Delhi High Court
Jagdish Chopra vs Delhi Development Authority on 17 August, 2007
Author: S. Muralidhar
Bench: S. Muralidhar
ORDER S. Muralidhar, J.
1. The Petitioner applied for an LIG flat under the New Pattern Registration Scheme 1979 (NPRS) with the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and gave his address as F-72, Outram Lane, Kingsway Camp, Delhi.
2. According to the Petitioner after shifting his address to House No. 297, Block 18, Dakshinpuri, Madangir, Delhi he informed the DDA on 14.9.1995 of the change of address. The DDA, however, disputes this.
3. A further intimation was given on 11.3.1999 which was received by the DDA on 15.3.1999. The latter communication is not disputed by the DDA.
4. The Petitioner again changed his address to House No. 166, F-1, Madangir, Delhi-110 062 and according to him he informed the DDA of this change of address on 12.4.1999. He has produced the photocopy of the said letter with initials by way of acknowledgment dated 15.4.1999 which according to him is of the DDA's. This is, however, disputed by the DDA.
5. The next communication by the Petitioner to the DDA was on 30.10.2000 stating that he had yet not heard about the allotment of flat to him. He gave his address as House No. 166, F-1, Madangir. The receipt of this communication is admitted by the DDA.
6. In the meanwhile, according to the DDA, the Petitioner's allotment matured in a draw of lots held on 28.3.2000. A demand-cum-allotment letter with block dates of 30.6.2000 - 7.7.2000 was sent to him at the address at House No. 297, Block 18, Dakshinpuri, Madangir, Delhi. In this letter it was indicated that the allotment, which was on cash down basis, was liable to be automatically cancelled if the payment was not made within 30 days i.e., 6.8.2000 or, together with interest on or before 5.10.2000. The DDA claims that this letter, which was sent by courier, was not delivered back to the DDA as unserved, and therefore it was presumed that the Petitioner had been duly intimated of the allotment. The DDA is unable to inform the Court of the exact date of the dispatch of this letter of allotment.
7. The factual situation, therefore is that when the Petitioner approached the DDA on 30.10.2000, he had crossed the deadlines for making payment by about 25 days.
8. The stand taken by the DDA in these proceedings is that the demand-cum-allotment letter was sent to the Petitioner at the last known address available in its records. Since the payment was not made as required by the demand letter, the allotment stood automatically cancelled. Though the allotment was cancelled on 30.10.2000 an intimation to that effect was sent by the DDA to the petitioner on 13.11.2000.
9. As regards the cancellation of the allotment and sending of the intimation in that regard this Court finds that the DDA was not justified in cancelling the allotment on the very day that it received the intimation from the Petitioner at the public hearing of the change of address. Further, although the change of address was available with the DDA from 30.10.2000 onwards, it sent the cancellation letter again to the old address, as is evident from the copy of the letter dated 30.11.2000 which has been enclosed with the counter affidavit of the DDA.
10. There are two approaches that could be adopted in the present matter. One is to ascertain if the fault lay with the DDA in not taking note of the change of address, and even after taking note of change of address, in sending allotment letter to the old address. One set of consequence will flow if the fault is with the DDA. There are the policies of the DDA as expressed in its Office Order dated 25.2.2005 and 13.2.2006 for such contingencies.
11. The second approach is to proceed on the assumption that the fault lay with the Petitioner in not informing the DDA of the change of address till 30.10.2000. If the automatic cancellation of the allotment ensued, and the Petitioner was seeking restoration of the allotment thereafter, then there are another set of DDA circulars/resolutions dated 1.6.2000, 31.8.2001 and 9.6.2005, that would become applicable.
12. As far as the present case is concerned, it is the Petitioner's case that a demand-cum-allotment letter was never received by him. Mr. Saini, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has sought to place reliance on the judgments of this Court in Madan Lal Mokhawal v. Delhi Development Authority [decision dated 21.2.2005 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 15212 of 2004] in which this Court directed that the demand letters should be dispatched only through registered post and since the fact of such letter having been delivered to the allottee could be verified through the postal records.
13. This Court finds that without entering into the controversy whether the change of address intimated by the Petitioner was in fact recorded by the DDA, the matter could be decided on certain admitted facts.
14. Even the DDA does not dispute that on 30.10.2000 it received intimation of the change of address. Even assuming that the automatic cancellation came into effect on that very date, it could not have been difficult for the DDA to inform the Petitioner that it will be willing to restore the allotment by treating the payment of the Petitioner thereafter as a case of delayed payment. Admittedly the delay as of that date was only 25 days beyond the deadline of 5.10.2000 as indicated in the demand-cum-allotment letter.
15. However, the DDA does not appear to have adopted such an approach. In response to the numerous representations made by the Petitioner on 30.11.2000, 10.1.2001, 13.7.2001, 4.10.2001 and 22.2.2004, the response of the DDA has been to treat the case as a cancelled allotment which could not be restored. The Petitioner was informed on 1.4.2002 that the case had been placed before the competent authority and had been rejected. The Petitioner thereafter made further representations on 4.6.2002, 24.7.2002 and also had a legal notice issued to the DDA on 11.3.2003. Thereafter, he filed the present writ petition.
16. The narration of facts hereinabove indicates that the approach of the DDA in the matter was not reasonable. It could have easily, even according to its own case, treated the case as one of an automatic cancellation of allotment followed by a delayed payment. The Petitioner was ready and willing to take the allotment of the flat at the time he informed the DDA on 30.10.2000 of the change of address. In the numerous representations made after knowing of the cancellation of the allotment, the Petitioner kept asking for the allotment to be made to him. Therefore, the DDA ought to have considered this as a request for restoration. It should have applied its Policy dated 1.6.2000 as further modified by the policies dated 31.8.2001 and 3.6.2005, and processed the petitioner's case there under.
17. The delay was not so extraordinary that it could not be condoned. Mr. Saini says that it is a normal practice of the DDA to permit at least three months' time beyond the time indicated in the demand-cum-allotment letter for making payment. In this case the delay was only of 25 days. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner may have required about 10 days thereafter to arrange the funds, the total period of delay would not be over 45 days. Considering that this is the case of delayed payment this Court is of the considered view that the delay of 25 days in the Petitioner approaching the DDA for the allotment of the flat to him could have easily been condoned. In other words it should have easily been possible for the DDA, in terms of the above policies dated 1.6.2000 as modified by the revised policies dated 31.8.2001 and 3.6.2005, to have condoned the delay and restored the allotment.
18. Accordingly a direction is issued to the DDA to consider the case of the Petitioner as one of an automatic cancellation followed by the request for restoration of the allotment on delayed payment of about slightly over a month. It is directed that the DDA will process the case of the Petitioner on the basis that the delay in making payment has been condoned subject of cause to the Petitioner making payment within the time to be stipulated in the fresh demand letter. The DDA will allot the Petitioner either the flat in question if it is available, and if not, the DDA will hold a mini draw within a period 6 weeks from today, and allot another flat of the same category and size in the same locality within a period of 6 weeks thereafter. On the basis that the delay which has been condoned is for a period slightly over one month the DDA will collect the restoration charges and also charge interest for such period of delay. The cost of the flat will be that indicated in the demand letter already issued to the Petitioner with block dates of 30.6.2000 to 7.7.2000. This is further subject to all other formalities including proof of identity being satisfied by the Petitioner.
19. With the above directions, the writ petition is allowed, with no order as to costs.