Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Chittorgarh Kendriya Sahkari Bank Ltd vs Heera Singh on 29 May, 2017
Author: Vijay Bishnoi
Bench: Vijay Bishnoi
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Crml Leave To Appeal No. 1 / 2017
Chittorgarh Kendriya Sahkari Bank Ltd. Main Branch, Chittorgarh
Through Shri Kailash Kohli S/o Shri Ram Chandra Ji, Aged About
59 Years, Chief Manager, Head Office, Chittorgarh Kendriya
Sahkari Bank Ltd. Tehsil & District- Chittorgarh.
----Appellant
Versus
Heera Singh S/o Gulab Singh Rajput, Railway Colony, Chittorgarh,
Police Station-sadar, Distt. Chittorgarh.
----Respondent
_____________________________________________________
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ashwini Kumar Babel
For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.L. Sukhwal
_____________________________________________________
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI
Judgment / Order 29/05/2017 This criminal leave to appeal has been preferred by the appellant-bank seeking leave to file appeal against the judgment dated 24.10.2016 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Chittorgarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') in Regular Criminal Case No.598/2013, whereby the trial court has acquitted the accused respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the NI Act').
Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is a Nationalised Bank and is in business of advancing loan to it's customers. On behalf of it a complaint was filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the trial court on 29.10.2012 with the allegations that the respondent is working in the Western Railway and a loan was given to him by the appellant-bank in the Ridhi Sidhi Scheme. It is (2 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] alleged that for repayment of the said loan, the respondent gave a cheque to the appellant-bank bearing Cheque No.329401 dated 13.08.2012 of amounting to Rs.72,405/- payable at Punjab National Bank, Branch Pratap Nagar, Chittorgarh with the assurance that on presenting the said cheque in the concerned bank, the same will be realised. It is alleged that when the said cheque was presented for realisation in the concerned bank the same was returned with the remark of insufficient fund. It is contended that thereafter a registered notice dated 17.08.2012 was served upon the accused respondent by the appellant-bank through it's advocate, which was received by the accused respondent on 15.09.2012, but despite that he did not make the payment of the said cheque and, therefore, this complaint.
The trial court took cognizance against the accused respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act on 05.02.2013 and, thereafter, framed charge for the aforesaid offence against him on 28.01.2014.
In support of the complaint, the appellant-bank produced two witnesses and also got exhibited five documents. The appellant-bankments of the accused respondent were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and he also got examined himself as defence witness.
The trial court, after pondering over the evidence produced on behalf of the parties, has acquitted the accused respondent for the aforesaid offence.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-bank has submitted that as per Section 139 of the NI Act, it is obligatory on (3 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] the Court to raise a presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that the same was given by the accused for discharging of a legally enforceable debt. It is further submitted that the accused respondent appeared as a witness in defence and admitted his signatures on the cheque in question and also admitted that he served with the notice by the appellant-bank but despite that he did not make payment of it. Learned counsel for the appellant- bank has argued that once the accused respondent admitted his signature on the cheque in question and also admitted that the notice sent by the appellant-bank was served upon him, this fact itself is sufficient to record the finding of guilt of the accused respondent. It is contended that the trial court has erred in acquitting the accused respondent while holding that the appellant-bank has failed to discharge the initial burden to prove that the cheque in question was given to it by the respondent against a legally enforceable debt. Learned counsel has argued that because in view of the admission of the accused respondent and in view of the statuary presumption in favour of the appellant- bank, as provided under Section 139 of the NI Act, the said finding of the trial court is not sustainable in the eye of law.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-bank has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan reported in 2010(3) RLW 2379 (SC) and appellant-bankd that it is a fit case wherein leave to appeal be granted.
Per contra, learned counsel for the accused respondent has supported the impugned judgment passed by the trial court and (4 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] argued that as the appellant-bank has failed to prove before the trial court that the cheque in question was handed over to it by the respondent against legally enforceable debt, the trial court has not committed any illegality in acquitting the accused respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Hence, no case for grant of leave to appeal is made out.
As per Section 139 of the NI Act, it is obligatory upon the Court to presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of cheque received the cheque in whole or in a part, of any debt or other liability, but at the same time for that purpose the holder of the cheque has to provide details or the factual basis for raising of the said presumption and if the factual basis for raising the presumption, as available under Section 139 of the NI Act, has not been established, the prosecution can fail.
Simply because that the accused respondent has admitted his signatures on the cheque in question and also admitted the receipt of the legal notice sent by the appellant-bank, it cannot be held that the guilt of the accused respondent has been proved.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan (supra) has held that in order to raise a defence, an accused can rely on the material submitted by the complainant and in every cases, it is not necessary for the accused to adduce evidence of his / her own. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as under:-
"14. ... ... Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is (5 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own."
At this stage it will be useful to refer the relevant findings given by the trial court, while acquitting the accused respondent :-
12- ---------------------- izdj.k esa ifjoknh us vius ifjokni=] 'kiFki= o eq[; ijh{k.k esa izLrqr 'kiFki= esa ,slk dksbZ rF; ugha crk;k gS fd vfHk;qDr us ftl fj)h fl)h ;kstuk ds rgr _.k fy;k Fkk] mldh D;k 'krsZ Fkh rFkk mldk C;kt fdruk rFkk fdl o"kZ dh dkSu&dkSu ls ekg dh fd'rs vfHk;qDr dh cdk;k Fkh rFkk izR;sd ekg dh fd'r fdruh FkhA ifjoknh ih-M- 01 us vf/koDrk vfHk;qDr }kjk dh xbZ ftjg esa ;g dFku fd;k gS fd 72405@& :i;s ,d ekg dh fd'r ugha gksdj cdk;k fd'rs gS] tks tuojh 2011 ls tqykbZ 2011 rd dh gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa tcfd ifjoknh ih-M- 01 viuh ftjg esa vfHk;qDr ij 72405@& :i;s cekg tuojh 2011 ls tqykbZ 2011 dh dqy 07 ekg dh fd'rs cdk;k gksuk dgrk gS rks ;g ifjoknh dk uSfrd nkf;Ro Fkk fd og ;g Li"V djrk fd vfHk;qDr us tks _.k cSad ls izkIr fd;k] og fdruh jkf'k dk o fdruh vof/k ds fy;s izkIr fd;k rFkk mldh ekfld fd'r D;k Fkh rFkk cekg tuojh 2011 ls tqykbZ 2011 rd dqy 07 efguksa dh _.k dh jkf'k izR;sd ekg dh fd'rksa o iSuYVh vkfn dks tksM+dj fdl izdkj 72405@& :i;s gqbZA blds vykok izdj.k esa lcls egRoiw.kZ rF; ;g Hkh gS fd ifjoknh us tks ikWoj vkWQ vVksZuh izn'kZ ih- 01] bldh QksVks izfr izn'kZ ih 01 , izLrqr dh gS] tks u rks jftLVMZ gS vkSj u gh cSad ds ySVjisM ij gS rFkk ;g fnukad 16-01-2007 dh gksdj ,d lkns ist ij gS rFkk bl mDr nLrkost dk voyksdu djus ij ih-M-01 vfuy dqekj dk uke Hkh vafdr ugha gksuk ik;k tkrk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa ;g Hkh lkfcr ugha gksrk fd ifjoknh ih- M- 01 vfuy dqekj dks cSad dh vksj ls bl ifjokn dks is'k djus ds fy;s vf/kd`r fd;k gksA blds vykok xokg vfHk;qDr vkSj cSad ds chp (6 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] cdk;k jkf'k dks ysdj fglkc ugha gksus ds rF; dks Hkh Lohdkj djrk gS ,slh fLFkfr eas tc vfHk;qDr vkSj ifjoknh cSad ds chp cdk;k jde dk fglkc gh ugha gqvk rks vfHk;qDr }kjk fdl izdkj ls jkf'k 72405@& :i;s dk pSd tkjh fd;k x;k] ;g ckr vius vki esa lansgiw.kZ gSA blds vykok lk{kh ih-M- 01 vfuy dqekj us ,slk dksbZ nLrksot ;k lk{; is'k ugha dh gS fd vfHk;qDr o ifjoknh cSad ds chp tc ysu nsu gqvk] rc og 'kk[kk izca/kd lh- ds- ,l- ch- ds in ij dk;Zjr gks rFkk mDr ysu nsu mlds lkeus gqvk gks] ;g rF; Hkh izdV ugha gqvk gSA lk{kh ih-M- 01 viuh ftjg esa bl rF; dks Hkh Lohdkj djrk gS fd vfHk;qDr us ifjoknh cSad dks pSd fjVuZ gksus ds ,d fnu igys fn;k FkkA bl laca/k esa pSd izn'kZ ih 02 o fjVuZ eseks izn'kZ ih 02 dk voyksdu fd;k x;k tkos ;g izdV gksrk gS fd pSd ij fnukad 13-08-2012 vafdr gS rFkk mDr pSd fnukad 17-08-2012 dks fjVuZ gqvk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa tcfd pSd fnukad 17-08-2012 dks fjVuZ gqvk gS rks lk{kh ih-M- 01 ds dFkuksa vuqlkj bl pSd ij fnukad 16-08-2012 vafdr gksuh pkfg;s] fdUrq bl pSd izn'kZ ih 02 ij fnukad 13-8-2012 vafdr gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa ;g rF; Hkh Li"V ugha gks ik;k gS fd vfHk;qDr }kjk ifjoknh cSad dks ;g pSd dc fdl fnukad dks fn;k x;kA blds vykok lk{kh ih-M- 01 vfuy dqekj vf/koDrk vfHk;qDr }kjk nh xbZ ftjg esa izn'kZ Mh 01 ls yxk;r izn'kZ ih 04 rd vfHk;qDr ds [kkrs esa tek djkus dh jlhns gksuk crk;k gSA gekjs }kjk izn'kZ Mh 1 yxk;r izn'kZ Mh 04 dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA vfHk;qDr }kjk izn'kZ Mh 01 yxk;r izn'kZ Mh 04 ds ek/;e ls 32500@& :i;s tek fd;s x;s gSA bl izdkj lk{kh ih-M- 01 vfuy dqekj ds c;kuksa esa ifjokni= esa vafdr rF;ksa ls fojks/kkHkkl dh fLFkfr gksus ds dkj.k izdj.k esa lansg dh fLFkfr mRiUu gksrh gSA 13 izdj.k esa vU; xokg lk{kh ih-M-02 dSyk'k pUnz dksyh gS] tks vius 'kiFki= eq[; ijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k gS fd og o"kZ 2012 essa fpRrkSM+x<+ esa fjdojh vf/kdkjh FkkA og _.kh lnL;ksa ls _.k jkf'k dh olwyh gsrq _.kh lnL;ksa ds ikl tkrk Fkk] ftlls vfHk;qDr ghjkflag tks fj)h fl)h _.kh lnL; Fkk] mldk pSd vuknj.k gks x;k] mldk uksfVl cSad vf/koDrk }kjk tkjh fd;k gqvk] rkehy djkus gsrq mls fn;k] ftl ij vfHk;qDr ghjkflag ds uksfVl esa fy[ks irs ij fnukad 15-09-2012 dks x;k ,oa ghjkflag dks O;fDrxr :i ls ,d izfr (7 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] ghjkflag dks nh o nwljh izfr ij uksfVl izkIr ds gLrk{kj e; fnukad ds djok;s Fks] tks izn'kZ ih 04 ij , ls ch gS] ftjg esa bl xokg vius eq[; ijh{k.k ds foijhr fojks/kkHkklh dFku fd;k gS vkSj ;g Li"V :i ls mYys[k fd;k gS fd uksfVl rkehy djokus gsrq mls fdl fnukad dks fn;k] ;g mlds 'kiFki= esa ugha gSA xokg ;g Hkh dFku djrk gS fd mls uksfVl feyk mlds nks fnu ckn gh uksfVl dh rkfey djok fn;k FkkA xokg uksfVl ij D;k fnukad vafdr gS] ;g mls /;ku gha gksuk crk;k gSA xokg uksfVl izn'kZ ih 04 ij fnukad 15-09-2012 mlus uksfVl ghjkflag dks fn;k Fkk] ftldh izkfIr ds gLrk{kj mlus izkIr fd;sA ckn esa vafdr djus ds rF; ls badkj djrk gS vkSj dFku djrk gS fd uksfVl izkIr fd;k] ml le; gh mlus rkjh[k vafdr dj nh FkhA mDr xokg ds c;kuksa ds laca/k esa uksfVl izn'kZ ih 04 dk voyksdu fd;k tkos rks ;g izdV gksrk gS fd uksfVl izn'kZ ih 04 fnukad 17-08-2012 vafdr gS] bl ij , ls ch ghjkflag ds lkbZu gS rFkk gLrk{kj ds uhps tks rkjh[k vafdr gS] og fnukad 15-09-2012 vafdr gSA lk{kh ih-M- 02 dSyk'k pUnz us vius c;kuksa esa ;g Li"V ugha fd;k x;k fd mlss uksfVl fdl rkjh[k dks feyk] ftjg esa ;g xokg uksfVl feyus ds nks fnuk ckn rkfey djokuk dgrk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa izdj.k ;g lansg dh fLFkfr mRiUUk gksrh gS fd xokg dSyk'k pUnz dksyh dks uksfVl fdl rkjh[k dks izkIr gqvk vkSj ml rkjh[k ds nks fnu ckn dkSu lh rkjh[k dks mlds }kjk vfHk;qDr dks uksfVl fn;k x;k rFkk izdj.k esa ;g Hkh xkSjryc ckr gS fd uksfVl izn'kZ ih 04 ij vfHk;qDr ds gLrk{kj dh L;kgh o gLrk{kj ds uhps vafdr fnukad dh L;kgh esa Hkh fHkUurk gS] vfHk;qDr }kjk ftl iSu ls gLrk{kj fd;s x;s] mlh iSu ls mlds }kjk fnukad vafdr ugha fd;k tkuk Hkh izdj.k es lansg dh fLFkfr mRiUu djrk gSA 14 --- --- ---
15- bl izdkj izdj.k esa lk{kh ih-M- 01 vfuy dqekj us ifjokni=] 'kiFki= o eq[; ijh{k.k eas vafdr rF;ksa ds foijhr dFku viuh ftjg esa fd;s gSA ifjoknh }kjk ;g Hkh Li"V ugha fd;k x;k gS fd vfHk;qDr }kjk cSad ls fdruk _.k fy;k x;k] ftl ;kstuk fj)h fl)h ds rgr _.k fy;k x;k] mldh D;k 'krsZ Fkh rFkk vfHk;qDr ij fdl&fdl o"kZ dh vkSj fdrus ekg dh] fdruh fd'rs cdk;k FkhA lc (8 of 8) [CRLLA-1/2017] feykdj jde 72405@& :i;s fdl izdkj gqbZA lk{kh ih-M- 01 vfuy dqekj us vfHk;qDr vkSj cSad ds chp fglkc fdrkc ugha gksuk Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS] tc nksuksa i{kksa ds chp dksbZ fglkc fdrkc gh ugha gqvk rks vfHk;qDr }kjk fdl izdkj ifjoknh cSad dks oknxzLr pSd fn;k x;k] ;g rF; lansg ls ijs lkfcr ugha gSA izdj.k esa lk{kh ih-M- 01 vfuy dqekj }kjk tks ikWoj vkWQ vVksZuh is'k dh gS] ml ij lk{kh vfuy dqekj dks izdj.k dh iSjoh djus fy;s vf/kd`r fd;k gks ;g rF; lkfcr ugha gSA izdj.k esa uksfVl izn'kZ ih 04 fnukad 17-08-2012 vafdr gS fdUrq ;g fnukad 15-09-2012 dks vfHk;qDr dks izkIr gksuk crk;k x;k gS] tks izdj.k esa lansg dh fLFkfr mRiUu djrk gSA vr% vfHk;qDr ghjk flag dks vijk/k vUrxZr /kkjk 138 ,u- vkbZ- ,DV ds vijk/k ls lansg dk ykHk fn;k tkdj nks"keqDr ?kksf"kr fd;k tkuk U;k;laxr izrhr gksrk gSA In the present case, as per the findings of the trial court, referred above, the trial court, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, has held that the appellant-bank has failed to satisfy that the cheque handed over to it by the accused respondent was in lieu of a legally enforceable debt and after carefully scrutinising the record of the trial court, this Court does not find any perversity in the said findings.
In view of the above discussions, I don't find any illegality in the judgment impugned passed by the trial court while acquitting the accused respondent, therefore, no case for grant of leave to appeal is made out.
Accordingly, this criminal leave to appeal is dismissed.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)J. Abhishek Kumar S.No.42