Karnataka High Court
Gangya @ Gangadhar vs The State Of Karnataka on 22 January, 2021
Author: K.Natarajan
Bench: K. Natarajan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K. NATARAJAN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100329/2020
C/W.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100327/2020
IN CRL.A NO 100329 OF 2020
BETWEEN:
1. GANGYA @ GANGADHAR
S/O. SANTRAM SHINDE, AGE. 26 YEARS,
R/O. MARATHA GALLI, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
2. VINAYAK S/O. BASAVARAJ HADIGINAL
AGE. 22 YEARS,
R/O. MOKASHI GALLI, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
3. VITTAL S/O. PARASHURAM PAWAR
AGE. 23 YEARS,
R/O. MOKASHI GALLI, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
4. VINOD S/O. CHANDRU HOSAMANI
AGE. 22 YEARS,
R/O. SOMAWARPET, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
2
5. KIRAN S/O. VIJAY DODDANNAVAR
AGE. 22 YEARS,
R/O. AMBIGER GALLI, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
6. RAVI S/O. BHIMASHI CHUNNAVAR
AGE. 22 YEARS,
R/O. SIDDESHWAR NAGAR, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
7. KEDARI BASAVANNI JADHAV
AGE. 36 YEARS,
R/O. MARATHA GALLI, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
8. SANTOSH @ SANTU
S/O. PANDURANG CHIGADOLLI,
AGE. 21 YEARS,
R/O. MARATHA GALLI, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI 590 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. ZAHEERABBAS M. HATTARKI AND SRI. HARSHAWARDHAN
M. PATIL, ADVOCATES)
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY GOKAK TOWN POLICE STATION,
R/BY THE ADDL. STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH, DHARWAD 580 011.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. V. M SHEELVANTH, SPP FOR RESPONDENT-STATE;
SRI.AVINASH M. ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR DE-FACTO
COMPLAINANT)
3
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED U SEC. 12 OF KARNATAKA
CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIMES ACT, 2000, PRAYING TO QUASH
THE ORDER PASSED BY THE PRL. SESSIONS JUDGE (KCOCA SPL.
JUDGE) BELAGAVI IN GOKAK TOWN PS CRIME NO.72/2020 DATED
30/07/2020 VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND THEREBY GRANTING
EXTENSION OF TIME IN VIEW OF SECTION 22 OF KARNATAKA
CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIMES ACT 2000 BE SET ASIDE AND
THE APPELLANTS ACCUSED NO.1 TO 7 MAY KINDLY BE ENLARGED
ON DEFAULT BAIL U/SEC. 167(2) OF CR.P.C. IN CONNECTION
WITH THE GOKAK TOWN PS CRIME NO.72/2020 FOR THE
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE U/SEC. 143, 147, 148, 302, 504, 506 R/W
SEC. 149 OF IPC AND SEC.3(2) (V) OF SC/ST (PREVENTION OF
ATROCITIES) ACT AND SECTION 25(1) A OF ARMS ACT AND
SECTION 120B OF IPC AND SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIME ACT 2000.
IN CRL.A.NO.100327/2020
BETWEEN:
SUNIL S/O MALLIKARJUN MURKIBHAVI
AGE. 43 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O BASAVA NAGAR, GOKAK,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST.BELAGAVI 591 307.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PATIL M H AND SRI. H. M. PATIL, ADVOCATES)
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY GOKAK TOWN POLICE STATION,
R/BY THE ADDL. STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH, DHARWAD.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. V. M SHEELVANTH, SPP FOR RESPONDENT-STATE;
SRI. AVINASH M. ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR DE-FACTO
COMPLAINANT)
4
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED U SEC. 12 OF KARNATAKA
CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIMES ACT, 2000, PRAYING TO QUASH
THE ORDER PASSED BY THE PRL. SESSIONS JUDGE (KCOCA SPL.
JUDGE) BELAGAVI IN GOKAK TOWN PS CRIME NO.72/2020 DATED
30/07/2020 VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND THEREBY GRANTING
EXTENSION OF TIME IN VIEW OF SECTION 22 OF KARNATAKA
CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIMES ACT 2000 BE SET ASIDE AND
THE APPELLANT ACCUSED NO.8 MAY KINDLY BE ENLARGED ON
DEFAULT BAIL U/SEC. 167(2) OF CR.P.C. IN CONNECTION WITH
THE GOKAK TOWN PS CRIME NO.72/2020 FOR THE OFFENCES
PUNISHABLE U/SEC. 143, 147, 148, 302, 504, 506 R/W SEC. 149
OF IPC AND SEC.3(2) (V) OF SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES)
ACT AND SECTION 25(1) A OF ARMS ACT AND SECTION 120B OF
IPC AND SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THE KARNATAKA CONTROL OF
ORGANIZED CRIME ACT 2000.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD THROUGH PHYSICAL
HEARING AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 18.01.2021, COMING
ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
COMMON JUDGMENT
Accused Nos. 1 to 7 and 9 have filed Criminal Appeal No.100329/2020 whereas accused No.8 filed Criminal Appeal No.100327/2020 under Section 12 of the Karnataka Control of Organized Crimes Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the KCOCA Act', for brevity), against the common order passed by the Principal Sessions Judge (KCOCA Special Judge), Belagavi (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court', for brevity) in Crime No.72/2020 registered by Gokak Town Police Station.
5
2. Heard the arguments of learned counsel Zaheerabbas M. Hattarki and Harshwardhan M. Patil, for the appellants and learned SPP Sri. V. M. Sheelvant for the respondent-State. The ranks of the parties before the trial Court is retained for brevity.
3. The factual matrix of the case of the prosecution is that, the Gokak Town Police registered the case in crime No.72/2020 against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 302, 504, 506, 120(B) R/w. Section 149 of IPC, Section 3(2) (v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Section 25(1)A of Arms Act and Sections 3 and 4 of the KCOCA Act. The accused persons were arrested by the police and they were remanded to judicial custody and the police required to file the charge sheet within 90 days from the date of their arrest. During the pendency of the investigation, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) through the public prosecutor moved an application under Section 22 of the KCOCA Act for extension of time by another 90 days for filing of the charge sheet. Accordingly, the learned trial Judge allowed the application on 30.07.2020. Subsequently, the accused persons moved an application under Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. 6 seeking statutory bail for non-filing of the charge sheet within the prescribed time, which came to be rejected. Being aggrieved by both the orders, the accused persons 1 to 9 have preferred these appeals.
4. Learned SPP Sri.V. M. Sheelvant filed detailed objections.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants/accused contended that the order passed by the trial Court extending the time for filing of the charge sheet and rejection of the bail application of the accused u/s. 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. are against the provisions of law. Section 22 of the KCOCA Act is synonyms to the section 21 of the MCOC Act, Section 20 of the TADA Act, Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act, Section 43D(2) (b) of the Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act, 1967 and Section 49(2)(b) of POTA Act.
Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that, in order to extend the time limit for filing of the charge sheet, the public prosecutor is required to file a detailed report under Section 22 of the KCOCA Act, which is not filed. On the other hand, he has forwarded the report of the I.O. and based upon the said report of 7 the I.O. the trial Court extended the time limit which is not correct and against the judgment of the Hon'le Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602. There is no notice issued to the accused persons prior to extending the time for filing the charge sheet as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Hitendra Vishnu's case (supra) and thereby order of the trial Court is sheer violation of the principles of natural justice.
Learned counsel further contended that the Coordinate Bench of this Court also observed the same in the case of Sayeed Majid Ahamed Vs. State of Karnataka passed Criminal Petition No.4398/2020 and connected matter. In a similar case the Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the order of the Bombay High Court, Bench at Aurangabad and directed the District Judge to dispose the matter on merits. Even while rejecting the application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., has observed, the report of the prosecutor is essential, but the public prosecutor has not filed any independent report and therefore the order of the trial Court is nonest of law. Hence prayed for setting aside the same and consequently, for 8 granting bail to the accused persons u/s. 167(2) of Cr.P.C. by allowing this appeal.
6. The learned SPP by filing objection contended that the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the accused is not applicable to the fact and circumstances of this case and he would further contended that in Hitendra Vishnu's case and other matters, the period of 90 days was already lapsed. The right of accused for getting bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. was accrued but the trial Court has not given any opportunity to the accused by issuing notice before extending the time. But here in this case, the charge sheet is required to be filed by the I.O. on the 90th day, which is falls on 06.08.2020, but the I.O. submitted report on 30.07.2020, which is 83rd day of the arrest and the trial Court extended the time for another 90 days as per Section 22 of the KCOCA Act and the right for the accused was not at all accrued for getting default bail under section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, there is no necessity for the Court to issue notice to the accused persons before extending 90 days for filing the charge sheet. 9
Learned SPP further contended that, as per Section 22 of the KCOCA Act, it is mandatory to extend time for 90 days by the Special Court when a report is filed by the Public Prosecutor. Of course the trial Court considered the application filed by the Public Prosecutor which is annexed with the report of the I.O. and considering the entire request made by the Public Prosecutor, the trial Court extended the time for another 90 days for filing the charge sheet. Even on the next date of hearing, when case was called on 06.08.2020, the accused persons not moved any application before the trial Court even though 90 days expires on 06.08.2020. But the application is filed by the accused persons only on 12.10.2020 i.e., just seven days prior to the filing of the charge sheet. The trial Court considered the entire materials placed on record and after satisfaction, extended the time and as per the Section 22 of the KCOCA Act it is mandatory or compulsory to extend the time by the trial Court. Further he contended that the charge sheet is filed within 180 days and therefore, the question of granting default bail to the accused does not arise.
The learned SPP would further contend that the Public Prosecutor is not supposed to invent the facts and not to present 10 something new, but in this case, he has filed an application with the report of the I.O. and nothing is required to be attached with the report of the I.O. Therefore, the application of the Public Prosecutor itself is construed as a report. Therefore, the question of challenging the order of the trial Court would not arise. Hence prayed for dismissing the appeals.
7. Having heard the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned SPP, the points that arise for my consideration are:
i. Whether the trial Court is justified in extending another 90 days for filing the charge sheet u/s. 22 of the KCOCA Act?
ii. Whether the appellants/accused are entitled for default bail u/s. 167(2) of Cr.P.C?
8. On perusal of the records, the Gokak Town Police registered a case against accused persons for various offences in IPC and invoked Sections 3 and 4 of KCOCA Act. The accused persons were arrested by the police on various dates and charge sheet is required to be filed by the I.O. within the dates as mentioned below:
11
Accused No. Date of Arrest Charge sheet to be
filed or on before
Accused Nos. 1 to 3 08.05.2020 06.08.2020
Accused Nos. 4 to 6 11.05.2020 09.08.2020
Accused No.7 12.05.2020 10.08.2020
Accused No.9 18.05.2020 16.08.2020
9. The I.O. invoked Section 120B of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of KCOCA Act on 21.07.2020. During the investigation, prior to 06.08.2020, the Public Prosecutor by filing an application on 29.07.2020, along with the report of the I.O. seeking extension of another 90 days time for filing the charge sheet. The trial Court by considering the application filed by the Public Prosecutor allowed the application by extending another 90 days as per proviso to Section 22(b) of the KCOCA Act on 30.07.2020. Admittedly, the said order of extension has not been challenged by the appellants within 30 days from the date of the order as per Section 12 (2) of the KCOCA Act. However, after extending the time for filing the charge sheet by the police, which expired on 19.10.2020, and just 12 7 days prior to that, the accused filed an application under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. for granting default bail, which came to be rejected vide order dated 19.10.2020. The appellants/accused challenged both the orders together by filing the single appeal before this Court.
10. Section 22 (b) of the KCOCA Act provides for extending 90 days time in addition to the 90 days prescribed under the 167(2) Cr.P.C. which is as under:
"22. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. -
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law, every offence punishable under this Act, shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code and "Cognizable case" as defined in that clause shall be constructed accordingly.
(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modifications that, in sub-section (2), -
(a) The references to "fifteen days" and "Sixty days"
wherever they occur, shall be constructed as references to "Thirty days" and "ninety days" respectively; 13
(b) After the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted namely:-
"Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Special Court shall extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days.
xxxxxxxx"
11. Admittedly, the alleged offences are punishable with imprisonment for death or imprisonment for life. The investigation officer is required to file final report within 90 days as per Section 167 of Cr.P.C. As per Section 22 (b) of the KCOCA Act, which extends another 90 days on the report filed by the Public Prosecutor and on bare reading of the proviso, it defines that the Special Court shall extend the said period up to 180 days on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond 90 days. Of course the trial Court in its order dated 30.7.2020 not elaborately dealt with the application but it is stated, perused the application of the PP and heard the arguments of learned PP and by 14 referring to Section 22 of the KCOCA Act, extended another 90 days to complete the investigation. However, no notice has been issued to the accused while extending further 90 days for filing charge sheet.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu's case (supra) at para 20 while considering the TADA Act which is synonyms to the Section 22 of the KCOCA Act, has held as under:
"20. Thus, we find that once the period for film,- the charge- sheet has expired and either no extension under clause (bb) has been granted by the Designated Court or the period of extension has also expired, the accused person would be entitled to move an application for being admitted to bail under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA read with Section 167 of the Code and the Designated Court shall release him on bail, if the accused seeks to be so released and furnishes the requisite bail. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the expiry of the period during which investigation is required to be completed under Section 20(4) TADA read with Section 167 of the Code, the court must release the accused on bail on its own motion even without any application from an accused person on his offering to furnish bail. In our opinion an accused is required to make an application if lie wishes to be 15 released on bail on account of the 'default' of the investigating prosecuting agency and once such an application is made, the court should issue a notice to the public prosecutor who may either show that the prosecution has obtained the order for extension for completion of investigation from the court under clause (bb) or that the challan has been filed in the Designated Court before the expiry of the prescribed period or even that the prescribed period has actually not expired and thus resist the grant of bail on the alleged ground of 'default'. The issuance of notice would avoid the possibility of an accused obtaining an order of bail under the 'default' clause by either deliberately or inadvertently concealing certain facts and would avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It would, therefore, serve the ends of justice if both sides are heard on a petition for grant of bail on account of the prosecution's 'default'. Similarly, when a report is submitted by the public prosecutor to the Designated Court for grant of extension under clause (bb), its notice should be issued to the accused before granting such an extension so that an accused may have an opportunity to oppose the extension on all legitimate and legal grounds available to him. It is true that neither clause
(b) nor clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA specifically provide for the issuance of such a notice but in our opinion the issuance of such a notice must be read into these provisions both in the interest of the accused and the prosecution as well as for doing complete justice between the parties. This is a requirement of the principles of natural justice and the issuance of notice to the accused or the 16 public prosecutor, as the case may be, would accord with fair play in action, which the courts have always encouraged and even insisted upon. It would also strike a just balance between the interest of the liberty of an accused on the one hand and the society at large through the prosecuting agency on the other hand. There is no prohibition to the issuance of such a notice to the accused or the public prosecutor in the scheme of the Act and no prejudice whatsoever can be caused by the issuance of such a notice to any party. We must as already noticed reiterate that the objection to the grant of bail to an accused on account of the 'default' of the prosecution to complete the investigation and file the challan within the maximum period prescribed under clause(b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA or within the extended period as envisaged by clause (bb) has to be limited to cases where either the factual basis for invoking the 'default' clause is not available or the period for completion of investigation has been extended under clause (bb) and the like. No other condition like the gravity of the case, seriousness of the offence or character of the offender etc. can weigh with the court at that stage to refuse the grant of bail to an accused under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA on account of the 'default' of the prosecution."
13. The Coordinate bench of this court in a similar case in Crl.P.No.4398/2020 C/w. Crl.P.No. 4322/2020 in the case of Sayeed Mahzid Ahmed Vs. State of Karnataka and Ramesh 17 Kumar Vs. State of Karnataka in respect of the NDPS Act held similar.
14. I have perused the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the Coordinate Bench of this Court and judgment of Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. In all those cases, the 90 days period of time limit for filing the charge sheet has been completed and the right of the accused for getting default bail accrued, but the trial Court extended the time limit for another 90 days without giving any opportunity to the accused by issuing notice. But here in this case, the time for filing of the charge sheet expires only on 06.08.2020. But prior to that, on 30.07.2020, the Public Prosecutor moved an application along with the report of the I.O. regarding progress of the investigation and requirement of the time for completion of investigation has been mentioned. Based upon the report and application filed by the Public Prosecutor, the trial Court extended 90 days time prior to expiry of 90 days from the date of the arrest of the accused persons and as on 30.07.2020, there is no right for the accused accrued for seeking default bail under Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. and their application 18 under Section 167 Cr.P.C. is filed only on the 177th day of their arrest and by that time the trial Court already extended 90 days under Section 22 (b) of the KCOCA Act, which was not challenged by the accused persons by filing appeal under Section 12(2) of the KCOCA Act within 30 days from 30.07.2020. If at all the accused persons had no knowledge about the extension of time, they could have filed an application u/s. 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. immediately after completion of 90 days on 06.08.2020, but they filed application for default bail only on 12.10.2020. The fact remains that the accused knowing fully well about the extension of time by the trial Court, kept quite without filing any application and only to defeat the extension of time granted by the trial court, filed an application for default bail just prior to filing the charge sheet.
15. In my considered opinion, notice is required to be given to the accused only after accruing any right of getting default bail after expiry of 90 days from the date of their arrest. That apart, once the time is extended by the trial Court and the charge sheet is filed within 180 days, as per Section 22 (b) of the KCOCA Act, the 19 question of granting default bail to the accused u/s. 167(2) of Cr.P.C. does not arise.
16. That apart, with regard to the contention of the learned counsel that the Public Prosecutor shall file the report and he has only forwarded the request of the I.O. and therefore, he has not complied the proviso to Section 22(b) of the KCOCA Act, the learned SPP relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2019) 5 SCC 178 in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Surendra Pundlik Gadling and Ors, While considering the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the status of the prosecutor is not a part of the investigating agency, but it is an independent statutory authority and by considering the Hitendra Vishnu's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"36. No doubt, in para 23 of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur9 case, this Court laid emphasis on the importance of the scrutiny by a public prosecutor so as to not leave the detenu in the hands of the IO alone, being the police 8 (supra) 9 (supra) authority. The public prosecutor, thus, has the option to agree or disagree with the reasons given by the IO for seeking extension of time but in the facts of the present 20 case, the second document in the form of an application shows scrutiny of the first document and thereafter details grounds and expanded reasons for the requirement of further time to complete the investigation.
37. Undoubtedly the request of an IO for extension of time is not a substitute for the report of the public prosecutor but since we find that there has been, as per the comparison of the two documents, an application of mind by the public prosecutor as well as an endorsement by him, the infirmities in the form should not entitle the respondents to the benefit of a default bail when in substance there has been an application of mind. The detailed grounds certainly fall within the category of "compelling reasons" as enunciated in Sanjay Kedia case.
38. We are, thus, not able to persuade ourselves to agree with the conclusions of the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the impugned order and hold that the respondents would not be entitled to the benefit of default bail and consequently the impugned order is set aside.
39. We may, however, clarify that since the charge-sheet has been filed, any observations made by us herein, would not, in any manner, affect the right of the respondents to seek regular bail from the trial court, if so advised, which would be decided on its own merits by the trial court. The appeal is allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs."21
17. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Surendra Pundlik Gadling's case (supra), the Public Prosecutor filed the application before the Sessions Judge along with the report of the I.O. and based upon the report, the trial Court extended the time. The learned counsel for the accused not produced the application filed by the Public Prosecutor before the trial Court to verify the same by this Court and the learned counsel also not produced their application filed before the trial Court u/s. 167 of Cr.P.C. In the absence of those applications, especially the application filed by the prosecutor along with the report of the I.O., it cannot be acceptable that the Public Prosecutor has not filed any report of the I.O. along with the application for extension of time to comply the proviso to Section 22 (b) of the KCOCA Act.
18. For the reasons stated above, the appellants/accused have failed to make out a case that there was an error or omission committed by the trial Court while passing order without issuing notice to the accused and the order cannot be set aside in view of the Section 465 of Cr.P.C., wherein on technical grounds the Appellate Court cannot set aside the order or sentence passed by 22 the trial Court. Learned counsel for the appellants/accused not argued the case on merit and therefore, this Court has no occasion to consider the bail on merits. Therefore, the appellants are required to move the bail application before the Special Court for seeking bail.
19. Therefore, without expressing any opinion regarding merits of the case, I answer point No.1 in the affirmative holding that the trial Court is justified in allowing the application under Section 22(b) of the KCOCA Act while extending the time and answer point No.2 in negative that the appellants have failed to make out a case for getting default bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.
Accordingly, both the appeals filed by the accused No.1 to 7, 9 and 8 under Section 12 of the KCOCA Act are hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE gab