tenant and restoration of possession could be ordered in the execution. It was held that the order could be executed and restoration of possession could be sought. However, in that case, whether a separate application under Section 27 and 28 of the Act could be maintained for restoration of possession and if so, under what circumstances, was not gone into. The decision in so far it holds that the order could be executed falls in line with the view expressed by us in this case and also the view expressed in K.C. Saree Emporium's case.
10.7. In LAWRENCE MASCREANHAS v. IGNATIUS PEREIRA, 1973(2) KLJ 105 it was held that the proper remedy to seek restoration of possession by a tenant who was evicted under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, was by way of suit. In the light of the view expressed by us, it is not possible to agree with the view expressed in this decision. Hence it is overruled.
10.8. Thus on contention No. I, it is held that if the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act is not vague and contains in clear terms the particulars necessary for seeking redelivery of possession from the landlord to the tenant of the premises erected after demolishing the old premises pursuant to the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, the tenant can seek possession by executing that order. In a case where the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act does not contain all the necessary particulars regarding redelivery of possession from the landlord to the tenant of the premises built on demolishing the old premises and simply directs eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, the application for redelivery of possession can be filed by the tenant for seeking possession of the reconstructed premises before the Court which has passed the order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. The suit is not the proper remedy. The matter lies within the jurisdiction of the Court specified under the Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is excluded.
CONTENTION NO. 211. The contention is that the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, is vague, therefore, it cannot be "executed even if it is held that the remedy is by way of execution. It is relevant to notice that in this case, the tenants have sought for redelivery of possession by filing an application and not by way of execution of the order of eviction. The order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act is passed on the basis of a compromise. The terms of the compromise reproduced above no doubt do not contain the words on erection of a new building the landlord should redeliver possession of the premises', but the other terms of the compromise regarding the rate of rent, of the new building payable by the tenant to be referred to the Competent Authority for fixing the rent would go to show that what the parties intended was that immediately after erection of a new building, the landlord should redeliver possession of the same to the tenant. This intention was made clear by the tenant and the same was not resisted or refuted by the landlord. Pursuant to the order of eviction, the landlord failed to take possession of the premises within the stipulated period. The tenants sent notices dated 17-10-1982 by registered post. The contents of the said notices are as follows:
" XXX XXX XXX
2. You are aware that you filed eviction petition against our client for his eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction of the same and thereafter re-let the same i.e., the portion now in his occupation as per the compromise petition filed in H.R.C. No. 111/1975 on the file of the III Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore City, on 24-6-1978 and our client was given time to vacate and deliver possession of the premises for one year. Our client, has, accordingly been ready and willing to hand over possession and he has kept the same vacant. You are requested to take possession of the same and issue necessary receipt and you have to reconstruct the same and re-let the same to our client. Our client has paid rents upto the end of December 1979. But you have receive the rents and have not issued receipts from June 1979 to the end of December 1979,"
The aforesaid notices sent through registered post were returned to the tenants on the ground that the addressees (landlord) was not found. The tenants produced copies of the notices along with the registered covers in both the cases. The landlord did not file any objection nor did he refute the contents of the letter which was produced before the Court below through a memo. The underlined portion of para 2 of the letter makes the intention of the parties clear as to what they intended when they arrived at a compromise for passing an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the order of eviction does provide for delivery of possession. Even otherwise, even if it is held that the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act does not contain all the necessary particulars regarding redelivery of possession from the landlord to the tenant of the premises built on demolishing the old premises and simply directs eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of Act, it does not in any way effect the right of the tenants, as in such a case, possession can be sought by the tenant by filing an application under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act as is done by the petitioners in the instant case. In K. Srinivasa Rao v. K.M. Narasimhaiah also an application was filed under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act seeking redelivery of possession of the new building. The trial Court on going through the terms of the compromise has held that the parties had agreed for redelivery of possession after reconstruction and has accordingly directed redelivery of possession of the new premises to the tenants. In the instant case, whether it is by way of separate application or by way of execution does not make any difference because, the Court which has to entertain the application or the execution petition is the same. Further the remedy against the order passed either on the application or on the execution side, lies to this Court. In the case of an application, revision lies to this Court under Section 50 of the Act or in the case of an order passed in the execution, revision lies to this Court, under Section 115 C.P.C. Therefore, we do not see any justification, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to hold that execution alone is maintainable as in substance it does not make any difference as far as the facts and circumstances of this case are concerned as stated earlier. Hence contention No. 2 is negatived.CONTENTION No. 3
12. It is contended that the tenants did not issue notice as required by Section 27 of the Act within six months from the date of delivery of possession, therefore, they are not entitled to seek redelivery of possession inasmuch as they must be deemed to have waived their right by their failure to issue notice; that if only the respondents-tenants had issued notice, the landlord would not have let out the premises to the third parties. This contention need not detain us any longer because in M/s. K.C. Saree Emporium's case, a Division Bench of this Court has interpreted that the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Act, regarding issuing of notice by the tenant to the landlord within six months from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the premises to the landlord expressing his intention to occupy the new building on its completion, are directory and are intended to confer benefits on the tenant. If the intention of the parties is clear from the order of eviction, the fact that the notice has not been issued under Section 27 of the Act does not result in depriving the tenants to seek redelivery of possession. Thus once it is held that the provisions regarding issuing of notice as contained in Section 27 of the Act are not mandatory, but are directory, the contention loses its efficacy.
13. In the instant case, as it is already pointed out, the parties when they agreed for an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act, it was also agreed that after erection of a new building, the tenant was to be put in possession of the same. This aspect is considered under Contention No. 2. When the landlord himself delayed taking possession of the old premises, he cannot be permitted to take a contention that the tenants did not issue notice by registered post within a period of six months from the date of delivery of possession by them requesting the landlord to deliver possession of the new building erected after demolishing the old premises. Of course, the notice sent by registered post was not delivered to the landlord. It was returned on the ground that the addressees was not found. Under the very terms of the compromise, it was provided that the rate of rent payable by the tenants should be mutually agreed upon and if the parties do not agree regarding the rate of rent payable by the tenants, the matter would be referred to the Competent Authority for fixing the rent. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid term of the compromise that the intention of the respondents-tenants to occupy the new building on its completion was conveyed to the landlord even at the time of passing the order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. Hence failure to give notice as per Section 27 of the Act to the landlord by the tenants did not militate against them. Hence in the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping in view the observations made in M/s. K.C. Saree Emporium's case, we are of the view that the absence of notice under Section 27 of the Act cannot be held to affect in any manner the right of the tenants to seek redelivery of possession. Accordingly, this contention is also rejected.CONTENTION No. 4
14. The last contention is that there is no equity in favour of the tenants inasmuch as they are in arrears of rent. The Court below has in this regard held that if there are any arrears, it is open to the landlord to recover the same by way of appropriate suit. It has accordingly rejected this contention. The Act confers a right on a tenant to secure possession of a new building on its completion and at the same time, it does not impose a condition that the tenant who is in arrears of rent is not entitled to be put in possession of the new building; therefore, it is not possible to appreciate the contention of the petitioner-landlord and deny relief to the respondents-tenants. Hence this contention is also rejected.
15. For the reasons stated above, the revision petitions fail and the same are dismissed.
16. As requested by the learned Counsel for the landlord, time for complying with the order is granted till the end of September 1990.