Gujarat High Court
Thakore Shri Chelsinhji Nathusinhji ... vs State Of Gujarat on 11 January, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1995)2GLR1282
Author: B.N. Kirpal
Bench: B.N. Kirpal
JUDGMENT B.N. Kirpal, C.J.
1. The challenge in this writ petition, when filed, was to the validity of the Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982 which was enacted with a view to amending some of the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 and of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws. At the time of hearing of this petition, an application was filed seeking amendment of the petition with a view to challenging the provisions of Section 7(3) of the said impugned Act. By way of amendment, it was also sought to be contended that Section 10 of the Bombay Merged Territories and Area (Jagirs) Abolition Act, 1953 (the Jagir Abolition Act for brief) is prospective in nature and as it has been enacted by the said Act No. 8 of 1982 and which Amending Act came into force with effect from 23rd February 1992, therefore, the rights of the petitioner prior to that Act remained unaffected.
2. The main reason for filing of this writ petition is that, even after abolition of the Jagirs, the petitioner continued to be in occupation of the land in question and thereafter proceedings were initiated by the respondent under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the rights. These proceedings were initiated by issuance of Section 4 notification and, according to the respondent, the petitioner got divested of all the rights in the Jagir lands including the right to operate the mines and therefore, no compensation in regard thereto was payable by the respondent.
3. As regards the validity of Act No. 8 of 1982 is concerned, there is not much which can be argued on behalf of the petitioner for the simple reason that the said Act has been placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nilubhai Nijbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in JT 1994 (4) SC 473, the said Amendment Act has received its protective canopy of Ninth Schedule and it is saved by Article 31A of the Constitution of India. In view thereof, it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of Section 10(1) of the Jagir Abolition Act after its amendment in 1982.
4. We also do not find any merit in the contention of the petitioner that his rights were not extinguished notwithstanding the amendment of Section 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act.
5. By Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982, a number of amendments in different Acts were carried out. By Section 2 of the said Amending Act, Section 69A was inserted in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Sub-section (1) Section 69A, with which we are concerned, reads as under:
69A (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any custom, usage, grant, sanad or order or agreement or any law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of a Court or of other authority, with effect on and from the 1st May, 1960 all mines whether being worked or not and minerals whether discovered or not and all quarries which are situate within the limits of any land, granted or recognised under any contract, grant or law for the time being in force or decree of a Court, shall vest in and with all rights over the same or appurtenant thereto be the property of the State Government, and the State Government shall subject to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 have all powers necessary for the proper enjoyment and disposal of such rights.
By the said Amending Act, one of the other amendments which was carried out was substitution of Section 10 in the Jagir Abolition Act with Section 10. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 after amendment is as follows:
10. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any custom, usage, grant, sanad, or order or agreement or any law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of a Court or of other authority, with effect on and from the appointed date, all mines whether being worked or not and minerals whether discovered or not and all quarries which are situate within the limits of any Jagir village granted or recognised under any contract, grant or law for the time being in force or decree of a Court shall vest in and with all rights over the same or appurtenant thereto be the property of the State Government and the State Government shall, subject to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 have all powers necessary for the proper enjoyment and disposal of such rights.
6. A reading of aforesaid two provisions would show that the same are in pari materia. Both under Section 69A as well as Section 10(1), all rights of the petitioner as a Jagirdar had come to an end long before the acquisition proceedings had started in 1974. By virtue of the provisions of Section 69A, these rights had come to an end with effect from 1st May 1960. Under Section 10(1) of the Jagir Abolition Act, the rights of Jagirdars would come to an end with effect from the 'appointed date'. It is contended by Shri Patel that the words 'appointed date' in Section 10(1) must mean the date when the Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982 came into operation. We are unable to agree with this submission. Section 10 has been inserted in the Jagir Abolition Act, 1953. The said Principal Act, of which Section 10(1) became a part, has defined the words 'appointed date' in Section 2(l)(i) as meaning the date on which the said Jagir Abolition Act came into force. The said Act came into force with effect from 1st August 1954. A plain reading of Section 10(1) as it exists after amendment would show that, with effect from the appointed date as is found in Section 2 of the said Act, the rights of Jagirdars came to an end.
7. It was also submitted that no compensation has been paid or has been contemplated for the loss of the mining rights of the Jagirdar. This submission of the learned Counsel is not correct. By Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982, Section 21-A was inserted in the Jagir Abolition Act and by the said Section 21-A, compensation for vesting of rights to mines and mineral products in the State Government had to be paid to the Jagirdars. The manner of computation of compensation is prescribed therein and, according to this, the amount of compensation is to be equivalent to the average of the net annual income received by the Jagirdar in respect of the mines and mineral products during the three years immediately preceding the date of vesting. Section 7 of the Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982 deals with the transitory provision and Sub-section (3) of Section 7 reads as under:
7. (3) Any obligation or liability of the Government to pay any royalty or any other sum to a person in relation to his right or privilege to any mines and mineral products existing before the commencement of the said Ordinance shall cease and no legal proceeding or remedy for enforcement of such right or privilege or in respect of such obligation or liability shall be instituted, continued or enforced in any Court, or other authority.
8. It is submitted by Shri Patel that, because of aforesaid Section 7(3), the right of the petitioner to get compensation under Section 21A would be taken away. We do not agree with this apprehension of the learned Counsel. It is quite clear that Section 21A and Section 7 have to be read together in a harmonious manner. Both of them have been enacted by Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982. Reading the two together it would mean that, apart from the compensation which is payable under Section 21A under the Jagir Abolition Act, the Government will not be liable to pay any other royalty or sum to any other person in relation to his right or privilege to the mines or mineral products. It is pertinent to note that, whereas Section 21A makes a specific reference to the payment of compensation to Jagirdar, Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the impugned Act, on the other hand, refers to payment of royalty to "a person". The ambit of Section 7(3) is wide enough to include not only the Jagirdars but to any other person who may have a right or privilege with regard to the mines or mineral products. All such rights and privileges were to cease and the liability of the Government was to come to an end. If viewed from another point, Section 7 (3) brings to an end any obligation of the Government which had existed prior to the commencement of the Ordinance preceding Gujarat Act No. 8 of 1982. The compensation which is payable under Section 21A was not one such compensation and therefore, Sub-section (3) of Section 7 will not affect the payment of such.
No other contention has been raised before us. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition is dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged. The interim relief stands vacated. The parties will bear their own costs.