Chattisgarh High Court
M/S. Anil Buildcon (India) Private ... vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 May, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:22526-DB
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
SAGRIKA AGRAWAL
AGRAWAL Date:
2026.05.15
10:44:57 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 2423 of 2026
M/s. Anil Buildcon (India) Private Limited (Cin- U 45200 Ct2011 Ptc022277)
(Earlier Incorporated As M/s Anil Constructions Company Limited, 104,
Lovina Courts, Mungeli Naka, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. Email
[email protected] Through Its Authorised Director Mr. Anil Kumar
Verma, S/o Late Jagdish Verma, Aged About 66 Years, R/o House No.
14/1152, Talapara Road, Vinoba Nagar, Tahsil And Distt. Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Public Works Department,
Mantralaya (New Secretariat), Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - The Engineer In Chief Public Works Department, Sirpur Bhawan, Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Superintending Engineer Public Works Department, National Highway
Circle, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Executive Engineer Public Works Department, National Highway
Division, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner : Mr. Suryapratap Yuddhveer Singh, Advocate through virtual mode along with Mr. Rajkamal Singh, Advocate For State : Mr. Prasun Bhadhuri, Dy. A.G. For Respondent No. 2 to 4 : Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13-05-2026
1. Heard Mr. Suryapratap Yuddhveer Singh, Advocate appeared through virtual mode along with Mr. Rajkamal Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhadhuri, learned Dy. Advocate General for Respondent No. 1/ State and Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 to 4.
2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief(s):-
"10.1 This Hon'ble Court may please be kind enough in quashing the impugned order dated 23.03.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by Respondent No. 3.
10.2 This Hon'ble Court may please be kind enough in restraining the Respondents from proceeding with or enforcing any recovery against the Petitioner pursuant to the impugned order dated 23.03.2026 (Annexure P/1).
10.3 This Hon'ble court may please be kind enough in granting the cost and any other relief to the petitioner."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order dated 23.03.2026 passed by Respondent No. 3 is wholly arbitrary, illegal, malafide and without jurisdiction, and the same has been passed in complete violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the Petitioner under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the 3 Constitution of India. The Petitioner Company was awarded certain road construction works during the years 2001-2003, which were duly executed to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. Thereafter, on the basis of alleged shortage in the quantity and grade of bitumen used in the works, the Respondents sought to recover an amount of Rs. 77,40,732/- from the Petitioner, against which the Petitioner had earlier approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 4379/2010. This Court, vide order dated 26.07.2012, specifically directed the parties to invoke arbitration under Clause 29 of the agreement within one month and to have the dispute adjudicated in accordance with law. However, despite such categorical and binding directions, the Respondents failed to initiate arbitration proceedings within the stipulated time and remained completely inactive for nearly 14 years. It is submitted that after allowing the matter to remain dormant for such an inordinate period, the Respondents could not have legally revived the alleged claim in the year 2026, as the same had become stale, dead and hopelessly barred by limitation.
4. He is further submitted that despite the Petitioner raising detailed objections vide representation dated 16.01.2026 regarding limitation, lack of jurisdiction and non-compliance with the earlier order passed by this Court, the Respondents proceeded in a wholly arbitrary and predetermined manner and mechanically passed the impugned order without adjudicating upon the objections raised by the Petitioner. Respondent No. 3 acted as a judge in his own cause by unilaterally determining the alleged liability of the Petitioner, which is contrary to the settled principles of natural justice and the law governing arbitration. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed 4 by this Court in Macadum Makers v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., AIR 2012 Chhattisgarh 123, wherein it has been held that the Government cannot recover a disputed amount unless the same is first adjudicated and held due by a competent Court or Arbitral Tribunal. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s B and T AG v. Ministry of Defence, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 657, wherein it has been categorically held that time-barred claims cannot be referred to arbitration and dead claims cannot be revived after prolonged delay. Therefore, the impugned order being non-reasoned, arbitrary, barred by limitation and contrary to settled legal principles, deserves to be quashed by this Court.
5. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition as framed and filed is not maintainable as the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
6. Learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 would submit that alternative remedy available to the Petitioner against the impugned order dated 23.03.2026. The impugned order itself specifically provides that, "In case either of the parties is aggrieved by this decision, they may prefer an appeal before the appellate authority within 30 days from the date of this order." Thus, the competent authority has expressly provided a remedy of appeal to the aggrieved party, which the Petitioner has failed to avail before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that the issues raised by the Petitioner involve disputed questions of fact as well as adjudication on merits, which can 5 appropriately be examined by the appellate authority in accordance with law. Therefore, in absence of exceptional circumstances warranting interference by this Court, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, with liberty to the Petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal as provided in the impugned order.
7. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with petition.
8. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Supreme Court in the said case observed as under:
"6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to 6 appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995."
(emphasis supplied)
10. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana and others, (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows:
"16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which 7 arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
(emphasis supplied)
11. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under:
"26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports 8 and decide which one is acceptable."
12. Subsequently, in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10 SCC 690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed:
"24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads."
13. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated:
"82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the 9 question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit."
(emphasis supplied)
14. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper.
15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 23.03.2026 itself provides a statutory remedy of appeal to either of the parties who aggrieved by the said order. The grievances raised by the Petitioner, including the questions relating to limitation, jurisdiction, legality of initiation of proceedings after considerable delay, and validity of the recovery determined by the authority, involve disputed questions which may appropriately be examined by the competent appellate authority in accordance with law. Since an efficacious alternative remedy is available to the Petitioner under the 10 relevant provisions, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage.
16. Accordingly, while declining interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the present petition stands disposed of with liberty reserved in favour of the Petitioner to avail appropriate remedy as available under law against the impugned order dated 23.03.2026.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
sagrika