Madras High Court
R. Ramachandra Raja vs M. Nanda Govind on 16 April, 2005
Equivalent citations: (2005)3MLJ132
Author: T.V. Masilamani
Bench: T.V. Masilamani
ORDER T.V. Masilamani, J.
1. The revision petitioner as landlord has filed this revision challenging the legality of the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (VII Judge, Court of Small Causes), Chennai in R.C.A. No. 723 of 1994 dated 26.3.1999.
2. The revision petitioner filed the petition in R.C.O.P.No. 2415 of 1989 before the Rent Controller (XVI Judge, Court of Small Causes), Chennai for eviction of the respondent herein/tenant under Section 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960") on the basis that the respondent committed wilful default in the payment of rent and also without the petitioner's knowledge and consent committed waste in the demised premises by removing old super-structure and putting up a new construction. The learned Rent Controller, having analysed the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side and upon hearing the counsel for both sides, allowed the petition and directed the respondent to vacate the premises within two months from the date of the order.
3. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller, the respondent herein filed the appeal in R.C.A.No. 723 of 1993 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, who after having scrutinised the recorded evidence and after hearing the arguments advanced on either side, allowed the appeal by setting aside the fair and decretal orders passed by the Rent Controller and ultimately dismissed the petition filed by the revision petitioner before the Rent Controller. Hence, the revision petition.
4. The contentions put forth by the revision petitioner herein as landlord before the Rent Controller may be set out briefly as under:-
(a) The respondent is the tenant under the petitioner in respect of the petition premises on a monthly rent of Rs.300/- and the tenancy is according to every English calendar month and for non-residential purposes.
(b) In the earlier proceedings before the Rent Controller and later before the Rent Control Appellate Authority between the parties, there was a compromise and fresh registered lease agreement dated 29.2.1984 was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent stipulating fresh terms and conditions of lease in respect of the demised premises.
(c) As per the lease agreement dated 29.2.1984, the respondent has to pay the rent of Rs.300/- per month on or before 5th of every succeeding month. After adjusting the amount sent by the respondent towards arrears of rent due for April 1989, the petitioner sent a notice to the respondent calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent due for May and June 1989. But, on the other hand the respondent had not sent any reply nor paid the arrears of rent. Thus, the respondent had committed wilful default in the payment of rent.
(d) Though the respondent agreed under the said agreement that he shall pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- as rental advance and get a separate receipt, he has not paid the said amount in spite of repeated requests made by the petitioner on that behalf.
(e) One of the essential conditions of the lease is that the respondent shall not commit any act of waste in respect of the petition premises and contrary to such terms and conditions, the respondent put up a shed in an area of 300 sq.ft. and also constructed a lavatory over the petition premises without the petitioner's knowledge and written consent during November, 1988. In spite of a letter dated 6.12.1988 addressed by the petitioner requesting the respondent to refrain from putting up such construction and also to remove the super-structure already put up over the premises, the respondent proceeded with the the construction and completed the same. The petitioner also sent a letter to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras on 12.12.1988 to take action against the respondent.
(f) Similarly, the petitioner continued to send letters to the respondent on 19.12.1988, 26.5.1989, 12.6.1989 and 5.7.1989 requesting him to remove the unauthorised construction failing which the petitioner will be compelled to initiate action in a court of law. There was no reply from the respondent and he has also failed to comply with the demands made by the petitioner. Hence, the respondent has committed an act of waste by making alteration and putting up construction in the petition premises without the consent and knowledge of the petitioner. Such additions and alterations are likely to impair the material value and utility of the premises.
(g) The respondent has also unauthorisedly put up a latrine over the petition premises without providing any let out to drainage. All the workers in the respondent's workshop are using the same and since there is no septic tank or outlet provided to the lavatory, the utility of the surrounding area is hampered and the value of the petition premises impaired.
5. The contentions of the respondent herein in the counter filed before the Rent Controller are briefly as follows:-
(a) The respondent is a tenant of the petition premises on a monthly rent of Rs.300/- and the petitioner is the landlord of the same. It is true that there was an earlier rent control proceedings between them and fresh lease agreement dated 29.2.1984 was executed in respect of such lease with fresh terms and conditions. The respondent in the usual course sent the cheques dated 4.4.1989 and 3.5.1989 for Rs.300/- each towards the rent for March and April, 1989 and the petitioner having received the same refrained from presenting the cheques before the bank for encashment. The respondent has therefore sent the future rent for the subsequent months by money order. Moreover, the respondent has not committed any wilful default in payment of rent for the simple reason that a sum of Rs.5,000/- had been paid by him as rental advance even as per the agreement dated 29.2.1984. Hence, it is false to contend that the respondent has not paid the advance amount as stipulated in the said agreement.
(b) The allegation that a construction was put up by the respondent in the petition premises without the knowledge of the petitioner is denied as false. Since the business of the respondent would not be carried out without necessary sanitary facilities, he requested the petitioner on several occasions (vide) letters dated 3.8.1984, 15.9.1984 and 25.1.1985 to provide adequate lavatory facilities. The Inspector of Factories was also insisting that such basic amenities should be provided in the premises and also threatened that failure to provide such amenities would entitle penal consequence. Since the petitioner did not sign the necessary forms for construction of the latrine, the respondent could not provide any such facility to the workers and hence a show cause notice from the Inspector of Factories dated 7.7.1986 for his failure to provide latrine and urinal facilities was sent to the respondent. Since the respondent could not provide such amenities again, another show cause notice dated 11.12.1987 was issued by the Inspector of Factories and the respondent had to pay a fine of Rs.450/- on 14.3.1989 in pursuance of the prosecution initiated for non-provision of adequate sanitary and latrine facilities in the workshop.
(c) Therefore, the respondent wrote to the petitioner informing all the foregoing situation and requested him to provide lite roofing without any further delay. Since no reply was received within 10 days as stipulated in his letter, the respondent provided a tatched shed at his own costs. Since the Inspector of Factories had again directed the respondent to remove the tatched shed with the direction to put up a proper roofing on or before 31.3.1988, he wrote to the petitioner on 23.6.1988 to provide a lite roofing shed. The respondent was once again prosecuted for not providing the lite roofing and hence, he had to construct the lite roofing shed on an emergent basis and the petitioner was informed about the same on 3.11.1989. For the reasons set out, the petition may be dismissed.
6. C.M.P.No. 2491 of 2004 is filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. for permitting the petitioner to produce additional evidence. C.M.P.No. 2670 of 2004 is filed for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to note down the new construction put up by the respondent.
7. The revision petitioner has contended in the affidavit filed in support of the petition as follows:-
(a) The respondent taking advantage of the absence of the petitioner during the month of May,2002 had put up pucca construction unauthorisedly by raising R.C.C. columns and brick walls in the petition premises besides that he has also high handedly and unlawfully closed the entrance from Halls Road and opened a gate facing the New Avadi Road and made a new huge entrance putting up steel grill gate. The respondent had not obtained the consent of the petitioner to demolish the old superstructure and put up new construction and he has opened new entrance after demolishing a portion of the compound wall in the first week of June, 2002.
(b) This Court by an order dated 20.6.2002 granted interim injunction restraining the respondent from putting up any further construction in the petition premises. But, in spite of the order of interim injunction, the respondent proceeded with the further construction. Hence, the petitioner issued a telegram dated 22.6.2002 calling upon him to stop forthwith further construction to which he has sent a reply telegram dated 24.6.2002 with the allegations that the he had not put up any further construction after the order of interim injunction.
(c) The Corporation of Madras also issued a notice dated 9.8.2002 and the petitioner sent a reply on 14.8.2002 to the Corporation of Chennai. He has also enclosed the photographs to show that the the respondent has completely changed the structure into one of a Mangalore tiled roofing with brick walls, windows, entrance, etc. These are all the subsequent developments during the pendency of the Civil Revision Petition after the order of interim injunction. Hence, the documents produced along with the petition are essential to adjudicate the dispute between the parties.
8. The contentions of the respondent in the counter affidavit are briefly stated hereunder:-
(a) The petition for reception of additional documents is inadmissible in law. Since the petitioner failed to carry out the repairs in spite of repeated requests when the structure deteriorated and the roof caved in, the respondent strengthened the structure and put up tiled roofing to make it inhabitable. The alterations had been completed before this Court passed an order of injunction. No construction of any nature has taken place subsequent to the injunction order. The photographs produced by the petitioner are misleading.
(b) The Corporation Authorities have not taken any action against the respondent for any unauthorised construction. The change in the entrance to the premises had to be done at the request of the traffic authorities when one way traffic was introduced in New Avadi Road and Halls Road and the entrance to the shed had to be shifted for the convenience of free flow of traffic on the busy New Avadi Road and Halls Road. The improvements that have been made by the respondent will enhance the value of the property and will in no way impair the utility of the building or lower the value of the property or in any way prejudicially affect the interest of the petitioner.
9. Mr.T.P.Sankaran, the learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submission in the course of his argument to substantiate the grounds adumbrated in the revision petition:-
The lower appellate court failed to note that the additions and alterations put up by the respondent are not likely to enhance the value and utility of the premises and therefore the respondent had committed act of waste. The respondent had no right to put up any unauthorised construction such as erecting the new shed by putting up an additional lite roofing adjacent to the shed already in existence and also to put up any unauthorised and unhygienic latrine over the premises without any outlet facility connecting to the drainage and septic tank. Similarly, the Rent Control Appellate Authority failed to appreciate the recorded evidence both oral and documentary in a proper perspective. Further he has contended that after the disposal of Rent Control Appeal, the respondent had completely demolished the structure put up by him and put up a pucca tiled roofing shed and also opened a new iron grill gate without the consent of the petitioner and therefore he has urged that the petitions in C.M.P.Nos.2491 and 2670 of 2004 may be ordered as prayed for.
10. With reference to the above submission, I have heard the arguments of Mr. R. Krishnaswamy, the learned senior counsel representing the counsel on record for the respondent.
11. In the above circumstances, the following points arise for consideration:-
(i) Whether the lower appellate court failed to appreciate the recorded evidence both oral and documentary, in the light of the provisions under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Amendment Act 23 of 1973 and thereby committed illegality in rendering the impugned judgment ?
(ii) Whether the subsequent events (i.e.,) construction put up by the respondent in the petition premises during the pendency of the Civil Revision Petition have to be taken note of in deciding the dispute between the parties?
(iii) Whether the revision petitioner is entitled to have the additional evidence received in evidence by this court as prayed for in C.M.P.No. 2491 of 2004?
(iv) To what relief the parties are entitled to?
12. Points 1 to 4: In the circumstances of the case, these points have to be considered together for the reason that any decision on a point will have a bearing on the other and therefore all the points may be discussed together with reference to the available materials on record. The relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the petition premises between the revision petitioner and the respondent is not in controversy. Though the revision petitioner had originally instituted the proceedings before the Rent Controller both on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent and commission of the act of waste by the respondent, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has fairly conceded at the outset in his argument that the plea with reference to wilful default in the payment of rent is not pressed at this stage.
13. Admittedly, the respondent is running a motor vehicle repair workshop in the petition premises by virtue of a valid lease agreement entered into between him and the revision petitioner and it may be useful to refer to Ex.R-1, the lease agreement between the revision petitioner and the respondent to evaluate the findings of the lower appellate court in the light of the recorded evidence. Clauses 8, 17 and 18 are relevant for our purpose and they read as under:-
"(8) The party of Second part shall not commit any act of waste in respect of the schedule mentioned property.
(17) The party of first part will apply to MMWSSB for water connection within 3 months from the date of the agreement. The party of the second part will follow up and get the connection. The amount to be paid to MMWSSB for water connection shall alone be borne by the party of first part.
(18) If the party of second part wants additional structure to be put up, the party of First Part agrees to put at his (First Part) cost under the terms and conditions to be mutually agreed to."
14. Admittedly, without the consent of the revision petitioner, the respondent has changed the structure existing at the time of entering into the lease agreement, Ex.R-1 in different stages. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the respondent has admitted in his counter statement filed before the Rent Controller that he constructed latrine and urinals at his own cost, as the revision petitioner had refused to provide such convenience as per Clause 18 in the agreement cited above. Similarly, he has also fairly conceded in the counter statement itself that he has originally provided a tatched shed as the original roof was leaking and subsequently he had removed the said tatched shed put up by him and replaced the same with a lite roofing.
15. It is relevant to mention in this connection that the Engineers taken by both the revision petitioner and the respondent to inspect the petition premises have filed reports and plans, Exs.P-10 to P-12 and Exs.R-60, R-60(A) to R-63. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner as well as the respondent would rely upon the said reports and plans to press their respective contentions. It is therefore necessary to find out whether the reports filed by the Engineers have thrown any light on the question decided by the courts below.
16. Ex.R-60 report of the Engineer taken by the respondent shows that the construction of latrine and shed measuring about 300 sq.ft. with asbestos roofing have been put up by the respondent. The learned senior counsel for the respondent would refer to the communications under Exs.R-7 to R-10, R-13 and R-17 in support of his contention that in spite of repeated requests made by the respondent, the revision petitioner had not agreed to put up the lavatory as well as to replace the roofing in spite of the fact that the Labour Welfare Officer had directed the respondent to provide such amenities to the labourers working in his automobile workshop and therefore he has urged that the additional improvement made by him cannot be considered as act of waste.
17. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has pointed out the Engineer's Report, Ex.P-10 and Sketches, Exs.P-11 & P-12 in the light of the evidence of the Engineer who has been examined as P.W.2 on the side of the revision petitioner and argued that the newly put up shed with lite roofing rests on the compound wall on the north-west and the south-west and on the country wood posts upon which the old structure had been rested. It is therefore urged by him with reference to the said report and plans that on account of the newly put up structure, the old pillars developed cracks as a result of which they were likely to collapse as they had to bear the additional weight of the new structure. It is in these circumstances, he has drawn my attention to the fact that even in the report filed by the respondent's Engineer (vide) Ex.R-60, the additional construction put up by the respondent has been mentioned and that while the old structure rests on brick pillars and wooden posts, the new structure rests on four iron 'L' angles at the four corners and two wooden posts in the centre.
18. As per Ex.R-60, the additional construction put up by the respondent was made to rest on the iron 'L' angles at the four corners and two wooden posts in the centre and it is in the evidence of R.W.2 that on account of new structure, the old structure had not been affected in any way as the new one was made to rest on the iron angles and wooden pillars independent of the old structure. Hence, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that the value of the demised property had not been materially affected nor had it impaired materially the value or utility of the building demised under the lease agreement Ex.R-1.
19. In this context, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the subsequent events and contended that on account of the judgment passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in his favour, the respondent had completely altered the structure by replacing the said superstructure by the new structure put up by him with R.C.C. columns and brick walls in the petition premises. In this respect, he has pointed out that in view of such subsequent development, the revision petitioner was constrained to take out the applications for reception of additional evidence and also to appoint Advocate Commissioner in this revision petition (vide) C.M.P.Nos.2491 of 2004 and 2670 of 2004 respectively. Further, he has referred me to the very admission of the respondent in the counter affidavit filed in C.M.P.No. 2491 of 2004 wherein he has categorically admitted the putting up of a pucca structure.
20. It is no doubt true that an order of interim injunction was granted in favour of the revision petitioner (vide) order dated 20.6.2002 in C.M.P.No. 8207 of 2002. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, despite such order, the respondent continued to raise new structure with brick walls and lite roofing and that in spite of his intimation to the Authorities of City Municipal Corporation, Chennai, the respondent completed the construction.
21. Though the respondent denied such contentions put forth on the side of the revision petitioner, he has candidly admitted such alteration and putting up of tiled roof construction and also closing the entrance from Halls Road and opening a new entrance from New Avadi Road with steel grill gate. A cursory glance of the documents filed along with C.M.P.No. 2491 of 2004 reveals that the respondent had in fact raised a pucca tiled construction. It is seen therefrom that the City Municipal Corporation Authorities issued prosecution notice to the revision petitioner on account of such unauthorised construction put up in the petition premises. Similarly, the photographs filed along with the petition would also show that the respondent emboldened by the order of the Appellate Authority in his favour had raised pucca construction in utter derogation of the Rules and the provisions of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act.
22. The learned senior counsel for the respondent, Mr.R.Krishnaswamy, has made strenuous attempt to convince this Court that on account of the directions given by the Authorities under the Factories Act, the respondent was constrained to put up such an additional constructions at different stages. However, there is no evidence on record to show that the workshop run by the respondent comes within the definition of a factory and more so, the Authorities under the Factories Act could give such direction to put up any construction against the provisions of Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act whereunder the owner of the premises has to apply for putting up any additional construction in accordance with Rules. Hence on the factual aspect of the matter, the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in my opinion failed to appreciate the recorded evidence to come to a proper conclusion.
23. On the contrary, this Court is of the considered opinion that if really the respondent was so directed by the Authorities under Factories Act, he should have sought for proper directions from the Rent Controller in that respect. But, on the other hand, the recorded evidence discloses that even in the first instance, the respondent had not chosen to approach the Rent Controller seeking necessary directions. I am therefore of the view that the conduct of the respondent would lend support to the above conclusion.
24. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner, Mr.T.P.Sankaran, relied on various decisions of this Court as well as the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in support of his submission that the constructions put up by the respondent at various stages in the petition premises would invariably cause prejudice to the interest of the petitioner herein and it would also amount to deprivation of the value and utility of the building.
25. It is pertinent in this context to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in MANMOHAN DAS v. BISHUN DAS (AIR 1967 S.C. 643) and 1993 (2) S.C.C. 614 (VIPIN KUMAR v. ROSHAN LAL ANAND) at first to decide the question under consideration. In the earlier case, the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlords made alterations by lowering the level of the shop by about 1-1/2 feet and putting up a new floor with corresponding lowering of the front door and therefore it was held that such alteration would tantamount to substantial change in the structure of the premises and hence the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises was ordered. In the latter case also, the Supreme Court held that the act of the tenant in constructing walls and putting up a door without the consent of the landlord would prevent the free flow of air and light and that therefore such act would deteriorate the value and utility of the building. Hence, the order of eviction of the tenant from the premises was upheld. In these circumstances, having regard to the principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said decisions, consideration of other decisions rendered by this Court is not necessary.
26. But, on the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court reported in 1986-(Vol.99)-L.W.-678 (DINAKARAN, R.R. v. S.L. CHINNA KUPPUSWAMI) and 1975 T.N.L.J. 53 (P.M. MOHIDEEN SAHIB v. MOHAMMED HABIBULLA SAHIB) in support of his contention that the replacement of the worn out roof with a new roof and the old mud walls and wooden pillars with brick walls and brick pillars as well as construction of staircase would not diminish the value or utility of the building. It is therefore urged by him that in this case also, the construction put up by the respondent would not in any way amount to deprivation of the value or utility of the petition premises.
27. As referred to above, the original structure in respect of which the lease agreement Ex.R-1 was entered into between the parties measures to an extent of 300 sq.ft. Subsequently, as per Exs.P-10 and R-60, the Engineer's reports, the respondent removed the tatched shed and put up a new lite roofing structure measuring 18' x 12' running east to west and also constructed a toilet at the south-eastern corner without providing necessary hygienic convenience like septic tank, water facility, etc. and without the consent of the petitioner herein. Further, as has been referred to above, while the revision petition is pending, again without the consent of the revision petitioner, the respondent has put up a pucca tiled roofing structure by opening a new entrance with steel grill gate in flagrant violation of the provisions under the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act.
28. In this context, it is important to find out whether the respondent as tenant of the petition premises had been left without any remedy except to carry out the said constructions without the consent of the petitioner herein under the guise of directions from the Authorities under the Factories Act.
29. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the light of the ratio laid down in the decision of this Court in DORAIPANDIA KONAR v. SUNDARA PATHAR (1970 (1) M.L.J. 62), I am of the considered opinion that the construction now put up by the respondent altering the entire structure originally leased out to him, cannot at any stretch of imagination fall within the definition of "repairs" (vide) Section 2(7) of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent cannot be heard to say that what has been put up by him in the petition premises is only an improvement to the petition premises and that the same would not deprive the value or utility of the same..
30. While deciding a question in AIR 1967 S.C. 643 (supra) arising out of a provision pari materia in U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, it was held by the Apex Court as follows:-
"Without attempting to lay down any general definition as to what material alterations mean, as such a question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the alterations in the present case must mean material alterations as the construction carried out by the respondent had the effect of altering the form and structure of the accommodation. The expression "material alterations" in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises."
31. If the said ratio is taken into account while deciding whether the alterations made by the respondent in the petition premises would amount to "altering the form and structure of the accommodation" and that the same would result in the deprivation of the value or utility of the building, this court has no other option except to hold that it would certainly amount to such deprivation of the value or utility of the building for the simple reason that the whole structure originally leased out was completely changed by the respondent subsequently.
32. There is no controversy on the position of the legal principle that subsequent events can be taken into account before the final adjudication of the matter is taken up by the forum competent to decide the issue and for this position, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in PRATA RAI TANSWANI AND ANOTHER v. UTTAM CHAND AND ANOTHER (2005 (1) L.W. 98) may be usefully referred to hereunder. While deciding the question whether the subsequent events may be taken into account for adjudicating upon the question of bona fide requirement of the building by the landlord both under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, Their Lordships laid down the law as under:-
"The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused."
Further, in para 17 also, the ratio has been laid as under:-
"As observed in HASMAT RAI's case (1981 (3) S.C.C. 103), the appellate Court is required to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the subsequent events and their effect."
33. Hence, it is unnecessary to embark upon the applicability or otherwise of the principles laid down in all other decisions rendered by Single Judge of this Court cited by the learned counsel on either side, in view of the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this aspect of the matter. While considering the subsequent events in this case, it is abundantly clear from the very admission in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent in C.M.P.Nos.2670 and 2491 of 2004 that he had in fact, put up the construction by totally changing the original structure leased out to him in utter violation of the provisions under Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919.
34. Further, it is seen that on account of such an act of the respondent in putting up the construction without the consent of the revision petitioner, the latter is liable for prosecution under Sections 256 (for demolition) and 362 (for continuing offence) of the said Act for no fault on his part. It is needless to state that since such prosecution is for continuing offence, ultimately the revision petitioner may not only be convicted for such an offence, but demolition of the building is also likely to be ordered by the Corporation Authorities. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that subsequent events as seen from the records of the case would certainly indicate that the respondent had in fact committed the act of waste with reference to the demised premises and also violated the statutory provisions of law in putting up such construction and thereby landed the revision petitioner also in the predicament of being prosecuted for such violation of the provisions under the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act.
35. For the same reason, I am unable to countenance the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the revision petitioner has to file a fresh petition before the Rent Controller for eviction of the respondent from the demised premises in view of the subsequent developments referred to above. Therefore, this Court finds that the revision petitioner cannot be driven to initiate another round of litigation merely on the ground of subsequent construction put up by the respondent without any authority, especially when proceedings were pending in this Court.
36. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has lost sight of the above facts and circumstances of the case while rendering the impugned judgment. Thus, the impugned judgment and decretal order passed by the learned VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras in my opinion are liable to be set aside, as the same are not based on the recorded evidence.
37. In view of the pronouncement of the legal principle in the decisions SUNDARAM STEEL CO v. LAKSHMI (1997 (I) M.L.J. 376) and VOORA MAHALAKSHMAMMA v. C. VERRA REDDY (1995-1-L.W. 82) that no additional evidence can be let in at the stage of revision under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, this Court is of the view that the additional evidence sought to be adduced in this revision (vide) C.M.P.No. 2491 of 2004 cannot be received at this stage.
38. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs throughout by setting aside the judgment and decretal order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (VII Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras in R.C.A.No. 723 of 1993 dated 26.3.1999. The respondent/tenant is given six months' time to vacate the property subject to condition that he files an affidavit within two weeks from today giving an unconditional undertaking that he will vacate the property on or before 15-10-2005 failing which the petitioner/landlord will be at liberty to execute the order of eviction. Consequently, C.M.P.Nos.2491 and 2670 of 2004 are closed.