Madras High Court
Mr.S.Ragendran ... Revision vs Mrs.N.Ambika on 29 June, 2012
Author: R.S.Ramanathan
Bench: R.S.Ramanathan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 29.06.2012 CORAM The Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.S.Ramanathan C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.2638 and 2639 of 2009 and M.P.No.1 of 2009 in C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.2638 of 2009 Mr.S.Ragendran ... Revision Petitioner in both C.R.Ps Vs. Mrs.N.Ambika ... Respondent in both C.R.Ps Prayer in C.R.P.(NPD)No.2638 of 2009:- Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1980, against the order, dated 27.11.2007, passed in R.C.O.P.No.1044 of 2006, on the file of the XVI Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, confirmed in R.C.A.No.126 of 2008, dated 23.7.2009, on the file of the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai. Prayer in C.R.P.(NPD)No.2639 of 2009:- Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1980, against the order, dated 27.11.2007, passed in R.C.O.P.No.2177of 2006, on the file of the XVI Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, confirmed in R.C.A.No.794 of 2007, dated 23.7.2009, on the file of the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai. In both C.R.Ps. For Revision Petitioner : Mr.S.V.Jayaraman Senior Counsel for Mr.T.Dhanasekaran For Respondent : Mr.R.Thiagarajan COMMON O R D E R
The tenant is the revision petitioner herein and the landlady is the respondent herein.
2. The respondent/landlady filed a Petition in R.C.O.P.No.1044 of 2006, for eviction of the tenant, on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent, owner's occupation and act of waste. The said Petition was allowed and eviction was ordered and the same was confirmed in R.C.A.No.126 of 2008, on the file of the learned VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the tenant has filed C.R.P.(NPD)No.2638 of 2009.
3. The revision petitioner/tenant filed R.C.O.P.No.2177 of 2006, under Section 8 (5) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1980, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') seeking permission of the Court to deposit the rent and that Petition was dismissed and the same was affirmed in R.C.A.No.794 of 2007, on the file of the learned VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the revision petitioner/tenant filed C.R.P.(NP.D) No.2639 of 2009.
4. Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/tenant submitted that, both, the learned Rent Controller and the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, without appreciating the pleadings and evidence, erroneously held that the revision petitioner/tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rent, and the premises is bona fide required for owner's occupation, without appreciating the facts that the landlady failed to satisfy the basic requirements of Section 10 (3) a (iii) of the Act and she has also failed to prove that the revision petitioner/tenant has committed wilful default in the payment of rent.
5. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, admittedly, the respondent/landlady owned three non-residential portions and one portion is in the occupation of her grand son, who is running business and the tenant in respect of other portion had already vacated, and, no attempt was made by the landlady to start her business in that portion, and, no reason was adduced by her for not occupying that portion. Therefore, when the landlady is doing business in one portion of the premises, she cannot ask for another portion for her own occupation, and, she can only apply for additional accommodation, and that was not pleaded and even assuming that quoting wrong portion will not disentitle the landlady from seeking eviction, she had failed to adduce any evidence regarding the comparative hardship that may be caused to the tenant in the event of eviction order is passed. Hence, the Courts below erroneously held that the landlady proved her case that the petition premises is bona fide required for her own occupation.
6. The learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, further submitted that the revision petitioner/tenant has not committed any wilful default in the payment of rent and it was the specific case of the revision petitioner that the rent was paid through the nephew of the landlady, by name Chitramuthu, who was also occupying a portion of the property, owned by the landlady, and that was also admitted in evidence by P.W.1. The said Chitramuthu, was examined by the landlady as P.W.2 and he has also admitted that the revision petitioner/tenant was paying the rent through him. He vacated the portion occupied by him and that was kept vacant by the landlady and the landlady received the rent sent by the tenant, by way of money orders for July and August, 2006, and thereafter, she refused to receive the rent for the month of September, 2006 and the landlady also issued a notice, claiming arrears of rent from November, 2004, as if, the tenant has paid advance of Rs.10,000/- and after deducting 10 months rent, from January, 2004 to October, 2004, the tenant refused to pay the rent from November, 2004. The tenant was paying the rent through P.W.2, and he has not committed any wilful default in the payment of rent and having accepted the rent for the month of July and August, 2006, it was not open to the landlady, to contend that the rent from November, 2004 was not paid and the reason stated in the Eviction Petition, that she requested the tenant to vacate the premises in January, 2004, and the tenant agreed to vacate and sought two years' time and agreed to adjust the rent from the advance, cannot be accepted and therefore, eviction on the ground of wilful default is also not correct. The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the following reported judgments in support of his contentions:-
I) A.I.R. (2001) SC 1387 in the case of [ M/s. Shaw Wallace and Co.Ltd., Vs. Govindas Purushothamadas and another ] II) (2000) 1 C.T.C. 239 S.C. in the case of [C.Chandramohan Vs. Sengottaiyan ( dead) by lrs. And others ] III) (1999) A.I.R. S.C.W. 3152 in the case of [T.Sivasubramaniam and others Vs. Kasinath Pujari and others ] and IV) (2003) 10 S.C.C 610 in the case of [P.M.Punnoose Vs. K.M.Munneruddin and others ]
7. Mr.R.Thiagarajan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlady submitted that, both the Courts below concurrently held that the revision petitioner/tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rent and the petition premises is bona fide required for own occupation of the landlady and the concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with, in the Revision Petition. The learned counsel further submitted that the revision petitioner/tenant, though sent the rent for the month of July and August, 2006, by money orders and the same was received by the landlady, the tenant has not paid the rent from January, 2004 and evenafter adjusting the arrears of rent from the advance of Rs.10,000/-, the tenant was liable to pay the rent from November, 2004 and without paying the arrears of rent for 19 months, the tenant, suddenly, sent money orders for July and August, 2006 and the landlady, being an illiterate and old woman, without knowing the legal consequences, received the money orders. Later on, the respondent/landlady sent a notice, stating that the arrears were not paid and unless and until, the arrears of rent are paid, the future rent will not be accepted and the tenant has not proved that, he paid the rent till June, 2006 and the burden is cast upon the revision petitioner/tenant to prove that, he paid the rent and the revision petitioner/tenant having failed to prove the same, is liable to be evicted.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent/landlady further submitted that the revision petitioner/tenant has filed R.C.O.P.No.2177 of 2006, under Section 8 (5) of the Act, for deposit of rent, without properly complying with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2003) 1 S.C.C. 123 in the matter of [ E.Palanisamy Vs. Palanisamy] held that, when the tenant had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, he has committed wilful default in the payment of rent and the landlord is entitled to an order of eviction on the ground of wilful default and hence, having regard to the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Courts below have rightly held that the revision petitioner/tenant has committed wilful default in the payment of rent and ordered eviction.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent/landlady also contended that, though the building consists of three non-residential portions, P.W.1, the daughter of the landlady had given evidence that there was an oral partition in the family and in the said partition, the portion in the occupation of her son was allotted to her share and other portion, which had fallen vacant belonged to her another sister and the portion in the occupation of the revision petitioner/tenant was allotted to the share of the landlady and she wanted to do business in her portion and therefore, she has complied with the provisions of Section 10 (3) a (iii) of the Act.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the respondent/landlady wanted to do business in snacks and no preparation is necessary for doing such business and therefore, both the Courts below have concurrently held that the landlady bonafidely requires the petition premises and ordered eviction. The learned counsel has also relied upon the following reported judgments in support of his contention that the concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below cannot be meddled with in the Revision Petition:-
I) (1996) 1 S.C.C. 25 in the case of [ Dev Kumar (died) through Lrs. Vs. Swaran Lata ( Smt) and others .
II) (1980) 4 S.C. 259 in the case of [ M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar] .
III) (A.I.R.) 1994 S.C. 217 in the case of [Kasturchand Vs. Raman Rajan and another ] and IV) (2003) 10 S.C.C. 610 in the case of [P.M.Punnoose Vs. K.M.Munneruddin and others ]
11. Admittedly, the Petition in R.C.O.P.No.1044 of 2006, was filed by the respondent/landlady on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent, owner's occupation and act of waste. Both the Courts below rejected the claim of act of waste. Therefore, we will have to find out, 1) Whether the tenant has committed wilful default in the payment of rent? and 2) Whether the landlady bona fide requires the premises for her own occupation?
12. Insofar as the plea that the petition premises is bona fide required for owner's occupation is concerned, the respondent/landlady has to prove that she is not in occupation of any other non-residential building of her own and she requires the building bona fide for doing business and the premises is a non-residential one.
13. Admittedly, the demised property is a non-residential one. It is also admitted by P.W.1, who is the daughter of the landlady, that the building is having a ground and the first floor and the ground floor consists of three non-residential portions and one residential portion and out of three non-residential portions, her mother, viz.., respondent/landlady was doing business and now, that portion is taken by her grand son and the tenanted premises is required bona fide for occupation of the landlady. P.W.2-Chitramuthu, who was the tenant in respect of another portion, admittedly, vacated the premises and it is kept under lock and key and no explanation has been given by the landlady for not occupying that vacant premises.
14. Therefore, as per the admission of P.W.1, the landlady, is the owner of three non-residential portions and in one portion, her grand son is doing business and another portion is lying vacant and the third portion is in the occupation of the tenant. Though an attempt was made by P.W.1 in evidence, by stating that the building belongs to her mother and herself and another daughter, and her mother is entitled to 1/3rd share and the portion in the occupation of her son was allotted towards her share and the other portion, which is lying vacant, was allotted to the share of another sister and the tenanted portion alone was allotted to her mother, no proof was adduced to prove the oral partition and admittedly, no such plea was taken in the counter, and therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 regarding oral partition and her right over the property, cannot be accepted.
15. Therefore, having regard to the admission of P.W.1 and having regard to the pleadings, the landlady was already in the occupation of another non-residential portion, in which, she allowed her grand son to do business and one another portion is lying vacant and hence, the landlady is not entitled to seek eviction under Section 10(3) a (iii) of the Act and this fact was not considered by the Courts below, and the Courts below, merely proceeded on the basis that the landlady wanted to do business and her requirement was bona fide, ordered eviction, without properly appreciating the essential ingredients of Section 10(3) a(iii) of the Act, as stated above.
16. Further, no evidence was adduced by the landlady explaining the reason for not occupying another portion, vacated by the another tenant/P.W.2. Further, the landlady did not enter the box and evidence was given by her daughter and when the landlady is inclined to do business on her own, she ought to have given evidence about her personal requirements, and that cannot be spoken to by her daughter and no attempt was made by the landlady to get herself examined through Commission. Considering all these aspects, I hold that the findings of the Courts below, that the building is bona fide required for owner's occupation are against the pleadings, and the Courts below failed to appreciate the essential ingredients of Section 10 (3) a (iii) of the Act and therefore, the findings are set aside.
17. The next question is to find out as to whether the tenant has committed wilful default in the payment of rent?
18. According to the respondent/landlady, the monthly rent was Rs.1,000/- and the tenant paid the rent upto December, 2003 and during the month of January, 2004, she expressed her willingness to run a shop and requested the tenant to vacate the premises and the tenant also agreed to vacate the premises and requested two years' time and agreed to adjust in the advance and evenafter, adjusting the advance, the tenant was liable to pay the balance rent and since the tenant did not pay the balance rent, she filed Petition for eviction, in June, 2006.
19. Admittedly, no notice was issued, prior to the filing of the Petition for eviction. The defence of the revision petitioner/tenant was that, he was paying the rent regularly through P.W.2, who is the nephew of the landlady and he never agreed to vacate the premises and he never paid any advance of Rs.10,000/- and till June, 2006, the rent was received by the landlady and thereafter, she refused to receive the same and therefore, he sent the rent for the month of July, 2006, by money order and that was received, and the rent for August, 2006, was also received by the landlady, when sent by money order and the rent sent by money order, for the month of September, 2006, was refused by the landlady. Thereafter, the respondent/landlady issued notice, as if, she has received the rent for July and August, 2006, without prejudice to her claim made in R.C.O.P.No.1044 of 2006, viz., the Petition filed for eviction. P.W.1 has admitted in evidence that the landlady was not in the habit of issuing receipts, whenever rents were received by her. P.W.2/Chitramuthu, also admitted in evidence that the rent was paid by the tenant through him.
20. The main contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that, duty is cast upon the tenant to prove that he had paid the rents and when the tenant has filed an Application under Section 8 of the Act, for deposit of the rent, he has to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 of the Act and when there is no proper compliance of Section 8, the landlady is entitled to an order of eviction, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment rendered in E.Palanisamy case ( referred to supra) and in this case, the tenant has not complied with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act and also not proved the payment of rent from January, 2004 and therefore, considering all these aspects, the Courts below rightly held that the tenant has committed wilful default in the payment of rent.
21. No doubt, it is true that in E.Palanisamy case (referred to supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings ( Lease and Rent Control) Act, and held that, omission to avail the prescribed procedure disentitles the tenant to plead that there was no wilful default on his part and the landlord was entitled to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default. But, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in E.Palanisamy case ( referred to supra) was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a later judgment reported in (2003) 10 S.C.C. 610 (cited supra), wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 10 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the meaning of the words 'wilful default' and also distinguished the decision rendered in E.Palanisamy case ( referred to supra) in Paragraph Nos.18 & 19, which reads as follows:-
" Placing reliance on a recent decision of this Court in E.Palanisamy Vs. Palanisamy and various decisions of the Madras High Court, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that once the tenant is shown to have been in default, then, it is for him to prove that the default was not willful.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that in E.Palanisamy case, this Court has referred to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act and held that where the landlord alleged to have refused or avoided accepting the tender of payment of rent, then, the appropriate remedy of the tenant is to have recourse to Section 8 of the Act or pay or tender the rent in the manner contemplated by Section 8 of the Act, failing which, the deposit of rent before the Controller would not enure for the benefit of the tenant and the effect of default shall not be washed out.
We have carefully perused the judgment relied on by the learned counsel and we are of the opinion that the same has no applicability to the facts of the present case. In E.Palanisamy case, the proceedings for eviction were initiated after issuing a default notice to the tenant which was served on the tenant and the tenant had responded by denying any default on his part in payment of rent.
The question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case a tenant could be said to have committed wilful default did not arise for consideration of the Court.
The submissions made by the parties centered around Section 8 of the Act only. The Appellate Authority observed in its decision that even after the petition had been filed by the landlords, the tenant did not think of offering the rent to the landlors. In this background, the Court held that where the applicability of Section 8 is attracted, it has to be strictly complied with by the tenant before he can seek benefit under the said provision regarding deposit of rent in the Court. "
22. Further, a reading of the judgment rendered in E.Palanisamy case (referred to supra) would also make it clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, framed the following question for consideration Whether the provisions of Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings ( Lease and Rent Control) Act are to be strictly complied with by the tenant before he can seek benefit under the provisions, regarding deposit of rent in the Court? "held that, procedures contemplated under Section 8 of the Act, has to be strictly complied with by the tenant. Therefore, in the subsequent judgment, viz., in the judgment reported in (2003) 10 S.C.C. 610 (supra), the scope of the judgment rendered in E.Palanisamy case (referred to supra) was explained, as stated above.
23. In this case also, no notice was issued, prior to the filing of the Eviction Petition by the respondent/landlady and therefore, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2003) 10 S.C.C. 610 (cited supra), the present case is a fit case, where the learned Rent Controller should have exercised his power conferred under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act, before passing order thereunder and ought to have given the tenant a reasonable time for paying the arrears of rent, if any. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2003) 10 S.C.C. 610 ( cited supra), explained the term wilful default in Paragraph Nos.12 and 13, which is quoted hereunder:-
"12. The provisions of Section 10 (2) of the Act came up for consideration before a three-Jude Bench of this Court in S.Sundaram Pillai Vs. V.R.Pattabiraman. On a review of decisions, this Court held that wilful default would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. The use of the words "wilful default" in the provision is suggestive of the legislative intent that default, in order to be wilful, must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. So is the view taken by this Court in Chordia Automobiles Vs. S.Moosa Sundaram Pillai case, came up for consideration of this Court in Raja Muthukone Vs. T.Gopalasami. This Court held that on a cumulative reading of the provisions of Section 10(2) (i), the proviso and the explanation appended to sub-section (2) the following consequences follows :-
" (1) Where no notice is given by the landlord in terms of the explanation, the controller, having regard to the four conditions spelt out by us has the undoubted discretion to examine the question as to whether or not the default committed by the tenant is willful. If he feels that any of the conditions mentioned by us is lacking or that the default was due to some unforeseen circumstances, he may give the tenant a chance of locus poenitentiae by giving a reasonable time, which the statute puts at 15 days, and if within that time the tenant pays the rent, the application for ejectment would have to be rejected.
If the landlord chooses to give two months' notice to the tenant to clear up the dues and the tenant does not pay the dues within the stipulated time of the notice then the Controller would have no discretion to decide the question of wilful default, because, such a conduct of the tenant would itself be presumed to be wilful default unless he shows that he was prevented by sufficient cause or circumstances beyond his control in honoring the notice sent by the landlord
13. The explanation appended to sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act enacts a rule of evidence. After the issuance of two months' notice claiming the rent, the default by the tenant shall be construed as willful raising a presumption in that regard and it will be for the tenant to show availability sufficient case or circumstances beyond his control to escape from the consequence of default. The landlord is not prevented from initiating proceedings for eviction on the ground of default under Section 10(2) (i) of the Act, without serving a notice under the explanation but in that case, it will be for the landlord to make out a case of wilful default by the tenant failing which, the controller may exercise his discretion under the proviso giving the tenant a reasonable time,not exceeding fifteen days for payment or tender. "
24. In this case, according to the admission of P.W.1, the landlady is not in the habit of issuing receipts and without giving any notice, calling upon the tenant to pay the rent, she directly filed the Eviction Petition, stating that the rent from January, 2004, was not paid and she adjusted the advance of Rs.10,000/- for 10 months rent, as requested by the tenant and the tenant has committed wilful default from November, 2004. If the agreement, as alleged by the landlady, viz., that she requested the tenant to vacate the premises in January, 2004, and the tenant agreed to vacate and sought two years' time and agreed to adjust the advance is genuine, the landlady would have perhaps, demanded the rent, the moment the tenant committed default in the payment of rent from November, 2004, but, no attempt was made by the landlady to demand the rent from November, 2004. Moreover, when the tenant has agreed to vacate and agreed to pay the rent till such time, normally, no landlady/landlord would have kept quiet, if the tenant commits default in the payment of rent. Further, the landlady was the competent witness to speak about the alleged agreement between her and the tenant regarding the adjustment of rent from advance and she has not entered the box and P.W.1, her daughter cannot speak about the agreement. Therefore, an adverse inference can be taken against the landlady.
25. Further, the landlady received the rent for July and August, 2006, sent by money orders and in the money order coupons, the tenant has stated that the amount represented the rent for the month of July and August, 2006 and without protest, the landlady received the rent and thereafter only, she sent a notice, refusing to receive the rent for the month of September, 2006. No acceptable explanation was given by the landlady for having accepted the rent for July and August and it is beyond one's comprehension whether the landlady would have accepted the rent for July and August, 2006, if the tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rent for earlier months. Further, the tenant has pleaded in evidence that the rent was paid through P.W.2/Chitramuthu and that was also admitted by P.W.2 in his evidence. P.W.1, also admitted in evidence that P.W.2/Chitramuthu was collecting the rent on behalf of her mother/landlady.
26. Nevertheless, the Courts below held that there was no pleading by the tenant that the rent was paid through Chitramuthu. The Courts below without properly appreciating the scope of Section 10 (2) of the Act and without properly appreciating the meaning of the word 'wilful default' as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, gave an erroneous and perverse findings that the tenant has committed wilful default.
27. I, therefore, hold that the findings of the Courts below that the tenant has committed wilful default are absolutely perverse and the Courts below ordered eviction by presuming that the tenant has committed wilful default, without properly appreciating the fact that the landlady has received the rent for July and August, 2006 and the landlady failed to prove that the tenant agreed to vacate the premises after two years and therefore, she kept quiet for two years. Further, two years' time, as alleged by the landlady expired in December, 2005 and even thereafter, no attempt was made by her by filing a Petition for eviction or sending any notice. Only during the month of June, 2006, she filed the Petition for eviction. Considering all these aspects, I am of the opinion that the Courts below erred in holding that the tenant committed wilful default and the findings of the Courts below regarding that aspect are set aside.
28. The scope of Section 25 of the Act has been dealt with in the judgment reported in (2003) 10 S.C.C. 610 (supra), wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Act, is not as narrow as one under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, and the findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority cannot be lightly interfered with by the High Court acting like a Court of Appeal and reappreciating the evidence.
29. In the judgment reported in (1996) 1 S.C.C. 25 (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of any perversity, the concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered. In the judgment reported in A.I.R. (2001) SC 1387 (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is wider than the power conferred under Section 115 of C.P.C., and it is within the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact, illegally or incorrectly arrived at.
30. As stated supra, the Courts below failed to see that the essential ingredients of Section 10 (3) a (iii) of the Act, was not complied with by the landlady and when the landlady is in the occupation of two portions of non-residential premises, she is not entitled to seek eviction for her own occupation in respect of another portion too and without realizing the same, the Courts below order eviction on the basis of owner's occupation.
31. Similarly, the Courts below, without properly appreciating the judgment reported in 2003 10 S.C.C. 610 (supra) wherein, the judgment rendered in E.Palanisamy case (referred to supra) was distinguished and the meaning of the words 'wilful default' was explained and held that the tenant cannot be evicted on the ground of not complying with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act.
32. Further, the Courts below did not consider the fact that the respondent/landlady accepted the rent for July and August, 2006 without any protest and the landlady also admitted that she was not in the habit of issuing any receipts, whenever rents were received by her and the tenant has proved payment of rent through P.W.2, the landlady also did not give evidence and hence, the findings of the Courts below regarding wilful default is also perverse and hence, this Court can interfere with such perverse findings, while dealing revision under Section 25 of the Act.
33. In the result, the findings of the Courts below are set aside and the C.R.P.(NPD)No.2638 of 2009 is allowed.
34. C.R.P.(NPD)No.2639 of 2009, viz., the Petition filed by the tenant against the order rejecting the application filed by him is concerned, it is seen that, admittedly, the tenant has not complied with the various steps contemplated under Section 8 of the Act, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments reported in (1996) 1 S.C.C. 243 in the matter of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Ganpat Lal and another and (1996) 6 S.C.C. 228 in the matter of M. Bhaskar Vs. J.Venkatarama Naidu. Therefore, this Revision Petition is liable to be rejected and that was rightly rejected by the Courts below. Hence, I do not find any perversity, nor any illegality, to interfere with the judgment and order of the Courts below. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the Courts below are hereby confirmed and C.R.P. (NPD)2639 of 2009 is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
sd To
1.The XVI Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai.
2.The VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai