Madras High Court
Union Of India vs M/S.Kiran Overseas Ltd on 24 April, 2017
Equivalent citations: AIR 2018 (NOC) 254 (MAD.)
Author: Rajiv Shakdher
Bench: Rajiv Shakdher, R.Suresh Kumar
In the High Court of Judicature at Madras
Dated: 24.04.2017
Coram
The Honourable Mr.JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
and
The Honourable Mr.JUSTICE R.SURESH KUMAR
C.M.A.SR.No.67516 of 2016
and C.M.P.No.131 of 2017
Union of India
rep. by
The Director of Enforcement,
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India, Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue, 2nd and 3rd Floor,
Murugesa Naicker Complex, No.84, Greams Road,
Thousand Lights, Chennai - 600 006.
.... Appellant
Vs.
1. M/s.Kiran Overseas Ltd.
2. Shri.O.P.Batra (Died)
rep. by Ranjiv Batra
3. Shri.M.G.Gupta
4. Shri.Gopalakrishna Thiyagarajan
5. Shir.Kiren Batra
6. Shri.Ranjiv Batra
.... Respondents
APPEAL filed under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 against the order dated 22.01.2016 made in Revision Petition No.1254 of 2004 on the file of the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange at New Delhi.
For Appellant : Mr.Rajnish Pathiyil
For Respondents: Mr.K.Jayachandran - R1, R5 and R6
No appearance - R3 and R4
------------
C O M M O N J U D G M E N T
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAJIV SHAKDHER,J.)
1. The Miscellaneous Petition is preferred seeking condonation of delay.
1.1. This petition has been filed on behalf of the Union of India, i.e., Revenue.
1.2. The petition accompanies an appeal preferred under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 ( in short FEMA).
1.3. The appeal is, presently, at the stage of registration, as the captioned petition is pending consideration of this Court.
2. Notice in this petition was issued on 12.01.2017. Pursuant to which, respondent Nos.1, 5 and 6 have filed their reply. The said respondents have taken an objection to the condonation of delay.
2.1. It is the stand of the respondents that, being a statutory appeal, which provides for a specific period of limitation, this Court would have no jurisdiction to condone the delay.
2.2. It is the submission of the respondents that FEMA is a special statute and, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would have no application.
3. As against this, learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant makes a contrary submission. In support of his submission, learned counsel relies upon a judgment of a single Judge of the Delhi High Court dated 06.07.2012, passed in Crl.M.A.No.4671 of 2011 in Crl.A.No.493 of 2011 in the matter of: Kamlesh Ishwarbhai Patel V. UOI & Ors., 2012 (130) DRJ 511.
3.1. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant that the said judgment was rendered in the context of FEMA, where the Court upon placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of: Kailash V. Nanhku and Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 480, has come to the conclusion that the Court, while, entertaining an appeal under Section 35 of FEMA, could, in a given case, upon sufficient cause being shown, condone the delay.
4. We must indicate herein that the learned counsel for the aforementioned respondents have cited the following judgments in support of their plea:
(i) Union of India V. Jagdish Prasad Jalan Nandalal, 2012 (286) E.L.T. 525 (Cal.);
(ii) Judgment dated 07.02.2012, passed in Civil Application No.140 of 2010 in Ferast No.22607 of 2010, in the case of Union of India V. Reliance Industries Ltd.;
(iii) Union of India V.Ashok J.Ramsinghani, 2011 (272) E.L.T. 534 (Bom.); and
(iv) M.R.Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India, 2004 (178) E.L.T. 137 (Del.)
5. To be noted, the judgment in the case of: M.R.Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India, 2004 (178) E.L.T. 137 (Del.), which dealt with Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (in short 'CE Act'), was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, via a brief speaking order.
6. Thus, given the objection, we are not required, at this juncture, to deal with the merits of the matter.
6.1. Having regard to the same, we are setting out the dates and events, which are relevant, only in so far as the discussion qua the issue at hand is concerned.
7. The record shows that the impugned order was passed on 22.01.2016 by the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange (in short 'the Tribunal').
7.1. To be noted, there is nothing on record to show as to when an application for issuance of a certified copy was preferred by the Revenue.
7.2. We are informed that there is no procedure in place for applying for a certified copy and that the same is dispatched by the registry of the Tribunal, as and when it is ready.
7.3. To be noted, learned counsel for the Revenue is also not able to state correctly as to what is the correct date of dispatch by the Tribunal.
7.4. We may only note that the first page of the impugned judgment of the Tribunal carries a stamp, which reads as follows:
"FTS No.1057/DE:3.2.2016".
7.5. There is also an endorsement on the very same page, at the foot of the page, on the left side, which reads as follows:
"247/DLA:04.02.2015"
7.6. The date obviously seems to be a typographical error, as the impugned judgment was rendered on 22.01.2016.
8. Based on the said dates, there are two versions as to when the impugned judgment was received by the Revenue.
8.1. The Revenue says that the impugned judgment was received in their Delhi Office on 04.02.2016, whereas, the contesting respondents state that the impugned judgment was received by the Revenue on 03.02.2016.
8.2. Furthermore, it is the stand of the Revenue that the certified copy of the impugned judgment was received in Chennai, which is the jurisdictional office, i.e., Chennai Office, on 25.04.2016.
8.3. Therefore, if, 04.02.2016 is taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation, then, 60 days limitation period would expire on 04.04.2016 and the further period of 60 days, which is the period available under the proviso to Section 35 of the FEMA, expire on 03.06.2016.
8.4. On the other hand, if we were to take 03.02.2016 as the date of commencement of limitation, the initial period of 60 days will expire on 02.04.2016, while further period of 60 days will expire on 02.06.2016.
8.5. It is not disputed by both sides, that the instant appeal in this Court was filed on 08.09.2016.
8.6. Therefore, if, 04.02.2016 is taken as the date of commencement, as per the record available with us, the Revenue has overshort the period of 120 days, which is the maximum period, according to the contesting respondents, available for condonation, by 68 days, whereas, if, 03.02.2016 is taken as the date of commencement of limitation, this period will get extended to 69 days.
8.7. Either way, there is a delay, according to the contesting respondents, which, this Court cannot condone, in view of the language used in Section 35 of the FEMA.
9. Given these facts, we may therefore, examine the provision in issue, i.e., Section35 of the FEMA. For the sake convenience, the said provision is extracted hereafter:
"35. Appeal to High Court.Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order: Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order\:" Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.
Explanation.In this section High Court means
(a)the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and
(b)where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
10. A bare perusal of Section 35 of FEMA would show that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal is entitled to file an appeal to the jurisdictional High Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or the order of the Tribunal on any question of law arising from such an order. The proviso gives a leeway to the jurisdictional High Court to entertain an appeal beyond the period of 60 days provided in the main provision, in case, sufficient cause is furnished, as to why an appeal could not be preferred within the time stipulated therein.
10.1. The only caveat, which is entered in the proviso is that the High Court can allow condonation of appeal for a "further period not exceeding 60 days".
10.2. Therefore, as to whether or not, this Court would have power to condone the delay beyond the period provided in the proviso, would depend on the language used.
11. It is the contention of Mr.Jayachandran, who appears on behalf of the contesting respondents, that given the language used in the proviso to Section 35 of FEMA, this Court has no leeway to condone the period of delay, beyond the time frame provided therein.
11.1. Learned counsel submits that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application, on account of the fact that, it is a special Statute.
12. As against this, Mr.Rajinish Pathiyil contends to the contrary.
12.1. As indicated above, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of a single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kamlesh Ishwarbhai Patel V. UOI & Ors., 2012 (130) DRJ 511 to buttress his submission.
13. We had noticed, at the very outset, that the said judgment is largely predicated on the view taken by the Supreme Court in the matter of: Kailash V. Nanhku and Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 480.
13.1. It is pertinent to note that in Kailash V. Nanhku and Ors.,, the Supreme Court was called upon to rule, whether the decision of the Allahabad High Court in rejecting the application filed by the first respondent before it, to condone the delay in filing a written statement in an Election Petition, was justified.
13.2. The High Court, evidently, rejected the application for condonation of delay and, thus, refused to take on record the written statement filed by the first respondent, based on its understanding of the scope of provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the 'CPC').
13.3. The Supreme Court, taking into account the fact, that the written statement was sought to be filed in an Election Petition, overruled the decision of the High Court. In doing so, the Supreme Court, inter alia, held that given the language of Section 87(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (in short, the '1951 Act'), the procedure applicable in the trial of suit is not attracted with all its rigidity and technicality in trying the Election Petitions. The Court further went on to say that, rule of procedure contained in CPC would apply to the trial of Election Petitions under the 1951 Act with due flexibility and act as only guidelines.
13.4. In so far as the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of CPC was concerned, the Supreme Court held that the provision, being in the domain of procedural law, it was directory and not mandatory in nature. The Court further observed that the power of the Court to extend time to file written statement beyond the time frame prescribed in the said provision was not completely taken away.
13.5. A close reading of the judgment would show that, in coming to this conclusion, the Court took into account the fact that the time limit, provided in Order 8 Rule 1 of CPC, obtained qua the defendant and not vis-a-vis the Court. In addition thereto, the Court also took into account the other provisions obtaining in the CPC, i.e.,Order 8 Rule 9, which empower the Court, to permit a written statement being filed, if, the Court requires such a written statement to be placed on record. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also noticed the provisions of Order 8 Rule 10, which, interalia, provide that a Court need not necessarily pronounce a judgment against a defendant, who fails to file a written statement, as required under Order 8 Rule 1 or Rule 9 of the CPC.
13.6. Clearly, neither the scheme of CPC nor the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kailash V. Nanhku and Ors., can be applied, in our opinion, to understand the scope and ambit of Section 35 of FEMA.
13.7. Therefore, to our minds, the principle, which is enunciated in the matter of Kailash V. Nanhku and Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 480 would not be applicable to the appeals filed with the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA.
13.8. On the other hand, in respect of pari materia provision, which is Section 35 of the CE Act, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of M.R.Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India, 2004 (178) E.L.T. 137 (Del.), has, after considering extensively the law on the subject, came to the conclusion that the High Court cannot condone the delay beyond the period provided in the proviso to Section 35 of the CE Act.
13.6. For the sake of convenience, the said provision is extracted hereafter:
" 35. APPEALS TO COMMISSIONER (APPEALS).
(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals) within "within sixty days" from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order:
Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.
(2) Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner."
14. We may note that though Section 35 of the CE Act, provides for an appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals), the language of the provision is pari materia with the provisions of Section 35 of FEMA.
14.1. Section 35 of the CE Act provides an opportunity to any person aggrieved by a decision or order passed by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, to prefer an appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order.
14.2. The proviso to said Section states that, in case, the aggrieved party was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting an appeal within a prescribed period of 60 days, the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered to entertain an appeal beyond the stated period, albeit, with a caveat, that the condonable period falls within a further period of thirty "(30) days".
14.3. The Division Bench, in our view, quite correctly, applied the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the matter of: Union of India V. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 and came to the conclusion that the delay could not be condoned beyond the period provided in the proviso to Section 35 of CE Act. We respectfully agree with the view taken in M.R.Tobacco case.
14.4. Notably, in the Popular Construction case, the Supreme Court was dealing with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
14.5. Once again, for the sake of convenience, the relevant part of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is extracted hereafter:
"34 Application for setting aside arbitral award. (1)Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2)........
(3)An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
(4)........"
14.6. The Court, in that case, was considering, as to whether an application to set aside the award, where it had been filed after the expiry of the condonable period, could be entertained by the High Court.
14.7. Looking at the language, the Court made the following apposite observations:
"10.This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133] : (SCC p. 146, para 17) If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.
11.Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded [Patel Naranbhai Marghabhaiv.Dhulabhai Galbabhai, (1992) 4 SCC 264] .
12.As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are but not thereafter used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase but not thereafter wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
13.Apart from the language, express exclusion may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law:
[E]ven in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. [(1974) 2 SCC 133] (SCC p. 146, para 17)
14.Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendible by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process [ Para 4(v) of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996] . This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:
5.Extent of judicial intervention.Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.
15.The Part referred to in Section 5 is Part I of the 1996 Act which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and is therefore subject to the sweep of the prohibition contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act.
16.Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application in accordance with that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17.The appellant then sought to rely on a decision of this Court in Union of India v. Hanuman Prasad & Bros.[2000 AIR SCW 3934(2) : (2001) 8 SCC at p. 476 (See below)] to which one of us (Ruma Pal, J.) was a party. It is contended that the decision is an authority for the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to objections to an award under the 1996 Act. It is true that in the body of that judgment, there is a reference to the 1996 Act. But that is an apparent error as the reasoning clearly indicates that the provisions of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not Section 34 of the 1996 Act were under consideration. In order to clarify the position, we have scrutinised the original record of Hanuman Prasad & Bros.[2000 AIR SCW 3934(2) : (2001) 8 SCC at p. 476 (See below)] decided on 6-3-2000. We have found that that was indeed a case which dealt with an award passed and challenged under the Arbitration Act, 1940. No question was raised with regard to the applicability of the Limitation Act to the 1940 Act. The only issue was whether the High Court should have refused to condone the delay of 2 months and 22 days in filing the objection to the award. This Court found that sufficient cause had been shown to condone the delay and accordingly set aside the decision of the High Court. This decision is as such irrelevant."
(Emphasis is ours)
15. In so far as Section 35 of the FEMA is concerned, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Union of India V. Jagadish Prasad Jalan Nandalal, 2012 (286) E.L.T. 525 (Cal.) came to the conclusion that the High Court would not have power to condone the period of delay beyond the time frame provided in the proviso to the said Section.
15.1. For the sake of convenience, the observations made in that behalf, which are contained in paragraph 17 to 22, are extracted hereafter:
In the body of the FEMA, there has been no provision and cannot be any provision to prefer any appeal against the decision of the Appellate Board constituted under FERA after FEMA has been brought into existence with dissolution of Board. Hence, going by the plain language of the provisions of Section 35 of FEMA, under which an appeal has to be preferred is set out below:
Section 35:
Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. From the language of the proviso, it is clear that the power of condonation of delay by the High Court is restricted to only sixty days and not beyond the same. The language is indicator to hold decisively that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act being one of the sources of power of Court to condone delay for unlimited period, has been excluded by the special enactment. According to us, this special statute is a self-contained code as far as dispute resolution mechanism is concerned, and for the purpose of condonation of delay, the provision of Limitation Act, 1963 is not required to be referred nor relied on. Section 35 of FEMA itself is the source and is the only source for which no other provision is required to be pressed into operation.
Core contention is whether for the purpose of condonation of delay, power of Court to condone unlimited period as is available in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in a fit case, can be applied under relevant provision of present Act as it was in the corresponding provision of FERA. It is settled by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions dealing with various enactments that the nature of language mentioned in the statute is an indicator to hold that the special statute has expressly excluded the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act.
In our view, the language mentioned in Section 29(2) does not require that the special statute should provide expressly and with certain language that such and such section is expressly excluded. The substance of the language mentioned in the statute concerned is good enough to conclude that effect thereof is nothing but exclusionary. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee has usefully drawn our attention to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470.
In paragraph 10 of the report, while accepting the earlier decision of Supreme Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v.Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, the Apex Court in the context of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has viewed as follows:
This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. Again in paragraph 13 of the report, it is to be found as follows:
Apart from the language express exclusion may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law. While respectfully following the aforesaid legal principle, we find that the language mentioned in the provision of Section 35 of the FEMA with the phrases allowed to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days is clearly expressive of the intention of the legislature to exclude the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, or for that matter, any provision for any period exceeding sixty days.
(Emphasis is ours)
16. Similar view has also been taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Union of India V.Ashok J.Ramsinghani, 2011 (272) E.L.T. 534 (Bom.) and in Civil Application No.140 of 2010 in FERAST No.22607 of 2010, in the case of Union of India V. Reliance Industries Ltd.;
17. We may note that a single Judge of the Delhi High Court, in the case of Enforcement Directorate V. American Express Bank & Ors., MANU/DE/1578/2014 has taken a view in line with the view expressed by the Calcutta and Bombay High Court.
17.1. We may, however, note, that the single Judge of the Delhi High Court, in the matter of Enforcement Directorate V. American Express Bank & Ors. has not noticed a contra view taken in the matter of: Kamlesh Ishwarbhai Patel V. UOI & Ors., 2012 (130) DRJ 511 by another judge of the same Court .
17.2. This appears to be on account of the reason that, perhaps, the said judgment was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge.
18. Having regard to the provisions of the Statute, we are of the view that, given the language of the proviso to Section 35 of FEMA, this Court does not have a power to condone the delay beyond the time prescribed therein. The language used in the proviso appended to Section 35 of the FEMA by necessary implication excludes applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to FEMA, being a Special law, which operates in a field, inter alia, connected with economic offences. Speed coupled with certainty are the bedrock of the statute. Clearly, even according Mr.Rajinish, learned counsel for the Revenue, the accompanying appeal has been filed beyond the prescribed time frame.
18.1. In the circumstances, we are unable to condone the delay. The application will have to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.
19. In this view of the matter, the Registry need not number the appeal. The appeal, which, presently, is at the SR Stage, consequently, stands dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Speaking order/Non-speaking order (R.S.A.,J) (R.S.K.,J) Index:Yes/No 24.04.2017 sl To The Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, New Delhi. RAJIV SHAKDHER,J AND R.SURESH KUMAR,J. sl C.M.A.SR.No.67516 of 2016 and C.M.P.No.131 of 2017 24.04.2017 http://www.judis.nic.in