Madras High Court
Royal Enfield Employees Union vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu on 13 July, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 MAD 1042
Author: Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy
Bench: A.P.Sahi, Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy
W.A.No.504 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 13.07.2020
CORAM :
THE HON'BLE MR.A.P.SAHI, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY
W.A.No.504 of 2020
Royal Enfield Employees Union
(Regn.No.3617/CNI)
Rep. by its General Secretary
No.5, Dr.Vasudevan Road
Kilpauk, Chennai – 600 010. .. Appellant
vs.
1. The Government of Tamil Nadu
rep. by its Secretary
Labour & Employment Department
Fort St. George
Chennai – 600 009.
2. The Commissioner of Labour
Labour Welfare Building
DMS Compound
Chennai – 600 006.
3. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour
Sriperumbudur
Kancheepuram District.
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W.A.No.504 of 2020
4. The Management, Royal Enfield
(A Unit of Eicher Motors Ltd.)
No.A-19, Sipcot Industrial Growth Centre
Oragadam, Kancheepuram District – 602 105.
5. Royal Enfield Collaborative Forum
Royal Enfield (A Unit of Eicher Motors Ltd.)
Oragadam
Kancheepuram District – 602 105. .. Respondents
PRAYER: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the
order dated 08.07.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.18902 of 2019.
For Appellant : Mr.K.M.Ramesh
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by The Hon'ble Chief Justice) The appeal questions the correctness of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge contending that the conclusion drawn by the Court that the issue involving the validity of a Settlement under Section 12(3) can be raised under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, “the 1947 Act”) is not correct.
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2. Learned counsel has cited the Division Bench judgment in the case of Pudukottai Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and others, decided on 23.11.2007 [(2008) 3 MLJ 456], to urge that if the action of the Conciliation Officer was questionable and was patently illegal, then the writ petition could be entertained and the issue with regard to a settlement having been arrived at under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act being binding, was not required to be referred for adjudication before the Labour Court. It is urged that the Conciliation Officer was not justified in proceeding to entertain a partisan bipartite agreement settled by the Management so as to give a closure to the entire issue.
3. The learned Single Judge has held that an exercise cannot be undertaken under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to probe into the evidence and the facts relating to the settlement, as to whether it was binding, or was fair and proper or not. This, according to the learned Single Judge, was a matter to be __________ Page 3 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 adjudicated only by the Labour Court/Tribunal under the 1947 Act.
4. A settlement under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act is an outcome of an exercise undertaken in conciliation proceedings by the Conciliation Officer. A report of such conciliation has to be sent to the appropriate Government together with the memorandum of settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. In the event of settlement not having been arrived at, a report has to be sent in this regard as to why the settlement could not be arrived at. It is on receipt of any such report that a reference can be made to the Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or the forums prescribed therein and if the reference is not made, the Government can communicate and record reasons for not making such a reference.
5. A settlement which is arrived at finally under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act is binding in terms of Section 18 of the 1947 Act. There cannot be any dispute on this, but the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Conciliation Officer did not apply his mind to the terms of the settlement and __________ Page 4 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 erroneously proceeded with the same that was set up, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, by a splinter group or a minority group of members of a union.
6. In order to examine the issue as to whether such a dispute can also be raised as an industrial dispute or not, the provisions of Section 2(k) of the 1947 Act are relevant, which is extracted herein under:
“Section 2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.-
(a) to (j) ****
(k) 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.”
7. The said provision categorically holds that an industrial dispute means any dispute which may be even connected with the terms of employment. Settlement is nothing else, but it relates to the terms of the employment of the workmen and such other __________ Page 5 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 benefits that may have been arrived at. The definition covers almost every aspect of terms of employment and, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that an industrial dispute cannot be raised is not correct. In the present case, a challenge has been raised to a settlement dated 4.6.2019 which is said to have been staged by the management through a splinter minor group as against the claim of the appellant which is the majority union. The settlement arose out of a dispute relating to altering the existing service conditions and increase in wages.
8. In order to substantiate the aforesaid conclusion drawn by us, reference be had to the decision in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Krishna Kant and others, (1995) 5 SCC 75, which is a Three Judges decision, where after referring to Section 2(k) of the 1947 Act in paragraph (8) of the report, the Apex Court in paragraph (28) held as under:
“28. Now, coming back to Principle No. 2 and its qualification in para 24, we must say that para 24 must be read harmoniously with the said principle and not in derogation of it — not so as to nullify it altogether. Indeed, __________ Page 6 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 Principle No. 2 is a reiteration of the principle affirmed in several decisions on the subject including Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [(1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78] . Principle No. 2 is clear whereas para 24 is more in the nature of a statement of fact. It says that most of the industrial disputes will be disputes involving the rights and obligations created by the Act. It, therefore, says that there will hardly be any industrial dispute which will fall under Principle No. 2 and that almost all of them will fall under Principle No. 3.
This statement cannot be understood as saying that no industrial dispute can ever be entertained by or adjudicated upon by the civil courts. Such an understanding would not only make the statement of law in Principle No. 2 wholly meaningless but would also run counter to the well- established principles on the subject. It must accordingly be held that the effect of Principle No. 2 is in no manner whittled down by para 24. At the same time, we must emphasise the policy of law underlying the Industrial Disputes Act and the host of enactments concerning the workmen made by Parliament and State Legislatures. The whole idea has been to provide a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill afford. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt __________ Page 7 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and re-make the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them.” The ultimate conclusion summarizing the principles were enumerated in paragraph (35) of the judgment, which is extracted herein under:
“35. We may now summarise the principles flowing from the above discussion:
__________ Page 8 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act.
(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 — which can be called “sister enactments” to Industrial Disputes Act — and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums __________ Page 9 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open.
(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly — i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the Government — in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.
__________ Page 10 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to “statutory provisions”. Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute-resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.”
9. The above quoted decision has been followed subsequently by the Apex Court in Rajasthan SRTC and others v. Khadarmal, __________ Page 11 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 (2006) 1 SCC 59, which however considered the larger issue of exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
10. The decision in Krishna Kant case (supra) was quoted with approval in A.P. Foods v. S.Samuel and others, (2006) 5 SCC 469.
11. The Apex Court further deprecated the interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters of exhaustive and appropriate statutory remedies in reference to the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the case of U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and others v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S.Karamchari Sangh, (2004) 4 SCC 268. Emphasizing the need of avoiding entertaining such disputes under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court in paragraphs (12) and (17) held as under:
“12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the __________ Page 12 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner.
....
17. The only reason given by the High Court to finally dispose of the issues in its writ jurisdiction which appears to be sustainable, is the factor of delay, on the part of the High Court in disposing of the dispute. Doubtless the issue of alternative remedy should be raised and decided at the earliest opportunity so that a litigant is not prejudiced by the action of the Court since the objection is one in the nature of a demurrer. Nevertheless even when there has been such a delay where the issue raised requires the resolution of factual controversies, the High Court should not, even when there is a delay, short-circuit the process for effectively determining the facts. Indeed the factual controversies which have arisen in this case remain unresolved. They must be resolved in a manner which is just and fair to both the parties. The High Court was not the appropriate forum for the enforcement of the right and the learned Single Judge in Anand Prakash case had correctly refused to entertain the writ petition for such relief.”
12. The opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, in our opinion, also does not suffer from any legal __________ Page 13 of 15 http://www.judis.nic.in W.A.No.504 of 2020 infirmity, in as much as whether the settlement is binding; whether it is fair or proper; and as to whether the settlement can operate, are all questions of fact relating to the terms of employment, for which an industrial dispute can be raised before the appropriate forum.
We, therefore, do not find any error in the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
(A.P.S., CJ.) (S.K.R., J.)
13.7.2020
Index : Yes
sasi
To:
1. The Secretary
Government of Tamil Nadu
Labour & Employment Department
Fort St. George
Chennai – 600 009.
2. The Commissioner of Labour
Labour Welfare Building
DMS Compound
Chennai – 600 006.
3. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour
Sriperumbudur
Kancheepuram District.
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W.A.No.504 of 2020
THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY, J.
(sasi)
W.A.No.504 of 2020
13.07.2020
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