Punjab-Haryana High Court
Harjit Kaur vs M.K. Seth And Anr. on 15 September, 2004
Equivalent citations: (2005)139PLR547
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is landlord's petition filed under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for brevity 'the Act') challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below wherein it has been held that the landlord-petitioner did not require the demised house for her occupation or for occupation of her son. It has also been held that the grounds set up by the landlord-petitioner are false. The ground of non payment of rent has not been pressed because the rent was paid by the tenant-respondent. Both the Court below have recorded the finding that version of the landlord-petitioner that the she required gall bladder surgery have been disbelieved by both the Courts below because the land- lord-petitioner would not required to permanently come to Ludhiana for the treatment of the afore-mentioned disease. Moreover, the landlord-petitioners who were living in the demised-house had shifted to village Dhudike and the demised house was rented out to the tenant-respondent. Learned Appellate Authority has posed a relevant question as to what happened between the shifting of the landlord-petitioner and her family from Ludhiana to Dhudike in 1978-79 till the filing of rejectment petition by her on 7.3.1981 so as to justify the demand for shifting back to Ludhiana. It has been held that the story of illness of the appellant and consequent necessity of shifting to Ludhiana is nothing but a devise to get the ejectment of the tenant respondent on one pretext or the other be- cause her gall bladder was removed in March, 1981 and there is no necessity for her to come to Ludhiana so frequently so as to require the house. In any case the version of the landlord-petitioner is not corroborated by any medical evidence. Similarly, the ne- cessity of the son has been found to be superfluous because he was employed as a teacher in Punjab Public School, Nabha. Nothing has been shown that he has been car- rying out any work as IV Mechanic at Ludhiana or at any other place in pursuance to the Diploma in T.V. and Radio Technology.
2. Shri M.J.S.Sethi, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to persuade me to take a view different than the one taken by the Courts below because there are concurrent findings of facts which are based on evidence.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that the power of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below under sub-section 5 of the Section 15 are extremely limited.
4. The revisional power of this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act cannot be equated with the power to appeal. It is true that power in revision under Section 15(5) of the Act is wider than the power of revision preferred on this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but still it would fall short of the power of the ap- pellate Court. Sub Section 5 of the Section 15 of the Act is reproduced below for facility of reference :-
"15. Vesting of appellate authority on officers by State Government:- (5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion, call and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings may pass such an order in relation thereto as it may deem fit."
5. A similar provision made in the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity 'the Haryana Act') came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Vaneet Jain v. Jag/it Singh} (2000-3)126 P.L.R. 263 (S.C.). Deal- ing with the sub Section 6 of Section 15 of the Haryana Act which is pari materia to sub Section 5 of Section 15 of the Act, their Lordships observed as under:
"Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the Court below, this Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999)6 S.C.C. 222 held, that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in accordance with law. For the limited purpose the High Court would be justified in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co, Ltd., (1998)8 S.C.C. 119 it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.
A perusal of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below."
6. Similar view has been taken in the case of Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 (Suppl)2 S.C.C. 345 and Bhoop Chand v. Kay Pee Cee Investments,3 (1991)1 S.C.C. 343. Sub Section 6 of the Section 15 of the Haryana Act also fell for consideration in the case of Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995-3)111 P.L.R. 276 (S.C.). Placing reliance on Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698, State of Kerala v. KM. Charla Abdullah and Co.,6 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1585 and Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 499, their Lordships pointed out the distinction between the revisional power under the Rent Act and the appellate power which reads as under:
"From the use of expression "Legality or propriety of such order or proceedings" occurring in sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, it appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court under the Act is wider than the power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is confined to jurisdiction, but it is also not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb a concurrent finding of fact properly arrived at without recording a finding that such conclusions are perverse or based on no evidence or based on a superficial and perfunctory approach. If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the aforementioned well-recognised principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the find distinction between an appeal and a revision. That being so unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the concurrent finding recorded by the two courts below are wholly perverse and erroneous which manifestly appear to be unjust there should be no interference."
7. From the above enunciation of law laid down by the Supreme Court it is evident that despite wider nature of powers of revision with the High Court under the Rent Act than the power of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a distinction has to be maintained between a revision and an appeal. The ground of revisions are limited and can be summed up as under:-
a) Findings are perverse;
b) Findings are bald and without evidence;
c) Findings are based on perfunctory and superficial approach;
d) Findings are wholly unreasonable;
e) Findings cannot be reversed by re-assessing evidence merely because a view different than the one recorded by the Courts below is possible;
f) Powers of revision under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act do not extend to power of regular appeal.
8. When the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the principles laid down, in the binding precedents referred to above, no doubt is left that there is no scope for this Court to interfere in the findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below. It cannot be concluded that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts be- low are superficial and perfunctory in nature. It can also not be said that the material pieces of evidence have not been considered by both the Courts below. Therefore, the revision petition is devoid of any merit and is thus liable to be dismissed.
9. Moreover, personal necessity of the landlord is required to have the element of need and not that of greed. Facts of the present case shows that landlord-petitioner has filed the petition for reasons other than the personal necessity and it is found to be merely her wish. The petition is pending since 1988 no further efforts have been made by the landlord-petitioner to place on record any further development showing that her necessity has increased any further. It has been categorically stated by the counsel for the petitioner that landlord-petitioner has not posted with the latest facts. Therefore, no assistance to the Court could be rendered in respect of any later development. Even counsel for the tenant-respondent has not put in appearance.
10. In view of the above, I do not find any legal affirmity in the finding of facts re- corded by both the Courts below which are hereby affirmed and the instant petition is dismissed.