Delhi High Court
Darshan Singh And Anr. vs State on 16 December, 2013
Author: Kailash Gambhir
Bench: Kailash Gambhir, Indermeet Kaur
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.A. 391/1998
Judgment pronounced on : December 16, 2013
DARSHAN SINGH AND ANR. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr. K.B. Andley, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. M.L.Yadav, Advocate.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP for the
State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
JUDGMENT
% KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.
1. By this appeal filed under Section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C."), the appellants herein seek to challenge the impugned judgment and order on sentence dated 28th August 1998 and 29th August 1998, respectively whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi has convicted them for committing an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment together with imposition of fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 1 of 23 default of payment of fine, the appellants were directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of four months.
2. Brief facts of the case are stated as under:
"On 17th September 1991 at about 12 in the day Complainant Sahib Ditta Mal was getting a wall of his house No. 1A/13 Geeta Colony, Delhi, repaired but was objected by his neighbour Darshan Singh at 1A/14. Two days earlier also Darshan Singh had objected to the repair/construction of the wall, saying that it was a common wall and that he should raise his own wall. The complainant told Darshan singh with folded hands, that he is getting his own wall constructed, on which his sons Avneet @ Bobby and Kanwaljeet @ Bunty, started quarrelling and abusing the complainant. Complainant son Naresh also came out and he tried to persuade Darshan Singh and his son, but Darshan Singh asked his sons that Naresh Kumar be caught, where after Darshan Singh and Kanwaljeet caught hold of Naresh Kumar outside his house near to the gate and Avneet hit something like knife in the left side of the abdomen of Naresh kumar and then all the threDarshan., Avneet @ Bobby and Kanwaljeet @ Bunty fled away from the spot. Naresh Kumar was removed to hospital by complainant. He succumbed to injuries at 07.05 p.m. on the same day."
3. To bring home the charges, the prosecution in all examined 20 witnesses. After recording the evidence of the prosecution, the statement of the all the three accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 2 of 23 Cr. P.C. and in their statement, they pleaded innocence and false implication by the prosecution.
4. After addressing some arguments to assail the findings of the learned trial court on merits of the judgment and to plead for acquittal of the appellant, Mr. M.L. Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant mainly confined his arguments to urge that the offence committed by the appellants would fall under clause 4 of Section 300 of IPC, punishable under Section 304 (Part II) IPC.
5. The contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the appellant was that there was a sudden fight which had taken place between the accused persons on the one hand and the complainant and his son (deceased) on the other hand on a construction of wall, both being immediate neighbours. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no previous enmity between the parties and the row of controversy between them was the construction of a common wall. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that as per the MLC Report and the post mortem report, the deceased had suffered only one stabbed injury in his abdomen and in a case of single fatal blow on a vital part of body, the Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 3 of 23 Apex Court in catena of judgments has taken a view that the case would fall under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC provided such an injury has been caused on the spur of moment without pre-meditation plan or design on the part of the accused persons. Learned counsel for the appellants also argued that the prosecution failed to prove the weapon of offence used by the accused Avneet Singh through which the stabbed injury was inflicted on the deceased, as there is an inconsistent stand of the prosecution witnesses who entered into witness box pertaining to this fact. Inviting attention of the court to the deposition of Narinder Kumar (PW-2), the counsel submitted that he in his examination-in-chief deposed that the other co-accused Avneet Singh @ Boby thrusted something like a knife and similarly Sarditta Mal (PW-4) father of the deceased in his deposition stated that the accused Avneet Singh @ Boby brought a weapon like a knife and again said that the accused Avneet Singh @ Boby was already having a knife in his possession and he had just taken out and stabbed my son, Naresh.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that such inconsistencies in the deposition of the said eye-witnesses creates enough Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 4 of 23 doubt on the recovery of the weapon of offence during the alleged disclosure statement of Avneet Singh and the sketch of dagger proved on record as Ex.PW-6/A. Learned counsel for the appellant further argued that even as per the prosecution, the main assailant was Avneet Singh, who has already died and not the present appellants, who as per the prosecution had merely caught hold of the deceased. Learned counsel for the appellant further argued that even appellants had no knowledge of the fact that the other co-accused Avneet Singh was in possession of a sharp edged weapon through which he could cause serious injury to the deceased Naresh. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that the present appellants have already suffered incarceration for a period of around seven years and they are not involved in any other criminal offence and their antecedents are very clean. Learned counsel for the appellants pleaded that leniency be shown in awarding the sentence. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the following judgments:-
a) Malemptai Pattabi Narendra vs. Ghattamaneni Maruthi Prasad & Ors. Reported in 2000(2)JCC(SC) 702.
b) Din Dayal vs. Raj Kumar reported in AIR 1999 SC 537
c) Tholan vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1984 SCC (Cri) 164 Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 5 of 23
7. Refuting the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Sunil Sharma, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State strongly contended that the life of a young boy was lost at the hands of these appellants and the other co-accused Avneet Singh who is now no more and these appellants do not deserve any sympathy or leniency. Learned APP for State also argued that even in a case of single fatal blow on a vital part of body the Apex Court in a catena of judgments has awarded the punishment under Section 302 IPC and not under Section 304 of IPC. Learned APP for State also submitted that not merely these appellants caught hold of the deceased but exhorting the other co-accused by uttering that Naresh Kumar may not be spared (bach ke na jane paye). Learned APP for State further argued that a dagger of big size was recovered at the instance of co-accused Avneet Singh during the course of his disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, immediately after his arrest on 05.02.1998. Learned APP for State also argued that all the accused persons had fled away after committing the said crime, which further proves the criminal bent of mind of these appellants.
Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 6 of 23
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by them. We have also gone through the record of the learned trial court, and scrutinised the material on record.
9. In the present case, we have to first analyse as to whether the prosecution has succeeded to prove that the injury caused by the accused, Avneet was with intention of causing such bodily injury, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and therefore, falls under clause firstly of Section 300 IPC.
10. Intention is a desire of a person to bring about a particular result. It is a degree above knowledge. While assessing such cases involving intention, we must keep in mind the distinction between knowledge and intention. Since it is an element of mind, it has to be examined by the conduct of the person in the particular circumstances. A test of an ordinary person has to be conducted to examine whether a person doing a particular act had the intention to do that act or not i.e. if an ordinary person would have acted, in those set of circumstances in the manner the accused did, can we attribute intention to him.
Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 7 of 23
11. In the present case PW-4, father of the deceased as well as PW-3, have been consistent in their testimonies before Court that appellant No.1 himself asked his both the sons, appellant Nos.2 and accused, Avneet to hold the deceased "bach ke na jane pave" and thereafter appellant Nos.1 and 2 caught hold the deceased and accused Avneet brought a dangerous weapon like knife and gave one fatal blow in the vital part of the body of the deceased, being abdomen. PW-12, Dr. L.K. Barua, who conducted the autopsy of the deceased, stated that he had noted the following injuries:
a. "One midline vertically illiac stitched wound in front of abdomen of 25 cms long.
b. Another almost transversly illiac d stitched wound on the medial and touching the embidicus and the alteral and left lumbar region, the total length of this injury was 19 cms.
c. One stitched wound on the left iliac fossa placed obliquely size 2.5 cms."
12. According to PW-12, the cause of death was shock due to haemorrhage as a result of injury No.3 produced by sharp edged weapon and was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. It shall be noted that the injury no.1 and 2 were inflicted in the hospital by the Doctor during the operation.
Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 8 of 23
13. In the present case as per the MLC and the evidence of doctor, the size of the injury was only 2.5 cms and therefore it cannot be said with certainty that the accused, Avneet had intentionally caused death as provided under Section 300 part firstly.
14. Let us now examine whether it falls under Section 300 clause thirdly. In the landmark judgment of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1958) 1 SCR 1495, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the following are the four steps of inquiry involved in the offence of Murder under section 300 IPC, clause thirdly:
"i. first, whether bodily injury is present;
ii. second, what is the nature of the injury; iii. third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended; and iv. fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature."
15. In the present case all the above elements are fulfilled, there is an injury on the body of the accused; it is a fatal injury; the injury is the one which the accused, Avneet intended to inflict and also the injury has been Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 9 of 23 proved to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Thus it has sufficiently been proved that the accused, Avneet had committed murder of the deceased under Section 300 IPC clause thirdly.
16. Now dealing with the next contention raised by the counsel for the appellant whether the offence committed by the accused, Avneet would only be culpable homicide amounting to murder under Section 300 IPC or would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, under Exception 4 section 300 IPC. Let us first reproduce the said provision which reads as under:-
"Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code, reads as follows:
"Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.-It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault."
17. If the case falls under Exception 4, then the further inquiry should be as to whether the case falls under the first part of Section 304 or the second part, which reads as follows: Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 10 of 23
"304-Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.-Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death."
18. In order to bring the offence under this exception IV of Section 300 IPC, four things shall be proved by the accused:
I. That the act was without premeditation.
II. There was a sudden quarrel
III. In the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel there
was a sudden fight.
IV. Offender did not take undue advantage or acted in
a cruel or unusual manner.
19. In Pappu v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2006) 7 SCC 391 the Hon'ble Apex Court almost exhaustively dealt with the parameters of Exception IV to Section 300 of the Code. The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under:
Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 11 of 23
"13...The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and
(d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code is not defined in Indian Penal Code. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner.
The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage".
It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 Indian Penal Code is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body on which it was given and several such relevant factors."
Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 12 of 23
20. In the present case as per the testimony of two eye witnesses being PW-3 and PW-4, immediately before the alleged incident, there was a quarrel between the appellant no.1, appellant no.2 and accused Avneet on one side and PW-4 and deceased on the other side. The quarrel resulted into sudden fight and accused, Avneet gave a stab wound in the abdomen of the deceased. The stab wound proved fatal and the deceased died on the evening of the same day.
21. In the background of the aforesaid facts, it cannot be said that the accused had any premeditation to kill the deceased. In almost similar facts in Mohd. Sultan vs. State reported in 2011 Cri.LJ 4680, where also the accused had gone to his brother's factory nearby the same gali and within a gap of 2-3 minutes between the heated exchange of words, he brought the weapon and murdered the deceased, the Division Bench of this court took a view that the case is clearly of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and will fall under exception 4 of Section 300 IPC. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment is reproduced as under:-
It is clear from the testimonies of P Ws 8, 9 and 10 that there was no previous enmity between the Appellant Mohd. Sultan @ Kallu and Yamin and his brothers and cousin. It is also apparent from their testimonies that a theft had taken place in the night Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 13 of 23 intervening 17/18.09.1992 in the factory of Mohd. Farukh and his brothers. There was a heated exchange of words on the next night around 9:15 pm between Mohd. Sultan @ Kallu and PW8 Mohd. Farukh, in which the Appellant Mohd. Sultan is said to have questioned Mohd. Farukh as to why the former's name was being dragged in connection with the theft of the previous night. The altercation between the two escalated and resulted in Mohd. Sultan @ Kallu slapping Mohd. Farukh 2/3 times. On the intervention of the other brothers and cousin Mumtaz, Mohd. Sultan left the premises threatening to teach them a lesson. He went to his brother's factory nearby in the same gali and returned with a knife within 2-3 minutes and immediately thereupon stabbed Yamin who was standing outside the factory with PW9 Yasin. This incident was, of course, seen by PW9 Yasin. Immediately thereafter, Mohd. Sultan @ Kallu ran away from the scene. This is clearly a case of culpable homicide. It would not be murder and would fall under Exception 4 if it was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. There is no doubt in our minds that the incident took place without premeditation and the time gap between the heated exchange of words and the second incident of stabbing is only of 2-3 minutes, which clearly indicates that it was a sudden fight and there was no time for the tempers to have cooled so as to allow in the concept of premeditation. The tempers had not cooled and, therefore, in our view, the stabbing incident has to be regarded as in the course of a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
A similar situation had arisen in the case of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 327. In that Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 14 of 23 case also there was no enmity between the parties. The occurrence had taken place when Sukhbir Singh got mud splashes on account of sweeping of a street by Ram Niwas and a quarrel ensued. The deceased slapped the Appellant for no fault of his. The quarrel was sudden and on account of the heat of passion. The accused went home and came armed in the company of others without telling them of his intention. The time gap between the quarrel and the fight was a few minutes only. The Supreme Court observed that it was, therefore, probable that there was insufficient lapse of time between the quarrel and the fight which meant that the occurrence was sudden within the meaning of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC.
22. In Krishna Tiwary and Anr Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2001 SC 2410, where also the accused had inflicted knife blows in the heat of passion without any premeditation and without any intention that he would cause that injury, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the case was covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC; the accused was convicted under Section 304-I of the IPC. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"the accused had inflicted knife blows in the heat of passion without any premeditation and without any intention that he would cause that injury, his case was covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC; he had been convicted under Section 304-I of the IPC. 21 Applying the test laid down in this case, there is no Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 15 of 23 reason as to why the appellants should also not be accorded the benefit of Explanation 4 of Section 300 of the IPC. The conviction of the appellants for the offence of murder is accordingly modified for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. They are all accordingly convicted under Section 304-I of the IPC."
23. In State of H.P. vs. Wazir Chand and others reported in AIR 1978 SC 315 dealing with the sudden fight between two groups wherein one person in such fight was vitally wounded by the appellant by knife, the Hon'ble Apex Court took a view that this case falls in exception 4 of Section 300 as there was no pre-meditation. Relevant paras of the said judgment are as under:-
"Therefore, when Parshottam I.al appeared there was a sudden fight upon a sudden quarrel flowing from the earlier incident and in this both sides attacked each other. All the ingredients to attract Exception 4 to Section 300, I.P.C. are established. There is no premeditation. Parshottam Lal left the theatre and came over there. There was a fight that ensued in a sudden quarrel. The previous incident between Om Parkash alias Pashi and accused No. 3 Joginder was the cause and in that heat of passion and sudden quarrel parties grappled and attacked each other and it cannot be said in the circumstances that any undue advantage was taken. It may be recalled here that Parshottam Lal was a hefty well built fellow and if accused No. 1 alone was to attack him he could not Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 16 of 23 have escaped with few abrasions. Therefore, all the ingredients to attract Exception 4 of Section 300, I.P.C. are fully established.
26. As injury No. 1 was fatal in the ordinary course of nature and accused No. 1 had wielded a dangerous weapon and caused an injury on the vital part of the body and the blows were repeated inasmuch as four injuries were caused the offence but for the application of Exception 4 would be one under Section 302, I.P.C. but as Exception 4 is attracted, it would be reduced to Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. and the conviction of accused No. 1 would be modified to one under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. maintaining the sentence as awarded by the High Court as in our opinion that is adequate."
24. In the facts of the present case also what we find is that a sudden quarrel between the accused, Avneet, appellant no.1 and appellant no.2 and the deceased and his father, PW-4 had taken place over some issue of construction of wall and the sudden quarrel ultimately turned ugly, resulting into a sudden fight and ultimately, the murder of the deceased at the hands of the accused, Avneet. However it is proved that there was no premeditated plan or previous enmity between the accused, Avneet, appellants and the deceased.
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that it is a clear case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under Exception 4 of Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 17 of 23 Section 300 IPC, as the act was committed without premeditation, in a heat of passion upon sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
26. Now it has to be examined whether the case of the accused, Avneet falls under first part of section 304 or second part of section 304. When there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 part II.
27. In Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2009) 15 SCC 635 after scanning all the previous decisions where the death was caused by a single blow, the Hon'ble Apex Court indicated, though not exhaustively, a few factors to be taken into consideration while awarding the sentence. To quote:
"23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under:
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 18 of 23
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;
(m) The conduct and behavior of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment?
These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused."
28. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavor of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 19 of 23 appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.
29. In the present case although the accused, Avneet had given a single blow to the deceased which proved fatal, but it was sufficiently proved on record that the accused, Avneet was not just having knowledge as to what he was doing but also he intended to do the same.
30. The testimony of PW-3 and PW-4 were consistent that the appellant no.1 asked the co-accused to hold the deceased and he shall not be able to escape "bach ke na jaane paave", and thereafter appellant no.1 and appellant no. 2 caught hold the deceased and accused took out the murder weapon being dagger (knife) and gave a fatal blow in the vital part of the body of the deceased being abdomen. Thus his act makes it amply clear that the accused intentionally committed the said act and therefore it will fall under Section 304 first part and not section 304 second part.
31. Now dealing with the last contention of the counsel that the appellants herein were not having common intention under section 34 Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 20 of 23 IPC. Common intention as envisaged under Section 34 IPC is an exception to Rule of evidence. It lays down the principle of constructive liability, wherein if one person also commits the crime, all the other persons who were sharing a common intention with them, will also be liable. A person may be having a similar intention like other, but a similar intention becomes common when they mutually agree to commit an offence conjointly i.e. there is meeting of mind consensus ad idem. This mutual agreement results into a mutual agency, wherein one person represents the other and therefore even if one person commits the offence, it is deemed that all of them have committed the same. It is further pertinent to mention here that for proving common intention, it is essential to prove that there was a meeting of mind. The burden of proving the meeting of minds is on the prosecution. The burden is strict and the court shall not presume anything till proved.
32. However as far as appellant No.1 and appellant no.2 are concerned, there is nothing proved on record by the prosecution that they had any common intention to kill the deceased or that they had any previous knowledge of the fact that the accused was carrying a dagger with him. Merely by uttering words like "bach ke na jaane pave", it Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 21 of 23 cannot be concluded that the appellants were having a common intention with accused to cause death of the deceased.
33. In the matter of Sanjeev Alias Sonu & Birender @ Boya vs. State of Rajasthan Crl. A. No. 897/2010 Decided On: 24.05.2013, wherein a sudden fight ensued between two groups and on the spur of moment one accused caused a stab injury to the deceased, however prosecution failed to prove that the co-accused share common intention, the division bench of this Court convicted the other co-accused for the offence under section 326 read with Section 34 IPC.
34. In another case of Tirthi Lal and another vs. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 63-DB of 1996 Decided On: 30.04.1998 (Punjab and Haryana High Court) wherein in a sudden fight hot words were exchanged between the accused and deceased and without any premeditation, co-accused inflicted single knife blow on the body of the deceased, while appellant caught hold of the hands of the deceased. The Court held that the appellant cannot be said to have shared common intention to cause death of the deceased and accordingly he was convicted under section 326 read with section 34 IPC. Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 22 of 23
35. In the view of the aforesaid, the judgment and the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 28th August 1998 and 29th August 1998, respectively, convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is modified to the extent that the appellants are convicted under section 326 read with section 34 IPC and accordingly the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon them by the Ld. trial court is converted to the Sentence of the period already undergone by them.
36. It is ordered accordingly.
37. Copy of this order be sent to jail Superintendent for information and compliance.
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
DECEMBER 16, 2013 v/pkb Crl. A. No.391/1998 Page 23 of 23