Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Abhishek Gupta And Others vs Jammu And Kashmir Bank Ltd. And Others on 22 March, 2021
Author: Ali Mohammad Magrey
Bench: Ali Mohammad Magrey
COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT SRINAGAR
WP (C) no. 913/2020
CM no. 2033/2020
CM no. 2034/2020
c/w
WP (C) no. 908/2020
CM no. 2020/2020
CM no. 2021/2020
Reserved on 15.03.2021
Pronounced on 22.03.2021
Abhishek Gupta and others
.... Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr Jahangir Iqbal Ganai, Sr. Adv with
Ms Humaira Shafi, Advocate
V/s
Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. and others
... Respondent(s)
Through: Mr D. C. Raina, Advocate General with
Mr Sajjad Ashraf, GA for R-3
Mr Sunil Sethi, Sr. Advocate with
Mr Navyug Sethi, Advocate for R-1 & 2
CORAM:
Hon'ble Mr Justice Ali Mohammad Magrey, Judge
JUDGMENT
1/- These two writ petitions raise a common question for determination, therefore, both are taken up for disposal together, and shall be governed by this judgment.
2/- The petitioners are stated to have offered their candidature for the post of Probationary officers and Banking Associates sought to be filled up by the respondents in terms of Notification no. HRD-Rectt-2018-1564 dated 06.10.2018 and subsequently participated in the selection process. Before the selection list could be issued the respondents issued a notice dated 15 th April, 2020, cancelling the whole selection process. Subsequent thereto, an advertisement notice ref no. JKB/HR-Rectt-2020-27 & 28 dated 01.06.2020 was issued by the respondent Bank inviting applications from the desirous candidates for the posts of Probationary Officers and Banking Associates.
WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 1 of 32 3/- The petitioners are aggrieved of the Notice dated 15th April, 2020, cancelling the selection process and of the advertisement notice ref no. JKB/HR-Rectt-2020- 27 & 28 dated 01.06.2020, advertising the posts of Probationary Officers & Banking Associates, for short impugned notices, therefore, are seeking its quashment inter alia on the following grounds:
a) That no reasons have been disclosed by the Bank while issuing the impugned notice dated 15th April, 2020, cancelling the selection process conducted for the posts of Probationary Officers and Banking Associates and the failure of respondents to give reasons in support of its decision amounts to denial of justice;
b) That agency which conducted the online examination in question has a reputed track record; therefore, the cancellation of the process does not appear to be bonafide and it being so the impugned decision of cancelling the selection process is arbitrary and illegal, therefore, deserves to be declared as ultra-vires of the Constitution;
c) That a limited right of fair consideration is available to a candidate who participates in the selection process which cannot be taken away by arbitrary means and unreasonably. The decision to cancel the selection process is not backed by any cogent material;
d) That the Bank has got swayed by the direction issued by the respondent no. 3 which was issued absolutely without any basis or with the support of cogent material, therefore, the decision is irrational and unfair;
e) That the law does not permit the authority to exercise power in an arbitrary manner; etcetera.
4/- Upon notice, the respondents appeared and filed their reply. 5/- Respondents 1 and 2, in their reply after giving a brief history of the case, have resisted the claim of the petitioners, amongst others, on the grounds, that:
6/- It is settled position of law that merely by participating in the recruitment process the candidates do not possess a vested right to get appointed to the advertised post; the candidates do not acquire any right to the post even on selection; no statutory right of the petitioners is infringed by the withdrawal of the WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 2 of 32 advertisement notice which was not issued in furtherance of any rules or regulations; etcetera.
7/- Respondent no. 3 in his reply has stated, inter alia, that no fundamental, legal or statutory right of the petitioners is infringed by the respondents by cancelling the selection process; that selection criteria (uniform assessment score of 40% across all districts) for the post of Probationary Officers was changed mid course, which was bad in law and not consistent with the recruitment policy of the Bank; that post re-organization of erstwhile State was converted into two Union Territories which effected the permanent residency concept in the matte of recruitment in question, therefore, the continuance of the process was not consistent with legal framework; that the Bank followed the process of recruitment which was based on district-wise requirements which arrangement, reportedly, was not a part of the recruitment policy of the Bank earlier but it was changed on 27.12.2018 and the provision of selection on District-Division-wise merit as per the decision of the Chairman/ CEO of the Bank was incorporated in the policy.
This change was part of the recruitment notification on 06.10.2018. The whole action appears to have been done against the settled proposition of law; that no reservation was prescribed for RBAs/OSCs in the recruitment process in question which is violative of the reservation Rules; that the Administrative Council fully considered and thoroughly examined the issue and on the basis of legal advice finally unequivocally came to the conclusion that ongoing process of recruitment does not meet the scrutiny of law, propriety and equity; that no enforceable legal right has accrued to the petitioners as the selection process on the reasons supplied was abandoned; that it was proposed by the Government to initiate a fresh process instead of continuing with the old selection process with all its infirmities and illegalities; the decision of the Administrative Council was placed by the Chairman/ Managing Director who in turn sought approval of the Board of WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 3 of 32 Directors which approval was given approved by the Board of Directors and notification to this effect was issued on 15th April, 2020 cancelling the old Notification No: HRD-Rectt-2018-1564 dated 06.10.2018 and further in terms of notification No. JKB/HR-Rectt-2020-27&28 dated 01.06.2020 invited online applications from the candidates of Domicile of J&K-UT for the recruitment of Probationary Officers (350 posts) and Banking Associates (1500 posts), etcetera. 8/- Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and examined the record made available.
9/- Mr Jahangir Iqbal Ganai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the Bank had taken its own decision based on their policy as would the Public Notice issued by the Bank reflect and in light of said Policy the recruitment under question was undertaken.
10/- He further submits that for the post of Probationary Officer the candidates had to qualify the prelims, mains test and the interview while as for the posts of Banking Associates the candidates had to qualify the written exam only. 11/- He further submits that the petitioners are conscious of the fact that they have no right to seek appointment even if they have made it to the merit list, but the selection authority/ recruiting agency also has no right to cancel the selection process at their own whims arbitrarily. In this regard the learned counsel referred to 1991 (3) SCC 47 Paragraph 7 to indicate that the recruiting agency cannot cancel the selection process arbitrarily and unreasonably. The relevant paragraph is taken note of hereunder:
"7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 4 of 32 do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others, [1974] 1 SCR 165; Miss Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana and Others, [1986] 4 SCC 268 and Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, [1985] 1 SCR 899."
12/- Mr Jahangir further referred to 1993 (2) SCC 573 paragraph 8 to indicate that the whole exercise of recruitment cannot be reduced to ashes and the recruiting agency cannot quietly and silently cancel the process. Relevant paragraph, for facility of reference, is taken note of hereunder:
"8. It is true that mere inclusion in the select list does not confer upon the candidates included therein an indefeasible right to appointment State of Haryana v. Subhash Chandra Marwaha A.I.R. 1 973 S.C.2216; M.S, Jain v.State of Haryana A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 276 and State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty A.I.R. 1987 S.C 331 but that is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is the obligation of the government to act fairly. The whole exercise cannot be reduced to a farce. Having sent a requisition/request to the commission to select a particular number of candidates for a particular category, in pursuance of which the commission issues a notification, holds a written test, conducts a notification, holds a written test, conducts interviews, prepares a select list and then communicates to the government-the government cannot quietly and without good and valid reasons nullify the whole exercise and tell the candidates when they complain that they have no legal right to appointment. We do not think that any government WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 5 of 32 can adopt such a stand with any justification today. This aspect has been dealt with by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 1991 1 3 S.C.C.47 where the earlier decisions of this court are also noted."
13/- Learned senior counsel further referred to 1990 (3) SCC p. 157 paragraph 11 and submitted that the selected candidate does acquire a right of consideration for appointment if he is otherwise eligible, therefore, the selected candidate does enjoy some right. Paragraph no. 11 is taken note of hereunder:
"11. There is yet another aspect of the question. Where advertisement is issued inviting applications for direct recruitment to a category of posts, and the advertisement expressly states that selection shall be made in accordance with the existing Rules or Government Orders, and if it further indicates the extent of reservations in favour of various categories, the selection of candidates in such a case must be made in accordance with the then existing Rules and Government Orders. Candidates who apply, and undergo written or viva voce test acquire vested right for being considered for selections in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the adver- tisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Generally, a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his right crystalises on the date of publication of advertisement, however he has no absolute right in the matter. If the recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in accordance with the amended Rules. Whether the Rules have retrospective effect or not, primarily depends upon the language of the Rules and its construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent is ascertained either by express provision or by necessary implication, if the amended Rules are not retrospective in nature the selection must be regulated in accordance with the Rules and orders which were in force on the date of advertisement. Determination of this question largely depends on the facts of each case having regard to the terms and conditions set out in WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 6 of 32 the advertisement and the relevant Rules and orders. Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right for selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant Rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the Rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of Rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended Rules are retrospective in nature."
14/- Learned senior counsel submits that principles of legitimate expectation arises to the candidate even if he has no vested right of appointment, therefore, the cancellation has to be justified by reasons. He referred to 2018 (16) SCC p. 195 paragraph 23 and 25. Relevant paragraphs are taken note of hereunder:
"23. Having held so, we must also note that the law is well settled that even though the candidates may not have a vested right of appointment and the State is not under any duty or obligation to fill up the vacancies, the State has to act fairly and it cannot act in an arbitrary manner. The decision, not to fill up the vacancies pursuant to the selection process, must be taken bona fide and for justifiable and appropriate reasons. In this regard, we may make reference to the case of Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India .24....
25. The main attack against the decision of the Government is on the ground that the candidates had a legitimate expectation that pursuant to the written test and interview, their result would be declared and if found successful, they would be appointed. It is a well settled law that even if there is no vested right, the principle of legitimate expectation can be invoked. Legitimate expectation arises when the citizens expect that they will be benefitted under some policy or decision, announced by the State. At the same time, the law is well settled that the Legislature and the Executive can change any policy for good reasons. These good WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 7 of 32 reasons must be such which are not arbitrary, which are not mala fide and the decision has been taken in the public interest. If the decision to change the policy is arbitrary or capricious then it may be struck down."
15/- According to the learned senior counsel the complaints referred to in clause
(g) of the reply filed on behalf of respondent no. 3, were in essence the representations from various villagers saying as to why candidates were selectively called for the interview for the post of Probationary Officers, and that is why the then Hon'ble Governor took a decision and directed that henceforth 40% marks be kept as cut-off across the table. The learned senior counsel submits that the main examination was conducted by the present Chairman and the decision to shortlist the candidates by applying 40% cut-off across the table was taken by the Bank as per its own Policy and the allocation of vacancies was also made already on the district-wise basis.
16/- Learned senior counsel further submits that even if the reply, insofar as it mentions that the ratio of 1:10 was not adhered to is taken to be true, it will apply to the post of Probationary Officer and not for the post of Banking Associate. He further submits that it is wrong to say that because of conversion of the State into UT there was no requirement of PRC as the selection process for the posts in question had already begun at the time of conversion of the State into UT. 17/- Learned senior counsel further submits that whatever is being stated in the reply filed on behalf of the Union Territory of JK and the JK Bank has to borne out from the record. Learned senior counsel, in this connection, referred to case law reported as 1978 (1) SCC 405; 2017 (6) SCC 801 paragraph 85. Paragraph no. 85 is, for facility of reference, reproduced as under:
"85. In this context it is worth referring to Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji in which it was said:WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 8 of 32
"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." This view was affirmed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner."
18/- Mr Jahangir Iqbal, Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, further submits that in response to the application filed in terms of the provisions of Right to Information Act by the petitioners, the respondent Bank replied that Bank does not have the reasons of cancellation because it is done by the Government, therefore, in that view of the matter, the cancellation done in absence of any reasons is impermissible in law as there appears to be nothing of that sort in the records.
19/- Learned senior counsel submits that if there were complaints received against the selection process, the proper course was to obtain the records and ascertain the veracity of such complaints rather than going for cancellation of the whole process.
20/- He further submits that the Government did not associate anybody from the Bank with the process and on their own decided to scrap the policy which is unwarranted.
21/- Learned senior counsel submits that no reservation could be followed in the case for the reason that the Bank does not follow the Reservation Policy as the Reservation Act or Rules was not applicable to the Bank when the recruitment in question was in process.
WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 9 of 3222/- Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the Board of Directors of the Bank did not examine the matter thoroughly as was required of them but it considered the contents of a letter from the Finance Department and did not go into the infirmities, if any, in the recruitment process in question. Therefore, a mechanical consent by the Board of Directors of the Bank on the mere dictation of the Government, is illegal, therefore, impermissible. Learned senior counsel, in this behalf, referred to case law reported as 2014 (3) SCC, p. 502, paragraph 69. Relevant paragraph is reproduced, for facility of reference, hereunder:
"69. Besides, the present case is clearly a case of dictation by the State Government to the Collector. As observed by Wade and Forsyth in Tenth Edition of Administrative Law:-
"if the minister's intervention is in fact the effective cause, and if the power to act belongs to a body which ought to act independently, the action taken is invalid on the ground of external dictation as well as on the obvious grounds of bad faith or abuse of power".
The observations by the learned authors to the same effect in the Seventh Edition were relied upon by a bench of three judges of this Court in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadega and anr. vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1995 (5) SCC 302. In this matter the appellant was produced before the Executive Magistrate, Gondal, on the allegation that certain weapons were recovered from him. The provisions of TADA had been invoked. The appellant's application for bail was rejected. A specific point was taken that the DSP had not given prior approval and the invocation of TADA was non-est. The DSP, instead of granting prior approval, made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary, and asked for permission to proceed under TADA. The Court in para 13, 14, 15 has held this to be a clear case of 'dictation', and has referred to Wade and Forsyth on 'Surrender Abdications and Dictation'."
23/- Mr Jahangir Iqbal, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, submits that the respondents had advertised 250 posts of Probationary Officers and 1200 posts of WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 10 of 32 Banking Associates without any reservation in terms of the advertisement notice that stood cancelled. He submits that the respondents have, in terms of the fresh advertisement which is impugned in the writ petition, now advertised 300 posts of Probationary Officers and 1500 posts of Banking Associates increasing the number of posts by 50 and 300 respectively. The learned senior counsel submits that even if the respondents were required to apply the Reservation Rules and Domicile Rules to the Bank, it could have been made applicable on the increased posts. 24/- The learned senior counsel submits that every arbitrary action of the Government or any other authority is always subject to judicial review. In this connection, the learned senior counsel referred to and relied upon the case law reported as 1992 (4) SCC 605, paragraph 47 titled Krishnaswami v.Union of India and others. Paragraph no. 47 is taken note of hereunder:
"47. In this light the question emerges whether the decision of the Speaker to admit the motion to remove the Judge moved by requisite number of members of the House of the People is amenable to judicial review. Undoubtedly, in a parliamentary democracy governed by rule of law, any action, decision or order of any statutory/ public authority/ functionary must be founded upon reasons stated in the order or staring from the record. Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Art. 14 or unfair procedure offending Art. 21. But exceptions are envisaged keeping institutional pragmatism into play, conscious as we are of each other's limitations. The process to remove a Judge under Art. 124 (4) consists of several steps, i.e. the motion duly moved i.e. consideration of the record by the Speaker and decision to admit the motion; his immediate constituting of the Committee under S. 3(2) of the Act; drawing up of definite charges by the Committee and investigation for proof of misbehaviour or incapacity after adhering to the procedure envisaged therein; recording finding or findings- thereon and transmission of the report and the evidence to the Speaker and in case of proof of misbehaviour or incapacity placing the report WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 11 of 32 and the evidence on the floor of the House and address by each house and majority resolution recommending to the President to remove the Judge. The entire process though integral, all the steps in the process do not take the same colour of judicial - process but bear different contours. The initiation of the motion is statutory and address by each house and resolution recommending removal of the Judge are political processes. Its admission, the constitution of the committee are statutory functions. Investigation by the Committee is judicial process. The Speaker, in this setting, acts neither as an Executive authority nor as a quasi-judicial authority. He merely discharges the functions of high constitutional responsibility. His decision to admit the motion to remove the Judge of the Constitutional Court for absence of reasons stated or staring from the record is not violative of Art. 14 or Art. 21 of the Constitution nor offends the principles of natural justice."
25/- The learned senior counsel further relied on case law reported as 2007 (6) SCC p. 81 paragraph 16 and 26 delivered in case titled Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli and others to substantiate that an unfair and arbitrary exercise of power is always subject to judicial review. Paragraphs 16 and 26 are taken note of for facility of reference, thus:
"16. An executive action must be informed by reason. An unfair executive action can only survive for a potent reason. An action which is simply unfair or unreasonable would not be sustained. Objective satisfaction must be the basis for an executive action. Even subjective satisfaction on the part of a State is liable to judicial review. The 'State' acting whether as a 'landlord' or a 'tenant' is required to act bona fide and not arbitrarily, when the same is likely to affect prejudicially the right of others.
26. Reasonableness and non-arbitrariness are the hallmarks of an action by the State. Judged from any angle, the action on the part of the appellant does not satisfy the test of fairness or unreasonableness. It being wholly arbitrary cannot be sustained."
26/- The learned senior counsel for the petitioners while strengthening his submissions referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court delivered WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 12 of 32 in case titled Amar Nath Singh and others v. Union of India and others reported as AIR 1990 SC 461 and 1997 (Supp) 894, paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 13. Paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 13 are taken note of hereunder:
"8. The law, therefore, is well settled that mere inclusion in the select list does not confer upon the candidates included therein an indefeasible right to appointment, but that is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is the obligation of the State to act fairly. The whole exercise cannot be reduced to a farce. The observations made in Asha Kaul (Mrs.) and Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 573, may profitably be adverted to. In that case, the select list prepared by the Public Service Commission was sent for approval of the Government. The list was kept pending by the Government on being prima facia satisfied with some of the complaints received against the selection process. Subsequently, the State Government asked for the list of 20 candidates and appointed them. Names of rest of the 7 candidates in the list were not approved. It was held that the Government has no absolute discretion in the matter; it must act fairly; it cannot pick and choose or approve a part of it and reject the other part and must record reasons for disapproval of one set of candidates and approval of other candidates. When selection list is sent in accordance with the requisition of the Government, it must accord its sanction irrespective of the number ot vacancies. The Government's action in rejecting a part of the list was found to be unsustainable. The most striking observation in Ashs Raul's case (supra), is that "the Government cannot quietly and without good and valid reasons nullity the whole exercise and tell the candidates when they complain that they have no legal right to appointment. No Government can adopt such a stand with any justification today." Every in K.S. Gandhi's case (supra), in which the order of cancellation of result of account of mass copying was cancelled, the Supreme Court held that if the order cancelling the examination came to be passed, the record should indicate the reason though the order may not contain reasons. Every candidate who has applied for a particular post in pursuance of the advertisement and who has gone through the rigour of the entire process of selection, in my view, is entitled to WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 13 of 32 have a legitimate expectation for being considered for appointment, may be that he is ultimately not appointed. Appointment on a post in one thing while consideration for appointment is another. Both the things cannot be mixed up and the confusion, if any, in the mind of all and sundry, must be clear with reference to these two aspects of the matter, which are quite separate and distinct. The order of cancellation of the recruitment process cannot be attached with that much of sanctity as it may render it inviolable or beyond the pale of scrutiny. The law is that if an order has been passed to set at naught the entire selection process, it has to conform to the test of reasonableness and fairness. The order should be passed bonafide and must be passed on some concrete and tangible material and certainly it cannot be the outcome of an arbitrary act imbued with subjectively.
9. The Courts certainly have the power and authority to consider the efficacy and sufficiency of the grounds and the material in the wake of which an order of cancellation came into being.
11. As noted in the beginning, the Scrutiny Committee found the following four faults with the panel prepared by the Recruitment Committee :-
(i) excess recruitment to the extent of 99 candidates;
(ii) violation of extant rules/circulars information of the panel;
(iii) certain S.C. candidates who had secured more marks were not brought or merit list, and
(iv) procedure following by the Recruitment Committee has not been elaborated in that at no point of time the original application forms were scrutinised/compared and as such the possibility of impersonation by affixing different photographs in the call letter at various stages cannot be ruled out.
The above irregularities/Shortcomings were rectifiable. No officer of the department, even the DG/RPF had found that the above irregularities cannot be rectified. The first irregularity relates to the excess recruitment to the extent of 99 candidates. This point has been clarified by Sri Mewa Lal in his counter affidavit. He has given out that originally the advertisement was WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 14 of 32 for recruitment for 485 posts of RPF constables but subsequently, 99 vacancies were sanctioned by the Railway Board and the said information was conveyed by the Chief Security Commissioner to the Recruitment Board who also extended the date of recruitment as 99 posts more were to be added for purpose of recruitment in terms of CSC/RPF, N.E.R. Gorakhpur letter No. E/P/227/1/3 Pt. (iii), dated 31.8.1985 making up a total 534 vacancies for which recruitment was to be made. This fact, as disclosed by Sri Mewa Lal remains unchallenged. Even otherwise, if there has been same excess recruitment, the result could be slashed to the extent of excess recruitment by scoring off the names of the candidates from the bottom of the list. The second objection raised by the Scrutiny Committee about the violation, of extent rules/circulars information of the panel is sweeping in nature. It is neither here nor there. No specific instance of violation of extent rules or circulars has been set out. This objection, therefore, is to be ignored. The third shortcoming In the panel found by the scrutiny committee Is that certain scheduled caste candidates who had secured more marks were not brought on merit list. This again is an objection which merits outright rejection, if certain candidates who had not qualified and could not be brought on the merit list, have been included in the merit list, their names could be struck off. On this point reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in Anamica Mishra v. U.P. Public Service Commission and Anr., A.I.R 1990 SC 461, in which, with regard to the written examination the sole objection was confined to exclusion of a group of successful candidates in the written examination from the interview. The Supreme Court held that there was no justification for cancelling the written part of the recruitment examination of all the candidates. On the other hand, the situation could have been appropriately met by setting aside the recruitment and asking for a fresh interview of all eligible candidates on the basis of the written examination and selecting those, who on the basis of written and freshly held interview, became eligible for selection. The fourth irregularity pointed out by the Scrutiny Committee was that the procedure followed by the Recruitment Committee has not been elaborated as at no point of time the original application forms were WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 15 of 32 scrutinised/compared. The objection that 'possibility of impersonation by affixing different photographs in the call letter at various stages cannot be ruled out1 is nothing but hypothetical. A close study of the objections made by the Scrutiny Committee would lead one to the conclusion that the Committee was out to find faults with the panel prepared by the Recruitment Committee. It was a case of recruitment in which more than 1,10,000 candidates applied, out of whom call letters were sent to about 78,000 candidates and more than 24,000 candidates did appear in the various tests. The irregularities pointed out by the Scrutiny Committee in a recruitment which dealt with such a large number of persons were natural and bound to occur in the normal course. The fact that there was no attempt to harmonise hum-drum details speaks of rugged truthfulness and purity of the entire recruitment process. The Department should have done well if the irregularities were rectified either at the level of the recruitment Committee or the Chief Security Commissioner. The Chairman of the Recruitment Committee did submit the corrected proceedings and in respect of other irregularities, it was submitted that they may be corrected at the level of the Chief Security Commissioner. It appears that refusal by the Recruitment Committee to set right all the alleged irregularities was made the prestige point and hurt the vanity of the DG/RPF. He had jumped to an unfounded conclusion that the entire selection process requires to be scrapped. The observations made by the DG/RPF quoted above, indicate that he was bubbling with an anxiety to purge the existing system of recruitment; he had his own innovative ideas and wanted to bring about radical changes in the recruitment process. Imbued with the re-formative zeal the DG/RPF, without realising the consequences of his act, straightaway scrapped the recruitment process which had already reached the final stage. Nobody can quarrel with the laudable ideas of the DG/RPF as the transparency, in general and in the recruitment process, In particular, is the cry of the day a loud cry, which is the top in of the mind of everybody. The DG/RPF, however, had to shun the sensitive attitude which he had entertained in the matter as his observations and attitude for radical and innovative changes in the recruitment system had the effect of jettisoning the result of WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 16 of 32 already completed recruitment. The fanatical approach adopted by the DG/RPF in scrapping the entire recruitment could not be justified in view of the rectifiable alleged irregularities and shortcomings, brought out by the Scrutiny Committee. This fact cannot be lost sight that nobody below the DG/RPF had recommended for scrapping of the recruitment ; there was no allegation, whatsoever on record that there were complaints that money had a part to play in the recruitment and not even a single instance has come to light that money had changed hands. The DG/RPF by one stroke of pen, in his enthusiasm to re- impose the new procedure for the future recruitment also scrapped the already concluded recruitment. The order passed by the DG/RPF smacks only of subjectivity.
13. I am conscious of the fact that a selection process is not sacrosanct. It can be cancelled, scrapped or annulled if there is concrete and reliable evidence of large scale bungling, malpractice, corruption, favoritism and nepotism of the like of if there is a violation of fundamental procedural requirements. It is true that fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one could come forward to bear the brunt. Nevertheless, there should be wealth of material to take the extreme and drastic step of scrapping the whole recruitment process, particularly when it has reached the final stage. The cancellation or scrapping of the recruitment has very serious repercussions and impact not only on the candidates who have undergone the rigorous of the test but on the general public and the Department itself. It also casts aspersions on the members of the Recruitment Committee. I am constrained to observe that the order of scrapping of the recruitment by the DG/RPF, may not be mala fide but is in utter violation of the established norms and devoid of the considerations fairness and reasonableness. The order is the product of irrelevant considerations and has been passed in a cloistered manner. The fact that there has been non-application of mind to the real question, i.e., of removal of the discrepancies and irregularities, is eloquent of the arbitrariness on the part of the DG/RPF. The recruitment has been doled out in a wholly arbitrary manner."
WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 17 of 32 27/- Mr Jahangir Iqbal, learned senior counsel, lastly prayed that the writ petitions be allowed and the impugned notices be quashed and the respondents be commanded to proceed ahead with the selection already undertaken and draw a merit list accordingly.
28/- On the other hand Mr D. C. Raina, learned Advocate General, appearing for respondent no. 3, while resisting the claim of the petitioners, submits that the impugned cancellation of the selection process does not involve infringement of any legal, statutory or vested right of the petitioners as the selection process had not culminated at the time it was cancelled.
29/- He further submitted that the notification for the selection process in question was issued on 6th October, 2018. He submitted that in terms of Government Order No. 377-F of 2019 dated 04.07.2019 the J&K Bank became a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU).
30/- Learned Advocate General further submitted that when the J&K Bank became a PSU, it had to work with the Government of the time and not independently. He submitted that with the change in character and status of the Bank many changes took place like it came under the ambit of Right to Information Act, it now had to follow the CBC guidelines and the directives from the Finance Department.
31/- He further submitted that there are inherent inconsistencies in the selection process. He submitted that the employees of the Bank are transferred and posted anywhere in the country, therefore, to reflect the recruitment on district basis was bad and incomprehensible.
32/- He submitted further that by raising questions against the action of the respondents whom are the petitioners doubting, the State Administrative Council WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 18 of 32 or the Bank? He submitted further that the order under question has sanctity and it has to be understood as a continuous process. He further submitted that the Chairman is bound by the resolution of the Bank when it comes to Policy decisions.
33/- The learned Advocate General further submitted that the learned senior counsel for the petitioners referred all the judgments out of context. In support of his submissions, the learned Advocate General referred to and relied upon the judgment reported as 2017 (JKJ) (2) 537.
34/- He submitted that no legal, statutory, fundamental or constitutional right of the petitioners is infringed; therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. He submitted further that the selection process can be abandoned at any stage if the competent authority is satisfied that such a course is required to be adopted in the circumstances.
35/- Learned Advocate General further submitted that the objective sought to be achieved by the withdrawal of the selection process was to have an effective, fair and transparent method of selection that is consistent with the Rules and regulations.
36/- He further submitted that the impugned decision has been taken after proper application of mind which is fully corroborated by the records. He, therefore, sought dismissal of the writ petitions.
37/- Mr Sunil Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Bank, submitted that the Bank initiated the process of recruitment on the basis of district wise requirement but on noticing that the shortlisting of candidates was adhered to district-wise qua applying 40% cut-off as Bench Mark which rendered the whole process as bad in law, the Bank decided to abandon the process. Mr Sethi, learned WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 19 of 32 Senior counsel, further submitted that the status of the Bank qua requirement of employees is based on the principle of one unit, but the allocation of employees is made on requirement basis which does not make the posts as district cadre posts. 38/- Learned senior counsel appearing for the Bank also referred to the decision of the competent authority qua change in the character of the Bank from an autonomous body to a Public Sector Undertaking which is also supported by the learned Advocate General while making reference to the Government Order No. 377-F of 2019 dated 04.07.2019.
39/- It is submitted further that the respondents had no option but to abandon the selection process as certain illegalities/ infirmities/ violation of the Rules qua Reservation was noticed. It is submitted that such cancellation has not caused any prejudice to the rights of the writ petitioners as no indefeasible right had accrued to them by merely participating in the selection process. The submission so raised is supported not only with the stand taken by the Bank in the reply but also in the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court delivered in case titled Radhey Shyam v. Union of India reported as Mannu/ SC/ 0375/1997 which held that district-wise merit list is impermissible being violative of Article 14, 16 and 32 of the Constitution because in zone wise selection procedure, various candidates who appeared in some of zones and secure more marks then those who got selected from other zones having lesser marks would be deprived of their selection, resulting into great injustice and discrimination.
40/- Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there was no point in carrying on with the selection which was not going to withstand the judicial scrutiny. 41/- Learned senior counsel submitted that the infirmity in the selection process vis-à-vis having made a district wise allocation of the posts could have been altered by the Government without upsetting the whole selection process, but insofar as it WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 20 of 32 ignored the application of reservation in the selection process, the same was incurable and there was no scope for correcting the mistake by issuance of a corrigendum. Learned senior counsel further submitted that this being an inherent defect in the selection process it could not have been altered, therefore, a de-novo exercise undertaken by the Bank was a must and there was absolutely no option with the respondents but to go for a new advertisement. 42/- Learned senior counsel further submitted that in case the candidate is ousted from the selection process, then he can question the selection criteria which, however, is not the case with the petitioners as their right of participation is protected.
43/- Learned senior counsel further submitted that one needs to see the stage where the selection process was abandoned; one would be before the selection process concludes; the second is when the process culminates, selection list is issued then the Government decides to cancel the process; and third would be when the appointment orders are issued but persons with less merit are taken. 44/- Learned senior counsel submitted that the case in hand does not fall in category 2 and 3 but in category 1 as the selection process had not culminated and neither selection list was issued nor any appointments were made, therefore, it is submitted that the respondents had the power to cancel it with some reason and there are sufficient reasons that formed basis for cancellation of the process. 45/- Learned senior counsel for the Bank further submitted that the Bank did not change the criteria but only corrected the wrong and by doing so the Bank has enlarged the scope of competition which would fetch better talent and while doing so the right of participation to petitioner is not taken away. WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 21 of 32 46/- Learned senior counsel submitted that in the case in hand there is no merit list framed, therefore, it is a presumptive writ as petitioners are presuming their merit.
47/- In support of his submissions the learned senior counsel referred to and relied upon case law reported as AIR 1991, SC 1612 titled Shankarsan Dash versus Union of India which lays down that mere inclusion in the select list does not confer any right of appointment upon the candidate. 48/- In support of his submission that district wise allocation was bad in the learned senior counsel referred to case law reported as Mannu/SC/0375/ 1997 titled Radhey Shaam versus Union of India and others paragraph no. 8. The relevant paragraph, for facility of reference, is reproduced hereunder:
"8. It is needless to emphasise that the purpose and object behind holding a recruitment examination is to select suitable and best candidates out of the lot and such an object can only be achieved by making a common select list of the successful candidates belonging to all the zones. On the other hand if zone-wise selection is made then various candidates who appeared in some of the zones and secured more marks than those who are selected from other zones would be deprived of their selection resulting into great injustice and consequent discrimination. Thus, there can be said to exist no nexus between the aforesaid process of zone-wise selection and the object to be achieved, that is, the selection of the best candidates. That being so the process of selection as envisaged in paragraph 16 of the advertisement in question and reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment would lead to discriminatory results because by adopting the said process of zone-wise selection would result in the devaluation of merit at the selection examination by selecting a candidate having lesser marks over the meritorious candidate who has secured more marks and consequently the rule Radhey Shyam Singh & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 9 December, 1996 of equal chance for equal marks would be violated. Such a process would not only be against the principles enunciated in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution but it would also result in heart burning and frustration amongst the young men of the country. The rule of equality of opportunity for WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 22 of 32 every individual in the country is an inalienable part of our constitutional guarantee and that being so a candidate who secures more marks than another is definitely entitled to get preference for the job as the merit must be the test when selecting a candidate for recruitment for the posts which are advertised. In the present case admittedly the process of selection as envisaged in paragraph 16 of the advertisement in question is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it has been demonstrated from the marks st of the appellants placed before us at the Bar during the course of arguments that they had secured more marks than those secured by some of the selected candidates."
49/- Learned senior counsel further referred to the judgment delivered in case titled Mohammad Rashid versus The Director, Local Bodies, New Secretariat and others reported as AIR 2020 SC 1075, paragraph no. 12. Relevant paragraph, for facility of reference, is taken note of hereunder:
"12. The appellants who are aspirants for direct recruitment have no right for appointment merely because at one point of time the vacancies were advertised. The candidates such as the appellants cannot claim any right of appointment merely for the reason that they responded to an advertisement published on 12 th September, 2013. Even after completion of the selection process, the candidates even on the merit list do not have any vested right to seek appointment only for the reason that their names appear on the merit list. In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that a candidate seeking appointment to a civil post cannot be regarded to have acquired an indefeasible right to appointment in such post merely because of the appearance of his name in the merit list. This Court held as under:-
"7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 23 of 32 recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in the State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha [(1974) 3 SCC 220 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 488 : (1974) 1 SCR 165] ; Neelima Shangla (Miss) v. State of Haryana [(1986) 4 SCC 268 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 759] or Jitender Kumar v. State of Punjab [(1985) 1 SCC 122: 1985 SCC (L&S) 174: (1985) 1 SCR 899]"
50/- The learned senior counsel further referred to and relied upon the judgments reported as Manu/SC/692/1993 titled Jai Singh Dalal and others versus State of Haryana and others; Manu/JK/219/2016 titled Ateeq-ul-Rehman and others versus Sandeep Sharma and others; Manu/JK/0110/2015 titled Muzaffar Rasool Mir and others versus State and others; paragraphs 14, 15 and 29. Relevant paragraphs are taken note of hereunder:
"14. It is well settled law that the Advertisement Notice does not confer any right on a candidate who responds to the notice, to be considered for advertised post, to ask for finalization of the selection process or a right to oppose withdrawal of the post advertised or resist the abandonment of the selection process. The advertisement is nothing but a notice to the general public regarding availability of advertised vacancies so as to enable the candidates satisfying the eligibility criteria to submit their applications. It signifies the intention of the Selection Body to receive applications for the advertised post and initiate the selection process. It does not vest right for appointment in the candidates) who respond to the Advertisement Notice. It is equally well settled that the Selection Body can at any time withdraw the Advertisement Notice or abandon the selection process or withdraw some of the advertised posts and decide to restrict selection to only some of such posts. A candidate applying for the advertised post is not clothed with right to restrain the Selection Body from withdrawal of Advertisement Notice or abandonment of the selection process.
15. Furthermore, the Competent Authority would be well within its powers to change eligibility criteria after the advertisement is WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 24 of 32 issued and withdraw the advertisement notice. It may thereafter re-advertize the posts earlier advertised, now prescribing the changed eligibility criteria. The candidates, who responded to the earlier notice and become ineligible because of change in Recruitment Rules and therefore ineligible under the new Advertisement Notice, cannot insist that their eligibility should be assessed at the touchstone of old and repealed Recruitment Rules and they allowed to participate in the selection process. The only exception possibly would be where mala fides are alleged and substantiated on part of the employer or Selection Body in taking such decision. Having said so, let us for a while briefly even at the cost of repetition, revisit the facts and thereafter scan the case law on the subject to find out whether the above conclusions are supported by law.
29. Appreciating the case set up by the petitioners on the basis of settled legal principles, it is more than clear that petitioners' claim is bereft of any merit. Merely because petitioners' responded or proposed to respond to earlier Advertisement Notice or were eligible for the advertised posts under unamended rules would not give petitioners a right to insist that they be considered on the basis of unamended rules. In the present case, petitioners were not eligible for the advertised posts in view of Government Order No. 254-HE of 2013, dated 21st May 2013. They successfully challenged the Government order and the Advertisement Notification No. 09-PSC (DR-P) of 2013, dated 23rd May 2013 on the grounds that in absence of necessary amendment of the rules, the eligibility criteria could not be tailored in the manner Government Order dated 21st May 2013 required and as reflected in the Advertisement Notice. Petitioners admittedly did not participate in the selection process and the selection process itself was not initiated pursuant to the Advertisement Notice. The State Government taking clue from the observations made by the High Court while allowing writ petitions bearing SWP Nos. 1288 of 2013 and 1400/2013 amended the rules and issued a fresh Advertisement Notice. The Advertisement Notice earlier issued was withdrawn and the selection process abandoned. In terms of SRO-124 of 2014, dated 21.04.2014, a candidate with M.Phil Degree to be eligible for the post is necessarily to have NET/SET/SLET WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 25 of 32 clearance. Petitioners have only M.Phil Degree to their credit. They have not cleared NET/SET/SLET, and therefore would not be eligible for the advertised posts of Assistant Professor in the Higher Education Department.
51/- Learned senior counsel further referred to and relied upon law reported as Manu/SC/0389/2018 titled M. Ramesh versus Union of India and others. It would be profitable to reproduce paragraph no. 22, hereunder, thus:
"22. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that if the Union is compelled to make the appointments, this will lead to a plethora of litigation where the persons recruited to the IPS between 2013 and 2018 will claim seniority over the persons, who appear in the LCE. We are not going into the merits of the issue but, we can easily visualise the huge amount of litigation which will in all probability ensue, where members of the IPS would be litigating against each other. Such litigation would not be in public good and will achieve no higher purpose. In fact, such litigation may also affect the morale of the officers in the IPS."
52/- Further he referred to judgment reported as Manu/ SC/ 0083/2019 titled The State of Manipur and others versus Takhelmayum Khelendro Meitei and others. Paragraphs 10 and 11 are taken note of below:
"10. The issues that arise for our consideration in this case are:
(i) Whether the Respondents have any indefeasible right for appointment to the posts of Assistant Lineman on the basis of the selections made in the year 1999? (ii) Whether the High Court could have issued a direction for appointment of the Respondents as Junior System Assistants in the posts advertised on 11th May, 2016? 11. In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47, it was held that there is no indefeasible right for appointment merely because a candidate is found fit on the basis of a selection. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment.
Unless the relevant recruitment Rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it was also held in the said judgment that the State does not have any license to act in an arbitrary manner and that WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 26 of 32 the decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. The High Court observed that there is no bona fide reason for the successor entities of the Electricity Department for not appointing the Respondents. Further, the High Court concluded that it was not the stand of the Appellant that the process of recruitment has been scrapped. The policy decision of the Government dated 19th March, 2001 cancelling all the selections that were made earlier and banning any further recruitment was part of the record which could not have been ignored by the High Court. There was sufficient justification for the Government of Manipur to ban recruitment. The Government was compelled to take such decision in view of the financial crisis. The said decision of the Government cannot be said to be arbitrary under any circumstances. The policy decision of the Government of Manipur dated 19 th March, 2001 was bona fide and the Respondents cannot assert any right for appointment on the basis of the selections conducted in the year 1999."
53/- The learned senior counsel lastly referred to a judgment reported as Manu/JK/0036/2002 titled State of Jammu and Kashmir and others versus Altaf Hussain and others; Manu/SC/102/1986 titled Nidamarti Maheshkumar versus State of Maharashtra and others; and Manu/SC/55/1970 titled A. Peeriakaruppan and others versus State of Tamil Nadu and others.
54/- In rebuttal Mr Jahangir Iqbal Ganai, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, submits that Reservation Act insofar as the Jammu and Kashmir State, now a Union Territory, is concerned it has the Act of 2004 known as the Jammu and Kashmir Reservation Act, 2004. Learned Senior Counsel referred to the Advertisement notice of 2015 and to the result notification to indicate that no reservation was followed in the J&K Bank.
55/- Learned senior counsel for the petitioners referred to the objections filed by the Bank to indicate that the Board considered the 'contents' of the letter of WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 27 of 32 Finance Department which is annexed with the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners.
56/- Learned senior counsel further submits that it was never the stand of the Bank or the Union Territory that the selection process was in violation of the Supreme Court judgment, therefore, he submits that what is being said before the Court now does not borne out from the record.
57/- Learned senior counsel further emphasized as to when and how the posts in a selection process are said to be based on district wise recruitment. He submits that in the district wise selection the application forms make a specific mention of having applied for the district cadre post which is missing in the instant case. He submits that the selection process in question, therefore, did not commence as district cadre recruitment.
58/- The learned senior counsel referred to a judgment reported as AIR 1991 SC 101 titled Delhi Transport Corporation versus D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and others and JT 1991 (2) SC 296 titled Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Educational Board versus K. S. Gandhi and others. 59/- Considered the submissions made.
60/- The petitioners before the court are the direct recruitment aspirants having offered their candidature for the post of Probationary Officer and Banking Associates pursuant to the recruitment notification issued by the Respondent Bank in this connection. Subsequent thereto the petitioners, insofar as the post of Probationary Officer is concerned, appeared in and qualified the prelims examination and thereafter appeared in the Mains examination as well. While as the aspirants for the post of Banking Associates appeared in the written examination. Thereafter, instead of declaring the result of the said examination, the WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 28 of 32 Bank scrapped the selection process citing the 'legal infirmity' as reasons of such cancellation.
61/- Aggrieved of such cancellation, the petitioners, the aspirants for the posts in question, challenge the decision of cancelling the selection process on the grounds as taken note of in the foregoing paragraphs.
62/- The respondents neither deny the eligibility of the petitioners nor their participation in the selection process in question. The only dispute that is before the Court for adjudication is vis-à-vis the legality or otherwise of the abandonment of the selection process in the mid-way.
63/- Admittedly the selection process in question for the post of Probationary Officer has been cancelled after conducting prelims and mains examination and the qualified candidates were required to be interviewed only before final selection. While as in case of Banking Associate the requisite examination had been conducted and the selection list was required to be issued only. 64/- Now the following questions are required to be considered:
1. Whether the petitioners have any right of selection/ appointment against the posts advertised and subsequently withdrawn?
2. Whether the respondents were having the authority to cancel the selection process at a stage when the selection process had almost come to an end for one post while as in another it was over and only list was to be drawn?
3. Whether there existed valid reasons which necessitated such a course?
65/- The petitioners have taken a positive stand in their writ petitions which was reiterated by their learned senior counsel while making submissions, that no vested right of selection/ appointment is created in favour of petitioners merely because they participated in the selection process, however, they question the cancellation WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 29 of 32 on the ground that the infirmities or irregularities, if any, in the selection process in question could have been set right by some other administrative means, therefore, the cancellation done was unreasonably.
66/- This stand of the petitioners itself takes care of the first question that the petitioners are not clothed with any right muchless an indefeasible right to seek selection/ appointment against a post which initially had been advertised by the respondents and subsequently withdrawn/ scrapped or cancelled. Therefore, it is held that the petitioners are not having any indefeasible right to seek continuation of the selection process which stood cancelled.
67/- As far as the authority of the respondents to cancel the selection process is concerned, this aspect also stands literally admitted by the petitioners that the respondents had the authority to cancel it but their contention is that it was unwarranted as the defects, if any in the selection process, could have been cured by some other administrative means. The stand of the respondents that the recruitment process in question has gone wrong from its very inception is substantiated by the records. The Bank had gone wrong when it construed the district-wise requirement as district-wise recruitment. It further went on to frame a merit list district-wise, meaning thereby that the conception of one unit policy which is followed in the respondent Bank has been flouted with impunity in the said recruitment process. This irregularity might have had the scope of correction but the respondent Bank had gone further wrong in not offering reservation in the whole process which certainly was incurable, therefore, the Bank was left with no option but to initiate a process ab-initio. This is so because the district-wise merit list could have been redrawn by issuing a corrigendum etc. but insofar as the reservation aspect is concerned, it could not have been set right midway as the allocation of the seats was done and if at all the Bank could have tried to offer reservation to the posts that would have resulted in chaos as many of the WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 30 of 32 candidates who could have otherwise figured in the selection list would have seen exit. Such action was also very likely to be litigated and the respondent Bank in such situation would not have been able to justify its action. The respondents, therefore, had no option but to cancel the whole exercise and go for a fresh one which they did. In this view of the matter it is held that the respondents had the authority to cancel the whole selection process rather than for going to rectify the wrong by keeping the process intact.
68/- Furthermore, it needs no reiteration that since the selection process had not been completed; the petitioners have no right to dispute the decision of the respondents to go for a denovo exercise. It is beaten law of the land that a job aspirant does not have any right to seek appointment even if his name figures in the select list. In the present case, however, the selection process had not even culminated; therefore, the challenge laid to the impugned action of the respondents is impermissible.
69/- The question as to whether the cancellation had reasonableness attached with it, also finds its answer in the above paragraph wherein the court enumerated the whole situation in which the process came to be cancelled. The impugned cancellation, therefore, is held to have had the reasonableness attached with it and it was not arbitrary.
70/- Having said that, the writ petitions are held to be without any merit, therefore, dismissed along with all CM(s). Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated. The respondents shall proceed ahead with the fresh selection process initiated in terms of the impugned advertisement notice. 71/- Parties to bear their own costs.
72/- Registry shall place a copy of this judgment on each file. WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 31 of 32
73/- Records be returned to the respective counsels against proper receipt.
(Ali Mohammad Magrey) Judge Srinagar 22.03.2021 Amjad Lone PS Whether approved for reporting: Yes/ No. AMJAD AHMAD LONE 2021.03.22 16:58 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document WP (C) no. 913/2020 c/w 908/2020 Page 32 of 32