Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Smt Dr Swapna Naskar Williamson vs Aiims on 8 January, 2026
1
Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024
Court No. IV
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No. 4616/2024
Reserved on:- 12.12.2025
Pronounced on:- 08.01.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Dr. Swapna Naskar Williamson
age 73 years, W/o. J.M. Williamson
44 Shivaji Marg, Western Greens, Rangpuri
New Delhi - 110038.
...Applicant
(By Advocates: Mr. D. K. Sharma with Dr. Elumiani and
Ms. Sunita Sharma and Mr. Durgesh)
Versus
All India Institute of Medical Sciences
(AIIMS) at New Delhi, Through its Director.
Ansari Nagar East, New Delhi-II 0029.
Email: [email protected].
...Respondent
(By Advocates: Mr. V. Shashank Kumar for Mr. V. S. R.
Krishna)
ANKIT ANKIT
SAKLANI
SAKLA 2026.01.09
09:50:52
NI +05'30'
2
Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024
Court No. IV
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) In the present O.A. filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:-
"(a) To direct the Respondent to treat Ph.D on job of the Applicant by granting all the benefits and facilities available to other similarly situated Officers/Faculty who were doing/completed Ph.D on job for the period of grant of Extra Ordinary Leave without pay.
(b) To direct the Respondents to quash the Memorandum rejecting the representation of the Applicant, same being null, void, ultra-vires and unconstitutional
(c) Pass such other further order or orders as this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the facts of the case and in the interest of justice."
2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicant submitted as under:
2.1. The applicant was an employee of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi, and was working as a Lecturer in the College of Nursing. During the course of her service, the applicant was selected and registered to pursue a Ph.D. program at AIIMS and sought permission to pursue the same "on the job", in accordance with the applicable statutory rules and precedents within the Institute.
2.2 The applicant submitted a detailed representation dated 07.08.1996 seeking permission to pursue Ph.D. on the job and for grant of all consequential service benefits. As no ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 3 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV decision was taken by the respondent, the applicant was constrained to approach the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by filing a Writ Petition seeking appropriate directions. The said Writ Petition No. 3891/1996 came up for hearing before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, and by order dated 10.10.1996, the Hon'ble Court directed the respondent to consider and decide the applicant's representation dated 07.08.1996 within a period of six weeks. The said order is binding upon the respondent.
2.3. Despite the aforesaid judicial directions, the respondent failed to consider the applicant's representation dated 07.08.1996 and instead issued an Office Memorandum dated 25.02.1997, responding to the applicant's earlier applications dated 15.04.1996 and 09.05.1996, and wrongly granted Extraordinary Leave without pay under inapplicable rules, contrary to the directions of the Hon'ble High Court. The said Office Memorandum dated 25.02.1997, reads as under:
"Subject: Representation against grant of Extra Ordinary Leave without pay for doing the Ph.D. in Hospital Administration at the AIIMS, New Delhi Mrs. Swapna Nastar Villiamson, Lecturer in Nursing.
With reference to her representations dated the 15th April and 9th May. 1996 on the subject cited above. Mrs. Swapna Naskar Williamson is informed that due to the following facts she was granted Extra Ordinary Leave without pay for doing Ph.D. in Hospital Administration at the AIIMS. New Delhi:-
1) She, herself, requested on 14th August, 1995 for grant of leave of the kind due for a period of 3 years to complete the course of Ph.D. in Hospital Administration at the AIIMS. w.e.f.
01.09.1995.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 4 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV
2) She has been appointed to the post of Lecturer in Nursing with the qualifications & experience prescribed for the post
3) Her request for permission to do Ph.D. in the Deptt. of Hospitl Administration was recommended and forwarded by the Principal, College of Nursing with the comments that another faculty member may be provided to College during the leave vacancy so that the work of the College of Nursing may not suffer. The duty leave is granted for availing of the WHO/Commonwealth Fellowship etc. and no adhoc appointment is made. Since, she was granted permission to do Ph.D. Course in Hospital Administration at the AIIMS on Extra Ordinary Leave without pay for a period of 3 years, adhoc appointment was made to the post of Lecturer in Nursing during her absence so that the teaching activities in the College of Nursing may not suffer.
4) She was granted leave in accordance with Rule 12 of the Leave Rules according to which, no leave of any kind can be granted to a Government servant permanent or temporary. for a continuous period exceeding 5 years. Subject to this limitation, any amount of Extra Ordinary Leave without pay may be sanctioned to permanent Government servant. Rule 32 (ii) (e) of Leave Rules in this connection reads as under:-
"Officials who have completed 3 years continuous services upto 24 months. whether the leave is required for the course of prosecuting studies certified to be in the public interest."
Since, in this case, she sought leave for a period of 3 years w.e.f. 01.09.1995 to complete Ph.D. Course at the AIIMS, she can only be granted Extra Ordinary Leave for the above purpose according to above leave rules.
5) According to rules for doing Ph.D. at AIIMS if a faculty member registers himself/herself in any other department besides the parent department he/she is required to take leave in order to complete, Ph.D. Course, as Ph.D. Course at the AIIMS is full time course. Since, she requested for doing Ph.D. Course in the department of Hospital Administration which is not her parent department, she was granted Extra Ordinary Leave without pay and a substitute on adhoc basis was provided to the College of Nursing.
6) She is also informed that she was permitted on 18th March, 1991 to register her name for Ph.D. Course at the University of Delhi subject to the condition that no financial/foreign exchange commitment would devolve on the part of the Institute and it will not interfere with her normal working hours at this Institute. AIIMS, Ph.D. in Hospital Administration is a full time course.
7) The faculty members can do Ph.D. course in the same department where they are working subject to fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. Course at AIIMS. ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 5 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV
8) No other faculty members have so far been permitted to do Ph.D. in other department.
In view of the above, she has not been granted study leave with full pay but granted duty leave instead of Extra Ordinary Leave without pay for completion of her Ph.D. course in Hospital Administration for a period of 3 years. However, her request is being placed before the Standing Finance Committee of the Institute for their consideration as it is a deviation from the present guidelines framed by the Governing Body/ Institute Body for faculty membersto avail of the training/fellowship/study leave within India or abroad."
2.4. Due to continued non-compliance of the order dated 10.10.1996, the applicant initiated contempt proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. The contempt petition (CCP No. 6/97) was disposed of on the basis of an affidavit dated 05.03.1997 filed by the Director, AIIMS, giving assurances to the Court regarding consideration of the applicant's claim. The said affidavit dated 05.03.1997, reads as under:
"I, Dr. P.K.Dave, Director, AIIMS, New Delhi do hereby state on solemn affirmation as under:
At the outset, the deponent, submits that the deponent has the highest regards, for the Courts and the orders/directions passed by the, and tenders unconditional apologies for the unintentional delay occurred in disposing the petitioner's representation dated 7.8.96. That the representation of the petitioner has been disposed off vide memorandum dated 25.2.1997. In fact the nominal; delay occured due to the reason that the petitioner in her representation had given few names, without any reference, to the disciplines in which they were working and they sought permission for doing Ph. D. That the administration was trying to verify the contents of the representation of the petitioner. That at the cost of repetition, it is submitted that there was neither any intention nor attempt to delay the matter, or to disobey or defy the orders passed by this Hon'ble Court. The respondent is submitting the short paravise reply to clarify the issue.
PARAWISE REPLY ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 6 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV
1. That filling of writ petition is a matter of record of this Hon'ble Court. It is respectfully submitted that no details or particulars were given by the petitioner in the writ petition.
2. That the contents of para 2, do not call for any reply.
3. That in reply to para 3, it is respectfully submitted that after the receipt of order dated 10.10.96, the administration made an attempt to find out the details of the persons named in the representation and to take out the relevant files of such persons. That process of verification, without proper details and in taking out the relevant old files took considerable time. That on finding that none of the persons named by the petitioner in her representation is identical, the respondent, desired the administration to search, whether to any other persons not even named by the petitioner similar relief has been given by relaxing the rules. This process also took some time. This fact was known to the petitioner with whom the matter was discussed time and again by the Administrative Officer. There was no intention either to defy the orders or to delay the matter.
4. That the contents of para 4 are wrong and denied. The petitioner herself sought leave for 3 years, for completing Ph.D. Since Hospital Administration is not her parent department, she was granted extra ordinary leave without pay for a period of 3 years under the relevant rules.
5. That the contents of pars 5, so stated are wrong and denied. The administration of AIIMS, has passed order dated 25.2.97, which has also been served on the petitioner. The delay in passing the said order, occurred in tracing the files of the alleged similar persons/cases, the details whereof vere also not given, as explained hereinabove.
6. That the contents of para 6 are denied for want of Information.
It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court be kindly pleased to dismiss the petition." 2.5. Thereafter, the applicant filed a Writ Petition No. 2427/1997 praying for the following reliefs:
"a) Issue a writ mandamus directing the respondent to treat registration of the petitioner for the course of Ph.D. on-job' and also grant all facilities available to the benefits and other similarly situated officers/faculty members who doing Ph.D. on job.
b) Issue writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction quashing the Memorandum under No. F6-21/87-
Estt.1 dated 31.8.1995 as ultravires, unconstitutional. ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 7 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV
c) issue writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction quashing the Memorandum under No. F-6-21/87- Estt.1 dated 25.2.1997 rejecting the representation of the petitioner, the same being null, void, ultravires and unconstitutional."
2.6. The respondent thereafter filed a reply affidavit dated 30.07.1997 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2427 of 1997 before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. The said affidavit contained incorrect and misleading statements, which were specifically controverted by the applicant by filing additional material in support of her entitlement under statutory rules and on the basis of parity.
2.7. The Hon'ble High Court, by order dated 21.10.1997 in CWP No. 2427 of 1997, directed that the applicant be permitted to continue her Ph.D. programme without any interference in her normal working hours at AIIMS, subject to consideration of the financial commitment aspect at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. 2.8. Owing to repeated filing of false affidavits by the respondent, the applicant was constrained to file Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1305 of 1997, dated 04.03.1998, under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against the Director, AIIMS, before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. 2.9. The Hon'ble High Court, by a final order dated 17.03.1998, disposed of Civil Writ Petition No. 2427 of 1997 ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 8 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV along with Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1305 of 1997, observing as under:
"3. Admittedly, the petitioner remained on leave from 1.9.1995 to 5.5.1997 and she resumed her duties on 6.5.1997. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the AIIMS submitted that during the interregnum period from 1.9.1995 to 5.5.1997 respondent AIIMS had employed an ad hoc employees to carry on the duties of the petitioner. Mr. Gupta submitted that during this period she was not paid because it was made clear to her by the letter dated 31.8.1995 that the period of absence for the above purpose w.e.f. 1.9.95 to 5.5.1997 will be treated as extra ordinary leave without pay. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel further submits that there has not been any kind of discrimination against the petitioner whatsoever either with regard to her entitlement for the study leave or for grant of benefit of the earned leave. He further submitted that if the petitioner has any accumulated earned leave to her credit, she would be given benefit of the same per the Rules. He also submitted that in case the petitioner is further entitled for any study leave according to Rules the benefit of the same shall also be given to the petitioner.
4 The learned counsel for the petitioner on instructions from the petitioner who is present in Court submitted that he may be permitted to complete her Ph.D. alongwith her normal duties and responsibilities as a Lecturer of College of Nursing. The learned counsel for the petitioner assured the Court that normal duties and responsibilities shall not be hampered in the process of her completing Ph.d. in any manner whatsoever. Mr Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the AIIMS on instructions submitted that the respondent AIIMS has no objection in the petitioner's pursing her Ph.D. programme provided it does not hamper with her normal duties as Lecturer of College of Nursing-AIIMS.
5. The petitioner shall be entitled to all the benefits which she is otherwise entitled to according to Rules. In view of clear assurance from Mr. Gupta, counsel for the AIIMS no further directions are necessary in this writ petition and the writ petition is accordingly disposed of. The learned counsel appearing for the AIIMS assures that within two weeks a comprehensive letter shall be sent to the petitioner incorporating these assurances given to this Court by the counsel for the AIIMS. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.Cr.M. No. 1305/98
Mr Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner on instructions submits that he would not like to press Cri. M No. 1305/98 filed under Section 340 of the Court of Criminal Procedure. The same is dismissed as not pressed.C.C.P. No. 71/98
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 9 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV Mr Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he shall withdraw CCP No 71/98 pending before another Court within three weeks.
The writ petition and criminal miscellaneous petition No. 1305/98 are accordingly disposed of In the facts and circumstances of this case the parties are directed to bear their own costs."
2.10. It has been urged before us that even after the passing of the final order dated 17.03.1998, the respondent failed to implement the same. The applicant repeatedly approached the respondent authorities for compliance, but only verbal assurances were extended. Despite this, the applicant continued her Ph.D. work at AIIMS while discharging her regular official duties.
2.11 Due to unavoidable family circumstances, the applicant took voluntary retirement and relocated to the United Kingdom in July 2003. Thereafter, the applicant suffered multiple personal hardships, including bereavements in the family, financial constraints, and responsibilities of raising a young child, which prevented her from actively pursuing the matter immediately. Notwithstanding the aforesaid difficulties, the applicant continued to make efforts to secure implementation of the High Court's order and submitted several representations to the respondent, including applications dated 10.02.2006, 22.12.2010, 06.07.2011, 06.11.2012, and 23.08.2013, requesting the release of her ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 10 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV withheld salary for 20 months and the grant of consequential benefits.
2.12. The respondent, in its communication dated 05.05.2015, addressed to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, took the stand that although the Hon'ble High Court had observed that the applicant was to be treated as "on job"
and granted benefits, no specific direction had been issued for treating the Ph.D. registration as on the job. This stand was contrary to the observations contained in the High Court's orders dated 21.10.1997 and 17.03.1998.
2.13. After the Covid-19 pandemic, the applicant again approached constitutional authorities by submitting representations dated 12.12.2021 to the Hon'ble President of India, the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India and the Union Ministry of Health & Family Welfare. In reply, the respondent reiterated its stand and confined the applicant's case only to the issue of study leave.
2.14 The respondent, by communication dated 30.04.2022, stated that the applicant's case had been placed before the Standing Finance Committee in its meeting held on 02.04.1997, which did not agree to grant study leave, while completely ignoring the applicant's claim for Ph.D. on the job.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 11 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV 2.15. The respondent thereafter issued an impugned order bearing No. F.20-1/2021-Estt-I (PG Portal) dated 28.07.2023, rejecting the applicant's claim on the ground that the Standing Finance Committee had not approved study leave.
2.16. The applicant got issued a legal notice dated 31.10.2023, demanding release of Rs. 4,91,600/- towards 20 months' salary along with interest. Despite lapse of the stipulated period, the respondent failed to reply or comply.
2.17. Having no other efficacious remedy, the applicant approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by filing W.P.(C) No. 15357 of 2024 praying for the following reliefs:
"a) issue a writ of mandamus under article 226 and 227 of the constitution of India directing the respondent to treat PhD on job of the petitioner by treating all the benefits and facilities available to other similarly situated Officers/Faculty who were doing PhD on job during the period of Extra Ordinary Leave without pay and issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction quashing the Memorandum dated 30.04.2022 and 07.07.2023 rejecting the representation of the petitioner, same being null, void, ultra-
vires and unconstitutional."
However, by order dated 04.11.2024, the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the said Writ Petition in view of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, with liberty to approach the appropriate forum.
2.18. The present Original Application is therefore filed as the respondent has willfully failed to comply with the binding ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 12 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court in CWP No. 2427 of 1997, has illegally withheld the applicant's salary for a period of 20 months, and has persistently misdirected itself by treating the applicant's case as one of study leave, in complete disregard of judicial findings.
2.19. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the impugned action of the respondents in denying the applicant the benefit of pursuing Ph.D. on the job and withholding salary for a period of 20 months was arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 21A of the Constitution of India, particularly when similarly situated faculty members, namely Dr. A. Malhotra, Additional Professor, Nuclear Medicine and Dr. Sarman Singh, Associate Professor, Department of Laboratory Medicine, were granted permission to pursue Ph.D. on the job outside their parent departments with full salary and benefits.
2.20. It was further contended that the applicant was otherwise eligible under the Fundamental Rules and CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, and was entitled to draw leave salary equal to pay drawn while on duty, and that compelling her to execute a bond at the last moment was illegal and contrary to the Indian Contract Act. The denial of salary and benefits despite continuous allotment of work during her Ph.D. tenure was submitted to be contrary to AIIMS' own scheme, UGC ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 13 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV guidelines, public interest and judicial orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court in 1997-1998, which permitted the applicant to pursue Ph.D. along with normal duties and entitled her to all consequential benefits. 2.21. Learned counsel further argued that the respondent wrongly relied upon the decision of the Standing Finance Committee dated 02.04.1997, ignoring the binding court orders passed subsequently in 1998, and took contradictory stands by citing absence of records of other faculty members while simultaneously admitting parity in official correspondence. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the continued denial of pay, despite repeated representations from 1995 onwards and even after legal notice dated 31.10.2023, constituted a continuing cause of action, resulting in grave financial loss, mental hardship and violation of her statutory and constitutional rights, thereby rendering the impugned memoranda and communications illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the averments made in the counter affidavit and submitted that the applicant had voluntarily applied for leave vide application dated 14.08.1995, which was duly sanctioned and treated as Extraordinary Leave without pay, and the applicant had accepted the same without protest; ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 14 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV therefore, the present claims were an afterthought and legally unsustainable.
3.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant never continued her duties as Lecturer in the College of Nursing during the Ph.D. period, and whatever work she performed was strictly in furtherance of her Ph.D. programme in Hospital Administration, for which no salary was admissible, and hence there was no breach of the orders dated 21.10.1997 or 17.03.1998 passed by the Hon'ble High Court. 3.2. Learned counsel contended that the cases of Dr. Sarman Singh and Dr. Arun Malhotra were not comparable, as Dr. Sarman Singh was working on an ad-hoc basis and Dr. Arun Malhotra was a temporary project employee at the time of registration for Ph.D., and therefore the plea of parity under Article 14 is misconceived. It was argued that the applicant's claim had already been duly considered and rejected vide memorandum dated 25.02.1997, which was never challenged and had attained finality, and that the reliance placed on the Standing Finance Committee decision dated 02.04.1997 was in accordance with applicable rules. 3.3. Learned counsel further contended that the applicant had taken voluntary retirement in 2003, all her dues stood settled at that time, and she raised no objection for decades thereafter, rendering the present Original Application ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 15 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV hopelessly barred by limitation and laches. It was further contended that the applicant pursued Ph.D. at subsidised cost to the Institute, which had to incur additional expenditure by engaging an ad-hoc lecturer during her absence, and thereafter chose to settle in the United Kingdom for better prospects, disentitling her from any equitable relief. 3.4. Learned counsel vehemently argued that study leave is not a matter of right and is subject to administrative discretion, which was duly exercised in the present case, and that Fundamental Rules and CCS (Leave) Rules relied upon by the applicant were inapplicable. It was submitted that the bond executed by the applicant was valid and binding and could not be questioned after nearly three decades. Finally, it was argued that the applicant had failed to challenge the impugned memoranda dated 25.02.1997 and 30.04.2022 within limitation, had admitted prolonged delay, and had approached the Tribunal after an inordinate lapse of time without any justifiable cause, and therefore the Original Application is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.
4. In rejoinder to the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant was encouraged by the highest authorities of AIIMS, including the Dean and Registrar, to pursue her Ph.D. at AIIMS for mutual institutional benefit. ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 16 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant never applied for Extraordinary Leave without pay, but only for "leave of kind due" as per CCS Leave Rules. The unilateral imposition of EOLWP was contrary to Rule 32 of the CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 and was imposed without her consent. Despite repeated representations seeking study leave and permission to pursue Ph.D. on the job, and despite specific directions of the Hon'ble High Court dated 10.10.1996 and 17.03.1998, the respondent failed to consider applicant's case or extend the benefits lawfully due to her. The learned counsel for the applicant asserted that the applicant continued to perform duties while pursuing her Ph.D. and that denial of salary and benefits amounted to discrimination and violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record.
6. ANALYSIS :
6.1. The issue in the present O.A. revolves around, as to whether, the applicant is entitled to pay in respect of the Study Leave availed by her during the relevant period.
Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on paragraph 5 of the judgment dated 17.03.1998 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No. 2427 of 1997 ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 17 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV submitting that, despite the clear observations contained therein, the applicant's case has not been considered in a holistic manner and has instead been dealt with in a manner contrary to the applicable rules and provisions thereof. 6.2. Upon examination of the judgment dated 17.03.1998, the relevant paragraphs of which have been extracted hereinabove, it is evident that the learned counsel appearing for the respondent made the following categorical statement:
"Mr. Gupta, learned counsel further submits that there has not been any kind of discrimination against the petitioner whatsoever either with regard to her entitlement for the study leave or for grant of benefit of the earned leave. He further submitted that if the petitioner has any accumulated earned leave to her credit, she would be given benefit of the same per the Rules. He also submitted that in case the petitioner is further entitled for any study leave according to Rules the benefit of the same shall also be given to the petitioner."
6.3. The aforesaid submission made on behalf of the respondent cannot be construed as a concession. What was stated by the learned counsel for the respondent at the relevant point in time was that the case of the applicant would be considered in accordance with the applicable rules and that any benefit found admissible under the rules would be extended to her. Such a submission, by no stretch of the imagination, can be treated as a concession, as the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be read in isolation dehors the rule position or the statutory ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 18 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV provisions governing the field wherein the Committee had looked into all aspects.
6.4. Although it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no specific challenge to the Office Memorandum dated 25.02.1997 either in W.P.(C) No. 15357 of 2024 or in the present Original Application, the said objection cannot be sustained, as in W.P. No. 2427 of 1997 a specific challenge was laid to the Memoranda dated 31.08.1995 and 25.02.1997.
6.5. We have to consider the case of the applicant on merits rather than on technical pleas. It is also evident that after obtaining the no-demand certificate, including the settlement of dues towards leave encashment on 31.07.2003, the applicant, after a lapse of about three years, again began to re-agitate the issue relating to the payment of salary for the relevant period by submitting a communication in the year 2006. Such representations continued intermittently from 2006 till the issuance of the legal notice dated 31.10.2023. It was only in the year 2024 that the applicant chose to file a Writ Petition.
6.6 The present Original Application is required to be adjudicated in the context of the aforementioned factual position. It is a settled principle of law that successive representations do not give rise to a fresh or belated cause of ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 19 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV action. If the applicant was aggrieved by the response to her initial representation, it was incumbent upon her to avail the appropriate legal remedy in accordance with the law within the prescribed time.
6.7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2025 [arising out of SLP (C) No. 6289 of 2019], The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others, decided on 24.04.2025, observed as follows:
"24. The self-imposed restrictions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial precedents of this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say, unexplained delay or laches is considered one of the factors which could assume significance in denying relief when the discretionary writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate case, a writ court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if the applicant's negligence or omission to assert his right combined with undue delay or laches and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal.
25. However, although limitation laws do not apply to writ jurisdiction, in relation to service disputes triable under the 1985 Act the laws of limitation traceable in Section 21 read with Section 20 thereof do apply.
....
27. As noted in S.S. Rathore (supra) and as is still the present position, service rules (rules relating to conduct, discipline and appeal, leave, pension, etc.) governing public servants do have provisions providing for first appeals, second appeals (not ordinarily), revisions against original/appellate orders, or memorials (not ordinarily). In rare cases, such rules may also provide for representations against actions which affect the public servants and are perceived by them to be not in accordance with law. In any event, even though service rules may not provide for a representation, there could be cases (to be discussed hereafter) where omission or failure to consider and dispose of a representation could give rise to a claim to move the CAT.
28. We may, at this juncture, clear the position that the CAT does have, in exceptional cases, the power to entertain an original application under Section 19 of the 1985 Act even if the applicant before it has not exhausted the remedies ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 20 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV available to him under the service rules applicable to him as to redressal of grievances. If any authority on the point is required, one may profitably refer to the decision in D.B. Gohil v. Union of India(2010) 12 SCC301 .
29. Coming back to Section 20, the purport of the opening words of sub- section (2) read with sub-section (1) thereof, which we have highlighted above, leaves no manner of doubt that the word "remedies" referred to therein, used as a noun, mean the "remedies" that are statutorily available as to redressal of grievances under the relevant service rules. However, in a case where the service rules do not provide any scope for representation to be made, the aggrieved public servant without making an unprovided for representation, i.e., a non-statutory representation, and without waiting for its disposal, may approach the CAT directly challenging the order/action that has prejudicially affected his right and left him aggrieved; and, if any objection as to non-exhaustion of remedy before the departmental authorities is raised before the CAT by the authorities, the same can well be countered by urging that the service rules do not provide any statutory remedy by way of a representation to the departmental authorities against the order/action under challenge.
30. There could, however, be innumerable cases where formal orders may not exist affecting the rights of public servants covered by the 1985 Act but affectation of their rights could arise out of silence or inaction of the employer to confer an otherwise legitimate benefit. What is the recourse available in such a case? In such cases, it is eminently desirable that steps be first taken by the public servant to invite the attention of the employer to such affectation of rights for the same to be addressed by the employer. Suppose, a public servant is due for promotion or is due for a pay raise or claims entitlement to any service benefit which, according to him, is due but the employer has remained silent or inactive in not giving the public servant what is due to him. In such cases, the only way of espousing one's grievance is through a representation bringing to the notice of the employer that grant of the service benefit, though due, has not been considered and that the grievance be redressed. If the grievance is not redressed despite receiving the representation and despite expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 1985 Act, in such cases, the CAT cannot throw out an original application by holding that the remedy by way of a representation is not provided in the service rules. However, the public servant has to be cautious and take care not to wait indefinitely for espousing his grievance from the date affectation of his right begins. If he does wait indefinitely, he does so at his own peril."
6.8. It is equally true that once the dues of the applicant were settled after she opted for voluntary retirement, there was, in ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 21 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV the strict sense, a severance of the employer-employee relationship. Consequently, any claim pertaining to the period prior to such voluntary retirement was required to be raised within a reasonable time. Such a reasonable period cannot be stretched to nearly two decades merely by submitting successive representations.
6.9. The applicant's case can also be looked into on the principle of estoppel, as she cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time, particularly after such an inordinate delay and the severance of the employer-employee relationship upon her voluntary retirement and settling all the claims without any protest. Taking note of the assurance given by the learned counsel for the respondents in the earlier round of litigation, it cannot be said that any vested or legitimate right accrued to the applicant so as to entitle her to lay a claim on that basis alone.
6.10 In Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 41, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"20. Estoppel by conduct in modern times stands elucidated with the decisions of the English Courts in Pickard v. Sears, 1837 6 Ad. & El. 469, and its gradual elaboration until placement of its true principles by the Privy Council in the case of Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha, (1891-92) 19 IA 203, whereas earlier Lord Esher in the case of Seton Laing Co. v. Lafone, 1887 19 Q.B.D. 68, evolved three basic elements of the doctrine of Estoppel to it:
"Firstly, where a man makes a fraudulent misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to its true detriment: Secondly, ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 22 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV another may be where a man makes a false statement negligently though without fraud and another person acts upon it: And thirdly, there may be circumstances under which, where a misrepresentation is made without fraud and without negligence, there may be an Estoppel." Lord Shand, however, was pleased to add one further element to the effect that there may be statements made, which have induced other party to do that from which otherwise he would have abstained and which cannot properly be characterized as misrepresentation. In this context, reference may be made to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in the case of Craine v. Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1920 28 C.L.R. 305. Dixon, J. in his judgment in Grundt v. The Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines Pty. Ltd., 1938 59 C.L.R. 641, stated that:
"In measuring the detriment, or demonstrating its existence, one does not compare the position of the representee, before and after acting upon the representation, upon the assumption that the representation is to be regarded as true, the question of estoppel does not arise. It is only when the representor wished to disavow the assumption contained in his representation that an estoppel arises, and the question of detriment is considered, accordingly, in the light of the position which the representee would be in if the representor were allowed to disavow the truth of the representation."
(In this context see Spencer Bower and Turner: Estoppel by Representation, 3rd Ed.). Lord Denning also in the case of Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance Ltd., 1956 (3) All ER 905, appears to have subscribed to the view of Lord Dixon, J. pertaining to the test of 'detriment' to the effect as to whether it appears unjust or unequitable that the representator should now be allowed to resile from his representation, having regard to what the representee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the representation, in short, the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party who altered the situation upon the faith of it cannot complain. His complaint is that when afterwards the other party makes a different state of affairs, the basis of an assertion of right against him then, if it is allowed, his own original change of position will operate as a detriment, (vide Grundts: High Court of Australia (supra))." 6.11. As regards the attempt to equate the case of the applicant with that of two faculty members, namely, Dr. A. Malhotra, Additional Professor, Nuclear Medicine, and Dr. Sarman Singh, Associate Professor, Department of Laboratory Medicine, who were allegedly accorded study leave, we are of the view that the applicant has failed to place any material on ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.01.09 09:50:52 NI +05'30' 23 Item No. 79 O.A. No. 4616/2024 Court No. IV record to substantiate such parity. The initial burden of proof in this regard squarely lies upon the applicant. Nothing has been brought on record to demonstrate that the said faculty members had also opted for voluntary retirement at the relevant point of time, as is the case with the applicant herein. Employees who voluntarily sought and obtained VRS benefits and severed their relationship with the respondent-institution stand on a distinctly different footing. The applicant, therefore, cannot claim parity with those employees who continued in service, duly discharged their functions, and thereafter superannuated in the normal course.
7. CONCLUSION:
7.1. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the view that the present O.A. is liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
7.2. Pending M.A.s, if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/as/
ANKIT ANKIT
SAKLANI
SAKLA 2026.01.09
09:50:52
NI +05'30'