Central Administrative Tribunal - Madras
D Gnanasekaran vs M/O Defence on 13 March, 2025
1 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CHENNAI BENCH
OA/310/00356, 357, 347, 348 AND 415/2017
Dated this the 13th day of March, Two Thousand Twenty Five
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR M. SWAMINATHAN. MEMBER (J)
AND
HON'BLE MR. SANGAM NARAIN SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER(A)
1. K. Senthilkumar .. Applicant in OA 356/2017
2. S. Venkatesan .. Applicant in OA 357/2017
3. D.Gnanasearan .. Applicant in OA 347/2017
4. R. Kumaresan .. Applicant in OA 348/2017
5.V. Karunanandan .. Applicant in OA 415/2017
- All are working as Chargeman (Technical)
Engine Factory, Avadi, Chennai
By Advocate M/s. RP. Vijayakrishnan
& Poovendira Kumar
Vs
The Union of India
rep by The General Manager,
Engine Factory,
Ministry of Defence,
Avadi, Chennai .. Respondents in all the OAs
By Advocate Mr. S. Nagarajan
2 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017
ORDER
(Pronounced by Hon'ble Mr. M. Swaminathan, Judicial Member) Since the issue raised by the applicants in all these applications is similar, and the applicants seek an identical relief based on comparable facts and circumstances, these applications were heard together and are being disposed of through this common order.
2. The applicants are seeking the following relief:
"..... to call for all the records of the respondents culminating in the impugned letter No. EFA/A/Admin/017/LDCE, dated 07.02.2017 and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents not to revert the applicants from Chargeman to parent post i.e., HS/SK and pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper".
3. Brief facts of the case as submitted by the applicants are as follows:
The applicants were initially appointed as Fitter General (SS) on various dates through Direct Recruitment in the respondent office and were subsequently promoted to Fitter HSK on 23.11.2005. In December 2009, the respondent Factory announced a vacancy for Chargemen (Technical/Mechanical) through a Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) for 2008-2009. The applicants participated in and successfully passed the LDCE examination, securing a position on the merit list. Based on the published merit list, the respondent Factory issued 3 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017 promotion/appointment orders (No. 212, dated 19.03.2009). Upon their promotion to Chargeman Gr. II (Technical/Mechanical), the applicants were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 9300-34800 with a Grade Pay of Rs.
4200. After completing the 2-year probation period in 2011, the applicants underwent induction training and, upon successful completion, began working as Chargemen (Technical) to the satisfaction of the respondents.
However, to their surprise, the respondents issued a letter dated 07.02.2017 questioning why the applicants should not be reverted to their original post, Fitter HSK, from the Chargeman (Technical/Mechanical) position they had been promoted to in 2009. The applicants submitted representations, but received no response. As a result, the present OAs have been filed to challenge and quash the letter dated 07.02.2017 and to stay its operation.
4. The learned counsel for the applicants argued that the proposed reversion of the applicants after 15 years is unjust, especially since the applicants have committed no errors that would justify such an action. He further submitted that the reversion order violates Article 14 of the Constitution, as it is arbitrary and infringes upon the applicants' rights and legitimate expectations. Additionally, he contended that reversion constitutes a penalty, and imposing such a penalty on the applicants violates Articles 310 and 311 of the Indian Constitution. 4 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017
5. He cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs UOI (1957 SCC Online SC 5), which establishes that reversion is akin to imposing a penalty. The counsel emphasized that the applicants should not be reverted when there is no fault on their part and the reason for the proposed reversion is a procedural irregularity on the part of the respondent's administration, with which the applicants had no involvement. He also pointed out that the respondents had benefited from the applicants' promotion, and no harm was caused by their appointment.
6. The counsel argued that if the applicants' appointment through the LDCE process had been irregular, the respondents should have acted to cancel the appointments promptly. He added that, had the applicants not been selected via LDCE, they would have had numerous opportunities over the past 15 years to apply for higher positions, opportunities that were afforded to employees far junior to them. Having been selected and appointed, the applicants neither sought nor needed to pursue other fast- track promotion channels.
7. The counsel further argued that if the impugned order is not quashed, the applicants will face significant hardship, as they have served in the current post for over 15 years. Reverting them at this stage would be 5 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017 contrary to established principles of service law. He also pointed out that due to the pendency of the present OAs, the applicants have not been considered for promotion over the last 8 years, during which time their juniors have surpassed them in seniority. Therefore, he requested that their seniority be protected from 2017 and that they be considered for promotion in the upcoming cycles.
8. He relied upon the following judgements of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as Hon'ble High Court of Madras, in support of his contentions:
(i) Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs Union of India( 1957 SCC Online SC
5).
ii) M.A. Hameed Vs. State of AP & Anr. (2001) 9 SCC 261
iii) S.I. Paras Kumar & Others Vs S.I. Ram Charan & Others (2004) 6 SCC 88
iv) S. Muthukrishnan Vs Senior Superintendent of Post Offices (2015 SCC Online Mad 11531)
9. In contrast, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that, as per Factory Order No. 51, dated 03.07.2008, the respondent issued a Notification to fill vacancies for the post of Chargeman (Tech & Non- Tech) through LDCE-2008. He further explained that due to the implementation of the 6th CPC and the subsequent merger of Chargeman Grade II and Grade I, an additional 6 backlog vacancies arose, which were to be filled through LDCE, as communicated by the OFB in their letter, dated 16.02.2009. These 6 vacancies were then filled from the merit list of LDCE-2008, as per the letter dated 19.03.2009.
6 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017
10. He also clarified that these additional 6 vacancies were not originally mentioned in the LDCE-2008 advertisement. When this matter was raised with the OFB (HQ), they issued a letter, dated 13.10.2016, stating that appointments could only be made from the panel drawn up for the originally notified vacancies and no new candidates could be added due to the subsequent occurrence of vacancies, directing corrective action to be taken.
11. The counsel further submitted that the appointment of the 6 candidates to these additional vacancies was irregular and violated the existing rules. Consequently, the respondent initiated corrective action by issuing show-cause notices to the applicants appointed against these vacancies. He also referred to the Tribunal's order in OA No. 35 of 2016, dated 26.07.2014, involving identical facts, and prayed for dismissal of the OA.
12. We have heard both the parties at length, perused the pleadings and materials placed on record. We also gone through the judgment relied upon by the respective parties.
7 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017
13. There is no dispute regarding the facts of the case from either side. In the present OAs, it is clear that the applicants were appointed in 2009 after successfully passing the LDCE of 2008. The applicants also completed their probation in 2011. However, it was only on 07.02.2017 that the respondents issued the impugned reversion order, more than eight years later. Following the stay granted by this Tribunal on 08,03,2017, the applicants have continued in their current positions for over 15 years.
14. The respondent has relied upon the order, dated 26.07.2024 of this Tribunal in OA No.35/2016. Even though the said applicant in that OA is also similarly placed person like the applicants herein, the said order will not be applicable to the present case. The Tribunal dismissed the OA on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were pending against the applicant, which prevented the applicant from seeking promotion. Hence, the respondent's reliance on the order of this Tribunal in the said OA is misplaced and inapplicable.
15. In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.A. Hameed v. State of A.P. (2001) 9 SCC 261, held that reversion under such circumstances is wholly unjustified. The relevant observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is as follows:
8 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017
"......We are of the view that the reversion of the appellant after he held the higher post for more than a decade was wholly unjustified. If his appointment was temporary or irregular in any manner he should have been reverted within a reasonable period. Even after the reversion order was passed the appellant continued to hold the post till 1985 under the stay order granted by the Tribunal. We are, therefore, of the view that the reversion of the appellant from the post of District Inspector of Local Funds (Accounts) after a period of 11 years has done more harm than good. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of reversion. ......."
16. We also draw a similar analogy from the recent decision, dated 12.07.2023 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sivanandan C.T. & Others v. High Court of Kerala & Others (2024) 3 SCC 799, regarding the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The relevant portion is extracted below:
45. The underlying basis for the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation has expanded and evolved to include the principles of good administration. Since citizens repose their trust in the state, the actions and policies of the state give rise to legitimate expectations that the state will adhere to its assurance or past practice by acting in a consistent, transparent, and predictable manner. The principles of good administration require that the decisions of public authorities must withstand the test of consistency, transparency, and predictability to avoid being regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.
46. From the above discussion, it is evident that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is entrenched in Indian administrative law subject to the limitations on its 9 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017 applicability in given factual situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence is keeping in line with the developments in the common law. The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation can be successfully invoked by individuals to claim substantive benefits or entitlements based on an existing promise or practice of a public authority. However, it is important to clarify that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot serve as an independent basis for judicial review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such a limitation is now well recognized in Indian jurisprudence considering the fact that a legitimate expectation is not a legal right. It is merely an expectation to avail a benefit or relief based on an existing promise or practice. Although the decision by a public authority to deny legitimate expectation may be termed as arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the validity of the decision itself can only be questioned on established principles of equality and non-arbitrariness under Article 14. In a nutshell, an individual who claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to establish: (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and (ii) that the denial of the legitimate expectation led to the violation of Article 14.
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55. The question which now arises before the Court is in regard to the relief which can be granted to the petitioners. The final list of successful candidates was issued on 6 March 2017. The candidates who have been selected have been working as District and Sessions Judges for about six years. In the meantime, all the petitioners who are before the Court have not functioned in judicial office. At this lapse of time, it may be difficult to 16 direct either the unseating of the candidates who have performed their duties. Unseating them at this stage would be contrary to public interest since they have gained experience as judicial officers in the service of the State of Kerala. While the grievance of the petitioners is that if the aggregate of marks in the written examination and viva- voce were taken into account, they would rank higher than three candidates who are respondents to these proceedings, equally, we cannot lose sight of the fact that all the selected candidates are otherwise qualified for judicial office and have been working over a length of time. Unseating them would, besides being harsh, result in a situation where the higher judiciary would lose the services of duly qualified candidates 10 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017 who have gained experience over the last six years in the post of District Judge."
17. In similar circumstances, regarding the proposition that reversion is unjustified, the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, vide its judgment, dated 20.02.2010 in the case of Iqbal Singh v. Chandigarh Administration, held as follows:
"12. On merit also, we are of the view that the petitioner was given appointment on promotion on 14.4.1987 and reversion order was passed on 28.6.2004 after a period of 17 years. He filed Original Application before the Tribunal and his reversion was stayed on 28.6.2004. He continued working on the post of Sub Inspector (Inspector Grade-II) till his superannuation on 31.8.2005. The Original Application has been decided by the Tribunal on 30.9.2005 and review was dismissed on 22.8.2007. It was in somewhat similar circumstances that Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of M.A. Hameed v. State of A.P., (2001) 9 SCC 261, has held that reversion in such circumstances is wholly unjustified."
18. Given the facts and circumstances of the case, and in light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited above, we are of the view that the reversion of the applicants was entirely unjustified, as they had served in the post for over 15 years. Moreover, even after the reversion, the applicants continued in the same position based on the interim directions issued by the Tribunal. Therefore, we set aside the impugned reversion letter dated 07.02.2017 for all the applicants and direct the respondents not to revert the applicants from their current post to their parent post. The interim order passed by this Tribunal is made absolute. 11 OA No.310/356, 357 347, 348 415/2017 We further direct the respondents to consider the applicants' seniority from the year 2017 when evaluating them for promotion to the next higher post in future vacancies, as all their juniors have been promoted. 19, In the result all the Original Applications are allowed on the above terms. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(SANGAM NARAIN SRIVASTAVA) (M. SWAMINATHAN)
MEMBER(A) MEMBER(J)
13.03.2025
mas