Gyan Swaroop Ahuja vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 January, 2019

[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Gyan Swaroop Ahuja vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 January, 2019

Challenge in these intra court appeals is to an order passed by the Writ Court on 07/07/2006 whereby the W.P. No.2543/2000 and W.P. No.2589/2000 were dismissed. The proceeding of taking possession was upheld and in view of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (in short "Repeal Act"), the proceedings for declaring urban land as surplus land has been upheld.

2. W.A. No.591/2006 has been filed against the order dated 07/07/2006 passed in W.P. No.2543/2000, 3 W.A No.858/2006 and W.A. No.626/2010 are filed against the order dated 07/07/2006 passed in W.P. No.2589/2000.

3. Appellants of Writ Appeal No.591/2006 are purchasers from late Shri Gaya Prasad, S/o Kashiram, resident of Tilhari, Jabalpur whereas W.A. No.858/2006 has been preferred by Maniram Patel, S/o late Shri Gaya Prasad Patel and W.A. No.626/2010 has been filed by legal heirs of late Smt.Noni Bai.

4. In W.P. No.2589/2000 prayer has been made by widow and son of late Shri Gaya Prasad against whom the ceiling case was finalized to quash the notification issued under Section 10(1), 10(3), order under Section 10(5) of the Act, order (Annexure-P/4) dated 30/11/1992, order (Annexure-P/6) dated 15/04/1999 and to declare that possession of land bearing Survey No.146/1, 52/2, 125 and 227 situated at Village Tilhari was not taken over by the competent authority, therefore, the same cannot be treated as surplus in view of Repeal of the Act by the Repeal Act. They are absolute owners of the land 52/2, 125, 227 except 4 Survey No.146/1 which has been sold to the petitioners in other W.P. No.2543/2000.

5. In W.P. No.2543/2000, the petitioners therein have purchased the land from Gaya Prasad, as per sale deed, the name of Gaya Prasad was recorded in the khasra for the year 1986-87. The land was agriculture land and was declared as exempted as per order dated 28/05/1988 (Annexure-P/4) and was not subject to the provisions of the Act of 1976. They are continuously cultivating the land.

6. The facts of the case are that one Gaya Prasad (since dead) was the holder of certain agricultural lands ad-measuring 2.503 hectare of Patwari Halka No.23, Settlement No.231, Village Tilhari, Tahsil and District Jabalpur. The land in question is exclusively being used for agriculture purpose. The proceedings under the Act of 1976 were initiated against Gaya Prasad. On receipt of notice, return was filed by Gaya Prasad on 06/12/1982. The area of Khasra No.52/2 was 0.032, Khasra No.125 was 1.100, Khasra No.146/1 was 1.088 and Khasra No.227 was 0.283, total area 2.503 hectare. 5 Out of total area of 25141.38 Sq.Mts, an area of 23641.38 Sq.Mts (25141.38-1500= 23641.38) was declared surplus. The land owners were found entitled for 16146 sq.ft (1500 sq. metre) out of 25141.38 sq.metre.

7. Draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act of 1976 was, accordingly, prepared. Objection raised by the appellants were considered and final statement under Section 9 was prepared by order dated 29/05/1985. Notice under Section 10(1) was published in M.P. Gazette Part 3(1) on 21/6/1985. On 4/4/1986 notification under Section 10(3) of the Act of 1976 was issued vide M.P. Gazette Part 3(1) declaring the land in question free from all encumbrances. Thereafter vide Revenue Case No.116/c-121/86-87 after issuing notice by the authority not competent to issue notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 on 9/6/1987 to one Shanti Bai, the physical possession of the land in question was taken on 17/11/1987.

8. On 04/04/1987 the appellants in W.A. No.591/2006 have purchased the land from Gaya Prasad 6 vide registered sale deed (Ex.P/1). The land was agriculture land, it was under cultivation, land was declared as exempted as per order dated 28/05/1988 (Ex.P/4). The appellants are continuously cultivating the land. Behind the back of the appellants, name of State Government was shown in the revenue record, but, physical possession remained with them. Gaya Prasad died in the year 1991. Notice (Ex.P/2) was issued in the year 1996 which indicates that Gaya Prasad continued to be in possession of the land that is why legal heirs of late Gaya Prasad were called upon to appear in the Court of respondent No.2 to furnish proof of cultivation since 1976-1977. On enquiry they have learnt that Ceiling Case No.1386/A/90-B-9/79-80 and Case No.11-A/19-B-9/82- 83 were initiated against the predecessor in title of the appellants late Shri Gaya Prasad who had filed a return thereupon. The Act of 1976 has been repealed by the Act No.15 of 1999 with effect from 17/2/2000 in the 7 State of Madhya Pradesh as the possession was not taken over, the proceedings stand abated.

9. Their contention is that no notice was served to Gaya Prasad. Notice dated 09/06/1987 was served to Shanti Bai. The land in question was agriculture land being used for agriculture purpose and recorded as such in the revenue record. The land use of the land in question was recorded as agriculture in the master plan. The Joint Director, Town and Country Planning, Jabalpur vide his certificate dated 19/07/1987 certified the land as having been used under the master plan of Jabalpur for agriculture purpose. The certificate issued by the Joint Director dated 10/01/1990 (Annexure-P/6) and 29/10/1992 (Annexure-P/7) duly certified that the land as having been shown and used for agriculture in the Master Plan. Master Plan is Annexure-P/8 which shows that the land in dispute is ear-marked for agriculture purpose only. Thus, the land was liable to be subjected to the provisions of the Act of 1976.

10. On 30/11/1992 competent authority dismissed application dated 05/11/1992 on the ground that the 8 competent authority is not obliged to call for the opinion of the Town and Country Plan regarding use of land in the master plan under the provisions of the Act. Being aggrieved by the order dated 30/11/1992 the legal heirs of Gaya Prasad preferred appeal before the Additional Commissioner which was dismissed vide order dated 15/04/1999. In the year 2000, the legal heirs of Gaya Prasad preferred Writ Petition No.2589/2000 (Noni Bai and another Vs. State of M.P. and others). Gyan Swaroop Ahuja and others also preferred Writ Petition No.2543/2000.

11. In the reply it has not been disputed by the respondents that the land in question was agricultural land being used for agriculture purpose and recorded as such in the revenue record. They have also not disputed that the land use of the land in question was recorded as agriculture in the master plan.

12. One more ground was taken in the writ petition that notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 was issued by incompetent authority and as such cannot be termed as valid notice in the eyes of law, amounts to 9 non-issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976. As per original record, Tahsildar, Jabalpur issued notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 to Gaya Prasad mentioning therein that Gaya Prasad shall deliver the possession of the land on 17/11/1987. A bare perusal of Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976, it is evidently clear that it is competent authority declared as such by the State Government (Additional Collector, Jabalpur) which was authorized to issue notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 to the concerned land owner. The competent authority was devoid of any authority to delegate the power under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 to the Tahsildar, Jabalpur.

13. A perusal of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 issued by the Tahsildar, Jabalpur makes it clear that the aforesaid notice was served to Shanti Bai on 16/11/1987. The person who served the notice to the daughter of Gaya Prasad made an endorsement to this effect and also signed along with date. Notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 makes it clear that the same was served to the daughter of Gaya Prasad and not 10 Gaya Prasad on 16/11/1987 whereas on the very next day i.e. 17/11/1987 the possession is said to have been taken and Panchnama is said to have been prepared which clearly demonstrates that the entire proceedings under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 adopted by the respondents were merely an eye wash. As per revenue record the actual physical possession of the land was never taken by the respondents and the appellants remained in possession of the land in question. It is admitted position on the face of the record that the land in question was not only recorded as agriculture land in the revenue record but in the master plan also the land in question was recorded for agriculture purpose, therefore, in no way the land in question could have been categorized as "Urban Land" as per Section 2(o) of the Act.

14. Learned Writ Court has held that the possession has been taken over by the respondents, thus, the Repeal Act, 1999 does not come to rescue of the appellants. The proceedings stood concluded in the year 1987, the orders attained finality, they were not successfully 11 challenged at the relevant time. The application filed by the predecessor of title of the land under Section 2(o) read with Section 45 of the Act of 1976 was rightly dismissed by the competent authority. There is no infirmity in the order and dismissed both the writ petitions.

15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case.

16. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that right from the day one, the ancestor of the appellants in W.A. No.858/2006 and W.A. No.626/2010 are protesting the proceedings initiated by the respondents under the Act of 1976 on the ground that the land in question is an agriculture land. In the present case, it is true that a notice was issued by the revenue authority to Gaya Prasad directing him to file a return under Section 6(1) of the Act of 1976 and the original record produced before this Court clearly reflects that the return was filed under the signature of Gaya Prasad. They have stated that the land in question was being used for agriculture. The revenue record i.e. Khasra Panchshala 12 also reflects that the land Survey No.52/2, 146/1, 125 and 227 was being used for the agriculture purposes. It is also admitted that the land is being used for the agriculture purposes. As per the record of Joint Director, Town and Country Planning and the letter issued by the Joint Director, Town and Country Planning dated 06/01/1990, land of khasra No.125, 146/1 and 227 was recorded as agriculture land in the master plan. Not only, at present the appellants are in actual physical possession of the land in question and they are carrying out agricultural activities therein. draft statement which are part of the original records establish that agriculture activities was going on in respect of the land in dispute. The aforesaid facts have not been denied in the reply filed by the State. An objection was also raised in respect of the proceeding initiated under the Act of 1976 on the ground that the land was recorded as agriculture land right from the date of proceedings were initiated. In spite of there being objection on behalf of the land owner that it is an 13 agriculture land, proceedings were concluded and the land was declared as surplus.

17. The definition clause under the Act of 1976 defines the urban land as well as vacant land and the same reads as under :

"2(o) "urban land" means,-

(i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or

(ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. Explanation.-For the purpose of this clause and clause (q),-

(A) "agriculture" includes horticulture, but does not include-

(i) raising of grass,

(ii) dairy farming,

(iii) poultry farming,

(iv) breeding of live-stock, and

(v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed;

(B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture:

Provided that where on any land which is entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture, there is a building which is not in the nature of a farm-house, then, so much of the extent of such land as is occupied by the building shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture:

Provided further that if any question arises whether any building is in the nature of a farm-house, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government thereon shall be final;

(C) notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, land 15 shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture;

(q) "vacant land" means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include-

(i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated;

(ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building; and

(iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the and appurtenant to such building:

Provided that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than for the purpose of dairy farming or for the purpose of breeding of live-

stock, on any land situated in a village within an urban agglomeration (described as a village in the revenue records), then, so much extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such cattle immediately before the appointed day shall not be deemed to be vacant land for the purposes of this clause."

From perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the definition of urban land does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and the agriculture includes horticulture. The Act of 1976 came into force in the year 1976 and on the appointed day the land was very much recorded in the revenue record as agriculture land and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination the land which was recorded as agriculture land, could have been declared as surplus land under the Act of 1976. The appellants have also 17 filed certificate of Gram Panchayat stating therein that the land in question is being used for agriculture purpose. There is no document in rebuttal filed by the respondents in order to indicate that the land in question is not being used for agriculture purpose.

18. This Court in the case of Shanti Bai Vs. State of M.P. and others reported in 2011(2) MPLJ 307 in para-10 has held as under :

"10. Needless to say that the petitioner has also filed a certificate of Gram Panchayat Tewar (Jabalpur) dated 18/9/2010 (Annexure P-14) stating therein that the land in question is being used for agricultural purpose and in this land there is a well in which an electric pump has also been installed. In the said certificate it has been mentioned that for last 40 years the land is being used for agriculture purpose and in this land there is a well in which an electric pump has also been installed. In the said certificate it has been mentioned that for last 40 18 years the land is being used for agricultural purpose. There is no document in rebuttal filed by the respondents in order to indicate that the land in question is not being used for agricultural purpose, therefore, looking to the rider envisaged in Section 2(q) of the Act since the land is being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration, hence it cannot be included within the ambit and scope of term "vacant land" as envisaged under the said definition."

19. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of in the case of Trilok Singh Yadav Vs. Secretary Revenue Department, Bhopal, reported in 1996(1) MPWN 111 has held that a land in urban area shown as agriculture land at the commencement of the Act, is an agricultural land and the purpose cannot be changed by the Master Plan brought subsequently and, therefore, in the present case also any subsequent action of the respondents in changing the land use which was being used for agricultural and including the land under the master 19 plan as residential land will not be wipe out the right of the appellants over the land in question as it is exclusively agricultural land.

20. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of M.P. and others Vs. Thamman Chand Koshta (W.A. No.867/2015) passed an order on 06/07/2017 holding that the land owner was entitled to deliver possession in terms of Section 10(5) of the Act and on failure of the land owner tohand over possession to use force in terms of Sub section (6) of Section 10 of the Act. Since the Repeal Act contemplates that if possession has not been taken, the land will not vest with the State Government. Para-11 and 12 are relevant which read as under :

"11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported as (2013) 4 SCC 280 State of U.P. Vs Hari Ram in the context of the Act, held that the de-facto possession is required to be taken by the State and not de jure. The Court held that the Act deals with deemed vesting or 20 deemed acquisition, but the keeping in view the provisions of the Act, unless the possession is taken in terms of Section 10 (5) of the Act, the land cannot be said to be vested with the State Government. The proceedings of taking possession Annexure-R3 shows that it is only a paper possession without taking actual possession from the land owner and without giving notice to person who is in possession. The person in possession is required to be given notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10. The relevant extract from the Supreme Court judgment read as under :-

"30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The 21 purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words "acquired" and "vested" have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent.

31. The 'vesting' in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily 22 surrendering or delivering possession. The court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and Others (1977) 1 SCC 155, while interpreting Section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that 'vesting' is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows:

"We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a "vesting" certain. "To vest, generally means to give a property in." (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton.

Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization 23 cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To "vest", cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that "vested" does not necessarily and always mean "vest in possession" but includes "vest in interest" as well.

33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the 24 date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-

section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land.

Peaceful dispossession

34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of "possession" which says that where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-

section (3) of Section 10, the
competent        authority     may,      by
notice      in   writing,    order      any

person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorised by the State Government.

35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming 25 provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested" under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-

section (3) of Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early.

Once      there    is       no    voluntary
surrender         or        delivery     of

possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualises a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-

section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.

Forceful dispossession

36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section 26 (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-

section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force--as may be necessary--can be used. Sub-

section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force.

Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-

section (5) of Section 10. Sub-

sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by giving notice, that is, "peaceful dispossession" and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), 27 then "forceful dispossession"

under sub-section (6) of Section

10.

37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory.

Though the word "may" has been used therein, the word "may" in both the sub-sections has to be understood as "shall" because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word "may" has to be read as "shall"."

12. Since the revenue record records the possession of the writ petitioners and also the proceedings to take over possession, therefore, the writ petitioner was entitled to a notice to 28 deliver possession to the State in terms of Section 10(5) of the Act and on failure of the writ petitioners to hand over possession to use force in terms of Sub Section 6 of Section 10 of the Act. Since the Repeal Act contemplates that if possession has not been taken, the land will not vest with the State Government. Therefore, the land in question would not vest with the State Government.

21. Similar is the view taken by the Division Bench of Principal Seat at Jabalpur in the case of Dhaniram Vs. State of M.P., reported in 2012 SCC Online MP 5050. Para-8 and 9 are relevant which read as under :

"8. Now the question remains whether on coming into force of Repeal Act, 1999 whether the proceedings were pending ? In this case, no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was served upon the appellants while it was the mandatory requirement of the law to serve this notice. Even for the sake of arguments, if it is assumed that the 29 notice dated 29/2/1992 was issued to the appellants, even then 30 days notice was the mandatory requirement of the law and until and unless a notice of 30 days could have been issued, the provisions shall be deemed to be not complied with. Factually, neither notice under Section 10(5) was served upon the appellants nor any notice before handing over possession was given to the appellants. Neither the notice under Section 10(5) of the Act nor the warrant of possession bears the signatures of the appellant. Apart from this, the possession which was stated to be taken on 3.3.1992 was not in the presence of the witnesses. Even if it is assumed that the two names which are appearing in the notice were witnesses, but no particular of the witnesses are on record. No specific Panchnama was prepared on the spot that in the presence of these witnesses, the possession was taken. When, at what time and in whose presence, the possession was taken, letter of 30 possession is silent. In view of non- compliance of mandatory provision as contained under Section 10(5) of the Act or the suspicious circumstances in taking possession, it is apparent that the factual possession on the spot was not taken. Apart from this, the appellants/petitioners from the very inception were claiming their possession on the land and had come forward with the plea that the appellants were dispossessed after interim order in this appeal. The fact which has been established is that no factual possession was taken from the appellants and they continued to be in possession till filing of the appeal which was filed on 24.6.2002 after coming into force of Repeal Act, 1999. In aforesaid circumstances, the appellants were in possession of the land, as on the date, on which the Repeal Act, 1999 came into force. In such circumstances, it can very well be said that the proceedings were pending on the date when the Repeal Act came into force.

If the appellants remained in 31 possession of the land and their possession was not disturbed, then they were entitled to retain the land and the proceedings shall be deemed to have been abated. [See Vinayak Kashinath Shikar Vs. Deputy Collector and Competent Authority (2012) 4 SCC 718].

9. Now the question remains whether there were any laches on the part of the appellants in filing the writ petition ? So far as the contention of respondents that the possession was already taken on 3.3.1992 and the petition was filed belatedly, is concerned, we have already recorded the finding that no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was served upon the appellants and in fact the appellants were in possession of the land, then there was no laches on the part of the appellants in filing the writ petition. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition without considering the merits of the case merely on the ground of laches which order cannot be affirmed. In 32 the aforesaid circumstances, we find that the proceedings were pending as on the date when the Repeal Act has come into force. The appellants were in possession of the land on the date when this appeal was filed. So the appellants are entitled for the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999."

22. In the present case, it is apparent from the record that the land mentioned above was used for the purpose of agriculture and objection was raised right from 1976 that it is an agriculture land and still agriculture activities are going on, the same could not be treated as urban land as it was used for the purpose of agriculture. Hence, the order declaring it surplus is bad in law. The respondent/State is directed to correct all the revenue entries by substituting the name of appellants and the legal heirs of late Shri Gaya Prasad. The appellants are already in possession of the land in question, therefore, the question to hand over the possession by the State Government to the appellants does not arise. We have already recorded the finding that no notice under 33 Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 was served upon the appellants and, in fact, the appellants were in possession of the land and are still in possession of the land in question. In the aforesaid circumstances, we find that the proceedings were pending as on the date when the Repeal Act had come into force. The appellants were in possession of the land on the date when these appeals were filed. So the appellants are entitled for the benefit of Repeal Act, 1999.

23. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order dated 07/07/2006 passed in W.P. No.2543/2000 and the order dated 07/07/2006 passed in W.P. No.2589/2000 are hereby set aside. The proceedings against the appellants are declared as abated. The appellants shall be continued to be the owners of the land.

24. In the result, all these writ appeals are allowed. No order as to cost.




(P.K. JAISWAL)        (RAJENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA)
    JUDGE                      JUDGE

ts


 Digitally signed by TULSA SINGH

Date: 2019.01.25 16:25:43 +05'30'

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