Madras High Court
The Management Of Best & Crompton ... vs The Presiding Officer, I Additional ... on 30 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: (2002)2MLJ37
Author: D. Murugesan
Bench: D. Murugesan
ORDER D. Murugesan, J.
1. The point for determination in this writ petition is as to whether the 2nd respondent could sustain an industrial dispute before the 1 st respondent Labour Court at Madras, when the cause of action for the dispute arose at Jamshedpur within the State of Bihar. The following few facts as pleaded by both the petitioner management and the second respondent are as follows.
2. According to the petitioner, it's registered office is situate at Madras and the factories are situate in and around Madras and Bangalore. The petitioner is the manufacturer of dynamos, starter motors, alternators etc., for automobile vehicles. The major customer for dynamos, starter motors, alternators was Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd., (TELCO), Jamshedpur. The 2nd respondent was employed for the service centre at Jamshedpur and he was throughout working only at the said service centre. The 2nd respondent was under the control of the Regional Manager, Calcutta under whose control the service centre at Jamshedpur was functioning. By order dated 27.1.89, the said Regional Manager terminated the services of the 2nd respondent with effect from 28.2.89 on the ground that it was decided to close down the service centre at Jamshedpur from 28.2.89. Along with the said order, the Regional Manager also enclosed a demand draft for Rs.48 00/- representing (1) wages for February 1989, (2) one month's notice pay and (3) retrenchment compensation. Aggrieved by the said order of termination, the 2nd respondent raised an industrial dispute under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Officer-III, Chennai. The said dispute was resisted by the writ petitioner on the ground that no cause of action arose in Madras as the 2nd respondent was employed in the service centre at Jamshedpur and the cause of action, if at all would be only at Jamshedpur. After considering the said reply, the Labour Officer by order dated 5.9.89 refused to take further action on the ground that she had no jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute for conciliation. The said order of the Conciliation Officer was not challenged by the 2nd respondent. Accepting the same, the 2nd respondent also raised a dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Government of Bihar, Jamshedpur on 14.10.89. The said dispute was resisted by the writ petitioner on the ground that the service centre at Jamshedpur was closed since the volume of business from TELCO was declining rapidly and for the said bonafide reason only the 2nd respondent's services were terminated. However, he was given the salary for the month of February 1989, one month's notice pay and retrenchment compensation. The said dispute raised by the second respondent was referred to the Commissioner of Labour, Bihar at Patna by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Jamshedpur in his letter dated 12.3.99. Without pursuing the said conciliation proceedings, the 2nd respondent filed a claim statement under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court, Madras in I.D. No.45 of 1991 challenging the order of retrenchment dated 27.1.89. Again the petitioner filed a detailed counter statement inter alia contending that the Labour Court, Madras would have no jurisdiction to entertain the said claim statement since the petitioner was employed in the service centre at Jamshedpur and the cause of action for the dispute arose only at Jamshedpur and consequently the claim statement before the Labour Court at Madras was not maintainable. Rejecting the said contention, the 1st respondent Labour Court by award dated 26.12 .96 held that since the 2nd respondent was initially appointed in the year 1977 at Madras and thereafter he was transferred to Jamshedpur and therefore, the 2nd respondent would be justified in sustaining the claim statement before the Labour Court at Madras. Having held so, the Labour Court went into the merits of the case and finally set aside the order of termination with further direction to the writ petitioner to reinstate the 2nd respondent into service with continuity of service and back-wages. The said award is challenged in this writ petition by the management.
3. The case as pleaded by the 2nd respondent is that he was appointed in Best and Crompton Company at Madras as office peon on 6.6.77. He was later on promoted in the year 1981 as Mechanic and posted in auto electrical section and was transferred to Jamshedpur office of the writ petitioner company when the services of the 2nd respondent was sought to be terminated on the ground that the service centre at Jamshedpur is closed. It was further contended by the 2nd respondent that even after the closure, some of the employees who were working at Jamshedpur were transferred to the office of the writ petitioner at Madras and the 2nd respondent was alone discriminated and his services were terminated. Hence, the termination was bad in law.
4. Based upon the above rival claims, the Labour Court framed the following two issues viz., (1) whether the Labour Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute? and (2) whether the order of termination was invalid and if so, what relief to which the 2nd respondent was entitled to?
5. The Labour Court on the question of jurisdiction, placing reliance on the evidence let in by the 2nd respondent-employee and the writ petitioner-management came to the conclusion that the 2nd respondent was initially appointed at Madras and thereafter only he was transferred to Jamshedpur. When the initial appointment of the 2nd respondent was at Madras, the 2nd respondent would have a right to file claim statement at Madras. In that view of the matter, the Labour Court accepted the case of the 2nd respondent and on merits also held in favour of the 2nd respondent, finally awarded reinstatement of the 2nd respondent with back-wages and continuity of service.
6. Before considering the rival claims of the writ petitioner and the 2nd respondent as to the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent Labour Court to entertain a claim statement from the 2nd respondent under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, it would be relevant to consider the law laid down by various Courts including the Apex Court on the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain such claims statement under similar factual circumstances.
7. As early as in the year 1967, a similar question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the judgment in "WORKMEN OF SRI RANGA VILAS MOTORS v. SRI RANGA VILAS MOTORS (AIR 1967 SC 40)". In that case a workman working at the Bangalore branch office of a company having its head office at Krishnagiri in the Madras State (as then it was) was transferred by the orders of the head office. Since he did not obey the said order of transfer, he was removed from service. The State of Mysore (as then it was) referred the dispute relating to the transfer for adjudication. Labour Court found that the transfer was unjustified and directed the reinstatement of the workman at Bangalore with backwages. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that even though the order of transfer and the order of dismissal originated from the head office at Krishnagiri in Madras State, the dispute thereto arose within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government and therefore, the reference made by the State of Mysore was proper. In fact their Lordships quoted with approval a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in "LALBHAI TRICUMLAL MILLS LTD., v. D.M. VIN AND OTHERS ". The following observation made by Chagla, Chief Justice was also observed by their Lordships of the Apex Court which is as follows:-
"But what we are concerned with to decide is, where did the dispute substantially arise. Now the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction, upon the Labour Court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction, a Court or Tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within the jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within the jurisdiction."
In the subsequent judgment in "M/S HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD., v. THE WORKMEN AND OTHERS ", their Lordships of the Supreme Court was again considering a question as to whether the Government of West Bengal is competent to make reference concerning the Barrackpore branch which works under the control of Bangalore divisional office of the company which is within the jurisdiction of Karnataka Government. In that case also an industrial dispute between the employees of the Barrackpore branch and the company was referred for adjudication by the Government of West Bengal. While upholding the said reference, their Lordships of the Apex Court have held as follows:-
"The other leg of the argument to challenge the competency of the West Bengal Government to make the reference is also fruitless. It may be assumed that the Barrackpore branch was under the control of the Bangalore division of the company. Yet it was a separate branch engaged in an industry of repairs of aircrafts or the like at Barrackpore. For the purposes of the Act and on the facts of this case the Barrackpore branch was an industry carried on by the company as a separate unit. The workers were receiving their pay packages at Barrackpore and were under the control of the officers of the company stationed there. If there was any disturbance of industrial peace at Barrackpore where a considerable number of workmen were working the appropriate Government concerned in the maintenance of the industrial peace was the West Bengal Government. The grievances of the workmen of Barrackpore were their own and the cause of action in relation to the industrial dispute in question arose there. The reference, therefore, for adjudication of such a dispute by the Governor of West Bengal was good and valid."
8. In the judgment in "PARITOSH KUMAR v.
STATE OF BIHAR (1984 (II) LLN 617)", a Full Bench of Patna High Court considered the case of one A.K.Distributors (Private) Ltd., the sole distributor in Western India for the medicines of Mac Laboratories had its head office at Calcutta. One sales representative of the said company who was appointed to work in Patna raised an industrial dispute in the State of Bihar in regard to the payment and rate of commission between him and the company. The State of Bihar referred the said dispute for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. That reference was challenged on the ground that the Government of Bihar was not the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, for he was an employee of the firm having it's head office at Calcutta. After a detailed discussion and consideration of various judgments on the issue, the Full Bench upheld the reference holding that the State of Bihar was the appropriate Government and the reference made by it was consequently valid.
9. In fact, the above judgments have also been considered by a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the judgment in " FACT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. FACT LTD. (1992 (II) LLN 277)." In that case, the management had its regional office at Hyderabad and more than 146 employees were attached to the said office. One Sri Easo was one of the employees attached to that regional office. Alleged misconduct was committed by him while he was working at Hyderabad. Charge sheet was also issued to him by the Senior Regional Manager at Hyderabad and enquiry was conducted at Hyderabad for the alleged misconduct and the order of dismissal was served on him at Hyderabad through the controlling officer. However, the said order of dismissal originated from the regional office of the company at Hyderabad. While considering the dispute raised by the petitioner at Hyderabad, the learned Judge found that the order of dismissal became effective at Hyderabad where Sri Easo was employed and it is within the area of employment that the order of dismissal operates and the workman ceases to be a workman. The learned Judge also held that since the cause of action substantially arose at Hyderabad, and the dispute substantially arose within the cognizance of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, that Government alone should have made the reference. On the said conclusion, the learned Judge finally held that the reference made by the Government of Kerala at the instance of the employees association was not sustainable.
10. A reading of the above judgments would make the position clear that what is relevant for sustaining a dispute before a Labour Court is the place where the cause of action arose substantially, namely the place where the employee was working at the time when the order of termination was issued and not as to the place of initial appointment elsewhere even though he was transferred to other places. On the above conclusion, let me consider the case of the writ petitioner and the 2nd respondent as pleaded by them. According to the 2nd respondent, he was initially appointed at Madras on 6.6.77 and he was later on transferred to Jamshedpur. Disputing the said claim, the writ petitioner management contended that at no point of time the 2nd respondent was appointed at Madras and from the date of his appointment, he had been working in the service centre at Jamshedpur. The Labour Court went in detail on the above aspects and after considering the various materials placed before it both by way of oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that since the 2nd respondent was initially appointed at Madras and though he was subsequently transferred to Jamshedpur, he could maintain the dispute at Madras. In view of the settled law as discussed above, the Labour Court miserably failed in taking into consideration the place where initial appointment was made as the cause of action for the dispute. The Labour Court proceeded only on the basis of the initial appointment of the 2nd respondent at Madras whereas it was not disputed that at the time of the order of termination dated 27.1.89, the 2nd respondent was admittedly working at Jamshedpur, which was within the jurisdiction of the Government of Bihar. The Labour Court did not consider this aspect as to the cause of action for entertaining the claim petition when the facts are not disputed as to the order of termination only emanated from the Regional Manager, Calcutta and when the 2nd respondent was actually working in the service centre at Jamshedpur. Therefore, in my considered view, the 1st respondent Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim statement at the instance of the 2nd respondent who was employed at the service centre of the writ petitioner at Jamshedpur. In view of the same, the 2nd respondent cannot sustain a dispute before the 1st respondent. In this connection, it is further to be noted that the 2nd respondent himself earlier filed petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act on 31.7.89 before the Labour Officer at Madras. The said petition was resisted by the writ petitioner management on the ground that the Labour Officer at Madras would not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition and initiate conciliation proceedings. Accepting the said contention of the management, the Labour Officer-III Chennai, by order dated 5.9.89 which is marked as Ex.M4 while refusing to initiate conciliation proceedings rejected the petition filed by the 2nd respondent. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent also raised a similar dispute as against the order of termination before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Jamshedpur dated 30 .3.90 and the same has been marked as Ex.M10. The said dispute was in fact forwarded by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Jamshedpur for initiating conciliation proceedings by the Commissioner of Labour, Bihar at Patna in his letter dated 12.3.91 and the same had been marked as Ex.M11. However, strangely and the reasons best known to the 2nd respondent, he did not pursue the said petition submitted before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour on 30.3.90. Subsequent to the above, the 2nd respondent filed the claim statement under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court at Madras in I.D.No.45 of 1991. The order of the Labour Officer, Chennai refusing to entertain the petition of the 2nd respondent under Section 2A of the Act dated 31.7.89 has not been challenged by the 2nd respondent. It is also relevant to note that the 2nd respondent filed a suit in O.S.No.1533 of 1989 on the file of the Vth Assistant City Judge, Chennai for a declaration that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981 and for a consequential injunction restraining the management from terminating his services. Even though the said suit was dismissed by the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 1.12.82, in the appeal in A.S.No.215 of 1994, the lower appellate Court while allowing the appeal declared that the 2nd respondent is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981 and also granted the consequential order of injunction. The said order was passed on the ground that the 2nd respondent could maintain such a suit at Madras since he was initially appointed at Madras. However, when the said order of the lower appellate Court was challenged in the second appeal in S.A.No.1443 of 1995, this Court by order dated 19.12.95 observed as follows:-
"Now coming to the above referred first submission of learned counsel for the appellant, I must hold that the above said Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981 is not applicable to the present case and the declaration relief prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. It is evident that at the time when the plaintiff's services were terminated, the plaintiff was working only at Jamshedpur in the above said service center of the defendant. Even according to the plaintiff, at least right from 1984, he was working there till the above said termination order dated 27.1.89 was passed."
Having given such a finding, this Court also held that when the 2nd respondent was lastly employed at Jamshedpur and the provisions of Act 46 of 1981 is not applicable to the State of Bihar, the 2nd respondent could not maintain such a petition before the Civil Court at Madras. In view of the above categorical finding that the 2nd respondent was lastly employed at the time when the order of termination dated 2 7.1.89 was passed at Jamshedpur, he could not have maintained the claim petition before the Labour Court at Madras.
11. Coming to the power of this Court to interfere in the award of the Labour Court, the Apex Court in the judgment in "M/S PARRY AND CO.LTD. v. P.C.PAL AND OTHERS (1970 (II) LLJ 429)" has held as follows:-
"The writ of certiorari could be issued when manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction is shown for the purpose of correcting such defects."
In view of the above categorical pronouncement of the Apex Court, this Court could interfere in the award when the same was passed by a Labour Court which would not have jurisdiction to entertain a claim statement for want of cause of action.
12. The learned counsel for petitioner also made elaborate arguments on the merits of the case in supporting the order of termination on the ground that the termination was justified because the service centre at Jamshedpur was closed, and the directions contained in the award for reinstatement is also unsustainable since the factory at Madras also was closed and there is no post or vacancy to accommodate the 2nd respondent. In view of my finding that the 1st respondent Labour Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the very claim statement filed by the 2nd respondent, I do not incline to go into the merits of the case as well as the submissions made by both the learned counsel for the writ petitioner and the 2nd respondent.
13. In view of my above findings, the impugned award dated 26.12.96 passed by the 1st respondent Labour Court in I.D.No.45 of 1991 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected W.M.P. is closed.