Gujarat High Court
Patel Kashiben D/O Jeshingbhai ... vs Special Land Acquisition Officer & on 28 April, 2014
Author: S.H.Vora
Bench: S.H.Vora
C/CA/4463/2014 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4463 of 2014
In
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1183 of 2014
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PATEL KASHIBEN D/O JESHINGBHAI RAICHANDBHAI....Applicant(s)
Versus
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & 1....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR KM SHETH, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 1.4
MS AMITA SHAH AGP for Respondents
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA
Date : 28/04/2014
ORAL ORDER
1. The present Civil Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been preferred by the applicants for condonation of delay of 169 days caused in preferring Appeal against the judgment and order dated 15.6.2013 delivered by the learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Himmatnagar in Land Acquisition Reference No.444 of 2001.
2. The reasons for delay caused in preferring Appeal are narrated in paragraph No.2 of the application. As such, the opponents have not controverted or challenged any of the reasons/explanations stated by the applicant in the said paragraph.
3. The words "sufficient cause for not making the Page 1 of 2 C/CA/4463/2014 ORDER application within the period of limitation" should be applied in a reasonable and liberal manner depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and type of the case. The word "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act needs a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bonafides or deliberate inaction on the part of the applicant. In nut shell, the decisive factor for condonation of delay is not the length of delay but sufficiency and satisfactory explanation. Since there is nothing on record so as to infer inaction or want of bonafides that can be attributed to the applicant, the applicant cannot be non-suited at threshold and thus, deprived of substantial justice which has been made available to the applicant by way of statutory appeal. So, in order to advance substantial justice to the applicant, the explanation of delay does not smack of malafides and the delay caused in preferring the Appeal is hereby condoned. The application stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
(S.H.VORA, J.) YNVYAS Page 2 of 2