Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others vs Of on 6 May, 2016
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
.
CMP(M) No. 594 of 2014 Judgment reserved on: 29.4.2016 Date of Decision : 6.5.2016.
State of Himachal Pradesh and others. ...Applicants Versus of Sh. Satya Pal and others. ...Respondents ____________________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
rt Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Applicants: Ms.Meenakshi Sharma, Additional Advocate General with Mr.R.M. Bisht, and Ms.Parul Negi, Deputy Advocate Generals.
For the respondents: Mr.G.C. Gupta, Senior Advocate with
Ms.Meera Devi, Advocate, for
respondent No. 1.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge
This application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on behalf of the appellants/applicants, seeks condonation of 223 days delay in filing of the appeal. The applicants after filing the application and on receipt of reply, on 5.11.2014 sought time to file additional affidavit and thereafter when the matter was listed before the Court on 4.9.2015, when the applicants again sought an opportunity to file supplementary affidavit and in this manner apart from the application for condonation of delay, there are additional affidavits filed by the applicant on 12th March, 2015, 16th June, 2015 and 6th October, 2015 in support of the explanation of delay.
The sum and substance of these affidavits sets out the dates on ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 2 which the files relating to this appeal had moved from one desk to .
another.
3.6.2013 Appeal was decided by the learned District Judge (Forest) Shimla.
22.6.2013 Certified copy of judgment has also been received in the office of District Attorney Shimla. 28.6.2013 District Attorney Shimla sent the certified copy of of judgment along with two case files to the office of Land Acquisition Collector, HPPWD Winter Field, Shimla-3 vide letter No. 231.
2.7.2013 The Land Acquisition Collector sent the complete rt case to the Executive Engineer, IPH Division No. II, Shimla-3 vide letter No. 690.
4.7.2013 The Executive Engineer submitted the complete case to the Superintending Engineer, WS&S Circle, Shimla-3 vide letter No. 4236-39 for obtaining legal opinion in the matter.
19.7.2013 The Superintending Engineer sent the case for obtaining legal opinion to the Chief Engineer (SZ), IPH Department Shimla-1 vide letter No. 1836-38. 25.7.2013 The Chief Engineer sent the complete case to the Engineer in Chief, IPH Department Shimla-1 for obtaining legal opinion vide letter No. 424-25.
The Engineer in Chief advised that since the appeal was earlier filed by the Collector, therefore, next appeal is required to be filed by the Collector, hence asked Land Acquisition Collector to pursue the matter accordingly.
12.8.2013 The Engineer in Chief sent the opinion in the matter to the Chief Engineer vide letter No. 2403-05. 19.8.2013 The Chief Engineer sent the opinion to the Superintending Engineer vide letter No. 515-16. 6.9.2013 The Superintending Engineer sent the letter to Executive Engineer vide endorsement No. 2654. 17.9.2013 The Executive Engineer again submitted the letter to the Superintending Engineer regarding non return the complete case along with judgment vide letter No. 7994-95.
20.9.2013 The Superintending Engineer return the complete case vide letter No. 2815-16.
27.9.2013 The Chief Engineer sent the letter to the Engineer in Chief vide letter No. 634-35.
5.10.2013 The Engineer in Chief sent the complete original record to the Chief Engineer vide letter No. 3275. 5.10.2013 The Law Officer office of the Chief Engineer (SZ) IPH Department sent the said record to the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 3 Superintending Engineer vide letter No. 664. 8.10.2013 The Superintending Engineer sent the record to the .
Executive Engineer vide letter No. 3152.
14.10.2013 After receiving the original record/opinion, the Executive Engineer sent the complete record to the Land Acquisition Collector HPPWD Winter Field, Shimla-3 vide letter No. 8198-9201 21.10.2013 The copy of judgment/decree was received in the office of applicants from the office of Executive of Engineer IPH Division No. II Shimla through letter No. IPHDS-II-WA-II-Court case Staya Pal/2013-9198- 9201 dated 14.10.2013 addressed to the Land Acquisition Collector HPPWD Winter Field Shimla and rt copy of the same was endorsed to the Secretary (Revenue and Rehabilitation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.
13.11.2013 Thereafter, the applicant took up the matter with the Law Department and the Law Department had returned the same to the department with some observations that the record of the trial Court is not forwarded and without going through the record of trial Court it is not possible to give any legal opinion. 13.11.2013 The office of applicant wrote a letter to the office of Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) cum Settlement Officer (Sales) Shimla to supply the record of trial Court of relevant case.
18.11.2013 The office of the applicants received the record of trial Court.
19.11.2013 The matter was again referred to the Law Department along with record of the case.
28.11.2013 The opinion of Law Department received in the office of the applicants, in which Law Department was disagreed with the department over the issue of filing of appeal.
10.12.2013 The main case file of record of trial Court was received from the office of Land Acquisition Collector vide their letter No. PW-LAS-SZ-Civil Appeal titled as State of H.P. Vs. Staya Pal and another/13-14-1845- 48 dated 27.11.2013.
4.1.2014 The matter was again referred to the Law Department along with the entire record pertaining to this case. 16.1.2014 Law Department opined that the orders of Learned District Judge (Forest) should be assailed in the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh as perusal of the record shows that serious contentious issues are required to be got settled.
16.1.2014 The file was received in the office of applicant and after re-examination of the matter from the Law ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 4 Department the matter was kept for discussion because the old record pertaining to the land in .
dispute was to be examined for the purpose of preparing the draft appeal and due to non-availability of the requisite complete record, the matter could not be discussed till 11.2.2014.
After receiving/collecting the requisite record, the matter was discussed and concerned branch was directed to prepare the draft appeal.
of 22.2.2014 After preparing the draft appeal and the matter was discussed with the authority and it was decided that before submitting the draft appeal for its vetting with the office of learned Advocate General, the matter rt may be discussed on the issue whether in this matter Civil Writ Petition or Regular Second Appeal is required to be filed.
10.3.2014 The matter was discussed with the office of learned Advocate General and the office of learned Advocate General advised that against the order passed by the learned Court below, Regular Second Appeal along with application for condonation of delay is required to be filed.
The matter was further discussed with the office of learned Advocate General, where it was advised that the judgment will be assailed by way of Regular Second Appeal and the department has taken all sincere efforts for filing of the Regular Second Appeal. The draft of the Regular Second Appeal has been prepared and put up for the approval of the competent authority.
29.3.2014 The draft of the Regular Second Appeal and application under Section 5 of Limitation Act were approved.
31.3.2014 The official of the applicant was sent to the office of learned Advocate General for vetting of Regular Second Appeal.
2.4.2014 The Regular Second Appeal was vetted. However, the observations regarding delay had been pointed out by learned Additional Advocate General. 5.4.2014 In compliance of the observations, the matter was taken up with the office of Executive Engineer IPH Division No. 2 to supply necessary comments. 9.4.2014 After receiving letter from the said office file was again taken to the office of learned Advocate General for final vetting.
11.4.2014 The official of the applicant was again sent to the office of learned Advocate General for vetting the application and the same was vetted.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 523.4.2014 File was again put up in the department for doing needful as per the advice of the office of learned .
Advocate General.
25.4.2014 Matter was finally sent to the office of learned Advocate General for filing Regular Second Appeal along with application for staying the order dated 3.6.2013 and application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
of
2. It is averred that the decision on the file is usually not taken by a single person and file went through different channels rt for consideration and due to processing the matter at different channel, as narrated above, the appeal could not be filed immediately after receipt of the opinion of Law Department dated 16.1.2014. It is further averred that the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful, but on account of the aforesaid reasons.
3. Mr.R.M. Bisht, learned Deputy Advocate General argued that the expression sufficient cause ought to be interpreted in a manner which subserves the cause of justice or else, where even arguable points are involved, the cases could be thrown out at the threshold, resulting not only injustice, but perpetuating the same. He would further argue that this Court should take a pragmatic and not adopt a hyper technical approach in dealing with limitation period, more so when the stakes are high and there are arguable points.
4. While on the other hand Mr. G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms.Meera Devi, Advocate has seriously contested the application by contending that unexplained ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 6 delay has occasioned at every stage and since the concerned .
appellant was well aware of the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation, therefore, the delay should not be condoned. He would further argue that the Government Departments are under special obligation to ensure that they of perform their duties with diligence and commitment and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an rt anticipated benefit for the government department. After all there is no separate period of limitation for the Government.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case.
5. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus:-
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases--Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation---The fact that the appellant or the applicant was mislead by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
6. The law of limitation is based on the legal maxim "Interest Reipubulicea Ut Sit Finis Litium" which means that it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. It is more than settled that no litigant benefits by approaching the Court late.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 7Without any good cause, no would like to have his claim .
extinguished.
7. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst.
Katiji, (1987) SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while laying down certain principles for condonation of delay, made a significant of departure from the earlier judgments and observed:-
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay rt by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinary a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 8
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial .
justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or of on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious rt risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 9 cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do .
even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits."
8. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the scope and ambit of law of limitation was explained by of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following manner:-
"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of rt discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 10
Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do .
not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted of time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be rt fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749.
It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 11 when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then .
the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Count should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary of guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."
rt
9. In S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. Vs. Narasamma (dead) through LRs. (2013) 11 SCC 341, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in no unequivocal terms held that expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and unless the opposite party is able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:-
"12. The expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 12 condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more .
towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by.
14. We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting forth his of cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rt rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of the matter. In the instant case, we find that the appellants have shown sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay and the same has been explained satisfactorily."
10. In a very recent decision in B.S. Sheshagiri Setty and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2016) 2 SCC 123, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:-
"28. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it must be exercised within a reasonable time frame. In the instant case, it is evident that constant litigation has been carried on by the appellants, and therefore they cannot be accused of suddenly waking ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 13 up after 13 years to claim their land. Further, in the context of limitation, it has been held by this Court in a catena of .
cases that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant.
29. A three judge bench of this Court in the case of State of of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 has held as under: (SCC pp. 135036, para 7) rt "The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
30. More recently, a two Judge bench of this Court observed in the case of Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 14 SCC 127 as under: (SCC p. 131, para 15) "15.......The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hyper technical view of self-
imposed limitations."
11. Having noticed herein above, certain decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, I may now refer to the specific case law cited by the parties.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 1412. Mr.R.M. Bisht, learned Deputy Advocate General has .
placed reliance upon the following judgments:-
State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and Others, (2005) 3 SCC 752, State of Jammu and Kashmir and others Vs. Mohmad Maqbool Sofi and others (2009) 15 SCC 177 and of Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat Vs. G. Arumugam (dead) by legal representatives, (2015) 3 SCC 569.
13. rt In State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and Others, (2005) 3 SCC 752, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that justice-oriented approach should be adopted in the matter of condonation of delay and unless a pragmatic view is taken, injustice is bound to occur. Reliance has been placed on following observations:
"10. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1979 (4) SCC 365) which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Matu Din v. A. Narayanan (1969 (2) SCC 770), this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.
11. In State of Kerala v. E. K. Kuriyipe (1981 Supp SCC
72), it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 15 Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982 (3) SCC 366), it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the .
appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was of remitted for decision on merits.
12. In O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (1984 (4) SCC 66), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to rt condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987 (2) SCC 107), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 16 account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is .
not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The of fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, rt including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.
13 Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on- the-
buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra (1987 Supp SCC 339), this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 17 condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious .
disposal in accordance with law.
14. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988 (2) SCC 142), it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must of receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice rt where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 18tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that .
those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, of perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental rt functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision- making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 19 should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts .
or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made of personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision rt whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.
16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (1996 (3) SCC 132); and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma (1996 (10) SCC 634). It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal.
17. When the factual background is considered in the light of legal principles as noted above the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 57 days deserved condonation. Therefore, the order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay is set aside.
18. In normal course, we would have required the High Court to consider the application praying for grant of leave on merits. But keeping in view the long passage of time and the points involved, we deem it proper to direct grant of leave to appeal. The appeal shall be registered and disposed of on merits. It shall not be construed that we have expressed any merits on the appeal to be adjudicated by the High Court."
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 2014. In State of Jammu and Kashmir and others Vs. .
Mohmad Maqbool Sofi and others (2009) 15 SCC 177, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the fact that in so far as the appeals filed by the State are concerned, they are routed through different departments which requires some time and therefore, the of delay of 97 days in filing LPA before the High Court ought to have been condoned. Reliance has been placed upon the following observations:-
rt "3. It is not in dispute that there has been a delay of 97 days in filing the appeal at the instance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is well settled that for the purpose of filing an appeal, the file has to be rooted through different departments of the State which require some time to take a final decision whether the Letters Patent Appeal shall be filed against the order of the learned Single Judge.
4. That being the position, we set aside the impugned order and restore the Letters Patent Appeal to its original number.
The High Court is now requested to dispose of the Letters Patent Appeal within three months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a reasoned order in accordance with law."
15. In Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat Vs. G. Arumugam (dead) by legal representatives, (2015) 3 SCC 569, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the Court is convinced that there has been an attempt on part of government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, Court, in view of the larger public interest, should take a lenient view in such situations, condone the delay, howsoever huge may be the delay, ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 21 and have the matter decided on merits. Following observations .
have been relied upon:
"3. In the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant on 12.12.2006, it is brought to the notice of this Court that Shri K. G. Ramasamy, who was working as Executive Officer of the Panchayat at the relevant time was of suspended from service w.e.f. 12.07.2002 on allegations of corruption. Be that as it may, after going through the records and after hearing the counsel on both sides, we are rt satisfied that the delay occasioned only on account of the deliberate lapses on the part of the Executive Officer of the Panchayat at the relevant time. Who else are involved in the process, is not quite clear.
4. As held by this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and others, (2005) 3 SCC 752, the court must always take a justice-oriented approach while considering an application for condonation of delay. If the court is convinced that there had been an attempt on the part of the government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, the court, in view of the larger public interest, should take a lenient view in such situations, condone the delay, howsoever huge may be the delay, and have the matter decided on merits.
5. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and condone the delay of 1373 days in filing the second appeal. The case is remitted to the High court for further consideration in accordance with law. The Interlocutory Application No. 2 of 2014 is accordingly disposed of."
16. On the other hand, Mr. G.C. Gupta, Senior Advocate has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
Post Master General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and others (2012) 3 SCC 563, Popat Bahiru ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 22 Goverdhane and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer .
and another (2013) 10 SCC 765, Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, Basawaraj and another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, State of U.P. Vs. of Amar Nath Yadav AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 1917 and a coordinate Bench of this Court in General Manager Northern Railway Vs. rt Julfi Ram and others Latest HLJ 2014 (HP) 833.
17. In Post Master General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and others (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the affidavit filed by the appellant therein clearly indicated that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties. The following observations have been relied upon by the respondent:-
"26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 23
Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, .
the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were of well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They rt cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
29. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 24 considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation .
to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
of
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning rt of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."
18. Popat Bahiru Goverdhane and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and another (2013) 10 SCC 765, it was categorically held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there was need for strict compliance with statutory scheme and it was not permissible for the Courts to extent period of limitation, if statute does not permit the same and further the law of limitation though may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. Reliance has been placed on the following observations:-
"16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means the "law is hard ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 25 but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a .
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation".
(See: The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, of AIR 1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30).
17. In view of the above, we are of the candid view that rt none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is tenable. As the matters are squarely covered by the above referred to judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit. The cases do not warrant any interference. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed."
19. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, the principles applicable to an application for condonation of delay were culled out in the following terms:-
"(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 26
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part .
of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public of mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no rt real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 27 paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual .
perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."
20. In Basawaraj and another Vs. Special Land of Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised rt judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case.
Sufficient cause cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides is attributed to the party. It was further re-iterated that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. The Courts have no choice but to give effect to the same.
It was further held that inconvenience is not a ground for interpreting a statute and the Court do not have power to extend period of limitation based on equitable grounds. Reliance has been placed upon the following observations:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 28 should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and .
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court of exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from prosecuting his case, and unless rt a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See:
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a good cause and a sufficient cause and observed that every sufficient cause is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of sufficient cause.
11. The expression sufficient cause should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 29
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with .
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its of operation. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The rt legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means the law is hard but it is the law, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, inconvenience is not a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence".
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 30 Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam .
Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly of in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect rt that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the sufficient cause which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
21. In State of U.P. Vs. Amar Nath Yadav AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 1917, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the observation made earlier in Post Master General's case (supra).
22. This Court in General Manager Northern Railway Vs. Julfi Ram and others Latest HLJ 2014 (HP) 833 has held that the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 31 application for condonation of delay filed in a casual manner and .
without assigning any specific reason does not constitute sufficient cause and liberal approach in sufficient cause of delay cannot override substantial law of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the following observations.
of "4 It is settled law that the Courts have to take a liberal approach while considering the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act if the delay is of short duration, but the rt approach of the Court should be strict in case there is an ordinate delay.
5 Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459 have held that there shall be liberal approach in condoning delay of short duration and stricter approach in cases of inordinate delay. Their Lordships have further held that same yardstick should be applied for deciding applications of private individuals and the State. However, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible with regard to the State. Their Lordships have held as under:-
"14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 32 shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.
.
15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and of fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in rt condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106.
16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309, State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635, State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752, and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 33
6 Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) .
4 SCC 363 have held that liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not override substantial law of limitation, especially when court finds no justification for delay. Their Lordships have held as under:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by of the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this rt country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section
5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107).
23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (supra), as follows:-
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation."
"26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 34 party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and .
its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then of alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to rt deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay.
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 3529. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been .
repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary of powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within rt reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies;
prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers."
7 Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 have held that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can never become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. Their Lordships have further held that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Their Lordships have held as under:-
"20. In Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106, the Court observed that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 36 and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in .
the latter case no such consideration arises.
23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar of statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rt rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.
24. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.
25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies / instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 37
29. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in .
the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the of cause shown by the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly rtunsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation"
23. From the conspectus of various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it would not be too farfetched to conclude that when inordinate delay occurs due to sheer lethargy and negligence on the part of the Government authorities in taking decision to approach appropriate forum/Court of law and such delay remains unexplained, the Courts would undoubtedly refuse to exercise its discretion to condone the delay. But once it is established on record that there was no deliberate inaction, lethargy or willful or deliberate negligence or malafides on the part of the Government authorities in taking decision, then in such situation technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do the justice and in such cases the approach of the Courts would be governed by the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Katiji (supra).
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 3824. Further testing the case on the touchstone of the .
principles that have been broadly laid down in Esha Bhattacharjee case (supra), it would be evident from the material place on record that the appellant cannot be accused of lethargy, negligence or inaction in pursuing the matter and at no stage the case file was of dumped. There is no slackness on the part of the appellants. This Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that there were as many as rt three different departments involved in the litigation and in such situation it was obvious that a single authority of its own could not have taken decision.
25. As judiciously noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohmad Maqbool Sofi (supra) that in so far as the State is concerned, for the purpose of filing of an appeal, its files have to be routed through different departments and the same would obviously take some time before a final decision thereupon is taken. Therefore, in such circumstances the approach of the Court has to be liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic and is not supposed to legalise injustice but is obliged to remove injustice.
The sufficient cause has to be understood in proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation.
26. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations cannot be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. However, no presumption can be attached to deliberate ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP 39 causation of delay and there is also no gross negligence on the .
part of the appeal, which is really worthy to be taken note of. Still further there is no lack of bonafides imputable to the appellants, who have remained vigilant in pursuing the case. The delay in the given circumstances cannot be said to be "inordinate" or of "unexplained".
27. Having said so, I find that the appellants have been rt able to carve out a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and accordingly the delay of 223 days in filing the same is condoned. The application is disposed of.
Appeal be registered. List for admission on 13.5.2016.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan),
6th May, 2016 Judge.
(KRS)
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:17:16 :::HCHP