Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Priyabrata Gangopadhyay vs The State Bank Of India & Ors on 30 January, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
W.P.A. 6387 of 2018
Priyabrata Gangopadhyay
-Vs-
The State Bank of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sourav Prasanna Mukherjee
Mr. Arka Mondal
For the respondents/Bank : Mr. S. Pal Chaudhuri
Mrs. Tithi Paul
Ms. Shilpi Paul
Heard on : 04.08.2025, 01.09.2025
Judgment on : 30.01.2026
Uploaded on : 04.02.2026
Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-
1. The petitioner joined the State Bank of India as a Clerk-cum-Typist on
21st September, 1981. His entire service career of more than 35 years
postulated unblemished, dignified marked by integrity, diligence and
exemplary performance without an instance where the respondent-Bank
suffered any "financial or reputational damage". He asserted the hierarchy
through a series of meritorious promotions to Senior Management Grade
Scale-IV in 2013.
2. The petitioner's service tenure portrayed multifarious assignments in
several branches and administrative units including IIT Kharagpur
Branch, Bagmari Branch, HG More, Bankura, Datan, Ashok Nagar,
Jiaganj, Adra, Konnagar, Onda, Howrah, RBO-I to RBO-VI, Siliguri Zonal
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Office Corporate Sector (Inspection and Audit), Hyderabad and other
postings across the Bengal circle. At no point of time, had the Bank ever
alleged any act of misconduct, impropriety or behavior unbecoming of an
officer against the petitioner, nor had the bank suffered any pecuniary
loss or "reputational injury" on account of his conduct.
3. The petitioner asserted the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him
in 2016 were foundational upon alleged lapses pertaining to the
submissions of TA bills, which according to him were inadvertent in
nature and devoid of mens rea.
4. The petitioner contended to have relied upon one Shri Uttam Ghosh, a
transport operator, who had been an approved hired vehicle provider for
several branches of the respondent Bank for over fifteen years. The
petitioner submitted Shri Ghosh had transported the petitioner's
household articles from Bankura to Konnagar and had issued a bill of
Rs.22,000/- towards transportation and labour charges.
5. The petitioner averred that the bill was submitted bona fide without
knowledge of any irregularity concerning the transporter's fitness
certificate or operational status. The subsequent deposition of the said
transporter before the Enquiry Officer, denying portions of his earlier
stand was contended to be a self-serving attempt to escape tax liability
rather than reflection of the petitioner's intent or conduct. The petitioner
emphasized that the departmental enquiry was conducted without
supplying him relevant reports, including the report of the enquiry
conducted at his residence to verify the transportation of household goods
which vitiated the entire disciplinary proceedings as it caused grave
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prejudice to his defence and violated the settled principles of natural
justice.
6. The petitioner's case further revealed although alleged lapses related to a
miniscule financial component of approximately Rs.3,100/- the bank
chose to impose the highest major penalty of removal from service, by
order dated 19th November, 2016 at a time when the petitioner had nearly
two years of service left before superannuation. The Order of removal, it is
urged, disregarded the petitioner's spotless, meritorious service record of
more than 3 decades and stands in clear violation of principle securing
proportionality in disciplinary punishment vis-à-vis recognition of long
unblemished service.
7. Moreover the authorities failed to apply independent and judicial
consideration to the gravity of the alleged lapses vis-à-vis the extreme
punishment imposed. He asserted that the punishment had been
shockingly disproportionate, arbitrary and vitiated by non-consideration
of relevant factors and non-supply of material documents. The petitioner
should, therefore, be entitled to all admissible dues including those
withheld on account of punitive order together with consequential benefits
through setting aside of the impugned order of removal from service.
8. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner submitted the genesis of
the proceedings rest upon alleged irregularities in the submission of TA
bills relating to tour cycles dated 02.12.2015, 08.03.2016 and 16.03.2016
for local tours dated 12.02.2016, 16.02.2016 and 18.02.2016 for which
the authority decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings under major
penalty against the petitioner as per Rule 68(i) of the State Bank of India
Officers' Service Rules. The cumulative financial value involved had been
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of Rs.3,100/-. It was alleged two bills were inadvertently submitted for the
same tour dates and one was sanctioned without cancellation of the
duplicate. The petitioner submitted in a span of 35 years, he had
submitted over 600 TA bills and no previous discrepancy had ever been
recorded.
9. The Enquiry Authority conducted proceedings under Rule 68(2)(ii) holding
one out of two charges as fully proved and the remaining partly proved.
The alleged financial implication was quantified at Rs.3,100/- of which
the petitioner argued against any percentage of wrongful personal gain to
have accrued which otherwise caused in perceivable loss to the bank.
10. The penalty imposed however was the highest major penalty removal from
service resulting in secession of petitioner's remaining service tenure
approximately 2-3 years short of superannuation and extinguishment of
all terminal benefits. In comparative disciplinary data placed by the
petitioner for some charges of TA irregularity involving sums between
Rs.2,000/- and Rs.10,000/- penalties imposed in the years 2012 to 2017
ranged from (i) Censure, (ii) withholding of one increment and (iii)
reduction of one stage in pay.
11. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner, therefore, asserted the
punishment imposed on him represented a complete deviation from the
respondent Bank's established penalty norms for equivalent financial
lapses. It was further highlighted that the transport operator Shri Uttam
Ghosh had been an approved transport offender for multiple SBI
branches over 15 years issuing dozens of bills annually. The petitioner
relied on this data to argue bona fides and absence of intent to commit
fraud.
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12. The enquiry report dated 26.09.2016 was forwarded to the petitioner who
furnished his representation within 7 days as required under Rule
62(2)(iii) of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules. The Appellate
Authority deciding the appeal on 26.05.2017 upheld the finding of lapses
but did not furnish any comparative analysis of proportionality or
quantify the degree of alleged ill-motive.
13. The Review Authority by order dated 05.12.2017 occurred without fresh
statistical scrutiny. The petitioner, therefore, asserted for a charge value
of Rs.3,100/- with no proven wrongful gain, no proven financial loss to
the bank, no prior misconduct in 35 years, a removal penalty resulting in
earlier secession of service and forfeiture of retirement benefits had been
statistically disproportionate, administratively aberrant and
jurisprudentially intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
14. The Learned Advocate representing the respondent submitted that the
petitioner, a Scale-IV Chief Manager of the State Bank of India was at all
material times governed by the SBI Officers' Service Rules, 1971 and was
fully aware of his statutory obligations as a Senior Officer handling public
funds. Under the said Rules, travelling allowance is reimbursable strictly
to the extent of actual expenses duly supported by authentic documents.
15. It was contended that upon his transfer from Patna, the petitioner
submitted a TA bill of Rs.88205/- inclusive a kachcha bill issued by one
Uttam Ghosh claimed to be a transport operator who allegedly
transported the petitioner's household goods from Bankura to Konnagar.
16. It was further asserted said Uttam Ghosh when examined as PW-2
categorically admitted that he was not a transport operator but merely a
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car hiring service provider who supplied passenger vehicles to various
branches of the Bank. He further stated that he had not transported the
household goods of the petitioner nor had he issued any cheque transport
bill evidencing such movement. It was further urged that the petitioner's
claim of Rs.22,200/- towards transportation charges was unsupported by
any lawful receipt. The bill carried neither acknowledgement of cash
payment, nor any revenue stamp as mandated.
17. The vehicle mentioned in the TA bill, i.e., WB 25A 8353 was proved to be
backlisted with its fitness certificate having expired in July 2005 and was
registered in the name of an unrelated private individual therby returning
the petitioner's explanation demonstrably untenable.
18. It was further contended that the petitioner had fraudulently claimed
reimbursement twice for the same tour programme dated 12.02.2016,
16.02.2016 and 18.02.2016 having submitted TA bills both on
08.03.2016 and 16.03.2016, each containing different conveyance
charges despite identical tour dates. This duplication was proved through
PEX 11 and PEX 12 corroborated by PW-1.
19. The respondents, therefore, submitted that mala fides and ill-motive were
clearly established. It was further submitted the articles of charges were
accordingly framed including (i) submission of a fabricated transport bill,
(ii) unauthorized claim of Rs.22,200/-, (iii) use of a fictitious vehicle, (iv)
duel reimbursement for the same journey, (v) misrepresentation of
conveyance charges and (vi) actions amounting to deliberate cheating of
the bank; each of these charges, the Learned Advocate representing the
respondent asserted, stood conclusively proved in the departmental
proceedings.
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20. Rule 68(2)(iii) of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules, 1992
states as follows:-
"68(2) ...
(iii) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the Disciplinary
Authority shall frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of the
allegations against the officer and the articles of charge, together with
a statement of the allegations on which they are based, list of
documents and witnesses relied on and as far as possible copies of
such documents and statements of witnesses, if any, shall be
communicated in writing / sent to the officer, who shall be required to
submit within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary
Authority (not exceeding 15 days) or within such extended time as
may be granted by the said Authority, a written statement of his
defence."
21. It was further contended that the Enquiry Officer's report, after due
consideration of oral and documentary evidence, found the petitioner
guilty on all counts. The report was duly furnished to the petitioner, who
filed his reply. Thereafter applying independent judgment and considering
the gravity of misconduct, the disciplinary authority imposed the major
penalty of removal from service under Rule 67(i) of the State Bank of India
Officers' Service Rules after granting personal hearing on 23.11.2016.
22. The Appellate Authority affirmed the penalty on 28.06.2017 finding clear
lapses and ill-motive on the petitioner's part aimed at unlawful pecuniary
gain. Reviewing authority likewise rejected the review, thus, confirming
the findings at the respective stages.
23. It was further urged that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules without deviation from principles of
natural justice. It was further asserted that no material document was
withheld and no prejudice was demonstrated by the petitioner.
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24. The Learned Advocate representing the respondent relied on the following
decisions:-
i. In K. Vinod Kumar Vs. S. Palanisarry & Ors.1, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-
"11. The law is settled that over proceedings and decisions taken in
administrative matters, the scope of judicial review is confined to the
decision-making process and does not extend to the merits of the
decision taken. No infirmity is pointed out in the proceedings of the
Selection Board which may have the effect of vitiating the selection
process. The capability of the appellant herein to otherwise perform as
an LPG distributor is not in dispute. The High Court was not, therefore,
justified in interfering with the decision of the Selection Board and the
decision of BPCL to issue the letter of allotment to the appellant herein."
ii. In Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar.2, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"13. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for
judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions.
Administrative action is stated to be referable to the broad area of
governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise
every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether
legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error
in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly
arbitrary. (See State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. [(1988) 4 SCC 59 :
AIR 1988 SC 1737] ) At one time, the traditional view in England was
that the executive was not answerable where its action was
attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor de Smith in
his classical work Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn., at
pp. 285-87 states the legal position in his own terse language that the
relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly
1
(2003) 10 SCC 681
2
(2003) 4 SCC 579
9
summarized as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested
can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any
particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by
the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely
address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates
of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each
individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do
what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been
authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all
relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant
considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or
to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act
arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be
grouped in two main categories : (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and
(ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not,
however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly
fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into
account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another
body it acts ultra vires.
14. The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of
immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to
deployment of troops, entering into international treaties etc. The
distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness
of the courts to assert their power to scrutinize the factual basis upon
which discretionary powers have been exercised. One can conveniently
classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action
is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality",
the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural impropriety". These
principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC
374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] (commonly known as CCSU case). If the
power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of
mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as
manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative)
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is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are
patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated.
(See CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. [(1983) 4 SCC 392 : 1983 SCC
(Tax) 336 : AIR 1984 SC 1182] ) The effect of several decisions on the
question of jurisdiction has been summed up by Grahame Aldous and
John Alder in their book Applications for Judicial Review, Law and
Practice thus:
"There is a general presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of
the courts so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude
judicial review are construed restrictively. There are, however,
certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the
paradigm, which the courts regard themselves as incompetent to
investigate, beyond an initial decision as to whether the
Government's claim is bona fide. In this kind of non-justiciable area
judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also
been said that powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative are
inherently unreviewable but since the speeches of the House of
Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174
(HL)] this is doubtful. Lords Diplock, Scarman and Roskill appeared
to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based
upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that
judicial review can be limited by the subject-matter of a particular
power, in that case national security. Many prerogative powers are
in fact concerned with sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for example,
foreign affairs, but some are reviewable in principle, including the
prerogatives relating to the civil service where national security is
not involved. Another non-justiciable power is the Attorney-
General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal
proceedings on behalf of the public interest."
15. The court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to
administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability
enumerated above : like illegality, irrationality and procedural
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impropriety. Whether the action falls within any of the categories has to
be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient."
iii. In Principal Secretary Govt. A.P. & Anr. Vs. M. Adinanayane3, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"24. The order of the Administrative Tribunal interfering with the well-
considered order of TDP is unwarranted. APAT cannot sit as a court of
appeal over a decision based on the finding of the enquiry authority in
disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which
the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably
supported the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not
the function of APAT to review the same and reach a different
conclusion. So, it is well settled that if the findings recorded by the
tribunals or of the disciplinary authorities, are found to be perverse,
which are not based on the legal evidence, then the Administrative
Tribunal or the court is empowered to treat such flaw as a legal flaw
and quash the impugned action. In the instant case, the fact-finding
authority has based its findings on legally permissible substantive
evidence. And, therefore, such a finding on fact based on substantive
evidence is not permissible to be interfered with.
25. In our opinion, the Administrative Tribunal cannot ignore the
findings of the disciplinary authority or the tribunals. The truth or
otherwise of the charge is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go
into. The finding of the court or tribunal under judicial review which, in
our opinion, cannot extend to the re-examination of all evidence to
decide the correctness of the charge. In our view, the Administrative
Tribunal cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on finding
of the enquiry authority in disciplinary proceedings. This Court, time
and again, categorically stated that court should not interfere with the
quantum of punishment where there is some relevant material which
the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material has
reasonable support, the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary
Tribunal. It is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review
3
(2004) 12 SCC 579
12
the same and reach a different finding than that of the disciplinary
authority.
26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the examination of
the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal but only a review of
the manner in which the decision was made. We have, therefore, no
hesitation in setting aside the order of the Andhra Pradesh
Administrative Tribunal and the judgment of the Division Bench of the
High Court for reasons stated (supra). The order passed by the
Government removing the respondent from service is in order and,
therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant State stands allowed.
Further, there will be no order as to costs."
iv. In Apparel Export of Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra4, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review
of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while
exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the
fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative
authority after following the principles established by law and the rules
of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to
meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely
within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority."
v. In State Bank of Patialia & Ors. Vs. S.K. Sharma5, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-
"32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the preceding
para, would setting aside the punishment and the entire enquiry on the
ground of aforesaid violation of sub-clause (iii) be in the interests of
justice or would it be its negation? In our respectful opinion, it would be
the latter. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests
of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that
technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice
4
(1999) 1 SCC 759
5
AIR 1996 SC 1669
13
are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice
are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be
perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-
productive exercise.
33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above
discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are
evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders
of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee
consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation
of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such
enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the
Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a
substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as
explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or
the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is
this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a
reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent
officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his
interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be
said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed.
Except cases falling under -- "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no
hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural
provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice,
viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent
officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it
is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to
be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside
the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is
established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no
interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered
that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a
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fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of
prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such
cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where
there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of
the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an
opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case,
the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the
delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-
evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a
case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person
has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very
aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and
mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated
under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same
aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct
principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a
mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined
from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may,
the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside
only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the
delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a
mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the
provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded
against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it
must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said
requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to
have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside
on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found
that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the
provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal
should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the
order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the
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Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] . The ultimate test is always the
same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be
called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to
observe the principles of natural justice -- or, for that matter,
wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature
and impact of the order/action -- the Court or the Tribunal should
make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule
of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as
explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction
must be made between "no opportunity" and
no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing"
and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed
would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if
one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for
the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in
accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the
latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi
alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of
prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is
whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent
officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders
to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is
made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of
rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down
elsewhere.]
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary
principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must
always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective
underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to
ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which
16
should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that
arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public
interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem.
In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State
interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an
appropriate decision.
34. Now, in which of the above principles does the violation of sub-
clause (iii) concerned herein fall? In our opinion, it falls under Principles
Nos. 3 and 4(a) mentioned above. Though the copies of the statements
of two witnesses (Kaur Singh, Patwari and Balwant Singh) were not
furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes
therefrom more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two
witnesses, Balwant Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was
examined. The respondent did not raise any objection during the
enquiry that the non-furnishing of the copies of the statements is
disabling him or has disabled him, as the case may be, from effectively
cross-examining the witnesses or to defend himself. The trial court has
not found that any prejudice has resulted from the said violation. The
appellate court has no doubt said that it has prejudiced the
respondent's case but except merely mentioning the same, it has not
specified in what manner and in what sense was the respondent
prejudiced in his defence. The High Court, of course, has not referred to
the aspect of prejudice at all."
vi. In Lolit Popli Vs. Canara Bank and Ors.6, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as follows:-
"11. To start with, the approach of the learned Single Judge as regards
evidence of V.K. Sakhuja is clearly erroneous. Even if there were
adverse remarks (which we find related to 1958-59), that did not affect
the credibility of his evidence to treat it as totally irrelevant and to be no
evidence in the eye of law. What was required was a careful analysis of
6
(2003) 3 SCC 583
17
evidence, if it was brought to the notice of the authorities that his
evidence has been doubted in the past. Nothing could be shown to us
as to how the report in this particular case suffers from any infirmity.
There is no finding recorded by learned Single Judge to that effect. On
that score alone the Division Bench was justified in upsetting the
learned Single Judge's decision.
12. Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the
Evidence Act") deal with opinion of experts and comparison of
signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved. Section 45
itself provides that the opinions are relevant facts. It is a general rule
that the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skill is admissible.
There was no challenge to the expertise of V.K. Sakhuja. He deposed to
have testified in about ten thousand cases relating to disputed
documents. Though the employee highlighted certain adverse remarks,
it cannot be lost sight of that they were about four decades back. But
we need not go into that aspect in detail as no infirmity in the report
acted upon by the authority in the present case was noticed or could be
pointed out."
vii. In Sub-Divisional Officer, Kouch Vs. Maharaj Singh 7, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-
"5. In view of the submissions made at the Bar, we have scrutinised the
impugned order of the High Court. A bare perusal of the same makes it
crystal clear that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 has reappreciated the entire evidence, gone into the question
of burden of proof and onus of proof and ultimately did not agree with
the conclusion arrived at by the enquiring officer, which conclusion was
upheld by the disciplinary authority as well as the U.P. Public Service
Tribunal. It has been stated by this Court on a number of occasions that
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory one
and not an appellate one, and as such the Court would not be justified
in reappreciating the evidence adduced in a disciplinary proceeding to
alter the findings of the enquiring authority. In the aforesaid premises,
7
(2003) 9 SCC 191
18
we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 in interfering with the
findings arrived at by the enquiring authority by reappreciation of the
evidence adduced before the said enquiring authority. We, therefore, set
aside the impugned order of the High Court and the writ petition filed
stands dismissed. This appeal is allowed."
viii. In S.B.I. & Anr. Vs. Bela Bagchi & Ors.8, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as follows:-
"15. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty
and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers.
Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps
to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with
utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing
which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are
inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank.
As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional
Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
1194] , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit
which resulted in the case, when the officer/employee acted without
authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a
bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and
operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is
by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against
the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being
so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance."
ix. In State Bank of India Vs. R.D. Pandey9, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as follows:-
"21. Confronted with the facts and the position of law, learned counsel
for the respondent submitted that leniency may be shown to the
respondent having regard to long years of service rendered by the
respondent to the Bank. We are unable to countenance such
8
(2005) 7 SCC 435
9
(2006) 7 SCC 212
19
submission. As already said, the respondent being a bank officer holds
a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements
of functioning and it would not be proper to deal with the matter
leniently. The respondent was a Manager of the Bank and it needs to
be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion,
diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank
employee and in particular the bank officer so that the confidence of the
public/depositors is not impaired. It is for this reason that when a bank
officer commits misconduct, as in the present case, for his personal
ends and against the interest of the bank and the depositors, he must
be dealt with iron hands and he does not deserve to be dealt with
leniently."
x. In Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held as follows:-
"36. In our considered opinion, the appellant's contention that the
punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegation of
corruption, is without merit. It is a settled legal proposition that the
disciplinary authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for a
proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality
and fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which
prohibits State authorities from treating varying degrees of misdeeds
with the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a
function of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must
also factor the financial effect and societal implication of such
misconduct. [Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532, paras 14-16 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582] But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of
disciplinary proceedings courts only interfere on grounds of
proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is
inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the court itself is
shocked. Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal,
removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and
impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need
10
(2020) 9 SCC 471
20
to send a clear message of deterrence to the society. Charges such as
corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples
of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly."
xi. In Union Bank of India Vs. Bachan Prasad Lall11, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-
"10. The nature of allegation against the respondent employee was of
fraudulently preparing nine credit transfer vouchers on various dates on
the pretext of payment of interest towards fixed deposits and crediting
the whole amount to one saving account opened in the name of one Smt
Asha Devi (admittedly the fake account prepared by respondent
employee). In order to adjust the said amount, he manipulated the other
book records of the Bank using forged signatures. After such nature of
allegations stood proved, the disciplinary authority, after taking into
consideration the record of inquiry and the post held by the respondent
employee, punished him with the penalty of dismissal from service.
11. The finding of guilt recorded by the enquiry officer in his report was
confirmed at all later stages by the disciplinary/appellate authority and
even after judicial scrutiny by the Division Bench in the impugned
judgment but still refrained from interference on the premise that the
employee had superannuated in the year 2007."
25. The petitioner had an indubitably long and impeccable service career
spanning approximately for 35 years. However, the present challenge
arises not from the past performance but from specific delineated
allegations of misconduct emerging from events concentrated within a
particular period. The departmental enquiry unearthed the following:-
a) Submission of kachcha transport bill issued by a person, who
upon deposition asserted he was not a transport operator and
had not transported the petitioner's household goods,
11
AIR 2022 SC 943
21
b) Claim of Rs.22,200/- unsupported by any lawful receipt,
acknowledgement of payment, revenue stamp or goods list,
c) Mention of a vehicle in the TA bill that was blacklisted, with
fitness certificate lapse since 2005 and registered in the name of
an unearthed third party,
d) Double claims of TA for identical tour dates on 08.03.2016 and
16.03.2016 with different conveyance charges proved by
documentary evidence and deposition.
e) A Composite pattern of misconduct amounting to false
representation and unauthorized pecuniary gain.
26. The petitioner attributed these lapses to inadvertence, reliance of a
familiar transporter and absence of mala fide intention. Without being
oblivious of these explanations, the materials to have been relied upon in
the enquiry including depositions of PW-1 and PW-2 and the documentary
exhibits disclosed that the charges have not been merely technical defects
but substantive violation.
27. In Union of India & Ors., Vs. P. Gunasekaran12, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as follows:-
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note
that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the
enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is
not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
12
(2015) 2 SCC 610
22
India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High
Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting
the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can
be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.
23
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] , many of the above principles have been
discussed and it has been concluded thus : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant
: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court
in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court
may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have
held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of
the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly
held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed
before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of
the Constitution."
...
19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible 24 evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford Dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence, etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values."
28. In Union of India & Ors., Vs. Subrata Nath 13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"14. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are malafides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere.
15. In the above context, following are the observations made by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra):13
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617 25 "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of 26 legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel6 this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.
...
18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
16. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya7, a two Judge Bench of this Court held as below:
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.27
Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India8, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham9, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana10 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil11).
[Emphasis laid]
17. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu12, a two Judge Bench of this Court referred to several precedents on the Doctrine of Proportionality of the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and held that:
"21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved."
...
19. In Union of India v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan14, a two Judge Bench of this Court made the following pertinent observations:
"23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by 28 such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.
24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons."
20. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa (supra) held that if the order of dismissal is based on findings that establish the prima facie guilt of great delinquency of the respondent, then the High Court cannot direct reconsideration of the punishment imposed. Once the gravity of the misdemeanour is established and the inquiry conducted is found to be consistent with the prescribed rules and reasonable opportunity contemplated under the rules, has been afforded to the delinquent employee, then the punishment imposed is not open to judicial review by the Court. As long as there was some evidence to arrive at a conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority did, such an order becomes unassailable and the High Court ought to forebear from interfering. The above view has been expressed in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur15.
21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested 29 with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor."
29. The petitioner was served with the article of charges, the statement of imputations, list of documents and the names of witnesses, copy of the enquiry report and was granted opportunity to submit reply and to participate in the enquiry. There is no demonstrable material placed to establish that any crucial document was withheld or any procedural safeguard was denied. Allegations of prejudice must be specifically proved however none was specifically characterized.
30. The enquiry was conducted in accordance with Rule 68 of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules. The disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and reviewing authority; each applied independent mind and rendered reasoned findings. No perversity is disclosed.
3031. Bank officers hold fiduciary positions where probity is paramount even a since proven charge of misrepresentation or dishonest claim is capable of attracting major penalty. The charges had been multiple, the evidence was cogent and the conduct established was incompatible with the standards expected of a senior officer.
32. This Court exercising judicial review under Article 226 cannot re-
appreciate or substitute Court's view that of disciplinary authority. Bank officers occupy positions of trust; misconduct affecting financial claims strikes at the heart of the institutional integrity.
33. The petitioner laboured to portray the departmental action as arbitrary, disproportionate and vitiated by procedural lapse. However, the materials placed on behalf of the respondent reveal a chain of acts that were neither accidental nor innocuous. The statement of a transport bill placed on a vehicle long blacklisted, the absence of any contemporaneous evidence of payment, the non-production of revenue stamps mandated for claims exceeding the prescribed limit and the repeated claim of travelling allowance for identical tour dates constitute serious lapses. These findings are not conjectural and stand fortified by the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, by the document seized in the enquiry and by the petitioner's own documents which oscillated justification and retraction.
34. The petitioner after receiving the relevant documents and the enquiry report participated in the disciplinary proceedings, submitted statements and was afforded a personal hearing. The Appellate and Reviewing Authority applied their minds rendered reasoned findings and affirmed the penalty. No threat of perversity, mala fides or violation of natural justice is detected that could justify judicial intervention.
3135. Misconduct touching claims, reimbursements and financial submissions corrodes that trust. Even a solitary proven charge in such matters can warrant stern action. Indulgence cannot be stretched to the point of undermining the discipline essential for the functioning of a public financial body.
36. In Iqbal Nath Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"8. The only other question left open for consideration was relating to violation of Rule 15 and the proportionality of the punishment by taking into account the period of service as 35 years. As noted above earlier, the violation of Rule 15 was not a point in issue before the Division Bench. We, therefore, do not propose to deal with the same in this appeal. We, therefore, confine our consideration only to the question of proportionality of the punishment. It was not brought to our notice relating to any Rule or condition of service to state that the service put in by the deceased appellant in the Army can be tagged along with the service after his re-employment in the Cabinet Secretariat. In the said circumstances, it will have to be held that the service can be counted only from the date of his re-employment, namely, 27.8.1986 and the date of his removal from service i.e. on 17.11.2006, namely, twenty years and three months. The misconduct found proved was the alleged forged acknowledgments for having submitted the medical bills and false claim for having availed treatment for a value of more than Rs.1.5 lacs. It is not in dispute that though such claims were made by the deceased appellant, the same was not sanctioned, since even before that the respondent decided to take action against the deceased appellant.
9. Taking into account the said factors, we are of the view that though the act of misconduct found proved cannot be dealt with lightly, the punishment of removal may not be warranted while the other major 14 Civil Appeal No. 3198 of 2016 32 punishment of compulsory retirement would meet the ends of justice. Therefore, we are convinced that the punishment of compulsory retirement, which is also one of the major punishments under Rule 11
(vii) can be imposed instead of removal from service taking into account the long service of twenty years put in by the deceased appellant.
10. With the said modification in the matter of punishment, the impugned order of the High Court stands confirmed. Based on the said modified punishment of compulsory retirement whatever terminal benefits as well as family pension payable to the dependents of the deceased appellant shall be processed and wherever it needs to be granted, the same may be granted by passing appropriate orders."
37. Rule 67 Major Penalties in Chapter XI of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules, 1992 replicated as follows:-
"67.....
Major penalties
(f) save as provided for in (e) above reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the officer will earn increments to pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay;
(g) reduction to a lower grade or post;
(h) compulsory retirement;
(i) removal from service;
(j) dismissal.
........"
38. The misconduct on the part of the petitioner does not under any circumstance warrant reinstatement in the service. The petitioner was afforded necessary hearing and had participated in the disciplinary proceedings bereft of prejudice to his encumbrance. The inadvertence 33 claimed by the petitioner cannot be a mitigating factor in presence of glaring abhorrent act on his part. To uphold the dignity and trustworthy functioning of a financial institution the Senior Officials should be embodiment of fairness and integrity for others to emulate which the petitioner had failed to exemplify. The punishment of removal from service accordingly does not shock the conscience of this Court.
39. However, seeking reference to the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Nath Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra), considering the continuous period of 35 years of service, the respondent Bank may, on an application filed by the petitioner, consider the modification of punishment of removal from service to the punishment of compassionate retirement which constitutes a major punishment as enumerated above, entitling the petitioner to terminal benefits, pension etc.
40. In view of the above discussions, the instant writ petition being WPA 6387 of 2018 is disposed of.
41. There is no order as to costs.
42. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)