Allahabad High Court
Mahendra Singh Chaudhary And Anr. vs Tej Ram Singh And Ors. on 28 October, 1986
Equivalent citations: AIR1987ALL152, AIR 1987 ALLAHABAD 152, 1986 ALL CJ 717, 1986 ALL CJ 432, (1987) ALL WC 1
Author: N.D. Ojha
Bench: N.D. Ojha
JUDGMENT
1. This first appeal from order has been filed by two of the defendants in a suit against an order dt. 11th April, 1986 passed by the III Addl. Civil Judge, Meerut, issuing a temporary injunction as prayed for by plaintiff-respondent 1.
2. The case in a nutshell of plaintiff-respondent 1 was that he was a partner of a firm run under the name and style of M/s. Chaudhari and Company, 4 Civil Lines, Meerut. According to him the said firm existed prior to 31st Jan. 1984 with six partners under a partnership deed dt. 3rd April, 1982. The plaintiff was not a partner of that firm. His case further was that the old partnership was dissolved on 31st Jan. 1984. With effect from 1st Feb. 1984 the above firm was reconstituted whereby two old partners retired and six new partners including the plaintiff were included into the partnership. The case of the plaintiff-respondent further was that M/s. Chaudhari and Company had entered into a contract with the State Government for construction of a canal and that the Executive Engineer Meerut Division, Ganga Canal, Meerut, defendant 1 was the Engineer in charge, who was supervising the work of construction of the said canal. In connection with that contract payments were made by defendant 1 to M/s. M.S. Chaudhary and Company. The relief prayed for in the suit as also in the application for temporary injunction was that defendant 1 may be restrained from delivering the cross or payees account cheques of M/s. M.S. Chaudhary and Company in respect of the aforesaid constructions work to Sri Mahendra Singh Chaudhary or anybody else or any of the partners itself except to the plaintiff and Sri Mahendra Singh Chaudhary.
3. The application for temporary injunction was contested by Sri Mahendra Singh Chaudhary. At this place it may be pointed out that Mahendra Singh Chaudhary was a partner of the firm which is said to have been dissolved on 31st Jan. 1984 and he is also a partner of the firm said to have been constituted afresh on 1st Feb. 1984.
4. The case of the plaintiff was that after the new partnership came into being a power of attorney was executed by eight partners other than the plaintiff and Mahendra Singh Chaudhary whereunder payments to M/s. M. S. Chaudhary and Company were to be made jointly to the plaintiff and to Mahendra Singh Chaudhary. The case of the plaintiff further was that the cheques which were being paid to Mahendra Singh Chaudhary alone were being misutilised by him. In other words according to the plaintiff on account of cheques payable to M/s. M. S. Chaudhary and Company being paid to Mahendra Singh Chaudhary alone the interests of the newly constituted firm on Ist Feb. 1984 were being jeopardised. Obviously it was in order to safeguard the interest of this newly constituted firm that the suit for injunction was filed by the plaintiff and the application for temporary injunction on which the order appealed against was passed was made therein.
5. It has been urged by counsel for the appellants that this fact not having been disputed that the firm said to have been constituted on Ist Feb. 1984 was unregistered, the suit in which the application for temporary injunction was made itself was barred by Section 69, Partnership Act, and consequently no temporary injunction could be granted on an application made in such a suit. Counsel for the appellants in the alternative also submitted that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience was also not in favour of the plaintiff and that in case the application for temporary injunction was dismissed, the plaintiff was not likely to suffer any irreparable injury and the application for temporary injunction was liable to be dismissed on this ground also.
6. Having heard counsel for the parties we are of opinion that there is substance in the submission made by counsel for the appellants that the suit was barred by Section 69, Partnership Act. In this view of the matter we do not find it necessary to consider the alternative submission made by him in regard to maintainability of the application for temporary injunction. In regard to the plea that the suit was barred by Section 69, Partnership Act, it may be pointed out that there are certain facts which are not disputed one of them being that the firm of which the plaintiff claims to be a partner and for the benefit of which the suit for temporary injunction has been filed is unregistered. The other undisputed fact is that the plaintiff has no personal interest in the subject matter of the suit. The only interest which he has claimed is as a partner of the firm said to have been constituted on Ist Feb. 1984.
7. A similar plea about bar of Section 69 Partnership Act was raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John AIR 1977 SC 336. In a nutshell the facts of that case were that one Sethia and Company had entered into an agreement with M/s. John and Company on July 6, 1948 where by the partners of M/s. John and Company succeeded in obtaining financial accommodation from Sethia and Company. Sethia and Company was admittedly a partnership concern although unregistered. A suit was instituted by Loonkaran Sethia inter alia for recovery of money against M/s. John and Company and some others on the assertion that the firm Sethia and Company had been dissolved prior to 6th July, 1948 when the aforesaid agreement was entered into and that after the dissolution of the partnership the plaintiff had become the sole proprietor of Sethia and Company. The suit had been instituted by Loonkaran Sethia asserting himself to be the sole proprietor of Sethia and Company for the enforcement of the agreement dt. 6th July, 1948 said to have been entered into between him as sole proprietor of Sethia and Company and M/s. John and Company. The suit was contested inter alia on the ground that it was barred by Section 69, Partnership Act. This plea was repelled by the trial court as well as this court in appeal believing the case of Loonkaran Sethia that the firm Sethia and Company had been dissolved and that consequently the suit could not be held to be barred by S, 69, Partnership Act. When the matter was taken up in appeal, the Supreme Court took the view that it had not been established that Sethia and Company had been dissolved as asserted by Loonkaran Sethia and that it could safely be presumed in the, circumstances of the case that the partnership continued to subsist at least up to 20th July, 1948. In this view of the matter the agreement dt. 6th July, 1948 was apparently entered into by the plaintiff Loonkaran Sethia with the defendants' first set not as the sole supervising proprietor of Sethia and Company, but as the partner of the firm Sethia and Company. On these findings and on an admission made by Seth Sugan Chand, who was one of the partners with the plaintiff that Sethia and Company was not registered under the Indian Partnership Act. The Supreme Court took the view that the suit was clearly hit by Section 69, Partnership Act, and was not maintainable. In arriving at this conclusion the Supreme Court pointed out that the suit was for enforcement of the agreement entered into by the plaintiff as partner of Sethia and Company which was an unregistered firm. That being so the suit was undoubtedly a suit for the benefit and in the interest of the firm and consequently a suit on behalf of the firm. As is apparent the form of the suit wherein it was asserted that the plaintiff was suing as the sole proprietor of Sethia and Company was discarded and on the finding that the firm Sethia and Company had not been dissolved, notwithstanding that Loonkaran Sethia had described his capacity as sole proprietor of Sethia and Company, it was held that the suit was on behalf of the firm. Applying the ratio decidendi of the decision in the case of Loonkaran Sethia (supra) it would be seen that here also the only capacity in which the plaintiff has instituted the suit is that of a partner of the firm said to have been constituted on Ist Feb. 1984. He has not claimed any other capacity. The relief for injunction is as pointed out above for the benefit of this firm said to have been constituted on 1st Feb. 1984 which admittedly is an unregistered firm. In the absence of the injunction prayed for the cheques meant for M/s. M.S. Chaudhary and Company which were given to Mahendra Singh Chaudhary were according to the plaintiff not reaching the firm constituted on Ist Feb. 1984, but were being misutilised by Mahendra Singh Chaudhary. The purpose of obtaining injunction was that these cheques may reach the coffers of the firm constituted on Ist Feb. 1984. Apparently, therefore, the suit was for the benefit and in the interest of the firm and consequently as pointed out by the Supreme Court it would be a suit on behalf of the firm.. Moreover, the relief prayed for in the suit is also directed against the other partners of the firm. The injunction claimed is that the cheques meant for M/s. M. S. Chaudhary and Company may be paid only to the plaintiff and Mahendra Singh Chaudnary and to no other partner of the firm including Mahendra Singh Chaudhary singly. For all these reasons we are of opinion that the suit is barred by Section 69, Partnership Act. That being so the application for temporary injunction in which the order appealed against was passed was not maintainable and the order appealed against has to be set aside on this ground alone.
8. In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the order appealed against as mentioned above is set aside and the interim order of stay passed in the appeal is vacated. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
9. A copy of this order may be supplied to counsel for the parties within 48 hours on payment of necessary charges.