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Jharkhand High Court

Dr R P Singh Ratan vs The State Of Jharkhand Through A D G ... on 18 June, 2015

Author: R.R. Prasad

Bench: R.R. Prasad

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         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                    W. P. (Cr.) No. 151 of 2014

         Dr. R.P. Singh Ratan                          .... ... Petitioner
                                  Versus
         State of Jharkhand through A.D.G., Vigilance & Anr. ... ... Respondents
                               -----

         CORAM:     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R. PRASAD
                            -----

         For the Petitioner   : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate
         For the Vigilance    : Mr. Shailesh, Advocate
         For the Respondent No. 2: Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Sr. Advocate
                              -----

     C.A.V. ON 08.01.2015                   PRONOUNCED ON 18/06/2015

8/ 18.06.2015

This writ application has been filed for quashing of the order dated 1.7.2014 passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, Ranchi in Special Case No. 06A of 2010, whereby and whereunder, cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act has been taken against the petitioner.

Before adverting to the submission advanced on behalf of the parties, the case of the prosecution needs to be taken notice of.

On 20.7.2010 the complainant-respondent no. 2 lodged a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Ranchi alleging therein that one Harendra Prasad Singh, working in the office of the Director, Education, took a sum of Rs. 5000/- on 21.1.2010 for favouring him in the departmental proceeding going on against him. Even after taking the said amount, Harendra Prasad Singh was pressurising him to pay further a sum of Rs. 20,000/-, as the Director (petitioner) is very annoyed. In such situation, he lodged a case on 27.1.2010.

On the same day, Superintendent of Police, Vigilance deputed one officer to verify the allegation made in the complaint. During verification, when one Inspector of the Vigilance Bureau came to the department of Education Extension, Birsa Agricultural University and was having talk with the complainant, Harendra Prasad Singh, Section Officer of the Department, came before the complainant and told him that if he wants 2 to be exonerated from the allegation for which a departmental proceeding has been initiated, he has to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. Upon it the complainant told that he is not capable of giving such amount, rather he would be paying Rs. 10,000/- only. Thereupon, Harendra Prasad Singh told him that it would not be sufficient as money is to be given to this petitioner also. However, the matter was finalized at Rs. 10,000/-. Thereupon, Harendra Prasad Singh took the complainant to the room of the Director (petitioner) and told him that the complainant is ready to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. Upon it, the petitioner told the complainant to pay the money at 10:30am on 24.02.2010 in the office and if he will not remain present, the same be given to Harendra Prasad Singh. Thereafter when verification report was submitted, a case was registered as Vigilance P.S. Case No. 6 of 2010 under Sections 7/13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act against Harendra Prasad Singh and the petitioner. Thereupon, a trap was laid by the Vigilance Bureau during which Harendra Prasad Singh was caught red handed while accepting Rs. 10,000/- as illegal gratification. Subsequently, charge-sheet was submitted against Harendra Prasad Singh only. So far this petitioner is concerned, the investigation was kept open. However, later on final form was submitted against the petitioner showing evidence being insufficient against him. Thereafter, the complainant filed a protest petition alleging therein that since the petitioner has favoured the son of the Investigating Officer in getting employment, charge-sheet was not submitted against him though sufficient materials were there showing culpability of the petitioner. The court having regard to the allegation made in the complaint petition and also the fact collected during verification found sufficient material to constitute offence under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner and hence issued summon against the petitioner vide order dated 1.7.2014 which is under challenge.

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Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that admittedly cognizance of the offence has been taken against the petitioner without there being any sanction in terms of the provisions as contained in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and thereby the order taking cognizance being bad is fit to be quashed.

In this regard, it was further submitted that even reference of the complaint, lodged by a private complainant in terms of Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. for investigation by the police in absence of sanction under Section 19(1) C.P.C., is bad which proposition has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of Anil Kumar & Ors. Vs. M.K. Aiyappa and another {(2013) 10 SCC 705}. In that event, the order taking cognizance without there being any sanction for prosecution against the petitioner cannot be sustained and thereby the order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed.

As against this, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no. 2 as well as Mr. Shailesh, learned counsel for the Vigilance, submit that sanction can be granted at any stage of the case which has been a settled proposition of law and thereby the order taking cognizance cannot be said to be bad.

In support of the submissions, numbers of decisions rendered in the cases of Subramanian Swamy Vs. Manmohan Singh and another {(2012) 3 SCC 64}, Vineet Narain and others Vs. Union of India and another {(1998) 1 SCC 226}, Manzoor Ali Khan Vs. Union of India & Ors. {2014 (3) JBCJ 531(SC)}, K. Kalimuthu Vs. State of by D.S.P.{(2005) 4 SCC 512} and Dharam Pal & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. {2014 (1) JBCJ 539 (SC)} have been referred to in this regard.

In context of the submission, one needs to take notice of the provisions as contained in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act which reads as follows:-

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"19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-- (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,--
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed."

From perusal of the said provision, it is evidently clear that the bar has been put over the court to take cognizance in absence of sanction which would arise in a case where the offence has been committed by a public servant who is holding the office and by misusing and abusing the powers of the office, he has committed the offence. In number of cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that if the person after misusing or abusing the powers of the office demits the office on account of any reason sanction needs not to be there for the prosecution of the person, as the word 'office' repeatedly used in Section 19 would mean the 'office' which the public servant misuses or abuses by corrupt motive for which he is to be prosecuted. Here in the instant case, it is never the case of any of the parties that the petitioner has not been holding the same, power of which has been alleged to have been misused or abused.

In the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) whatever observation with respect to sanction being not required is there, that is in the context that the person after abusing or misusing the powers of the offence had demitted the offence. Moreover, the core question, which fell for consideration in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra), was that 5 whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and whether the authority is competent to grant sanction of a public servant for offences under 1988 Act which is required to take appropriate decision within the time specified in the case of Vineet Narain and others (supra)?

Coming to another decision of K. Kalimuthu (supra), the issue, which fell for consideration, was whether there is need of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. as soon as the complaint is lodged. However, Their Lordships did hold that the question whether sanction is necessary or not might be determined from stage to stage. So far as the decision rendered by the Constitutional Bench in a case of Dharam Pal & Ors. (supra) is concerned, the issue was altogether different wherein the core issue was that if the final form is submitted against some out of the several accused persons, what recourse is left with the Magistrate who disagrees with the police report. In the case of Manzoor Ali Khan (supra), the issue, which was raised before Their Lordships, was whether Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act is unconstitutional and whether any further direction is warranted for the public interest and for enforcement or fundamental rights.

Coming to the case of Vineet Narain and others (supra), there also the issue was quite different, which would be evident from the observation made in paragraph-55 which reads as follows:-

" 55. These principles of public life are of general application in every democracy and one is expected to bear them in mind while scrutinising the conduct of every holder of a public office. It is trite that the holders of public offices are entrusted with certain powers to be exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office is held by them in trust for the people. Any deviation from the path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach of trust ad must be severely dealt with instead of being pushed under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to an offence, it must be promptly investigated and the offender against whom a prima facie case is made out should be prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty of law is upheld and the rule of law vindicated. It is the duty of the judiciary to enforce the rule 6 of law and, therefore, to guard against erosion of the rule of law."

Thus, I do find that in none of the cases, referred to on behalf of the respondent no. 2 or the Vigilance, it has been held that even in absence of sanction for prosecution being there, cognizance of the offence under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act can be taken. The object of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is to protect the public servant against irresponsible, frivolous and vexatious proceeding for the acts performed in good faith in discharge of their official duties and to protect them from unnecessary harassment of legal proceeding arising out of unfounded and baseless complaint and in absence of such provision public servant may not be inclined to offer his/her free and frank opinion and may not be able to function freely.

Under the circumstances, the impugned order, under which cognizance of the offence under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)

(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act has been taken against the petitioner, cannot be sustained and hence, it is hereby set aside.

In the result, this writ application stands allowed.

(R.R. Prasad, J.) AKT