Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Y.G. Krishna vs Addl. Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Addl. ... on 29 June, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(4)ALD323, 1999(4)ALT414, (2000)ILLJ186AP
ORDER
1. The petitioner is a Conductor working in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. He filed this writ petition for issue of a writ of cerliorari calling for the records in MP No.298/1986 and quashing the order dated 7-9-1990 made by the 1st respondent-Industrial Tribunal insofar as it relates to denial of wages to him from 15-4-1979 to 16-5-1980, and directing the 2nd respondent-Management to pay him the wages from 15-4-1979 till the actual date of reinstatement.
2. The material facts of the case are as under ; During the year 1977 the petitioner was removed from the service of the 2nd respondent as a result of departmental proceedings that were conducted against him. On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the State Government referred the matter, regarding the validity of removal order, to the 1st respondent-Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") in ID No.92/77. After due enquiry, the 1st respondent-Tribunal made an Award on 30-12-1978 directing the Management to appoint the petitioner afresh as a Conductor. The said Award was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 15-3-1979 under Section 17 of the Act. As per Section I7-A(1) read with sub-section (4) that Award came into operation on 15-4-1979 i.e., on expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication on 15-3-1979. Without implementing the above said Award, the Management (respondents 2 and 3 herein) approached this Court by way of Writ Petition No.344l of 1979 and obtained interim stay of operation of the Award on 23-4-1979 in WP MP No.4394 of 1979. Inspite of this interim order, during the pendency of the said writ petition, the Management on the request made by the petitioner's Counsel issued an appointment order on 25-3-1980. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner reported to duty on 8-4-1980. Thereafter he was given the posting order on 17-5-1980. It appears that, subsequently, the said writ petition was also dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner approached the 1st respondent-Industrial Tribunal under Section 33-C(2) of the Act claiming an amount of Rs. 11,586.20 ps., under several heads, including an amount of Rs.6s229/- towards wages from 15-4-1979 to 16-5-1980. That petition was partly allowed on 7-9-1990. However the claim of Rs.6,229/- towards wages from 15-4-1979 to 16-5-1980 was disallowed. The relevant portion of that order is as follows :
"8. Unfortunately the petitioner suppressed the fact that Writ Petition No.3441/79 was filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the award was stayed by an order dated 23-4-1979. The petitioner also suppressed the fact that the reinstatement was ordered by the High Court at request of the Counsel for (he petitioner subject to the result of the writ petition. In pursuance of the direction given by the High Court the petitioner was appointed by proceedings dated 25-3-1980 in Ex.W2. The petitioner reported to duty by submitting his application dated 8-4-1980 in Ex.W3. The petitioner had to be reinstated as fresh candidate. As per the award the management had to find out the vacancy position and post the petitioner. Ultimately they posted the petitioner at Kukatpally depot with effect from 17-5-1980. They had to complete the formalities of fresh appointment. They took about one mouth after the application of the petitioner in Ex.W3. This is a reasonable time and the petitioner is not entitled for any amount for this period. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is not entitled towards wages from 15-4-1979 to 16-5-1990."
This part of the order is now challenged in this writ petition.
3. Mr. G. Vidyasagar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the order is vitiated by an apparent error inasmuch as the 1st respondent-Tribunal failed to consider the effect of Ihe mandatory provisions contained in Section 17-A(1) read with subsection (4) of Ihe Act and, therefore, the order of this extent has to be set aside.
4. Mrs. Nanda Ramachandra Rao, learned Standing Counsel for APSRTC, appearing for respondents 2 and 3 strongly disputed the same.
5. It is now appropriate to note the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 17-A(1) enjoins that : "an Award (including an arbitration Award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17." Sub-section (4) of Section 17 further enjoins that "subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and subsection (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) of sub-section (3), as the case may be".
6. It is, therefore, clear that when no date is specified in the Award, the Award comes into operation on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17 of the Act. In this case, the Award did not specify any date on which it should come into operation. The Award was published on 15-3-1979. Hencfi, the Award dated 30-12-1978 came into operation on expiry of 30 days therefrom i.e., on 15-4-1979. With effect from that date a statutory duty was imposed upon the Management to implement the Award and appoint the petitioner afresh as a Conductor. This view of mine gains full support from the decision of the Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Ajit Maneklal Choksi, 1979 Lab.IC 59. See para 6 of the report. Failure of the Management to timely discharge of the said statutory obligation will make it liable tor penal, and/or, civil consequences. Since the respondent-Management failed in timely discharge of the said statutory obligation, they are liable to pay salary to the petitioner-workman from 15-4-1979 i.e., the date on which the Award came into operation, till 16-5-1980, i.e., a day before he was given posting orders.
7. Swayed away by the fact that the petitioner-workman did not disclose the fact of filing of Writ Petition No.3441 of 1979 by the respondent-Management, the Tribunal has lost sight of the said statutory obligation and rested its decision On factors like interim stay of the Award by this Court, workman's subsequent request for appointment, and the time taken for finding out a vacancy by the Management. Those factors, particularly the fact by the Management has filed a writ petition questioning the Award, which was ultimately dismissed, cannot absolve the Management from the consequences of their failure in timely discharge of the statutory obligation. Yet, the Industrial Tribunal based its decision, wholly, on those factors. This, in my view, is an error apparent on the face of the order.
8. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Management, however, forcefully argued that a duty is cast upon the workman to request the Management for a posting after the Award came into operation; and that since the petitioner did not make any such request he is not entitled to claim wages from the date when the Award came into operation. In support of the said contention, she relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Peer Mohd. & Co. v. Mohd. Hussain, 1968 Lab. LG 1143; and the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Steel Rolling Mills v. K.R. Steel Mills Labour Union, 1964 (II) LLJ 120.
9. There is no merit in this contention. In Bombay Steel Rolling Mills' case (supra), the Supreme Court did not consider the mandatory effect of Section 17-A(l) read with sub-section (4). That case relates to appointment of a workman after acquittal in a criminal proceeding. In those circumstances, it was held that the workman should approach the Management within a reasonable time for reinstatement. Further, there is one important distinguishing feature here. Unlike in the above two cases referred to by the respondents' Counsel, in this case the respondent-Management approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.3441 of 1979 on 23-4-1979, i.e., immediately after the Award came into operation on 15-4-1979, and obtained interim stay of operation of the Award. In those circumstances, there was no scope for the petitioner to request the respondent-Management to give him appointment. In the decision of the Madras High Court i.e., Peer Mohd. & Company '5 case (supra), there is no discussion regarding the statutory obligation of the Management and, therefore, cannot lend any support to the Management's con ten! ion.
10. For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petition succeeds. The order of the 1st respondent-Tribunal, insofar as it relates to denial of wages to the petitioner from 15-4-1979 to 16-5-1980, is quashed. There shall be a direction to the respondent-Management to pay the amount of Rs.6,229/-representing the wages from 15-4-1979 to 16-5-1980 within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
11. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.