Delhi District Court
Chhote Ali vs State on 27 March, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL
DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-013522-2019
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 386/2019
CHHOTE ALI,
S/o. Shri. Shahzad Ali
R/o. A-124, Aman Vihar,
PS. Sultanpuri,
Delhi. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 30.09.2019
Date of institution : 01.10.2019
Date when judgment was reserved : 21.02.2026
Date when judgment is pronounced : 27.03.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code')/pari materia with Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS') against the judgment dated 30.03.2019 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment'), passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-02/Ld. MM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM'), in case bearing; 'State v. Chhote Ali, Crl. Case No. 27448/2006', arising out of FIR No. 430/2005, PS. Timarpur, under Sections 279/337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A IPC, and the consequent order of sentence dated 30.08.2019 (hereinafter CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 1 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:10:06 +0530 referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by the Ld. Trial Court, awarding the appellant; simple imprisonment for a period of 06 (six) months for the offence under Section 279 IPC; and simple imprisonment for a period of 01 (one) year and 06 (six) months (18 (eighteen) months) for the offence under Section 304A IPC, sentences to run concurrently. Further, the appellant was directed to pay fine of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand only), out of which, Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) was directed to be paid as compensation to the legal representatives/LRs of the deceased and the balance amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), to be deposited in court. Correspondingly, it was directed that in default of payment of the said fine amount, the appellant would undergo, further simple imprisonment for a period of 03 (three) months only. (hereinafter impugned judgment and impugned order are collectively referred to as the 'impugned judgment and order').
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution against the appellant is that on 13.09.2005, on receipt of PCR call vide DD No 21A regarding road accident, the concerned police officials proceeded for the spot of accident, i.e., Burari Chowk, Outer Ring Road, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'spot'), where one scooter bearing registration no. DL-8SE-9272 and truck bearing registration no. DL-1GB-0747 (hereinafter referred to as the 'offending vehicle') were found in accidental condition. Correspondingly, it was determined by the police officials/IO that the victim had been shifted to Trauma Centre. Consequently, the concerned police official(s) proceeded for the said Trauma Centre, where the victim was found under treatment vide MLC No. 67699/05 and determined to be 'unfit for statement' at that point CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 2 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:10:10 +0530 in time. Concomitantly, the complainant, namely, Sunil Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant') was also found present at the Trauma Centre, who tendered his statement. Markedly, the statement of the complaint was recorded at that point in time, wherein the complainant inter alia proclaimed that on the said day, i.e., on 13.09.2005, he/the complainant along with his wife/victim, Kiran were returning from the complainant's in- laws' house in Bhalaswa Dairy to their house on the complainant's scooter bearing registration no. DL-8SE-9272. As per the complainant at that point in time, he/the complainant was driving the said scooter, whilst the victim was a pillion rider on the said scooter. The complainant further avowed under his statement that at around 06:15 p.m., they had reached at Burari Chowk and he/the complainant had stopped his said vehicle at the red light. It was further chronicled under the complainant's complaint that suddenly one truck bearing registration no. DL-1GB-0747, approached from behind in a rash and negligent manner and hit the complainant's scooter from behind. As per the complainant, his scooter and they/complainant and the victim fell down and the victim came under the impact of the offending vehicle, sustaining multiple injuries on various body parts. Further, as per the complainant, thereupon, the driver of the said truck approached them and observed the consequences of said impact. However, it was asserted by the complainant that upon seeking them/the complainant and the victim, the said driver fled from the spot. 2.1. Relevantly, under the aforesaid facts and circumstances and on the basis of the complainant's complaint, the instant FIR came to be registered for the offences under Sections 279/337 IPC and the investigation ensued. Noticeably, during the CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 3 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:10:23 +0530 course of ensuing investigation, the complainant got the site plan of the incident spot prepared and the appellant was apprehended in the instant case. Correspondingly, it was determined during the course of the ongoing investigation that the victim, Kiran had succumbed to her injuries, whereupon Section 304A IPC was added in the instant case and the postmortem examination of the deceased's body was got conducted. The concerned IO further obtained the mechanical inspection reports qua the offending vehicle as well as the aforesaid scooter conducted. Subsequently, statements of various witnesses were recorded and eventually, on conclusion of investigation and on the basis of the material collected, the concerned police official/IO, filed the chargesheet before the Ld. Trial Court.
2.2. Markedly, upon such chargesheet being filed, Ld. Trial Court took cognizance of offences, specified under the chargesheet. Concurrently, upon compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C. and on arguments on the aspect of notice having been addressed by/on behalf of the State and the appellant, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 25.06.2009, directed framing of notice, against the appellant for the offences under Sections 279/304A IPC, inter alia under the following observations;
"...Heard on notice.
Notice is made out.
Heard on notice. Notice is given to the accused to which he had pleaded not guilty. Let PW... be summoned for ..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Apposite here to further reproduce the relevant extracts of notice dated 25.06.2009, served upon/framed against CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 4 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:10:30 +0530 the appellant, as under;
"...I, ***, MM, Delhi do hereby serve you Chotte Ali S/o. Sh. Sahzad Ali with the following notice:- That on 13.09.2005 at about 6.15 PM at Burari Chowk Ring Road, within the jurisdiction of PS. Timarpur you while driving truck No. DL1 GB 0747 in a manner so rash or negligent so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others and you thereby committed an offence punishable U/s. 279 IPC and within the cognizance of this court. Secondly, on the aforesaid date, time and place while so driving the aforesaid vehicle in the aforesaid manner you struck against Two wheeler no. DL 8SE 9272 and caused death not amounting to culpable homicide of Kiran and you thereby committed an offence punishable U/s. 304A IPC and within the cognizance of this court.
Show cause why you should not be punished for the aforesaid offence by this court..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.4. Significantly, during the course of trial, prosecution examined 11 (eleven) witnesses/prosecution witnesses, who deposed in their respective testimonies, regarding the following;
Prosecution Particulars of Description witness no. the witness PW-1 Rajinder Brother of the deceased, who inter Kumar alia deposed regarding the identification of the body of the deceased in Trauma Centre.
PW-2 Sunil Kumar Complainant/eyewitness of the incident. Deposed inter alia regarding the incident in question as well as identified the appellant as the perpetrator of offence.
PW-3 HC Sanjay Deposed regarding him inter alia reaching at the spot with IO/ASI Virender and of him getting the FIR registered in the police station, at the instructions of the IO.
PW-4 Retd. ASI/Tech. Conducted the mechanical
Devender inspection of the offending vehicle
Kumar and scooter bearing no.
DL-8SE-9272 and proved the
reports regarding the same.
CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 5 of 51
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27
16:10:35 +0530
PW-5 ASI Jagdish Deposed of him receiving
Chandra information regarding accident at
Burari Chowk and converting the
same to DD No. 21A.
PW-6 HC Manoj Deposed of him receiving
Kumar information regarding demise of the
victim, Kiran and converting the
same to DD No. 3A.
PW-7 Dr. K. Goyal Deposed of him conducting the
postmortem examination of the
deceased, Kiran and proved the said
report as Ex. PW7/A.
PW-8 Retd. ASI Eyewitness of the incident, inter
Devender alia deposed of the incident in
Mohanjeet question.
Singh
PW-9 Retd. SI Investigating Officer in the present
Virender Singh case. Conducted investigation.
PW-10 Rajesh Kumar Record Clerk from Sushruta Trauma
Centre, produced and proved the
death summary and death certificate
of the deceased/victim, Kiran.
PW-11 Dr. Vikas Deposed inter alia regarding him
Rampal preparing MLC of the victim and
proved the said MLC as Ex.
PW11/A.
2.5. Pertinent to note here that the aforenoted
witnesses/prosecution witnesses further exhibited/proved the following documents and objects, during the course of their respective evidence;
Exhibit Description of Exhibit Proved
no./Material by/Attested by
objects
Ex. PW1/A Body/dead body of the victim's, PW-1/Rajinder
handing over memo. Kumar
Ex. P1(Colly.) Photographs of the offending PW-2/Sunil
vehicle/truck bearing Kumar
registration no. DL-1GB-0747.
Ex. P2/A Complaint/statement of the PW-2/Sunil
complainant, PW-2 (tehrir). Kumar
Ex. P2/B Arrest memo of the appellant. PW-2/Sunil
Kumar
Ex. PW3/A Seizure memo of offending PW-3/HC Sanjay
vehicle.
Ex. PW3/B Personal search memo of the PW-3/HC Sanjay
appellant.
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Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27
16:10:41 +0530
Ex. PW3/C Seizure memo of the driving PW-3/HC Sanjay
license produced by the
appellant.
Ex. PW3/D Seizure memo of the scooter PW-3/HC Sanjay
bearing no. DL-8SE-9272.
Ex. PW4/A Mechanical inspection report of PW-4/ASI (Retd.)
scooter bearing registration no. Devender Kumar DL-8SE-9272.
Ex. PW4/B Mechanical inspection report of PW-4/ASI (Retd.) truck bearing registration no. Devender Kumar DL-1GB-0747.
Ex. P4(Colly.) Photographs of the scooter PW-8/Retd. ASI
bearing registration no. Devender
DL-8SE-9272. Mohanjeet Singh
Ex. PW5/A DD No. 21A, pertaining to PW-5/ASI
information of accident at Burari Jagdish Chandra Chowk.
Ex. PW5/B Copy of FIR No. 430/2005 under PW-5/ASI
Sections 279/337 IPC. Jagdish Chandra
Ex. PW5/C DD No. 3A pertaining to demise PW-5/ASI
of the victim, Kavita. Jagdish Chandra
Ex. PW7/A Postmortem examination report PW-7/Dr. K.
of the deceased/victim, namely, Goyal
Kiran.
Ex. PW8/A Order of concerned Dy. PW-8/Retd. ASI
Commissioner of police Devender
regarding destruction of old Mohanjeet Singh record PCR from 01.07.2005 to 30.06.2006.
Ex. PW8/B Certificate regarding destruction PW-8/Retd. ASI
of old record PCR from Devender
01.07.2005 to 30.06.2006. Mohanjeet Singh Ex. PW9/A Rukka prepared by PW-9. PW-9/Retd. SI Virender Singh Ex. PW9/B Site plan of the incident spot. PW-9/Retd. SI Virender Singh Ex. PW9/C Dead body identification memo. PW-9/Retd. SI and Virender Singh Ex. PW9/D Ex. PW10/A Death certificate of the deceased, PW-10/Rajesh Kiran. Kumar Ex. PW-10/B Death summary of the deceased, PW-10/Rajesh Kiran. Kumar Ex. PW11/A MLC of the deceased/victim, PW-11/Dr. Vikas namely, Kiran. Rampal 2.6. Markedly, on conclusion of prosecution evidence, statement of the appellant, under Sections 313 Cr.P.C. was CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 7 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:11:05 +0530 recorded on 17.12.2018, wherein the appellant opted to lead evidence in his defence. Consequently, the appellant adducted Sh. Bal Govind as DW-1 and the evidence of the appellant was, thereafter, closed on 25.03.2019 on the appellant's statement to the said effect. Subsequently, on conclusion of arguments on behalf of the appellant as well as by State, as aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and order, while holding the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A IPC, sentenced him in the manner, as noted hereinabove.
3. Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant vehemently contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment and order are against all cannons of law and facts of the case, as well as in gross contravention of the principles of natural justice. It was further contended by the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not appreciate the facts of the present case as well as failed to consider that the prosecution was unable to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant, while passing the said judgment/order. As per the Ld. Amicus Curiae, while reaching the finding of appellant's guilt, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the 'so called' eyewitness of the incident PW-8, admitted in his cross examination that he could not see the driver of the offending vehicle as he had already fled from the spot. Ergo, under such circumstances, as per Ld. Amicus Curiae, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the prosecution has not been able to link the appellant as the perpetrator of the offence, making CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 8 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:11:12 +0530 the appellant's conviction per se, bad in law. Correspondingly, it was argued by Ld. Amicus Curiae that even proper weightage/consideration was not accorded to the deposition of DW-1/Bal Govind, who proclaimed that when he reached at the spot of occurrence, incident has already occurred and that the police, instead of apprehending the actual perpetrator of offence, falsely implicated the appellant in the instant case. Further, as per Ld. Amicus Curiae despite a thorough cross examination of DW-1, prosecution has not been able to belie the deposition of DW-1, rendering the entire story of the prosecution against the appellant, nugatory and false. Further, as per Ld. Amicus Curiae the 'so called' eyewitness of the alleged incident has been unable to attribute specific role to the appellant in the instant case, besides the prosecution has been unable to prove its case against the appellant beyond a pale of doubt. In this regard, Ld. Amicus Curiae further vehemently asserted that there are material contradictions and improvements in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, discrediting the said witnesses and making the presence of the said witnesses at the spot itself doubtful, thereby, rendering their testimonies unreliable. It was further submitted by the Ld. Amicus Curiae that the prosecution made no endeavor to join any public witnesses, despite the incident having allegedly taken place at a public spot, in open gaze and further despite that fact that none of the prosecution witnesses have been able to prove appellant's culpability. 3.1. Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider the fact that the appellant was not apprehended at the alleged spot of occurrence, rather, subsequently, creating doubt in the presence or complicity of the CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 9 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:11:17 +0530 appellant in the alleged incident. Congruently, as per Ld. Amicus Curiae the said fact further proves that PW-8 is a stock witness of the police station, deployed to falsely rope in the appellant in the present case. As per Ld. Amicus Curiae despite there being serious lacunae, omissions, improvements and contradictions in the version of various prosecution witnesses, the Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider and discuss the said facts in the impugned judgment. Even otherwise, Ld. Amicus Curiae submitted that the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that no accident took place with the 'so called' offending vehicle. As per the Ld. Amicus Curiae, Ld. Trial Court also erred in considering that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the case and the police illegally involved the offending vehicle, despite the fact that the appellant was neither involved in the alleged accident, nor driving the said vehicle in a negligence manner or with high speed.
Correspondingly, Ld. Amicus Curiae reiterated that there are several contradictions in the statements/depositions of prosecution witnesses. Further, as per Ld. Amicus Curiae the Ld. Trial failed to appreciate that none of prosecution witnesses, corroborated the version put forth by other and the testimony of PW-8 is not supported by other prosecution witnesses. As per Ld. Amicus Curiae, the Ld. Trial Court convicted the appellant on presumptions and assumption, without there being any direct or indirect evidence against the appellant in the instant case. 3.2. Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant further submitted that under the facts and circumstances brought forth as well as the material placed on record, it was not within the domain and/or jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court to attribute guilt on the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case. Further, as CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 10 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:11:23 +0530 per the Ld. Amicus Curiae even the necessary mens rea necessary for bringing home culpability against the appellant has not proved by the prosecution. As per the Ld. Amicus Curiae, the Ld. Trial Court erred in presuming rashness/negligence in the instant case, that too on the basis of deficit/insufficient evidence. Accordingly, Ld. Amicus Curiae submitted that not only did the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the truth of circumstances and passed its judgment in haste, rather, did not properly appreciate/examine the facts of the present case, wrongly holding the appellant guilty of the aforementioned offences. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Amicus Curiae that the order of sentence was also passed by the Ld. Trial Court, whimsically, while failing to appreciate that the appellant was of young age at the relevant point in time, as well as responsible for the look after and take care of his family members. Ld. Counsel further vehemently argued that the punishment/penalty must not be retributive in nature, rather, humanizing, considering that sentencing an accused/convict with severe sentence would subject his family members to grave depravity. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, substantial time has lapsed since the incident in question, with the appellant's facing rigors of litigation since the year, 2005 and in case, necessary relaxation/leniency is not afforded to the appellant, serious/severe repercussions may ensue to the appellant and his family members' physical and mental well-being. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant inter alia prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the impugned judgment and order be set aside.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 11 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:11:28 +0530 Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents. Ld. Addl. PP for the State further submitted that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have been not only consistent, rather, immaculate as well as lucidly point out towards the only inference of appellant's guilt. In this regard, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that it is settled law that conviction of an accused can be based even on the testimony of a sole witness if it inspires confidence, which in the instant case is sufficiently established from the unwavering testimonies of PW-2/complainant, PW-8 and other prosecution witnesses. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the facts and circumstances put forth as well as the evidence placed on record, unerringly point out towards the guilt of the appellant and that no fault can be attributed to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court, which is based on proper appreciation of facts as well as law. Further, as per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State even the order of sentence was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, after due appreciation of the facts of the present case, judicial dictates and other mitigating and aggravating factors in the instant case. As per Ld. Addl. PP for the State, considering the manner in which the offence was committed in the instant case, no relaxation can be afforded in favor of the appellant. Accordingly, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the outset, as grossly malicious and devoid of merits.
5. The arguments of Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record and other material brought on record, thoroughly perused.
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6. At the outset, this Court deems it apposite at outrightly enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court1 in Atley v. State of U.P., (1955) 2 SCC 45, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the 'scope and ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction, inter alia noted as under;
"9. ... It is also well settled that the Court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207: AIR 1952 SC 52]; Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 SCC 898: AIR 1953 SC 122]. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions...."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Congruently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narendra Bhat v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 785, iterated in respect of the foregoing as under;
"3. This Court has in a series of judgments held that a court exercising appellate power must not only consider questions of law but also questions of fact and in doing so it must subject the evidence to a critical scrutiny. The judgment of the High Court must show that the Court really applied its mind to the facts of the case as particularly when the offence 1 Reference further made to; Padam Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC 621.
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alleged is of a serious nature and may attract a heavy punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the foregoing judicial dictates it is perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction extends to re-appreciation of the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, is not only required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach at a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law2 that non-re-appreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even an accused. Needless to re-emphasize that an appellate court is to be further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that such a presumption is neither strengthened by acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court.
9. Therefore, being cognizant of the aforesaid principles, however, before proceeding further with the appreciation of the merits of the case(s) at hand, as well as rival contentions of/on behalf of the parties, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
"279. Rash driving or riding on a public way- Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to 2 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.
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any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** *** 304-A. Causing death by negligence-Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Relevantly, from a perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is observed that the essential ingredients3 to constitute an offence punishable under Section 279 IPC inter alia are that there must be, "rash and negligent driving or riding on a public way and the act must be so as to endanger human life or be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person." Concurrently, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ras Bihari Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC Online Del 12290, while explicating the ingredients of the provisions/ offence(s) under Sections 279/304A IPC inter alia observed as under;
"9. To constitute an offence under Section 279 IPC, it must be shown that the person was driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. Criminal negligence or criminal rashness is an important element of the offence under Section 279 IPC.
*** *** ***
11. In a road accident case, to convict a person for the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC, the prosecution is required to bring on record the basic requirement of the said Section i.e. "Rash or Negligent Act" with following conditions:
1) There must be death of the person in question;
2) that the accused must have caused such death; and
3) that such act of the accused was rash or negligent and that it did not amount to culpable homicide.3
Vinod Kumar v. State, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4347.
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13. Section 304A which deals with unintentional death caused by doing any rash or negligent act of the offender. The applicability of this Section is limited to rash or negligent acts which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. To bring an offence within the ambit of Section 304A, the prosecution is required to bring on record that the act was done by an accused and the death was caused due to rash and negligent act."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Quite evidently, in order to sustain conviction under the provisions under Section 279 and Section 304A IPC, the prosecution is inter alia required to prove that the driver of the offending vehicle/the accused was driving the same in a rash or negligent manner and further by doing such an act, rashly or negligent, the offender endangered human life or caused death of any person, respectively. Demonstrably, rashness or negligence is one of the key ingredients as well as common4 elements to constitute the offences under the said provisions. Ergo, unless the aforesaid 'basic ingredients' are proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, no criminal liability can be attributed to an accused. As a corollary, there must be proof that the rash or negligent act of accused was the proximate cause of the incident in question and, in particular, for the offence under Section 304A IPC, there must be proof that death of the deceased, resulted due to such an act of an accused. Apposite at this stage to further make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Hussain v. State of A.P., (1972) 3 SCC 18, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the contours of the words, 'rash(ness)' and 'negligent(ce)', noted as under;
4Adwait Surendra Aatre v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 473.
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"7. It is against this background we have to see whether the appellant was either rash or negligent. Rashness consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. This definition of criminal rashness and criminal negligence given by Straight, J. in Empress v. Idu Beg [(1881) 3 All 776] has been adopted by this Court in Bhalchandra Waman Pethe v. State of Maharashtra [Cri A No 62 of 1965, decided on 20-11-1967: 1968 SCD 198]..."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in H.W. Smith v. King-Emperor, 1925 SCC Online Cal 128, in a similar context, observed on an earlier occasion, as under;
"... Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury but without intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequence. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted..."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Ergo, it is quite comprehensible5 that negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations, which ordinarily 5 Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284.
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regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In contrast, a rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. In fact, it is a settled law6, "Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is the species." Further, rashness consists7 in overhasty act, with the criminality lying in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Needless to reiterate, to bring home the conviction of an accused, in particular, of the appellant in the instant case, it is imperative for prosecution to establish said mens rea beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant/accused.
14. Consequently, being wary of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed with the appreciation of the material placed on record, in order to determine 'whether the prosecution has been able to prove its case/charges under Sections 279/304A IPC against the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case?' In particular, to determine whether the finding of appellant's guilt can be reached beyond a pale of doubt in the instant case, in light of the facts and circumstances as well as material brought forth, as has been determined by the Ld. Trial Court. However, in order to do so, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly refer to the deposition of PW-2/Sunil Kumar, who deposed about the incident in question and the role of the appellant herein. Relevantly, as per PW-2, on 13.09.2005, he along with his wife, namely, Kiran were returning to their home from complainant's sasural/in-laws' house in scooter bearing no. DL-8SE-9272 via outer ring road.
6Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 269.
7Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P., (2000) 7 SCC 72.
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Correspondingly, as per PW-2, he was driving the said scooter, while his wife was a pillion rider. It was further deposed by PW-2 that when they arrived at the red light Burari Chowk at around 06:00-06:30 p.m., and he/the complainant stopped his scooter, one truck bearing registration no. DL-1GB-0747 reached from behind and struck the complainant's scooter from behind. PW-2 also avowed that the driver of the said truck was driving the truck in a rash and negligent manner and also that his/complainant's scooter fell down as well as his/complainant's wife immediately fell on the impact of accident. Congruently, as per PW-2, after some distance, he along with his scooter fell down on the left side and after falling from the scooter, PW-2's wife got rolled down on the tyres of the said truck/offending vehicle. Thereafter, as per PW-2, the rear wheel of the truck turned over the said victim's leg and thereafter, the vehicle stopped. PW-2 further avowed that the driver of the offending vehicle was Chhote Ali, the appellant herein, who was also correctly identified by PW-2 before the Ld. Trial Court. Remarkably, PW-2 also proclaimed that he saw the appellant at the spot as he was trying to escape and the persons present there, apprehended him. Further, PW-2 asserted that the body of his wife got entangled in the wheel of the truck and thereafter, he/PW-2 along with local persons present at the spot, started pushing back the truck so as to retrieve the body. Thereafter, as per PW-2, the PCR van present nearby, came to the spot and took his/PW-2's wife and him/PW-2 to Trauma Centre. Congruently, PW-2 proclaimed that IO/ASI Virender Singh reached in the Hospital and recorded PW-2's statement (Ex. PW2/A). It was further asserted by PW-2 that after the postmortem examination of his/PW-2's wife, her dead body was handed over CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 19 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:12:11 +0530 to them vide memo, Ex. PW1/A and the appellant was also arrested vide memo Ex. PW2/B. Significantly, during his cross examination, PW-2 further identified his scooter as well as the offending vehicle from their respective photographs.
15. Markedly, upon being cross-examined by/on behalf of the appellant, PW-28, asserted as under;
"XXXXXX Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for Accused. There was less traffic on the road. I was driving my vehicle and was in front of the vehicle. The accident had occurred at the red light. At this stage, attention of witness drawn to the site plan EX.PW9/B. I was coming from the side of Bhalswa Dairy shown in the site plan from point D and going towards the point G. I was present at point P2 shown in the site plan which was middle of the road. I had not seen when truck hit against our vehicle. I also fell down on the road. Public persons gathered at the spot. Police officials also came at the spot. Police did not take statement of any public persons. Again said. I do not know whether statement was recorded or not. I did not medically examined because I sustained minor injuries. Vol. When the truck was behind us, my wife told me that truck was coming to us and driver is just trying to hit from behind. Truck driver pushed us once and thereafter I saw behind at driver of the truck. The second push/hit occurred from behind after 2-3 second impact of one hit. I had disclosed about the said first hit to the IO of the case, I am 12th pass. At this stage, the attention of the witness drawn to the statement recorded on dated 13.09.2005 which is already EX.PW2/A. Confronted with the statement where the fact about first hit before second was not mentioned in statement and same was disclosed by my wife to me dated 13.09.2005. I also tried to beat the accused but due to injury to my wife, I could not do so. Public persons had beaten the accused. There were 8-10 public persons on the spot who had given beating to the accused. Confronted with the statement EX.PW2/A where it is not so written. The accused truck driver fled from the 8 Notably, the right to further cross-examine PW-2 by/at the behest of the appellant was closed by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 22.10.2018 inter alia noting, "...PW Sunil Kumar is summoned for his cross examination but the main counsel for accused is absent.*** Ld. Proxy Counsel seeks adjournment but adjournment is not possible as PW-2 has been summoned on application moved u/s. 311 Cr.P.C. by the accused. The right of the accused to cross examine the witness PW-2 is closed...". Relevantly, the said order remained unchallenged and had since attained finality.
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spot when I along with public persons was trying to take out my wife from under the truck. I was conscious. I did not sustain injury due to this reason, I was not medically examined because I sustained minor injuries. I did not have word with the accused driver. Police officials came at the spot within 2-3 minutes. I do not know who made call to the number
100. vol. The PCR van stationed near the spot. PCR van took my wife and shifted her to the trauma center and at that time, I was with her. Police did not take photographs of the place of the incident. Police officials did not record my statement or of the public witness. It is wrong to suggest that I was not present at the spot at the time of incident. It is wrong to suggest that I had not seen the accused driver at the spot..."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Germane for the purposes of the present discourse to make a reference to the testimony of PW-8/Retd. ASI Devender Mohanjeet Singh deposed that on 13.09.2005, he was posted at Head Constable at PCR Van Sugar VI-1 as an In-charge, with his duty hours from 08:00 am to 08:00 pm. At about 06:15 p.m., as per PW-8, he was present at Burari Chowk (base) and noticed that one person was on scooter bearing no. DL-8SE-9272, who was proceeding from GT Karnal Road and proceeding toward ISBT and in the meantime, one truck bearing no. DL-1GB-0747, hit the said scooter from behind. PW-8 further proclaimed that the said truck driver was driving the said truck at very high speed and hit the aforesaid scooter as soon as it stopped on the red light. Further, as per PW-8, the scooter driver and the female pillion driver, thereof, fell down on the road and when he/PW-8 reached at the spot, the truck driver had fled away, leaving the truck at the spot. PW-8 further avowed that he called at the police control room and disclosed the incident. It was further asserted by PW-8 that the lady sustained severe injuries and he/PW-8 took both the injured into his PCR as well as shifted them at Trauma center where Duty CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 21 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:12:22 +0530 Constable Manoj was present. In the meantime, as per PW-8, he got busy in another PCR call and returned. PW-8 further asserted that the said accident occasioned due to the fault of the truck driver as he was driving the truck in rash and negligent manner. Correspondingly, PW-8 asserted that the said scooter was already stopped by the driver thereof, as it was red light. PW-8 correctly identified the said scooter and the offending vehicle from their respective photographs, Ex. P4 (Colly.) and Ex. P1 (Colly.). Further PW-8 also proved the order of the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police regarding destruction of old record PCR from 01.07.2005 to 30.06.2006 along with certificate as Ex. PW 8/A and Ex. PW 8/B. Relevantly, upon being cross-examined by/on behalf of the appellant, PW-8, asserted as under;
"XXXXXX by accused.
The PCR Van was stationed on the other side of red light. It is correct that I saw the incident after hearing the noise of the collusion between the above said vehicle. It is correct that I could not see the driver of the offending vehicle as he had already fled away from the spot. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely.."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Here, this Court deems it further pertinent to make reference to the deposition of PW-4/ASI (Retd.) Devender Kumar, who deposed that he was grade-I mechanic and, had pursued a specialized courses in automobile and vehicle mechanic from ITI as well as various vehicles manufacturing companies. PW-4 further proclaimed to have an experience of around thirty-five years at the relevant point in time. Correspondingly, as per PW-4, on 14.09.2005, he mechanically inspected scooter bearing registration no. DL-8SE-9272 and Tata truck bearing registration no. DL-1GB-0747 on the request of IO/ASI Virender Singh from CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 22 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:12:27 +0530 PS. Timarpur. As per PW-4, the said vehicle were inspected at PS. Timarpur itself and the said vehicles were determined to be fit for road test. PW-4 further proved his detailed report regarding the said inspection as Ex. PW4/A and Ex. PW4/B, respectively. Pertinently, during the course of his cross-examination, PW-4 proclaimed, as under;
"XXXXXX by ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. I took about 40-45 minutes in inspecting the vehicles at about 09.00 AM to 10.00 AM on 14.09.2005. 1 came from my residence Ashok Vihar for inspecting the vehicles at Police Station Timar Pur."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Germane for the purpose of the present discourse to refer to the deposition of PW-11/Dr. Vikas Rampal, Medical Superintendent, Deep Chand Bandhu Hospital, who deposed that on 13.09.2005, he was posted at Sushruta Trauma Hospital as CMO (NFSG) and on the said day, one patient, namely, Kiran was brought to the Hospital with alleged history of road traffic accident/RTA. PW-11 further asserted that he medically examined the said patient and prepared her MLC, Ex. PW11/A, wherein it was inter alia noted, "...1). Patient was gasping and her radial pulse was not palpable.*** 2). Suspected fracture mandible, chest compression test positive, pelvic test positive and suspected fracture left humorous and crush injury with De-gloving injury right foot...". Correspondingly, as per PW-11, the said patient was not fit for giving statement at that point in time. Relevantly, in his cross examination, PW-11 affirmed as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
The injuries were fresh. I cannot say about the exact timing of the same can be known from postmortem report of the deceased. The MLC CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 23 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:12:32 +0530 EX.PW11/A was prepared simultaneously during the medical examination.
Q. How much time did it take to prepare the MLC?
Ans. 2-3 minutes.
The whole MLC was prepared by me. These type of cumulative injuries can never be caused by fall, most definitely because of an accident and unlikely by beating."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Conspicuously, PW-7/Dr. K. Goyal avowed in his testimony that on 14.09.2005, he was posted at Aruna Asaf Ali Hospital as SMO and on that day, one dead body of Kiran was put before him/PW-7 for conducting postmortem examination. As per PW-7, the dead body was brought by ASI Virender Singh and same was identified by him/ASI Virender Singh. PW-7 further asserted that he conducted postmortem examination on the dead body as well as proved his detailed report/postmortem report in this regard as Ex. PW7/A. It was further opined by PW-7 during his deposition that the cause of death of the said deceased was, "...combined effect of asphyxia and hemorrhagic shock consequent upon Chest and lungs injuries. All injuries were ante mortem in nature caused by blunt force impact...". Congruently, reference is made to the deposition of PW-10/Rajesh Kumar, who proclaimed that he was working as a record clerk at Sushruta Trauma Centre since April year 2000 and that Dr. Dev Kumar had already left the services of the said Hospital. PW-10 nevertheless asserted that he had worked with the said Doctor as well as seen him sign and writing the documents. PW-10, consequently, proved the death summary as well as death certificate of the deceased, Kiran bearing CR no. 27828, as prepared by Dr. Dev Kumar as Ex. PW10/A and Ex. PW10/B. Pertinently, though, PW-7 and CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 24 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:12:36 +0530 PW-10 were offered for cross examination to the appellant, however, the appellant failed to cross examine the said witnesses.
20. Here, this Court deems it pertinent to make reference to the deposition of PW-3/HC Sanjay, who proclaimed that on 13.09.2005, he was posted at PS. Timarpur and on that day, on receipt of call at 06:25 pm, regarding an accident at Burari Chowk, he along with ASI Virender went to the spot. Correspondingly, as per PW-3, at the spot, they found one scooter bearing no. DL-8S-9272 and truck bearing no. DL-1GB-0747 in accidental condition. PW-3 further asserted that he was left at the spot and the IO/ASI Virender went to Trauma Center and then returned to the spot, post recording of the statement of the complainant. It was also asserted by PW-3 that on the IO's handing over tehrir to him, he/PW-3 got the FIR registered and handed over the copy of FIR and original tehrir to the IO, upon return from the police station. PW-3 also avowed that the IO seized the offending vehicle/truck, vide memo Ex. PW3/A and in the meanwhile, the appellant, who was correctly identified by PW-3 before the Ld. Trial Court, is also asserted to have returned to the spot along with the owner of the said vehicle, who was arrested on the identification of the witness, Sunil vide memo Ex. PW2/B. PW-3 further proved the personal search memo (Ex. PW3/B) of the appellant, seizure memo of appellant's driving license (Ex. PW3/C), and the seizure memo of the said scooter (Ex. PW3/D). PW-3 also proclaimed that thereafter, the said truck, scooter and the appellant were brought back to the police station and the case property deposited in the malkhana. Congruently, PW-3 asserted that the appellant was also identified as the driver of offending vehicle by the owner of the said truck. Pertinently, PW-3 was not cross examined by/on behalf CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 25 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:12:40 +0530 of the appellant, despite opportunity. Congruently, PW-5/ASI Jagdish Chandra corroborated the version of PW-3, in so far as it relates to the registration of FIR No. 430/05 under Sections 279/337 IPC, the instant FIR, on receipt of rukka from PW-3, as sent by IO/ASI Virender. PW-5 further proved the copy of said FIR as Ex. PW5/A as well as DD No. 21A (Ex. PW5/A) pertaining to the information of the present accident and DD No. 3A (Ex. PW5/C), pertaining to the information of the death of victim, Kiran. Needless to mention that even PW-5 was not cross- examined by the accused, despite opportunity. Pertinent to further note that PW-6/HC Manoj Kumar deposed that on 14.09.2005, at around 12:10 a.m., he received an information regarding the demise of Kiran W/o. Sunil Kumar, which was informer to the duty officer telephonically by him/PW-6 vide DD No. 3A.
21. Correspondingly, reference is made to the deposition of PW-9/IO/ASI (Retd.) Virender, who testified that on 13.09.2005, he was posted at PS. Timarpur as ASI and on the said day, DD No. 21A was handed over to him by the Duty Officer regarding accident at Burari Chowk. Consequently, as per PW-9, he along with Ct. Sanjay Kumar went to the spot i.e. Burari Chowk, Outer Ring Road, where one accidental scooter bearing no. DL-8SE-9272 and one offending truck bearing no.
DL-1GB-0747 was lying ahead of chowk. PW-9 further asserted that there was no eyewitness at the spot and he came to know that the injured had already been taken to the Trauma Center. Consequently, PW-9 asserted that he left Ct. Sanjay at the spot and went to the Trauma Center, where the MLC of injured, Kiran was collected, and she was opined to be not fit for statement. It was further avowed by PW-9 that victim's husband, Sunil Kumar met CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 26 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:12:45 +0530 him/PW-9 at Hospital and he stated himself to be an eyewitness and driver of the accidental scooter. PW-9 further proclaimed that he recorded the statement of the complainant (Ex. PW 2/A) and returned to the spot and prepared the rukka (Ex. PW 9/A). PW-9 further asserted that he handed over the rukka to Ct. Sanjay for the registration of FIR and in the meantime, the complainant Sunil Kumar came at the spot, at whose instance site plan (Ex. PW 9/B) was prepared and he/the complainant, as per PW-9 pointed out at the appellant, who disclosed that he/the appellant was the driver of the offending truck, who was also correctly identified by PW-9 before the Ld. Trial Court. It was further avowed by PW-9 that he apprehended the appellant, and in the meanwhile, Ct. Sanjay returned to the spot and handed over the copy of FIR as well as original rukka to him/PW-9. PW-9 further proved the arrest and personal search proceedings of the accused as well as seizure of the offending vehicle as well as the scooter involved in accident, and their respective memos. PW-9 also testified that he seized the driving license of the appellant vide memo Ex. PW3/C as well as asserted that he deposited the case property in malkhana. As per PW-9, he got mechanically examined both the vehicle and received the information vide DD no. 3A regarding death of injured. After receiving the dead body, as per PW-9, he got conducted the postmortem of deceased and handed over the dead body to the relative of deceased vide handing over memo Ex. PW1/A and recorded the statement of identification of dead body as Ex. PW 9/C and Ex. PW 9/D. Thereafter, as per PW-9, after completion of investigation, he filed the chargesheet and also identified the case property from their photographs.
22. Markedly, during the course of his cross CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 27 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2026.03.27 16:12:50 +0530 examination by/at the behest of the appellant, PW-9/IO/ASI (Retd.) Virender, asserted as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. I received the call at 6:25 pm and it took about 10 minutes to reach at the spot on my bike. There were damages on the scooter and the truck was not damaged. It took about 15 minutes to reach at the trauma centre from the spot.
*** *** *** I received information at about 6.25 pm and reached at the spot within 15 minutes. The offending vehicle and accidental vehicle were lying at one side of the road. The accidental vehicle i.e. scooter was damaged. The width of the road was about 40 feet. It was one way road. There was normal traffic on the road. I did not click the photographs of the spot. Vol. The spot was already dishaped as the vehicles were moved in view of the traffic. I did not observe any tyre skid marks on the road. I received the information regarding the death of the wife of the complainant at about 12 midnight on 14.09.2005. I arrested the accused from the spot at the instance of the complainant. It is wrong to suggest that I planted the accused in the present case to solved it and at the instance of the complainant. It is wrong to suggest that there was no accident occurred at the spot that is why no skid marks were found on the road. It is wrong to suggest that I did not properly investigate the present case. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely at the instance of the complainant and to solve the case."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Conspicuously, in light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, this Court would now proceed with the evaluation of the material placed on record, being wary of the arguments addressed by/on behalf of the appellant and the State. However, before proceeding further, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly deal with the contention of Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant inter alia to the effect that the conviction of the appellant could not have been premised on the sole testimony of PW-2/Sunil Kumar. Markedly, in this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 28 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:12:55 +0530 note that it is conscious of the settled law, repeatedly avowed 9 by superior courts that that there is no impediment in convicting a person on the testimony of a sole/single eyewitness if his version is clear and reliable, for the rule of evidence is that the evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Noticeably, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367, wherein the Hon'ble Court unambiguously noted as under;
"9. ... This Court held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Congruently, in light of the foregoing, this Court unmistakable notes that the mere fact that the prosecution, opted not to produce other public persons, asserted to be present or would have been present at the spot of occurrence at the time of incident, as prosecution witnesses before the Ld. Trial Court, as otherwise contended by Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant, cannot, in the considered opinion of this Court, be read against the prosecution in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court 9 Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P., (2013) 12 SCC 680.
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in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200, wherein the Hon'ble Court in a similar situation, held as under;
"34. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and its importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution along with the adequacy of the materials sufficient enough to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. Onus is on the part of the party who alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Pertinently, Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant has further strenuously contended that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider the contradictions, variations and/or improvements, in the testimonies of various prosecution witnesses while pronouncing the order of conviction against the appellant in the instant case. However, in order to precisely appreciate the said contention, this Court deems it apposite to iterate and explore the judicial precedents governing the law of contradictions in the testimony of the witness. In particular, in this regard, this Court deems it apt to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, wherein the Hon'ble Court inter alia observed in an akin context, as under;
"10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 30 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:04 +0530 earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross-examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. Having examined the evidence of this witness, a friend and well-wisher of the family carefully giving due weight to the comments made by the learned counsel for the respondent and the reasons assigned to by the High Court for rejecting his evidence simultaneously keeping in view the appreciation of the evidence of this witness by the trial court, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was in error in rejecting the testimony of witness Nair whose evidence appears to us trustworthy and credible."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Similarly, in this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rammi v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649, noted in an akin context, as under;
"24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 31 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:08 +0530 adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Evidently, from the conspectus of the above, it is clearly deduced that minor discrepancies, which do not go into the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, cannot be permitted to be annexed with any undue weight. In fact, it is trite law10, the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution and those which emanate due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance and must necessarily be discarded. The rationale behind the same is quite obvious, as elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324, inter alia recording as under;
"30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence.
"9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the 10 Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241 CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 32 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2026.03.27 16:13:11 +0530 entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility."...
Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier . The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited..."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Ergo, to recapitulate, in order to disregard the testimony of a witness, it is imperative that the same is replete with material improvements, contradictions and variation. In contrast, law provides for due concession to marginal variations and normal discrepancies in the statement/testimony of a witness, which are bound to occur due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Consequently, when the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in the instant case are meticulously analyzed, mindful of aforenoted revered principles, this Court finds itself difficult to be convinced with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that there are any material contradictions to belie the testimonies of the said witnesses. On the contrary, from a conscientious analysis of the testimonies of the various prosecution witnesses, including that of the complainant/PW-2 and PW-8, the appellant's role, complicity and involvement in the incident in question stands proved beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case. In this regard, this Court records that the complainant unequivocally proclaimed that on 13.09.2005, while he and his wife/deceased, Kiran were returning to their home from complainant's sasural/in-laws' house CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 33 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:16 +0530 in scooter bearing no. DL-8SE-9272 via outer ring road and had arrived at the red light Burari Chowk at around 06:00-06:30 p.m., one truck bearing registration no. DL-1GB-0747 reached from behind and struck the complainant's scooter, while he was waiting at the red light. PW-2 also avowed that the driver of the said truck was driving the truck in a rash and negligent manner and also that his/complainant's scooter fell down as well as his/complainant's wife immediately fell on the impact of accident. Congruently, as per PW-2, after some distance, he along with his scooter fell down on the left side and after falling from the scooter, PW-2's wife got rolled down on the tyres of the said truck/offending vehicle. Thereafter, as per PW-2, the rear wheel of the truck turned over the said victim's leg and thereafter, the vehicle stopped. PW-2 further avowed that the driver of the offending vehicle was Chhote Ali, the appellant herein, who was also correctly identified by PW-2 before the Ld. Trial Court. Remarkably, PW-2 also proclaimed that he saw the appellant at the spot as he was trying to escape and the persons present there, apprehended him.
29. Correspondingly, the version as put forth by the complainant regarding the accident in question stands duly corroborated with the testimony of PW-8, who inter alia proclaimed that on 13.09.2005, he was posted at Head Constable at PCR Van Sugar VI-1 and at around 06:15 p.m., when he was present at Burari Chowk (base), he noticed that one person was on scooter bearing no. DL-8SE-9272, was proceeding from GT Karnal Road and proceeding toward ISBT. Congruently, as per PW-8, in the meantime, one truck bearing no. DL-1GB-0747, hit the said scooter from behind. PW-8 further proclaimed that the said truck driver was driving the said truck at very high speed and CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 34 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:22 +0530 hit the aforesaid scooter as soon as it stopped on the red light. Further, as per PW-8, the scooter driver and the female pillion driver, thereof, fell down on the road and when he/PW-8 reached at the spot, the truck driver had fled away, leaving the truck at the spot. Remarkably, from the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-8, the factum of the offending vehicle striking the scooter of the complainant, of the complainant's and the victim's falling down due to the said impact, of the victim's getting entangled in the tyre of the offending vehicle and that of the accident having occurred on 13.09.2005 at Burari Chowk, at the time, when the complainant had stopped his vehicle/scoter at the red light, stand duly proved. In as much as the contention of the Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant that since PW-2 made improvement in his cross- examination regarding his scooter being hit twice or that he was told by his wife that the driver of the truck was coming from behind which was to hit his vehicle, this Court concurs with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the said improvements/embellishments in PW-2's testimony are not sufficient to discard the complainant's testimony in its entirety, especially when the superior courts have persistently avowed11 that witnesses do have tendency to exaggerate, embroider or embellish their version before court. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, unwaveringly proclaimed as under;
"8. ...It appears to us that merely because there have been discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence of some or all of the witnesses does not mean that the entire evidence of the prosecution has to be discarded. It is only after exercising caution and care and sifting the evidence to separate the truth 11 Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643.CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 35 of 51 Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:13:26 +0530 from untruth, exaggeration, embellishments and improvement, the Court comes to the conclusion that what can be accepted implicates the appellants it will convict them. This Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered though where the substratum of the prosecution case or material part of the evidence is disbelievable it will not be permissible for the Court to reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest..."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Ergo, in light of the foregoing this Court reiterates that merely because the complainant opted to embellish/improve on certain aspects of his proclamations, which otherwise, does not otherwise affect the corroborated and consistent versions regarding the aforenoted facts, even in the considered opinion of this Court, sufficient to discredit the deposition of PW-2 in its entireness. On the contrary, from a scrupulous analysis of the material brought forth, it is noted that the presence of the appellant at the scene of crime or that of him driving the vehicle in question is not even denied by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., except to the extent that the appellant merely asserted that his truck was in a stationery position at the red light and that it was raining on the said day. Correspondingly, the appellant proclaimed the driver of the scooter started to move and as the scooter applied brakes, it completely turned and when he/the appellant moved his vehicle, people told him that one lady had come under the tyres of his truck. Apposite, here to reproduce CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 36 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:31 +0530 the relevant extracts from the appellant's statement dated 17.12.2018, recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., as under;
"...Q. No. 1. It is evidence of PW2 against you that on 13.09.2005, PW2 Sh. Sunil Kumar was driving his scooter bearing No. DL 8 SE-9272 and his wife was pillion rider. At about 6:00/6:30 pm when he stopped his scooter at the red light Burari Chowk, one truck bearing number DL 1 GB 0747 came from back side and struck against back side of his scooter. You were driving the truck bearing number DL 1 GB 0747 at the fast speed in rash and negligent manner. The scooter of PW2 and his wife fell down on the road due to the impact of accident. After felling down from the scooter his wife got rolled under the tyres of the truck and thereafter the rear wheel of the truck crushed her leg. PW2 apprehended you. PCR van present nearby took the injured alongwith PW2 to Trauma centrer. After the postmortem the dead body of wife of PW2 was handed over to him vide handing over memo EXPW1/A. What do you have to say? Ans. It is incorrect. My truck was in a stationery position at the red light and it was raining on that day. As the scooter started to move, the rider of the scooter applied brakes because of which the scooter completely turned and as I started to move my vehicle, people told me that one lady has come under the tyres of my truck. I have been falsely implicated in the present case FIR..."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Congruently, it is observed from the deposition of DW-1/Sh. Bal Govind that the said witness/defence witness further corroborated the factum of the appellant's driving the offending vehicle on the date of occurrence as well as of being present at the spot, however, merely asserted that the accident had occasioned due to/by a vehicle, which was proceeding ahead of the offending vehicle. Here, it is pertinent to reproduce the relevant extracts from the deposition of DW-1, as under;
"...I am owner of truck LPT 1612 bearing registration No. DL 1 GB 0747. That on 13.09.2005, I was in the above said truck & my driver Chotey Ali was driving the said truck. That on 13.09.2005, when CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 37 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:35 +0530 my truck reached near Burari chowk, then an accident has been occurred by ahead going truck and ran away from the spot. My truck was just behind the offending vehicle and has been take over by police. I also requested the police that my above-mentioned truck was not involved in the accident..."
(Emphasis supplied)
32. At this stage, this Court deems it pertinent to deal with the contention of the Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant inter alia to the effect that the appellant's identity as the perpetrator of the offence is not established in the absence of TIP proceedings of the appellant at the behest of the complainant. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to note that though this Court is conscious of the settled law, persistently avowed by superior courts that mere identification of an accused at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character, however, the superior courts have further declared that conducting of TIP proceedings is a safe rule of prudence. However, it has also been declared that such rule of prudence is also subjected to exceptions, i.e., when the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, even without other corroboration. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkhansingh v. State of M.P., (2003) 5 SCC 746, wherein the Hon'ble Court, whilst being confronted with an akin conundrum remarked, as under;
"...7. It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 38 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:39 +0530 the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration. (See Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1958 SC 350 : 1958 Cri LJ 698] , Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P. [AIR 1960 SC 1340 : 1960 Cri LJ 1681] , Budhsen v. State of U.P. [(1970) 2 SCC 128 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 343 : AIR 1970 SC 1321] and Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K [(1971) 2 SCC 715 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 638] .)..."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Pertinently, in the instant case, not only did PW-2/complainant, identify the accused/appellant before the Ld. Trial Court as the perpetrator of offence, rather, PW-3/HC Sanjay and PW-9/IO/ASI (Retd.) Virender both asserted that the complainant had identified the appellant as the perpetrator of offence at the spot, besides PW-2/complainant also proved the arrest memo of the appellant in the instant case as Ex. PW2/B, bearing the complainant's signatures. Needless to reiterate that the factum of the appellant being the driver of the offending vehicle, CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 39 of 51 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:13:43 +0530 not only stands reinforced from the deposition of the owner of the offending vehicle/DW-1, as aforenoted, rather, even the appellant did not deny the said fact under his statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Ergo, under such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, non- conducting of TIP proceedings would not be of much consequence, in the instant case.
34. Proceeding further on the aspect of rashness or negligence in the instant case, this Court finds itself, further, in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that from the material placed on record and the deposition of various witnesses, the factum of rashness and negligence on the part of the appellant stands unambiguously proved in the instant case. In this regard, this Court though outrightly notes that though the complainant/PW-2 and the eyewitness/PW-8 did not depose of the exact speed of the offending vehicle at the time of the occurrence, however, the manner in which the accident is stated to have occurred is sufficient to attribute necessary mens rea on the appellant, in as much as the offending vehicle is asserted to have hit the complainant's stationary vehicle at the red light stop from behind and in the said process, the complainant's scooter is asserted to have fallen down as well as the victim is also proclaimed to have immediately fallen due to the impact of accident. Congruently, as aforenoted, PW-2 proclaimed that he along with his scooter fell down on the left side and after falling from the scooter, his wife/the deceased got rolled down on the tyres of the offending vehicle and the rear wheel of the truck turned over the deceased's and only thereafter, the offending vehicle is avowed to have stopped.
CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 40 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:13:46 +0530
35. In fact, this Court further concurs with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that appellant's negligence is not only proved under the depositions of the complainant/PW-2 and PW-8, rather, further duly corroborated from the site plan (Ex. PW-9/B), as put to the complainant and explained by him under his cross examination; mechanical inspection reports of the offending vehicle as well as the complainant's vehicle (Ex. PW4/A and Ex. PW4/B), proved by PW-4/ASI (Retd.) Devender Kumar, wherein fresh damage, dents, etc., are noted on both the said vehicle, as corresponding with the version of PW-2 and PW-8; and depositions of PW-7/Dr. K. Goyal and PW-11/Dr. Vikas Rampal. In fact, even this Court deems it pertinent to note that PW-11 inter alia testified that the deceased had sustained, "... suspected fracture mandible, chest compression test positive, pelvic test positive and suspected fracture left humorous and crush injury with De-gloving injury right foot...". Appositely, during the course of his cross examination, PW-11 explicitly proclaimed that the type of cumulative injuries sustained by the deceased could have never be caused by fall, "...most definitely because of an accident and unlikely by beating...". Correspondingly, even under the postmortem report of deceased, as proved by PW-7, cause of the deceased's death was opined to be due asphyxia and hemorrhagic shock, consequent upon lung injuries and all injuries were further opined to be ante-mortem in nature, caused by blunt force impact.
36. Here, it is further apposite to note that, though, this Court is conscious of the settled law12 that merely driving a vehicle 12 State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; Ram Chander v. State, 2017 SCC Online Del 11763; and Narender v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC Online Del 4729.
CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 41 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:13:50 +0530
with high speed does not denote driving the vehicle, rashly and negligently. As a corollary, no culpability can be attributed to a driver of a vehicle merely for the reason that the offending was being driven in high speed, for the want of clear and unambiguous proof of rashness or negligence on behalf of/by such a person/accused. However, it is equally trite that high speed may amount to rash and negligence driving in certain circumstances, if the evidence in respect of those circumstances is brought on record through the prosecution witness. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of Bombay High Court in Surendra Savlo Gaddi v. State, 2014 SCC Online Bom 264, wherein the Hon'ble Court, remarked as under;
"6. The fact of accident is proved by the prosecution. However, whether the accident has occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner/accused is a question before the Court. Evidence of all the three eye witnesses PW.2, Mr. Jayesh Bugde, PW.3, Mr. Manoj Parab and PW.4, Mr. Prashant Dessai disclose that they were travelling in the bus at the relevant time, bus turtled as the driver was driving the bus in speed and at the turn he was trying to overtake a Maruti van and in this attempt, the bus turned on the driver's side. All the witnesses also suffered injuries. The passengers in the vehicle which meets with an accident are the best witnesses on the point of rash and negligent driving of a driver. It is true that high speed itself cannot be attributed to rashness and negligence. However, high speed may amount to rash and negligence driving in certain circumstances. If evidence in respect of those circumstances is brought on record through the prosecution witness, then Court is required to appreciate driving in high speed on the background of those circumstances. In the present case, the witnesses have brought a particular fact on record that the bus turned on one side when the driver was trying to overtake a Maruti van and secondly this attempt of overtaking was made at the turn. This shows that the petitioner/accused when driving the vehicle at high speed has also indulged into overtaking the vehicle at a turn. The combination of CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 42 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:13:55 +0530 all these circumstances thus attribute rashness and negligence to the accused. The finding given by the learned Sessions Judge that thus the prosecution has established that the accused was rash and negligent is correct and has proved the case under sections 279, 337 and 338 of the I.P.C. Moreever, through out the trial and in the revision the accused adopted a defence that the road was uneven and therefore due to bad road conditions, he lost control over the vehicle. The learned Sessions Judge while marshalling the evidence of the prosecution and considering the defence of the accused has rightly observed that if at all the road was uneven, then it was obligatory on the part of the accused to be slow and cautious.
Considering this, I am inclined to maintain the judgments and orders passed by the Sessions Court. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage submits that leniency on the point of sentence be shown. Learned counsel submits that the accused has no criminal record and he has given up the job of driver Therefore, the sentence be reduced."
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Quite evidently, in light of the foregoing, this Court ardently reiterates that from the facts and material placed on record the mens rea, i.e., negligence on the part of the appellant is quite manifest in the manner in which the incident had transpired wherein upon being hit by the offending vehicle at the red light stop from behind, the complainant's scooter is asserted to have fallen down as well as the victim is also proclaimed to have immediately fallen due to the impact of accident. Congruently, as aforenoted, PW-2 proclaimed that he along with his scooter fell down on the left side and after falling from the scooter, his wife/the deceased got rolled down on the tyres of the offending vehicle and the rear wheel of the truck turned over the deceased's and only thereafter, the offending vehicle is avowed to have stopped. Needless to reiterate that the cause of deceased's demise from the said accident is further duly proved from the depositions of the testimonies of PW-7 and PW-11, as well as her CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 43 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date:
GOYAL 2026.03.27
16:14:00
+0530
MLC and postmortem examination report(s).
38. Conclusively, in view of the above discussion, in particular, in light of the unambiguous testimony of the complainant/PW-2/Sunil Kumar, read in conjunction with the testimonies of PW-8/Retd. ASI Devender Mohanjeet Singh, PW-4/Retd. ASI/Tech. Devender Kumar, PW-3/HC Sanjay, PW-7/Dr. K. Goyal, PW-11/Dr. Vikas Rampal and PW-9/Retd. SI Virender Singh, as also corroborated with the MLC and postmortem report(s) of the deceased as well as the other material brought on record of the Ld. Trial Court, the ingredients of offences under Sections 279/304A IPC, even in the considered opinion of this Court, stand duly proved against the appellant herein. Needless to reiterate that the factum of the offending vehicle striking the scooter of the complainant; of the complainant's and the victim's falling down due to the said impact; of the victim's getting entangled in the tyre of the offending vehicle and that of the accident having occurred on 13.09.2005 at Burari Chowk, at the time, when the complainant had stopped his vehicle/scoter at the red light; stand duly proved from the testimonies of PW-2, PW-8 and other material placed on record. Needless to further that the factum of the appellant being the driver of the offending vehicle at the relevant point in time also stands proved from the deposition of PW-2, besides as aforenoted, the said fact was not denied by the appellant under his statement, recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., rather, the same stands reinforced from the deposition of the owner of the offending vehicle/DW-1, as aforenoted. Correspondingly, it is reiterated that the mens rea and the victim's demise being occasioned due to such impact further stands proved from the deposition of the aforenoted CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 44 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:14:04 +0530 witnesses, including that of PW-7/Dr. K. Goyal and PW-11/Dr. Vikas Rampal as well as the MLC and postmortem report(s) of the deceased and the circumstances in which the incident is stated to have occurred. Correspondingly, no reasons for wrongful implication of the appellant in the present case are forthcoming under the testimonies of any of the prosecution witnesses. Pertinent to further mention that the defence put forth by the appellant in the instant case is not only uncorroborated with any material/witnesses, rather, the same is quite uninspiring of confidence, and seemingly specious. Needless in this regard to reiterate that the defence put forth by the appellant by means of his defence evidence/DW-1 and his own assertion under his statement, recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is extremely irreconcilable and contrary, as aforenoted. Ergo, under such circumstances, this Court is in concert with the Ld. Trial Court's observation that the prosecution has been able to prove its case 'beyond reasonable doubt' against the appellant herein for the offences under Sections 279/304A IPC.
39. In so far as the aspect of sentence awarded to the appellant is concerned, this Court deems it apposite to note that though, the penal provisions under law/IPC, prescribe for penalties to be imposed for offences, however, no harmonized strategies exist for the manner and quantum of sentence which may be awarded to an accused in each case. In fact, law provides for a considerable relaxation/discretion to the Courts at the time of awarding sentence, which in the light of persistent avowals of the superior courts13, has to be exercised, mindful of such parameters.13
'X' v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1; and Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2014) 4 SCC 375.CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 45 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:14:08 +0530 Indisputably, the inclination of courts is usually tilted towards reformative and rehabilitative approach towards the accused, however, superior court have also incessantly cautioned that sentencing should be adequate, just, and reasonable, for exercising undue sympathy, by imposing inadequate sentence may often result into causing more harm to the justice system. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516, wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as under;
"17. We reiterate that in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
40. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 16 SCC 380, while iterating the objective behind sentencing enunciated as under;
"9. The maintenance of peace, order and security is one of the oldest functions of the civil society. The imposition of penal sanctions on those who have infringed the rules by which a society has bound itself are a matter of legitimate interest to the members of the society...Punishment is the just desert of an offender. The society punishes not because it has the CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 46 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.03.27 16:14:14 +0530 moral right to give offenders what they deserve, but also because punishment will yield social useful consequences: the protection of society by incapacitating criminals, the rehabilitation of past offenders, or the deterrence of potential wrongdoers...The purposes of criminal sentencing have traditionally been said to be retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. To these there may now perhaps be added: incapacitation (i.e. putting it out of the power of the offender to commit further offences) and the maintenance of public confidence..."
(Emphasis supplied)
41. Apposite for the purpose of the present discourse to further make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182, wherein the Hon'ble Court in akin context, noted as under;
"23. In the instant case the factum of rash and negligent driving has been established. This Court has been constantly noticing the increase in number of road accidents and has also noticed how the vehicle drivers have been totally rash and negligent. It seems to us driving in a drunken state, in a rash and negligent manner or driving with youthful adventurous enthusiasm as if there are no traffic rules or no discipline of law has come to the centre stage. The protagonists, as we perceive, have lost all respect for law. A man with the means has, in possibility, graduated himself to harbour the idea that he can escape from the substantive sentence by payment of compensation. Neither the law nor the court that implements the law should ever get oblivious of the fact that in such accidents precious lives are lost or the victims who survive are crippled for life which, in a way, worse then death. Such developing of notions is a dangerous phenomenon in an orderly society. Young age cannot be a plea to be accepted in all circumstances. Life to the poor or the impecunious is as worth living for as it is to the rich and the luxuriously temperamental.
24. Needless to say, the principle of sentencing recognizes the corrective measures but there are occasions when the deterrence is an imperative necessity depending upon the facts of the case. In our opinion, it is a fit case where we are constrained to say that the High Court has been swayed away by the passion of mercy in applying the principle that CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 47 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:14:19 +0530 payment of compensation is a factor for reduction of sentence to 24 days. It is absolutely in the realm of misplaced sympathy. It is, in a way mockery of justice. Because justice is "the crowning glory", "the sovereign mistress" and "queen of virtue" as Cicero had said. Such a crime blights not only the lives of the victims but of many others around them. It ultimately shatters the faith of the public in judicial system. In our view, the sentence of one year as imposed by the trial Magistrate which has been affirmed by the appellate court should be reduced to six months."
(Emphasis supplied)
42. Clearly, in light of the above, it is noted that besides the resolute affirmations of the superior courts, inclined towards the grant of just and appropriate sentence, there has also been a cautionary word14 that mere long pendency of case is no ground to award lesser sentence. Here, it is further pertinent to note that the superior courts15 have also untiringly declared that payment of victim compensation to victim cannot be a consideration/ground for reducing the sentence imposed upon an accused. Clearly, the rationale behind the same is that victim compensation is not a punitive measure, rather, only meant for restitution, having no bearing on the sentence, which has been passed as a punitive measure. Correspondingly, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while accentuating the importance of adequate sentencing and compensation, keeping in view the interest of society and victim(ology), observed as under;
"30. From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous that this Court has expressed its concern on imposition of adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences regard being had to the nature of the offence and demand of the conscience of the 14 State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh, (2003) 8 SCC 13.15
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0428/2024.
CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 48 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 16:14:23 +0530
society. That apart, the concern has been to impose adequate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. It is worthy to note that in certain circumstances, the mitigating factors have been taken into consideration but the said aspect is dependent on the facts of each case. As the trend of authorities would show, the proficiency in professional driving is emphasized upon and deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent driving and causes accident has been condemned. In a motor accident, when a number of people sustain injuries and a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all around. The negligence of one shatters the tranquility of the collective. When such an accident occurs, it has the effect potentiality of making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in the social fabric. The agony and anguish of the affected persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has its impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by drunken, negligent or, for that matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for others. Be it noted, grant of compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in a different sphere altogether. Grant of compensation under Section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be paid to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused has been sentenced has a different contour and the same is not to be regarded as a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence.
31. Recently, this Court in Rattiram and Ors. v. State of M.P. Through Inspector of Police AIR 2012 SCW 1772, though in a different context, has stated that:
"64. criminal jurisprudence, with the passage of time, has laid emphasis on victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a trial from the view point of the criminal as well as the victim. Both are viewed in the social context. The view of the victim is given due regard and respect in certain countries. It is the duty of the court to see that the victim's right is protected.
32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment works as an eye-opener for the persons who are not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 49 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2026.03.27 16:14:26 +0530 indulgence or lives of others are like "flies to the wanton boys". They totally forget that the lives of many are in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act."
(Emphasis supplied)
43. Ergo, in light of the foregoing principles, when the impugned order is conscientiously scrutinized, this Court unwaveringly observes that the Ld. Trial Court has acted quite leniently with the appellant by awarding minimum sentence, prescribed under law for the offences under Section 279/304A IPC, considering the mitigating and aggravating factors. Quite understandably, considering that the purpose of sentencing is not only to punish the errant behavior but to also have deterrent effect on the society, the appellant does not, in the considered opinion of this Court, deserves any indulgence at this stage, even in the aspect of sentence so awarded by the Ld. Trial Court for the said offence is concerned.
44. Conclusively, in view of the above discussion, the present appeal deserves to be rejected/dismissed and is hereby dismissed. As a corollary, the judgment dated 30.03.2019 passed by Ld. MM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing; 'State v. Chhote Ali, Crl. Case No. 27448/2006', arising out of FIR No. 430/2005, PS. Timarpur, under Sections 279/337 IPC, convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A IPC, and the consequent order of sentence dated 30.08.2019 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, awarding the appellant; simple imprisonment for a period of 06 (six) months for the offence under Section 279 IPC; and simple imprisonment for a period of 01 (one) year and 06 (six) months (18 (eighteen) months) for the offence under Section 304A IPC, besides directing CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 50 of 51 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.03.27 16:14:31 +0530 him/the appellant to pay fine of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand only), out of which, Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) was directed to be paid as compensation to the legal representatives/LRs of the deceased and the balance amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), to be deposited in court, are hereby upheld. However, it is clarified that the sentences shall run concurrently, besides the appellant would be entitled to the benefit under Section 428 Cr.P.C./Section 468 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/BNSS.
45. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this judgment with direction to proceed as per law. Copy of this order/judgment be also given dasti to the appellant. Further, the appellant, Chhote Ali is directed to surrender before the Ld. Trial Court within a period of ten days from today for serving the sentence/remainder period thereof. Needless to mention that the compliance of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 1 has been carried out.
46. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.03.27 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal) 16:14:36 +0530
on 27.03.2026. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CA. No: 386/2019 Chhote Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 51 of 51