Allahabad High Court
Bhoora vs State Of U.P. on 27 November, 2014
Bench: Amar Saran, Vipin Sinha
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Reserved Court No. - 46 Case :- CAPITAL CASE No. - 969 of 2014 Appellant :- Bhoora Respondent :- State Of U.P. Counsel for Appellant :- Dr. C.P. Upadhyay,Anurag Pathak Counsel for Respondent :- Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Amar Saran,J.
Hon'ble Vipin Sinha,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vipin Sinha, J.) Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned AGA for the State and perused the record of the case.
This criminal appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 12.2.2014 passed by H.J.S., Additional Judge, Room No.7, Saharanpur in S.T. No. 271 of 2012 by which he has convicted and sentenced appellant Bhoora to hang till death under Section 302 I.P.C and fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment one year rigorous imprisonment, seven years rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 IPC and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment, six months rigorous imprisonment, and three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 25 of the Arms Act and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment, three months rigorous imprisonment.
The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR was lodged by Prem Singh on 4.11.2011 at about 11.20 pm at Police Station Teetro, Sub District Nakud, District Saharanpur with regard to an incident which took place on 3.11.2011. In the FIR, it has been stated that the informant Prem Singh S/o Bisan Singh, Village Ullawali, PS Gangoh, Saharanpur is a labour. His son Ashwani aged about 30 years was a frequent visitor to the house of Bhoora S/o Saleemu, as there was some money due from Bhoora payable to Ashwani. His son had gone to the house of Bhoora on 3.11.2011 and as he did not return till late evening, Prem Singh made inquiries about his son and in this regard he also visited the house of Bhoora where he could not find his son Ashwani and he also found that Bhoora and his family members were also not available at the house. It has further been stated that two persons, namely, Jeevan S/o Saadhu and Veera S/o Maandu had informed the informant Prem Singh that his son Ashwani was seen accompanying Bhoora and his brother-in-law Maamu going towards the forest. Thereafter, the informant Prem Singh went in search of his son Ashwani along with other persons of the village and when they reached the fields of Ompal Gurjar, they found the body of Ashwani from a well located in the fields of Ompal Gurjar. It has also been mentioned in the FIR that when the body of Ashwani was taken out from the well, there were injuries on the Stomach and Waist of the body. It has been mentioned in the FIR itself that Bhoora and Maamu on account of the money transaction had killed Ashwani and had hidden the body of Ashwani in the Well itself.
Another FIR was also lodged on 8.11.2011 at about 7.30 pm at Police Station Teetro, Sub District Nakud, District Saharanpur, by S.O. Sunil Kumar U/s 25-A of the Arms Act, which was registered as Case Crime No. 166 of 2011.
Accordingly, charges were framed separately and two sessions trials were initiated. One being sessions trial no. 271 of 2012, U/s 302 and 201 IPC and another being sessions trial no. 270 of 2012, U/s 25A of the Arms Act. As both the cases were with regard to the same incident, therefore, both the cases were tried together treating the sessions trial no. 271 of 2012 as the leading case.
It may be appreciated that informant Prem Singh had also given a separate application on 7.11.2011 to the police with regard to the fact that he had been informed by Jasveer S/o Jay Singh and Mosin S/o Naqali that Ashwani and Mobina were having an illicit relationship, aggrieved against which Bhoora and his brother-in-law Maamu had shot dead both Ashwani and Mobina in the night of 3.11.2011 itself and with the intention of destroying the evidence had thrown the body of Ashwani in the Well from where he was discovered and the body of Mobina has been buried in the graveyard of village Kolakheri. It was prayed in the said application that the body of Mobina may be exhumed and postmortem may be done. Consequent of which, the body of Mobina was exhumed from the graveyard at the instance of accused-appellant Bhoora in the presence of SDM. Thereafter, a Tamancha (country made pistol) 315 Bore was also recovered at the instance of accused-appellant Bhoora with regard to which he informed the police that he had committed the act with the said weapon. On further investigation, the police had also recovered the bloodstained clothes from the house of appellant Bhoora on 8.11.2011. Thereafter, postmortem on the body of deceased Ashwani was conducted by Dr. Karamveer Singh on 5.11.2011, who found the following injuries on the body of the deceased Ashwani:
(i) Gun shot wound of entry 2 cm x 1.5 cm x cavity deep on back of right and 10 cm above to right Iliac crest as 10 "O" clock position. Blackening and tattooing are inverted.
(ii) Gun shot wound of exit 4 cm x 3 cm on front of abdomen 8 cm above umbilicus at 12 'O' Clock position. Injury no.1 is communicating with injury no.2.
(iii) Lacerated wound 4 cm x 3 cm muscle deep and just below right elbow.
(iv) Cause of death is due to shock and Haemorrhage as a result of Ante-mortem injuries.
Postmortem on the body of deceased Mobina was conducted by Dr. Rajesh Tiwari (PW7) on 9.11.2011, who found the following injuries on the body of the deceased Mobina:
(i) Gun shot wound of entry 2 cm x 2 cm x cavity deep on left side of abdomen 3 cm away from left elbow as 3 'O' Clock position. Blackening, tattooing and charring skin around the wound present. Direction ant-post and downward.
(ii) Gun shot wound of exit 3 cm x 3 cm x cavity deep on left side of back 7 cm above left Iliac bone. On explanation, injury no.1 is communicating with injury no.2.
(iii) Cause of death is shock and Haemorrhage as a result of Ante-mortem firearm injuries.
In support of its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses.
Prem Singh S/o Bisan Singh, the informant, who was examined as PW1, has been declared hostile. PW2 Jivan and PW3 Veera have also been declared hostile.
In the application dated 7.11.2011, the informant Prem Singh has disclosed the names of Jasveer and Mosin as having informed him about the factum of killing of Ashwani and Mobina by Bhoora and his brother-in-law Maamu, however, as per the evidence on record, Jasveer and Mosin, who were examined as PW6 and PW4 have been declared hostile.
Dr. Karamvir Singh, who conducted the postmortem on the body of deceased Ashwani, was examined as PW5. In his cross-examination, he stated as under:
";g pksV ns[kdj eSus fy[kk Fkk fd ml ij CySdfauax o VsVksbax ekStwn gSA ;g ckr lgh gS fd CySdfuax o VsVksbax bUVjh es vkrk gSA bDlhV es ugh vkrkA eSus tks ekschuk dh 'ko ijh{k.k fjiksVZ ns[kdj crk;k Fkk mlesa CySdfuax o VsVksbax ekStwn gSA vxj nks vknfe;ksa dks ,d lkFk [kM+k djds ,d gh xksyh ekjh tk;s vkSj nksuks es ls xksyh ikj gks tk;s rks nksusk ds 'kjhj dh bUVjh ij CySdfuax] VsVksbax vk;sxhA"
Sri Gajendra Pratap, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has strongly contended that keeping in view the fact that almost all the witnesses have been declared hostile even the first informant himself has been declared hostile, as such, there is no evidence on record which could cause us to uphold the conviction of the appellant. He further contended that there was no motive and at best it can be said to be a case of circumstantial evidence, however, since the chain of evidence is not complete, the appellant is entitled to an order of acquittal by this Court. He filed written submissions wherein it has been stated that there is no evidence at all on record about the alleged illicit relationship or love affair between the deceased Ashwani and Mobina. It has further been stated therein that all the four witnesses of fact i.e. PW1 to PW4 have been declared hostile and they have deposed on oath in court that they have no knowledge about the love affair and illicit relationship between Ashwani and Mobina and that during investigation they had not told the police about it. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Wakkar Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2011 (3) SCC 306 where in para 14 it has been held as under:
"It is equally well settled that in a case which is based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on the part of the accused assumes importance."
With regard to the recovery of alleged country made pistol, it has been stated that the same was recovered from an open place accessible to all. Moreover, the said pistol was never produced before the court when the evidence of PW8 was recorded in court. It is further stated that the recovery of pistol at the instance of the appellant cannot by itself prove that it is the same weapon with which the offence was committed. Reliance has also been placed upon a judgment of Apex Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. reported in 1981 (2) SCC 166. It has further been submitted that in the present case the bullet which hit the deceased was not recovered and therefore there is no evidence to connect it with the recovered weapon which was used in the crime. He further stated in the written submission that recovery of bloodstained clothes, which according to the serologist report, were stained with human blood and as there being no recovery with regard to the blood group, the same could not be connected with the deceased or the appellant. He further relies upon a judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1987(3) SCC 480; Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa.
With regard to the recovery of the dead body of deceased Mobina is concerned, learned senior advocate has contended that the dead body was buried in the graveyard which is known to all and, therefore, there was no intention of concealment of the burial of the deceased Mobina. There is no evidence that the burial was done stealthily or other had no knowledge of the fact of burial. Therefore the possibility of other knowing the place of burial of the deceased cannot be ruled out. This possibility is further established from the evidence of PW10 S.I. Sunil Kumar Singh, who in his examination-in-chief stated that on 7.11.2011 he had given an application to the District Magistrate for exhuming the dead body of Mobina and conducting postmortem on her body. The said statement reads as under:
"fnuakd 07&11&11 dks oknh }kjk Fkkus ij nh x;h rgjhj dh udy vafdr dh o jiV ua0&17 le; 10 ih0,e0 fnuakfdr 07&11&11 dh udy th0Mh0 dh udy vafdr dh o mlh jkst esjs }kjk e`rdk dq0 ekschuk iq=h Hkwjk fuoklh dksyk[ksM+h Fkkuk frrjks dh yk'k dks dcz [kqnok dj iksLV ekVZe djkus ds laca/k esa ftykf/kdkjh egksn; dks izkFkZuk i= fn;k x;k Fkk------"
He further stated that even if it is assumed, though not admitted, that the dead body of Mobina was recovered at the pointing out of the appellant, this circumstance would alone prove only this much that the appellant had knowledge of the place where the dead body of Mobina was concealed but this circumstance by itself cannot form the basis for conviction. In this regard, learned senior counsel has also placed strong reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in 2012 (6) 107; Sandeep v. State of U.P, 2013 (4) ADJ 117; Subhash v. State of U.P. and 1952 AIR (SC) 354; Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab.
Learned senior counsel has contended that the trial court has not only held the appellant guilty of murdering Ashwani and Mobina but also having committed an offence U/s 201 IPC in respect of both the deceased. It is, however, clear from the record that there is no evidence, whatsoever, against the appellant for his implication for the murder of Ashwani and concealment of his dead body. In respect of charges against the appellant u/s 201 IPC is concerned, there is no evidence at all. So far as the charge regarding disposal of dead body of Mobina is concerned, that would also fail against the appellant because the prosecution has not been able to prove that Mobina's death is a result of homicide. The hypothesis of suicide or accidental death cannot be ruled out. Supposing that the gun shot wounds were found at the back then the possibility of suicide is ruled out but even in that case possibility of accident is not ruled out. Therefore to establish the charge under Section 201 IPC, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed.
Learned senior counsel has strongly contended that the chain as required to be completed in the cases of circumstantial evidence is not at all complete in the present case and in this regard reliance has been placed upon a judgment of Apex Court reported in 1981 (2) SCC 35; Shankerlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra.
Sri Akhilesh Singh, learned GA with Sri Rajeev Gupta, learned AGA, on the other hand, have placed strong reliance upon a number of cases while submitting that the clinching evidence on the basis of which the order of conviction has been recorded against the accused-appellant Bhoora is the recovery of the dead body at the instance of the appellant himself, who on his arrest had made a statement before the police in the nature of evidence of disclosure and it was on his pointing out the dead body was exhumed from the graveyard.
A necessary reference will have to be made to Sections 8, 27 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which read as under:
Section 8- Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.--Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact." The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.
Explanation 1.--The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act."
Explanation 2.-When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant."
Section 27- How much of information received from accused may be proved.-- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
Section 106- Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.-- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Learned GA further stated that it goes without saying that the disclosure statement of the accused-appellant made before the police in pursuance of which the body of the deceased Mobina was recovered/exhumed, the said disclosure statement is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the argument to the contrary that the said factum cannot be considered to be a discovery in view of the fact that the information regarding the burial of the dead body was given by the first informant in his application dated 7.11.2011 and as the first informant has subsequently turned hostile and not corroborated the contents of the said application, therefore, the contents of the said application ought not to be read in evidence and accordingly the recovery made on the basis of pointing out of the accused-appellant from the graveyard is not admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act. The said aspect is infact a very strong circumstance in favour of the prosecution. It has further been contended that since 7.11.2011 itself it was disclosed that the body was buried in the graveyard as such any subsequent recovery would not be recovery strictly with the section 27 of the Evidence Act. However, the factum as argued by the leaned AGA for the State that the aforesaid circumstances of the recovery of the body at the instance of the accused appellant is also admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act which was in the exclusive knowledge, the same also points to the proved complicity of the accused-appellant Bhoora.
A reference, at this stage, may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case reported in 2008(12) SCC 51; State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram. Relevant extracts of the said judgment are quoted as under:
"The conduct of the accused and his family members in not informing the parents of the deceased about the injuries caused on her head and consequential death and the fact that the cremation of the dead body was conducted in the wee hours of 30.3.1993 without informing the parents or giving an intimation to the Police so as to enable it to get the post-mortem of the dead body conducted go a long way to show that the accused had deliberately concocted the story that Shanti @ Gokul was suffering from epilepsy and she suffered injuries on her head by colliding against the door bar during the bout of fits. The disposal of dead body in a hush-hush manner clearly establish that the accused had done so with the sole object of concealing the real cause of the death of Shanti @ Gokul. In our considered view, this was a fit case for invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of the any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In Ram Gulam Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar [2001 (8) SCC 311] this Court considered the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act in a case somewhat similar to the present one. This Court noted that the accused after brutally assaulting a boy carried him away and thereafter the boy was not seen alive nor his body was found. The accused, however, offered no explanation as to what they did after they took away the boy. It was held that for the absence of any explanation from the side of the accused about the boy, there was every justification for drawing an inference that they had murdered the boy. It was further observed that even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The accused by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the court to draw a different inference.
In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra [2006 (1) SCC 681], a two judge-bench of which Hon'ble G.P.Mathur,J. Delivered the judgment which has elaborately considered the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and observed:
"The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonise a neighbourhood family. The parents or other family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the houses should go unpunished.
If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944 AC 315] quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [2003 (11) SCC 271]. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration
(b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. Similar view has been expressed in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh [2003 (11) SCC 271], State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram [2006 (12) SCC 254], Raj Kumar Prasad Tamakar vs. State of Bihar [2007 (1) SCR 13]."
Learned AGA further stated that another important aspect of the matter which can be inferred from the fact is that an application was given by the informant on 7.11.2011 in the form of information, which subsequently has not been corroborated by the witness who had moved the said application and as such the said information not being a substantive piece of evidence cannot be read and therefore the argument that the information regarding the recovery of the dead body cannot be said to be the fact discovered, as such, not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, the argument that the evidence of the recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused-appellant Bhoora cannot be said to be a discovery is not tenable, as the factum of presence of the dead body at the graveyard has been made by the accused himself in his disclosure statement and on the basis of which the said body has been exhumed and sent for postmortem.
The Apex Court in the case of Ponnusamy v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2008 (5) SCC 587 while considering the case of State of Maharashtra v Suresh reported in 2000 (1) SCC 417 had opined as under:
"26. We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well-justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act"
21. We have to consider the factual background of the present case in the light of the relationship between the parties. If his wife was found missing, ordinarily, the husband would search for her. If she was died in an unnatural situation when she was in his company, he is expected to offer an explanation therefor. Lack of such explanation on the part of the appellant itself would be a circumstantial evidence against him.
Thus, the presumption of Section 27 of the Evidence Act can easily be drawn against the accused-appellant which proves the guilt of the accused-appellant.
Learned AGA further stated that as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving a fact especially if it is in the knowledge of the accused-appellant lies upon the accused himself and in case the said burden is not discharged, the presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act would go against the accused-appellant and would certainly be an incriminating circumstance leading to the belief of guilt of the accused. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani and others v. State of Karnataka and others reported in 2009(14) SCC 582.
A reference may also be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Gujrat v. Anirudh Singh and another reported in AIR 1997 (SC) 2780 where in para 45 it has been held that "if the motive is proved that would supply a chain of links but absence thereof is not a ground to reject the prosecution case". Thus, relying upon the said principles of law even if the motive has not been proved, the entire story of the prosecution cannot be rejected, however, keeping in view of the fact that the body of deceased Mobina was recovered at the pointing out of the accused-appellant himself and the bloodstained clothes were also recovered from the house of the accused and the fact that weapon was also recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant, the chain of circumstances is completed and the guilt of the accused is amply proved.
Learned AGA also placed reliance upon a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in A. N. Venkatesh and another v. State of Karnataka reported in 2005 SCC (Crl.) 1938. Para 9 of the said judgment reads as under:
"9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simplicitor, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand Vs. State (AIR 1979 SC 400). Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused appellants(Ex. P14 and P15) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8. The evidence of the investigating officer and PWs 1, 2, 7 and PW4 the spot mazhar witness that the accused had taken them to the spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused. Presence of A-1 and A-2 at a place where ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their action of fleeing on spotting the police party is a relevant circumstance and are admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act."
This Court finds no fault with the findings recorded by the court below with regard to the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC, however, the Court feels that the present case is not a case in which death sentence may be awarded in view of the consistent legal position as laid down by the Apex Court in its recent judgment reported in 2014 AIR SCW 4049; Stantosh Kumar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where it has clarified to the effect that until the case falls within the category of rarest of the rare case, death sentence ought not to be awarded and in this reference has heavily relied upon the guidelines emerged in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1980 (2) SCC 684 which were also noticed by Apex Court in Machhi Singh and others v. State of Punjab reported in 1983 (3) SCC 470. Thus, keeping in view the terms and guidelines laid down by the Apex Court, this Court finds that the present case does not fall within the category of the rarest of rare case.
Thus, in view of what has been discussed above and in view of interpretation of Sections 8, 27 and 106 of Evidence Act as has been recorded by Apex Court in its various judgments and that there is ample evidence on record to uphold the conviction of the accused-appellant as has been awarded by the court below, the conviction of appellant Bhoora under Section 302 IPC is affirmed, however, the sentence of death is modified to life imprisonment. The conviction under Section 201 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act is also affirmed and the fine as imposed shall remain the same.
With the aforesaid modification, the appeal is partly allowed.
The reference for confirming the sentence of death is rejected.
The copy of the order be communicated to the CJM concerned for compliance.
Order Date :- 27.11.2014 Kuldeep