Madras High Court
Venkadasan K., Secretary N.L.C.I.T.I. ... vs Chairman-Cum-Director, Neyveli ... on 2 May, 2005
Equivalent citations: (2005)2MLJ694
Author: F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla
Bench: Markandey Katju, F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla
JUDGMENT F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. The appellant is aggrieved against the order of the learned single Judge dated December 17, 2004 made in W.P.No. 35562 of 2003, in and by which, the learned single Judge declined to interfere with the settlement dated May 18, 1995 reached under Section 12(3) of Industrial Disputes Act between Management and Workmen of Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited (in short, 'N.L.C. Ltd.').
2. The terms of the said settlement dated May 18, 1995 are as under:
"I. It is agreed by the management that the workers engaged by the INDCOSERVE in various production units as on May 18, 1995 in N.L.C. shall be absorbed in a phased manner over a period of 5 years. This absorption will, however, depend upon requirements, qualifications, length and nature of experience of the persons so engaged and subject to a test and selection by competent executives.
II. It is agreed by the parties that it will be left to the management as to how many workers are to be absorbed from one particular unit at the time and the phases in which the process is to be done periodically (sic) when the question of absorption will be reviewed and decided.
III. It is further agreed that based on the experience of working of this system during the aforesaid 5 years, the issue relating to remaining workers engaged by INDCOSERVE in non- production units will be taken up for discussion."
3. Challenging the said settlement, the appellant filed the present writ petition and claimed that respondents 1 to 4 should be directed to reserve 50% of the semi-skilled/ unskilled and skilled jobs to the members of the appellant association in the N.L.C. Ltd. The grounds of challenge made by the appellant both before the learned Judge as well as before us, inter alia on other grounds, was on the ground that the members of the appellant association being trained apprentices under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961, were entitled for preference as per the guidelines of the Ministry of Labour, Union of India as well as the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated September 20, 1995 P. Arul and Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, represented by its secretary, Madras and Ors., 1996-I-LLJ-376 (Mad). It was further contended that the lands belonging to the families of about 600 members of the appellant association for the establishment N.L.C. Ltd., for whom no job was given and therefore, on this ground also, they are entitled for the relief claimed.
4. The claim was resisted by the management of N.L.C. Ltd., by contending that the appellant has no legally enforceable right, that the apprentices are not even 'workmen' under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, they have no locus standi to question the Section 12(3) settlement. It was further contended that the Division Bench judgment on which reliance was placed has been subsequently overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 5285 to 5328 of 1995, dated October 3, 1996. According to the management of N.L.C. Ltd., since the settlement is a Bi-partite Settlement reached between the workmen and the management of N.L.C. Ltd., in the presence of a Conciliation Officer, the binding effect of the said settlement cannot be easily upset by strangers like the appellants.
5. The learned single Judge taking note of the decisions relating to the rights of the apprentices, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court including the judgment in C.A. Nos. 5285 to 5328 of 1996, dated October 3, 1996, held that the appellant has no right to challenge the impugned settlement and accordingly, dismissed the writ petition.
6. After going through the order of the learned single Judge as well as the various decisions referred to therein, we are entirely in agreement with the conclusions of the learned single Judge. In the first place, the impugned settlement was dated May 18, 1995, while the writ petition came to be filed only in December, 2003, nearly after 8 long years. Such a long time gap itself would frustrate the claim of the appellant. In the submissions made on behalf of the management of N.L.C. Ltd., it was pointed out that after the signing of the settlement in the year 1995, till 2003, about 2900 workers of INDCOSERVE have already been regularised by absorption and that another 2000 workers are awaiting regularisation based on the said settlement. Therefore, it would be wholly inequitable if the challenge made by the appellant to the said settlement is to be entertained at this belated point of time. There is absolutely no explanation offered on behalf of the appellant as to why the challenge was not made immediately after the signing of the said settlement. Therefore, on the ground of delay and laches itself the claim of the appellants cannot be probed into. Secondly, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the management of N.L.C. Ltd., reliance placed upon by the appellant on the Division Bench judgment of this Court, reported in P. Arul and Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, represented by its Secretary, Madras and Ors. (supra), has been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order in C.A. Nos. 5285 to 5328 of 1996, dated October 3, 1996. In fact, in the said order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also considered the earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishuks Berozgar Sangh and Ors., and it held as under:
"We are of the view that this Court has clearly laid down that the apprentice trainees have no right to be appointed in preference to other applicants..."
In fact, the Division Bench judgment relied upon by the appellant only followed the above referred to earlier decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Arul and Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, represented by its Secretary, Madras and Ors., (supra), yet, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while setting aside the order of the Division Bench, has ruled as above. Therefore, the apprentices who have undertaken training under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961, did not acquire any special status in order to intend that they are entitled to seek for preference in the job opportunities in the various Government institutions, much less the members of the appellant in N.L.C. Ltd.
7. In this context, the stand of the management of N.L.C. Ltd., as to the benefit granted under the settlement to the members of the INDCOSERVE Society needs to be explained. It has been pointed out that even as agreed to in the impugned settlement, the absorption of the members of the INDCOSERVE Society is in the bottom line post of industrial worker grade-II (IW-II) which is stated to be unskilled/semi-skilled post. It is also explained that such posts are not skilled posts or technical posts and that the minimum entry level qualification is stated to be S.S.L.C., while the qualification of the apprentices under Apprentices Act, is indisputably I.T.I, with apprenticeship training for whom the entry level post is stated to be a higher post of industrial worker grade-I (IW-I). Therefore, going by the said stand made on behalf of the management of N.L.C. Ltd., the terms of the impugned settlement do not seem to in any case affect the opportunities of the members of the appellant association. Therefore, on this ground as well, there appears to be no scope for interdicting with the settlement impugned in the writ petition.
8. Having regard to the above legal and factual position, the claims of the appellant made in the writ petition as turned down by the learned single Judge cannot be found fault with. As far as the rights of the appellant to invoke the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act to challenge the impugned settlement is concerned, the appellant themselves claim that they cannot be construed as 'workmen' as they are apprentices under the Apprentices Act and therefore, they have no right to invoke the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Having regard to such a categoric stand taken on behalf of the appellants, we do not propose to take a contrary view and provide any scope to challenge the impugned settlement which was entered into as long back as on May 18, 1995 under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act which would otherwise become a futile exercise. Looked at from any angle, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal. Therefore, the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed.
9. Accordingly, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, we make no order as, to costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M.P. is closed.