Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 28.06.2025 vs State Of H.P. & Another on 11 July, 2025
1 2025:HHC:22616 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA .
Cr. MMO No. 103 of 2025
Reserved on: 28.06.2025
Date of Decision: 11.07.2025
Nitin Rao .... Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another .... Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner : M/s. Radhika Gautam, Jai Ram Sharma, and Sahil Dixit, Advocates For Respondents : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State.
Ms. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel, for respondent No.2.
____________________ Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS2 2025:HHC:22616 Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition has been filed by the petitioner for .
quashing of F.I.R. No.35 of 2024, dated 15.11.2024, registered at Women Police Station, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376, 323 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the victim (name being withheld to protect her identity) filed a complaint before the police, asserting that she returned from the United Kingdom in October 2016 after completing her postgraduate degree. She met the petitioner through a mutual friend in 2017. The petitioner proposed marriage to her. The petitioner and the victim started a business together.
The victim and her parents invested ₹72,00,000/- in the business based on the promise of marriage made by the petitioner. The petitioner tried to have physical relations with the victim, but she refused. However, the petitioner forced her to have sexual intercourse in 2019, and she became pregnant. The petitioner made ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:22616 her abort the fetus. The victim asked the petitioner to solemnise the marriage, but he put off the marriage on one pretext or .
another. An engagement ceremony was held on 22.02.2021 in which the parents of the victim participated, but the parents of the petitioner were not present. The behaviour of the petitioner changed thereafter. He started abusing the victim emotionally and mentally, and asked her for money. He came to the room of the victim on 16.07.2023 in a drunken state and raped her. The victim narrated the incident to her mother. Her parents confronted the petitioner, but he threatened the victim and her parents. The petitioner subsequently got engaged to another woman in August 2024; hence, a complaint was filed before the police to take action against the petitioner and to return of ₹ 72,00,000/- invested by the victim and her parents.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioner has filed the present petition, asserting that the parties were virtually in a live-in relationship. They solemnised their engagement with each other in February 2021. The victim started ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:22616 withdrawing huge amounts from the business, making it difficult for the petitioner to continue with the business. They separated in .
June 2023. The victim started blackmailing the petitioner by threatening to implicate him in false cases. The petitioner was engaged and his marriage was fixed on 28.11.2024. The victim filed a false FIR against the petitioner. The main grievance projected in the FIR is regarding the money. The allegations made in the FIR are false. No documents were produced in support of these allegations.
The victim had also made the allegations against the landowner, and the police filed a cancellation report after the investigation.
The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by respondent No.1/State reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the police conducted an investigation and found that cognizable offences were committed; hence, the police filed a charge sheet before the competent Court of Law. The petitioner cannot escape ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:22616 from the consequences of the offences committed by him. The plea of the petitioner regarding the financial transaction is an .
afterthought and these allegations were made to divert the attention of the Court from the allegations of the rape. The allegations against the petitioner are heinous in nature. The existence of a prior business relationship or a live-in relationship does not negate the gravity of the offence. The delay in reporting the matter is no material and cannot be used to quash the FIR;
therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
5. No reply was filed on behalf of the informant, and the informant adopted the reply filed by respondent No.1.
6. I have heard M/s Radhika Gautam, Jai Ram Sharma, and Sahil Dixit, Advocates, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Ms. Suchitra Sen, learned Legal Aid Counsel, for respondent No.2/informant.
7. Ms. Radhika Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner are ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:22616 false. As per the FIR, the relationship between the parties continued from 2017, and the report was made in 2024 after the .
victim came to know about the petitioner's engagement. It is a case of a relationship gone sour and does not attract the provisions of Section 376 of IPC. The allegations made in the FIR are so inherently improbable that continuation of the trial based on these allegations would be an exercise in futility. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. She relied upon Salib v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 194, Rajnish Singh v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 197, Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471, and Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375 in support of her submission.
8. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR clearly show that the petitioner had raped the victim on two occasions. She became pregnant, and the petitioner made her to abort her fetus. The medical record regarding this fact was seized by the police. The police have filed a charge sheet before the ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:22616 Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR .
and leave the matter to the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9. Ms. Suchitra Sen, learned Legal Aid Counsel, for respondent No.2/informant, adopted the submissions of Mr. Lokender Kutlehria and submitted that this Court should not go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR while exercising the inherent jurisdiction. The allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of cognizable offences. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court should be left to adjudicate the same; hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -
::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS8 2025:HHC:22616 "7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the .
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:22616 a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in .
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.
::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS10 2025:HHC:22616 In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and .
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."
12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:22616 guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
13. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:
"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:22616 according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision .
which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
14. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions[1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.
*** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:22616 must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice." In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case .
observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 :
(1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
"It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:22616 preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94:
.
1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
"The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried."
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.
15. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:22616 case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FI₹ have been registered over a period of time. It is in the .
background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FI₹ assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522:
2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) "5. ... Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:22616 and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of .
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:22616 before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the .
section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death." (emphasis supplied)
16. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
17. It was specifically stated in the FIR that the petitioner proposed marriage with the victim in February 2017. They got engaged on 22.02.2021. The complaint was made to the police on 15.11.2024 after the victim came to know of the petitioner's engagement. As per the FIR, the relationship continued between the parties for more than seven years.
18. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nitin B NoIkhare vs State of Maharashtra, SLP(Crl.) No.1889/2024 decided on 21.01.2025 that in order to attract rape in a case of breach of promise it has to be established that the promise to marry was made with a sole intent to obtain the consent and false promise had a direct bearing on the consent of the victim for sexual relations. It was observed:
::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS18 2025:HHC:22616 "6. This Court in a catena of judgments has held that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every .
case. In order for the offence of rape to be made out, two conditions need to be satisfied i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. [See: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2019) 9 SCC 608; Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 347]
7. From a perusal of the record, it is clear that this was a case of a consensual relationship from the beginning. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted, it does not appear that the initial promise to marry was in bad faith. It was only the subsequent circumstances that prevented the fulfilment of the alleged false promise to marry. Resultantly, the relationship turned sour, which has given rise to the present FIR.
19. It was held in Mahesh Damu Khare vs State of Maharashtra 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471 that where a person acts after knowing about its consequences, it indicates her consent. When the prosecution alleges that a sexual relationship was maintained by making a false promise, such a physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances. When the relationship continued for a ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:22616 prolonged period, it cannot be said that the same was a result of a promise to marry; it was observed: -
.
"22. In our view, if a man is accused of having a sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have a physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. Thus, in a situation where the physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was a vitiation of consent under the misconception of fact."
20. It was also held that when the promise to marry was made initially, but a person was not able to fulfil the promise, it would not fall within the definition of a false promise, attracting the penal provisions of Section 375 of the IPC. It was observed: -
"24. It may also be noted that there may be occasions where a promise to marry was made initially, but for various ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:22616 reasons, a person may not be able to keep the promise to marry. If such a promise is not made from the very beginning with the ulterior motive to deceive her, it cannot .
be said to be a false promise to attract the penal provisions of Section 375 IPC, punishable under Section 376 IPC.
25. In the present case, even assuming that the appellant had made the promise since 2008 when they met for the first time, the fact that they remained unmarried for a long period till 2017 without there being any protest or objection by the complainant, does not indicate the intention at the initial stage itself to make the promise falsely to marry the complainant. Making an allegation of non-fulfilment of a promise to marry without undue delay by the promissee would, on the other hand, be an indicator of a false promise being made from the initial stage. In the present case, what is not in dispute is that the physical relationship between the appellant and the complainant continued for a long period of about a decade and as such it is difficult to infer that the appellant had made a false promise since the initial stage and continued to make false promises to marry her on the basis of which she also continued to have physical relationship with him."
21. It was ultimately held that the continuation of the relationship for nine long years would make the plea that there was a promise to marry improbable. It was held: -
"28. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to the complainant initially by the appellant, even though no such cogent evidence has been brought on record before us to that effect, the fact that the relationship continued for nine long years, would render the ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:22616 plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years was under misconception of fact that the Appellant would marry her implausible. Consequently, the criminal liability .
attached to such a false promise would be diluted after such a long passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest was registered by the complainant during all those years. Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in effect, takes out the sting of criminal culpability and neutralises it."
22. A similar view was taken in Prashant (supra), wherein it was observed:
"17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Sections 376 and 506 IPC were made out. A bare perusal of the FIR reveals that the appellant and the complainant first came in contact in the year 2017 and established a relationship thereafter. The parties met multiple times at various places during the years 2017 and 2019, including at parks and their respective houses.
Although the complainant stated that the appellant had a forceful sexual relationship with her, neither did she stop meeting the appellant thereafter nor did she file a criminal complaint during the said period.
18. It is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part. Moreover, it would have been improbable for the appellant to ascertain the complainant's residential address, as mentioned in the FIR, unless such ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:22616 information had been voluntarily provided by the complainant herself. It is also revealed that, at one point, both parties had an intention to marry each other, though .
this plan ultimately did not materialise. The appellant and the complainant were in a consensual relationship. They are both educated adults. The complainant, after filing the FIR against the appellant, got married in the year 2020 to some other person. Similarly, the appellant was also married in the year 2019. Possibly, the marriage of the appellant in the year 2019 has led the complainant to file the FIR against him, as they were in a consensual relationship till then.
19. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376 (2)(n) IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164 CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution."::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS
23 2025:HHC:22616
23. This position was reiterated in Rajnish Singh v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 197: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 478, wherein it was held .
at page 203:
22. There is no dispute that the complainant, a highly qualified female, was a major at the time when her relationship with the appellant sprouted. The first act of sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complainant is alleged to have taken place in the year 2006, and that too in her own house. However, at that time, the complainant did not make any complaint to anyone, including her own family members, that the appellant had established sexual relations with her based on an express promise to marry her in future.
23. It needs to be highlighted that the complainant categorically came out with a case in the FIR that the first act of sexual relation between her and the appellant (albeit forcible as per the complainant) took place in her own house, where her parents were also present. The very manner in which this incident is said to have taken place puts the case of the complainant under serious doubt. It is difficult to swallow that the complainant, a well-qualified major girl, was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse by an outsider in her own house where her parents were present, and still, they did not get a whiff about the incident. Thus, the complainant's allegations seem to be a well- orchestrated story and nothing beyond that.
24. It was nearly 16 years since the first incident, in a highly belated FIR, that the complainant alleged, for the first time, that the appellant, who was on friendly terms with her, forcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse in the year 2006.::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS
24 2025:HHC:22616 Further, she also stated that though she initially protested to this act and intended to report the matter to the police, she changed her mind, trusting the appellant's assurance that he .
loved her and if she refrained from spilling the beans, he would marry her. Under this guise, the appellant continued to establish sexual relations with the complainant.
25. Admittedly, the appellant got a job in the year 2006 as a Constable in the police department and was posted in a different town. The complainant alleged that whenever the appellant would visit Village Kudaria, he would establish sexual relations with her under the promise of marriage.
However, she has not clarified or elaborated when and where these acts of fornication took place. In the year 2008, the complainant came to be appointed as a Lecturer in the Kendriya Vidyalaya, whereas the appellant in the year 2009, got a job as a Clerk in the State Bank of India. As per the complainant, in the year 2009, the appellant called her to his residence in the town Farinda, Anand Nagar, where he mixed certain intoxicating substance in her drink and thereafter, subjected her to sexual assault and while she was in the state of drug-induced stupor, he recorded her obscene videos and pictures. He, thereafter, sent offensive messages to the complainant on WhatsApp, threatening that he would make her videos and pictures viral unless she continued to have sexual relations with him.
26. It does not stand to reason that when the intimate relations were continuing between the parties without any hitch for more than three years, then why would the appellant be impelled to take the trouble of spiking the drink of the complainant in order to establish sexual relations with her?
27. It is hard to believe that the complainant, being a highly qualified and well-placed major woman, kept on bending to ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 25 2025:HHC:22616 the demands of the appellant for a period of nearly 16 years without raising any protest to any quarter that the appellant was exploiting her sexually under the pretext of a false .
promise of marriage. The prolonged period of 16 years during which the sexual relations continued unabatedly between the parties is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship.
28. The complainant and the appellant were posted at different places pursuing their respective jobs. On a few occasions, the appellant would visit the complainant at her place, whereas on other occasions, the complainant was called by the appellant to his house, where these acts of fornication continued unabatedly till the year 2020/2021. It is almost impossible to swallow the version of the complainant that for the entire period of 16 years, she unreservedly allowed the appellant to subject her to repeated acts of sexual intercourse under the impression that the accused would one someday act upon his promise of marriage.
29. In Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra [Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471], this Court held that to make a man, accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage, criminally liable, the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and it must not be qualified by other circumstances or consideration. In a situation where the woman knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged period, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the accused to marry her.
30. In conclusion, the Court held that unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 26 2025:HHC:22616 promise of marriage and without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under a misconception of fact. It was .
further held that even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to the complainant initially by the accused, the fact that the relationship continued for a period of nine long years would render the plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years was under misconception of the fact that the accused would marry her implausible.
31. In Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 5 SCC 764: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375], this Court observed that it is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the accused or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part.
32. Testing the facts of the case at hand, on the touchstone of the above precedents, it is clear that the complainant, being a highly qualified major woman, continued in a consensual intimate sexual relationship with the appellant over a period of 16 years. At some point in time, the relationship went sour, leading to the filing of the FIR. No reasonable man would accept the version that the complainant allowed the accused to establish sexual relations with her over a period of 16 years purely under the misconception of marriage.
33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman, and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 27 2025:HHC:22616 be the wife of the appellant, thereby dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship.
.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all, there was an iota of truth in this allegation, then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped. xxxx
38. It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and consensual intercourse. This Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], differentiated between a mere breach of promise and not fulfilling a false promise and held that an accused will only be liable if the Court concludes that his intentions are mala fide and he has clandestine motives. The relevant extract is reproduced herein below: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:22616 "21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the .
mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
***
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:22616 unavoidable circumstances. The 'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence .
available, does not always amount to a misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance. Section 90IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."
(emphasis in original and supplied)
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.
40. This Court in Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 682], had quashed criminal proceedings on the ground that it is difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship, which continued for eight years, as "rape" especially when the complainant therein had alleged that they lived together as man and wife.
The relevant extract is reproduced herein below: (SCC p. 205, para 4) "4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who may have possibly made a false promise of marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as "rape" especially in the face ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 30 2025:HHC:22616 of the complainant's allegation that they lived together as man and wife." (emphasis supplied)
41. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can this Court be .
convinced that the present case is a case wherein the appellant is liable to be prosecuted for having sexually exploited/assaulted the complainant based on a false promise of marriage. The allegations of the complainant are full of material contradictions and are ex facie unbelievable. Throughout the prolonged period of 16 years, the complainant kept completely quiet about the alleged sexual abuse, meted out to her by the appellant, until she learnt that the appellant had married another woman. Further, in complete contradiction to the case set up in the FIR, the complainant has on many occasions portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant and thus, evidently, they lived together as man and wife. Additionally, the long gap of 16 years between the first alleged act of sexual intercourse, continued relations for one-and-a-half decades till the filing of the FIR convinces us that it is a clear case of a love affair/live-in relationship gone sour.
42. In this background, we are of the opinion that allowing the prosecution of the appellant to continue for the offences alleged, under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504, and 506IPC would be nothing short of a gross abuse of the process of law.
24. A similar view was taken in Jaspal Singh Kaural v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 742, wherein it was observed:
14. The decision in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 is squarely applicable to the conspectus of the present case. It has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court, that the mere fact that physical relations ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 31 2025:HHC:22616 were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of .
marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations (Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471)
25. Therefore, it is apparent from the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the parties are in continuing relationship for a long period of time, the FIR for the commission of rape cannot be lodged, simply because the relationship has turned sour.
26. It was held in Papadimitropoulos v. The Queen (1957) 98 C.L.R. 249 that there is a distinction between a consent given as a result of a deception or mistake as to the nature of the act of intercourse itself, and a consent to that act induced by a mistake or deception as to a matter antecedent or collateral thereto. While in the former case the offence might be made out, in the latter consent was considered to be real. It was observed:
::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS32 2025:HHC:22616 "[R]ape is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent: carnal knowledge is the physical fact of penetration; it is the consent to that which is in question;
.
such a consent demands a perception as to what is about to take place, as to the identity of the man and the character of what he is doing. But once the consent is comprehending and actual the inducing causes cannot destroy its reality and leave the man guilty of rape.
27. Professor Glanville Williams has observed in Textbook of Criminal Law, Fourth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2015, that the fraud must be related to the nature of the act itself to vitiate the consent and not something related to the attributes of a man. He observes in para 26-018 (citations omitted):
It is often said that consent is vitiated by fraud, but the point is not limited to fraud. Fraud can induce the complainant to make some mistake of fact, but it is also possible for the complainant to make a spontaneous mistake, which raises the same legal problem. To what extent does the complainant's mistake as to what is happening nullify or preclude his consent?
Consider the case where a man makes a false statement to a woman in order to obtain her consent to sexual intercourse. If he represents himself as being rich when he in fact is poor, few would argue that her consent is "vitiated," so that the man is guilty of rape or assault. The traditional view for both these offences is that they are acts done with consent. When, ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 33 2025:HHC:22616 if ever, is fraud so serious that it can be said to destroy any "real" consent?
The answer is given by the previous observation that .
consent always means something. If you consent to A, you do not, for that reason, consent to B. The converse is true too. If you do not consent to B, you do not, for that reason not consent to A...It may be said that in rape, the issue is the woman's consent to sexual intercourse with this man. If she does not know that the act is one of sexual intercourse, or if she is mistaken as to the identity of the man, then she does not consent, but otherwise she does. One must have regard to the decencies of language, and it cannot properly be asserted that the woman does not consent where she merely mistakes some attribute of the man (that he has career prospects, that he has been vasectomised, that he intends to marry her, that he is free from venereal disease). If a side-
effect of the consensual sexual intercourse is that the victim is harmed in some other way, and she has not consented to that harm, the defendant should be criminalised for causing that harm. There is, therefore, no need to inflate the grave offence of rape to make it cover deceits in general. Xxxx26-032 What if a punter runs off without paying for the services of a lady of the night? He does not commit rape, because V is not deceived as to the nature and purpose of the act The prostitute knows that she is being asked to engage in sexual intercourse and agrees to have sexual intercourse--there is consensus quoad hoc. She also consents to act A (sexual intercourse), even though she does not consent to B (not being paid). Nor is the punter's identity an issue, so there is consensus quoad hanc personam. If this type of fraud is to be criminalised, then it should be done by enacting a special provision. It does not involve a sexual violation as grave as ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 34 2025:HHC:22616 rape in the pure sense. It appears the gravamen of the wrong has more to do with fraud than it does with a sexual violation, because the woman was going to have intercourse .
with the punter anyway. There was nothing about the punter that was preventing her from consenting--she was more than willing to lie down with him. The prostitute would not have provided the service if the punter had said in advance, "I am not going to pay you." But her loss is pecuniary. It is not a case where she would not have slept with the punter under any circumstances. She was entirely willing to provide the service, but expected payment. It was the non-payment that she was not willing to accept, not the sexual intercourse.
28. The Indian Legislature has approved this view by specifically enacting Scheme 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, covering the cases of sexual intercourse by explaining deceitful means.
29. In the present case, the consent was related to the petitioner's attributes (that he intended to marry her) and not to the nature of the act itself.
30. It was submitted that specific allegations were made out of the commission of rape on two occasions and this Court should not go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. The ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 35 2025:HHC:22616 Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Salib v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 194: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 947 that when the petition is filed to quash .
the FIR on the ground that the proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious, the Court should look into the FIR with care and little more closely. It was observed at page 207:
"26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS
36 2025:HHC:22616 averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or .
Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged."
31. In the present case, if the FIR is seen a little carefully and closely, it is apparent that much of the FIR is regarding the business relationship, the investment of ₹72,00,000/- by the victim's parents and the return of ₹ 72,00,000/-.
32. It was stated in the FIR that the petitioner raped the victim in 2019 a couple of times and he raped her on 16.07.2023, however, the victim remained silent till she came to know about the petitioner's engagement in November 2024. In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held in Rajnish Singh @ Soni (supra) that the allegations of forced sexual ::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS 37 2025:HHC:22616 intercourse between the victim and the petitioner cannot be believed, when no complaint was made for a prolonged period and .
the victim remained silent until she learnt that the accused had married another woman. Thus, in view of the binding proceedings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reliance cannot be placed upon the ipse dixit of the victim when the other circumstances do not support her conduct.
33. It was submitted that the charge sheet has been filed before the Court, the learned Trial Court should be allowed to continue with the proceedings to determine the correctness or otherwise, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (28.08.2024 - SC) :
MANU/SC/1495/2024 that the High Court can quash the FIR even after filing the charge sheet, if it is satisfied that the continuation of the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. It was observed:::: Downloaded on - 14/07/2025 21:18:23 :::CIS
38 2025:HHC:22616 "7. The question of law involved in these two appeals as to whether quashing of the FIR should have been refused for no other reason than that the investigating officer has filed the .
charge-sheet is no longer res integra. Decisions of this Court to such effect are legion. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo MANU/SC/0621/2011: 2011:INSC:395 : (2011) 6 SCC 479, Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Home Department MANU/SC/1281/2018: 2018:INSC:1060 : (2019) 11 SCC 706 and Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0950/2023.
8. On the authority of the aforesaid decisions, law seems to be well-settled that the High Court Under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure retains the power to quash an FIR, even after charge-sheet Under Section 173(2) thereof is filed, provided a satisfaction is reached, inter alia, that either the FIR and the charge-sheet read together, even accepted as true and correct without rebuttal, does not disclose commission of any offence or that continuation of proceedings arising out of such an FIR would in fact be an abuse of the process of law as well as of the Court given the peculiar circumstances of each particular case."
34. Therefore, the filing of the charge sheet will not prevent this Court from exercising the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 528 of BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
35. No other point was urged.
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36. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and FIR No. 35/2024 dated 15.11.2024, registered as Women Police .
Station, Dharamshala and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR are ordered to be quashed.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
11th July, 2025
(rupsi)
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