Karnataka High Court
Balumal P. Seth vs Giriyappa on 19 February, 1991
Equivalent citations: ILR1991KAR1256
Author: B.P. Singh
Bench: B.P. Singh
ORDER B.P. Singh, J.
1. These three Revision Petitions arise out of the order of the First Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, dated 3rd August, 1989 in H.R.C.No.392/1986. The learned Judge by his impugned order passed an order of eviction of the petitioners herein on a finding that they were the sub-tenants of the tenant against whom a ground for eviction under Section 21(1)(p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', was made out by the landlords. Since the tenant was liable to be evicted, the petitioners, who were his sub-tenants, were also liable to be evicted from the premises in question. The question involved in the three Revision Petitions before me being identical, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this Common Order.
2. A few facts which are not in dispute may be stated thus:-
One Gangadharappa was the owner of a vacant site bearing old No. 206 (late No. 218) current No. 6, situated at Srinivasa Mandir Road, Balepet Cross, Bangalore, Respondents 1 to 3 in these Petitions are the successors in interest of the aforesaid Gangadharappa. They shall hereafter be referred to as 'the landlords'. Gangadharappa executed a lease deed in favour of Ananth Rai L. Parekh - respondent No. 4 in these Petitions, hereinafter referred to as 'the tenant'. By the said deed of lease, Gangadharappa demised the petition schedule plot of land for a period of 20 years on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- to the aforesaid tenant. It is not necessary to refer to the manner of payment envisaged under the said deed of lease as the same is not material. However, the lease deed provided that the tenant shall construct a building according to the plan got sanctioned by the Corporation by Gangadharappa. The term of the lease was 20 years. The building was to be constructed by the tenant at his own expense, and apart from the ground floor and the first floor as shown in the plan, the tenant was at liberty to construct other storeys thereon and use it for himself and for others at his instance according to his convenience. After the expiry of 20 years the tenant was to deliver possession of the building as it then stood with atleast the ground floor and the first floor, to Gangadharappa or his successors in interest without any claim from the lessee or his successors in interest. The building thus delivered was to be the absolute property of the aforesaid Gangadharappa or his successors in interest. The tenant was to pay the building tax and water charges as well as the electric charges to the concerned Departments till the expiry of the lease, The building tax was to be paid in the name of the landlord, namely, Gangadharappa The tenant was authorised to demolish the existing building on the schedule site at his expense. The lease deed also provided as follows:-
"(5) The lessee may let or sub-let any portion or the whole of the premises to anybody whomsoever he likes. But the lessee shall deliver possession of the same to the lessor or to his successors-in-interest at the expiry of the lease."
It is not in dispute that the tenant constructed a building on the aforesaid plot and inducted tenants in portions of the building constructed by him. The petitioners in these Petitions are sub-tenants said to have been inducted by the tenant pursuant to the authority given to him to do so under the lease deed, dated 6th of January 1966. Only the petitioner in C.R.P.6042/1989 claimed that the tenant had inducted one Dinesh B. Mulani as a sub-tenant and that the petitioner was only a consulting Optician, who came to the premises for his professional work. The real tenant was the aforesaid Dinesh B. Mulani and not the petitioner. It is not necessary to go into this question because even if it is assumed that the petitioner was inducted as a sub-tenant by the tenant, the result of the Petition will be no different. It may be observed that Gangadharappa died before the expiry of the term of the lease and the landlords became the owners of the suit plot as his successors-in-interest.
3. The landlords gave notice to the tenant on 1-8-1984, as also to the petitioners herein, calling upon them to handover vacant possession of the building on 6-1-1985, as the term of 20 years fixed under the lease was to expire on that date. The tenant and the sub-tenants did not respond to the said notice nor did they vacate the premises despite another notice dated 19-1 -1986.
4. The landlords filed a petition under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act contending that the tenant and the sub-tenants were liable to be evicted on various grounds. The case of the landlords was that since the tenant was a defaulter, he was liable to be evicted under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act. Since respondents 2 to 8 were unauthorised occupants being sub-tenants, they were also liable to be evicted under Section 21(1)(f) of the Act. It was the case of the landlords that in view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Act, once a decree for eviction was passed against the tenant on any ground whatsoever, the sub-tenants were also liable to be evicted from the premises pursuant to the same decree. The other grounds on which eviction was sought were those under Sections 21(1)(d)(h)(j) and (p) of the Act, namely, user of schedule building for illegal purposes, bona fide personal need, bona fide requirement of the schedule building for immediate demolition and erection of a new building in its place, and the tenant having acquired a suitable building for his purpose. As earlier observed the two other grounds under Section 21(1)(a) and (f) related to the tenant being a defaulter, and the tenant having unlawfully sublet part of the petition schedule building. The learned Judge, Small Causes, by his impugned order negatived all the grounds except one, on which eviction was claimed. He held that the tenant was not a defaulter within the meaning of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. He also held that the petition schedule premises was not being used for any illegal purpose. He also held that in terms of the lease deed, subletting of the portion of the petition schedule building by the tenant was permissible and therefore was not unlawful but was in accordance with the terms of the agreement. There was therefore no unlawful subletting of the premises by the tenant. He also held that the landlords had no bonafide personal need for the premises in question. He also negatived the claim of the landlords that they reasonably and bonafide required the petition schedule building for the purpose of demolishing and erecting a new building in its place. He, however, found that the tenant had acquired another suitable building for his purpose and on the basis of the evidence on record he held that the tenant had shifted to his own building, which was suitable for the purpose of his own business. The ground for his eviction therefore, under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act was made out.
5. Having held that the tenant was liable to be evicted under Section 21(1)(p) or the Act, the learned Judge went on to consider whether the sub-tenants were also liable to be evicted on that ground.
He observed that these tenancies had come into existence after the coming into force of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. The definition of "tenant" under Section 3(r) of the Act did not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant after coming into force of this Act. Such a person put in occupation of the premises or part thereof by the tenant with or without the consent of the landlord was not given statutory right of a tenant. When the tenancy of the main tenant was determined, the sub-tenants who had been inducted after coming into force of the Act acquired no right to resist the order obtained by the landlord against the main tenant in view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Act. Thus, if an order was made for recovery of possession of such premises against the main tenant, that order shall be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises including suit-tenants. The landlord was entitled to vacant possession of the premises by evicting all such persons therefrom. Thus, an order of eviction of the tenant under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act having been passed, all the sub-tenants were liable to be evicted from the premises since they enjoyed no statutory protection.
6. Learned Counsels for the petitioners (sub-tenants) contended before me that the order of the learned Judge is patently erroneous and proceeds on the wrong assumption that a lawful sub- tenant is not entitled to the protection of the beneficial provision of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. It was submitted that the ground under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act was a ground made out against the tenant personally for his eviction. It was not found that all the sub-tenants have also acquired alternative premises for their use and occupation. Thus, the mere fact that the tenant was liable to be evicted under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act, was no ground for holding that the sub-tenants were also liable to be evicted, in the absence of a finding that they too had acquired alternative accommodation for their use and occupation. Such a decree could not be executed against the sub- tenants, and Section 30 of the Act did not support the case of the landlords as it was inapplicable in the facts of this case. It was further submitted that the sub-tenants, who were put in occupation of the premises with the express consent of the landlord acquired the rights of a tenant, and were entitled to the same protection under the Act as a tenant. It was therefore contended on their behalf that the decree for eviction of the tenant obtained on the ground envisaged under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act could be executed only against the said tenant who had acquired a suitable alternative premises and not against the sub- tenants, who had not acquired such premises.
On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the respondents- landlords that a sub-tenant is not a tenant under the Karnataka Rent Control Act as is apparent from a bare perusal of Section 3(r) of the Act. A sub-tenant therefore is not entitled to the protection which the Act extends to the tenants. The fact that the landlord authorised the tenant to induct sub-tenants has only this limited effect that the tenant cannot be evicted on the ground of unlawful subletting. That however will not protect the sub-tenant's right to remain in possession when the main tenancy itself comes to an end. Reliance was placed on Sections 23 and 30 of the Act in support of this proposition. It was therefore submitted that the Court below has come to the correct conclusion, and once the tenancy of the main tenant came to an end, the sub-tenants must be evicted from the premises along with the tenant.
7. I shall first consider the question as to whether a sub-tenant is entitled to any protection under the Act. Learned Counsels for the petitioners (sub-tenants) did not urge that in all cases a sub-tenant would be entitled to such protection. They confined their submission to only those sub-tenants who have been inducted as such by the tenant with the express consent of the landlords i.e., lawful sub-tenants. We are therefore concerned only with the cases of such sub-tenants, who have been inducted as such by the tenant with the consent of the landlord. In this connection some of the provisions of the Act may be noticed. Section 3(r) of the Act defines a tenant as follows:
"(r) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and includes the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority."
Section 21(1)(f) provides for eviction of a tenant if he has unlawfully sub-let the premises. It provides as follows:
"(f) that the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein and where the subletting, assignment or transfer has been made before the coming into operation of this part (except in respect of subletting, assignment or transfer to which the provisions of Section 61 are applicable), such sub letting, assignment or transfer has been made contrary to any provision of law then in force".
The provisions of Clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 must be read along with Sub-section (3) of Section 21, which provides as follows:
"(3) For the purposes of Clause (f) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) the Court may presume that the premises have been sublet by a tenant -
(a) in any case where such premises have been let for use as residence if the Court is satisfied that any other person not being a servant or a member of the family of such servant has been residing in the premises or any part thereof for a period exceeding one month otherwise than in commensality with the tenant; or
(b) in any case where such premises have been let for non-residential purposes if the Court is satisfied that the tenant without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord has allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises ostensibly on the ground that such person is a partner of the tenant in the business or profession but really for the purpose of sub-letting such premises to that person."
Sections 22 and 23 of the Act may also be noticed. They provide as follows:
"22. Sub-tenant to become tenant on determination of tenancy - Where the interest of a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof has been lawfully sub-let before the coming into operation of this Act shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued.
23. Tenant not to sub-let or transfer after commencement of this Part - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, but subject to any contract to the contrary, it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of this Part, for any tenant to sub-let whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein:
Provided that the State Government may, by notification, permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases and to such extent as may be specified in the notification:
Provided further that nothing in this Section shall apply to a tenant having a right to enjoy any premises in perpetuity.
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of Sub-section (1), shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees."
8. The definition of a tenant under Section 3(r) no doubt excludes a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant, but it is well settled that the definition must always be read in the context. When we examine the provisions of Section 21(f) of the Act, it will appear that in order to attract the provision, there must be unlawful subletting. The provision therefore contemplates unlawful subletting as a ground for the eviction of the tenant. The question then arises as to whether an eviction can be ordered even if the tenant has lawfully sublet the premises. The answer must obviously be in the negative. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 gives some indication as to what may constitute lawful subletting. Clause (b) of Section 21(3) provides that where, the premises has been let for non-residential purposes, if the Court is satisfied that the tenant without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord has allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises ostensibly on the ground that such person is a partner of the tenant, the Court may presume that the premises has been sublet by a tenant. Obviously therefore if the tenant obtains the written consent of the landlord before) inducting a sub-tenant, that would not amount to unlawful subletting within the meaning of Section 21(1)(f) of the Act. The Act therefore does make a distinction between unlawful subletting which attracts the provisions of Section 21(1)(f) of the Act and lawful subletting which will not attract that provision.
9. That the Act does extend protection even to sub-tenants in some cases is also supported by the provisions of Section 22 of the Act. The Section affords the protection of the Act to lawful sub-tenants, who had been lawfully inducted before the coming into operation of the Act. It provides that in case the interest of the tenant is determined for any reason, the sub-tenant to whom the premises had been lawfully sublet before coming into the operation of the Act shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued. This leaves no room for doubt that a sub-tenant lawfully inducted before the coming into force of the Act becomes a deemed tenant under the Act if the interest of the tenant is determined for any reason. Obviously therefore, if the interest of the tenant of any premises is determined on any of the grounds mentioned in the Act, such as default in payment of rent, or his having acquired suitable alternative premises, the ground being personal to the tenant will not have the effect of rendering the sub-tenants liable for eviction if the sub-tenancy in their favour was created lawfully before the coming into force of the Act In such a case, even if the tenant is evicted, the sub-tenants shall be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions.
10. Section 22 deals with the case of a sub-tenant, who had been inducted as such before coming into force of the Act. On the other hand, Section 23 deals with subletting of premises by a tenant after the coming into force of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 23 provides that it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of Part V of the Act for any tenant to sublet whole or any part of the premises let to him. This however is made expressly subject to any contract to the contrary. The prohibition therefore is against the creation of a sub-tenancy without there being a contract to the contrary. If the contract between the landlord and the tenant authorises the tenant to induct sub-tenants, such a sub-tenancy cannot be characterised as unlawful and contrary to the provisions of Section 23 of the Act. Such a sub-tenant cannot be said to be an unlawful sub-tenant and in my view to such a sub-tenant as well the same protection is afforded as the sub-tenant envisaged under Section 22 thereof. In principle, I find no distinction between a sub-tenancy lawfully created before the coming into force of the Act and one created after the coming into force of the Act so far as it relates to the grant of protection to a lawful sub-tenant. I am therefore of the view that if a sub-tenancy is created in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, such a sub-tenant is also deemed to be a tenant for the purpose of the Act in case the interest of the tenant is determined for any reason.
11. Having regard to the provisions of Section 3(r), Section 21(1)(f) read with Section 21(3), Sections 22 and 23 of the Act, I have no hesitation in holding that the Act prohibits unlawful subletting and provides that as a ground for the eviction of the tenant along with the unlawful sub-tenant. The Act also envisages lawful subletting of premises i.e., where a tenant is authorised by the landlord to induct sub-tenants. In such a case, when the interest of the tenant is determined for any reason, the sub-tenant must be deemed to become a tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions and subject to the provisions of the Act. This is because the authority to sub-let emanates from the landlord himself. I further hold that the protection afforded to a lawful sub-tenant, whose sub-tenancy is not in contravention of the provisions of the Act, is the same as the protection afforded to a lawful sub-tenant under Section 22 of the Act. If I am right in my conclusion, Section 30 of the Act will not come to the aid of the landlords because the aforesaid Section does not apply to any person, who has an independent title to such premises. If the sub-tenant is deemed to be a tenant upon the determination of the interest of the tenant, he acquires an independent title to the premises, and therefore a decree obtained against the tenant cannot be executed against such lawful sub-tenant. In the instant case, the lease deed itself authorises the tenant to let or sublet any portion or whole of the premises to anybody whomsoever he likes. There is therefore clear authority in the written agreement providing for letting or subletting of premises by the tenant. The subletting therefore is lawful and not contrary to any of the provisions of the Act. Consequently, even if the tenancy of the tenant is determined on any ground, that would not entail the eviction of the sub-tenants as well with the aid of Section 30 of the Act. I hold that a lawful sub-tenant is also a tenant in the context of Section 21 of the Act.
It is only unlawful subletting which furnishes a ground for the eviction of the tenant. In the case of lawful subletting, even if the interest of the tenant is determined, the lawful sub-tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant and entitled to the same protection as any other tenant under the Act. There is no ground to distinguish between a lawful sub-tenant under Sections 22 and 23 of the Act and in both cases the lawful sub-tenant, whether his sub-tenancy was created before the coming into operation of the Act or thereafter, will be entitled to the same protection as is envisaged in Section 22 of the Act. Even in the absence of express words to this effect in Section 23, such an interpretation effectuates the legislative intention.
12. I shall now refer to some of the authorities cited at the Bar.
In ABDUL AZEEZ v. SAKAMMA, relied upon by the Counsel for the landlords, there are observations which support the conclusion, which I have reached. It was observed:
"10...................In fact, Section 30 specifically states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of a tenant is determined, for any reason and an order made by a Court for recovery of possession under this Act shall be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises. The proviso states that nothing in this Section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such premises. Mere fact of impleading of sub-tenant as a party to the proceeding will not oust the jurisdiction. Sub-tenant in whose favour sub-lease is created after coming into force of this Act, if otherwise lawfully permissible, gets relegated to the status of a tenant vide Section 22 of the Act. In sum and substance, issue as to whether sub-lease is with the consent or authorisation of owner or in contravention of Clause (f) exclusively lies within the jurisdiction of the Court as defined and by implication general jurisdiction of the Civil Court is deemed to have been ousted.........."
In MAHABIR PRASAD v. SURINDER KAUR, the Supreme Court was considering the case of a tenant, who inducted a sub-tenant with written permission of the landlord under the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. No doubt under Section 13 of that Act, a tenant could be evicted only if he had sublet the entire building or any portion thereof without the written consent of the landlord. The Supreme Court observed in that context that a sub-tenant who was lawfully inducted was also recognised by the statute to be a tenant within the meaning of the Act and he must necessarily enjoy the protection against eviction afforded to a tenant by the Act. I have earlier held that a lawful sub-tenant becomes a deemed tenant under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act after determination of the tenancy of the tenant. In my view therefore the observations of the Supreme Court Mahabir Prasad's case will apply with equal force to the case of sub-tenant whose subtenancy is lawful and does not violate any of the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court observed:
"26...............The right of possession that the sub-tenants enjoy on the basis of lawful induction as sub tenants is assured to the sub-tenants as a "tenant" within the meaning of the Act. As a tenant in spite of the determination of his tenancy continues the right to remain in possession as a statutory tenant and enjoys the protection against eviction by virtue of the provisions contained in statute, a sub tenant who is lawfully inducted is also recognised by the statute to be a, "tenant" within the meaning of the Act and he must necessarily enjoy the protection against eviction afforded to a tenant by the Act. A lawful subletting on the basis of the provisions of the Act does not become unlawful merely because the contractual tenancy of the tenant comes to an end. A tenant incurs the liability to be evicted, if the tenant after the commencement of the Act sublets without the written consent of the landlord; and the tenant who has lawfully sublet with the written consent of the landlord must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction on that ground. Subletting lawfully done with the written consent of the landlord does not become unlawful merely on the ground that the contractual tenancy has come to an end. Subletting to constitute a valid ground for eviction must be without the consent in writing of the landlord at the time when the tenant sublets any portion of the sub-tenant."
13. Learned Counsel for the landlords placed strong reliance on two Judgments of the Madras High Court reported in DEVARAJA BHATT v. V.S. RAJ, and in EXPRESS ESTATES LTD. v. MODERN FURNISHING HOUSE, . Those Decisions are obviously distinguished because those Decisions proceeded on the basis that under the Madras Act a sub-tenant as such was not recognised, and if a landlord brought a suit in ejectment a sub-tenant let into possession could not raise any question and submit that he had a status under the Act which could be safeguarded by its provisions. In the instant case, I have found that a sub-tenant lawfully inducted with the consent of the landlords does enjoy a status under the Act, which has to be safeguarded.
The decision of this Court reported in MAHAVEERA v. MANGARAJ, can be of no assistance to the landlords because in that case, it was found that the petitioner was enjoying the premises in the tenancy created in favour of the tenant and had no independent right regarding the tenancy. Since, he had no independent status as a tenant, he was bound by the eviction decree passed against the tenant and in terms of Section 30 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, he was liable to be evicted. The case is clearly distinguishable because that was not a case in which a sub-tenant was found to have been lawfully inducted as a sub-tenant.
14. The learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon a decision reported in CARONA SHOE CO. LTD. v. K.C. BHASKARAN NAIR, . That was a case, where the tenants claimed that they were tenants of the building inducted into possession by the mortgagee as a mode of enjoyment, and that the mortgage deed authorised the mortgagee to enjoy the building by letting it out and they were not liable to be evicted through a decree of Court in a redemption suit without an order under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. It was held by the Supreme Court that the mortgagee was not entitled to induct tenants who would continue beyond the term of existence of mortgage or who would be given rights even after the expiry of mortgage. There was no concurrence or approval of mortgagor for continuance of tenants after expiry or redemption of mortgage. There was therefore no landlord and tenant relationship between tenant and mortgagor. It was further found that the induction of the tenant was not an act of prudent management and therefore the tenant was not entitled to the protection of Rent Act. In my view, cases of tenants claiming from a mortgagee stand on a different footing altogether, because in such cases, except in case where the mortgagor agrees or where the lease specifically and categorically makes exception in favour of the tenants that they would continue to be in possession even after the expiry or termination of the mortgage, and those leases are acts of prudent management, the tenants inducted by the mortgagee will not be entitled to the protection under the Rent Act after the redemption of the mortgage.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision reported in CHANDRA BAI v. TUKARAM, 1977(1) KLJ 270. In my view, that decision is of no assistance to the petitioners because in that case it was held that there was no subletting of the premises because the subject matter of the lease was only the land and not the super-structure. Section 21(1)(f) was not attracted in that case. Similarly, in TIRATH RAM v. GURUBACHAN SINGH, it was not found that the subletting was not lawful. These authorities in my view do not help the petitioners.
16. In GOPAL PRABHU v. MARK ALOYSIUS PEREIRA, ILR 1986 KAR 926 the eviction of the tenant was claimed on several grounds including default in payment of rent, bonafides personal need of the landlord and that the tenant had committed breach by sub-leasing the premises in question without the consent of the landlords. It was held in that case, that the obligation to pay rent was on the tenant and if he failed to do so, a sub-tenant could not interpose himself and offer to discharge the obligations beyond the time specified in the Statute. In my view, this decision also is of no assistance to either of the parties in this case.
17. Learned Counsel for the petitioners placed considerable reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. K.A. DHAIRYAWAN v. J.S. THAKUH, . The learned Counsel for the landlords also relied upon the same Judgment and submitted that the decision supported his case that the landlords became the owners of the building constructed by the tenant on the schedule plot. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision was considering a case where the trustees of the Mankeshwar temple had executed a registered lease in favour of the respondent whereby they demised a parcel of the land for a period of 20 years. Under the terms of the lease, the lessee had to construct a double storeyed building within six months consisting of shops on the ground floor and residential rooms on the upper floor. On the termination of the lease either at the end of 21 years or earlier, the lessee was to surrender and yield up the demised premises including the building with its fixtures and appurtenances to the lessors without any compensation for the same. Shortly before the lease was to expire, the lessors gave notice to the lessee to deliver possession of the demised premises and the building on the expiry of the lease. Despite the notice to quit, the lessee did not vacate the demised premises. The trustees thereafter filed a suit for declaration that they were entitled to the building in suit and were entitled to claim possession of the same and to recover the rents and profits thereof. The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit observed that the trustees were entitled to the declaration sought for. It was hold that the period of the lease having expired and the respondents having been given notice to quit, they were bound to vacate the demised premises unless they were protected by the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The Court found that the respondents were entitled to continue in possession as tenants of the land within the meaning of the Bombay Act and that they could be evicted only in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. The Court, however, hold that the Bombay Act did not have the effect of continuing the lease beyond the period specified in the lease. All that the Act did was to give to the person, who continued to remain in possession of the land, although the period of the lease had come to an end, the status of a statutory tenant. The appellants were entitled to a declaration that the building constructed on the land demised linear the least; belonged to Mankeshwar Temple Trust and the said Trust was entitled to recover all the rents and profits from the same. The Court had earlier noticed that the respondent had agreed to handover the building to the lessors without the right to receive compensation at the end of the lease, the matter being entirely one of contract between the parties. It may be noticed that so far as this case goes, it only holds that notwithstanding the expiry of the lease, the lessee may seek protection of the Rent Act. This did not amount to an extension of the lease, which came to an end by efflux of time, The property after expiry of the lease became the property of the Trust as agreed to between the parties. The Trust was therefore entitled to its declaration of title and the right to recover all the rents and profits. It was not a case where eviction of the tenants was sought by the trustees and therefore the question as to whether the sub-tenants acquired a status under the Bombay Act which was to be protected did not arise for consideration of the Court.
Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the instant case, all that can be said is that the landlords in view of the contract became the owners of the super-structure on the expiry of the term of the lease, and if they so desired, could recover rent from the sub-tenants. However, for seeking eviction of the tenants, they have necessarily to resort to the procedure laid down in the Karnataka Rent Control Act, which they have done in the instant case. They have therefore to make out a ground for eviction of the occupants from the premises in question. The decision in Dr. Dhairyawan's case can be of no assistance in deciding whether in pursuance of the decree for eviction passed against the tenant, the sub-tenant can also be evicted with the aid of Section 30 of the Act, because the status of the sub-tenants inducted by the tenant did not fall for consideration before the Supreme Court.
18. The only other authority which requires to be considered is the one reported in MOHANDAS v. VIJAYA S. KAIKINI, 1979(1 )KLJ 115. This Court was dealing with a case where the landlord had claimed a decree for eviction on three grounds, namely, that the tenant had without the landlord's consent erected a permanent structure, that he had unlawfully sublet the premises, and that the premises were reasonably and bonafide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. The trial Court had granted a decree on all the three grounds. But on appeal, the District Judge upheld the eviction on the grounds specified in Clauses (c) and (h) only, which included the ground of personal bonafide need of the landlord. It was held by the District Judge that the sub-tenancy was lawful and had been created before coming into force of the Act. In the context of Section 22 of the Act an argument was advanced before this Court that where the subletting was not unlawful, the landlord, who wanted to get possession of the premises had to bring two separate proceedings, one against the tenant in chief and thereafter another against the sub-tenant, who is deemed to have become the direct tenant after such eviction of the tenant in chief, and that it was not permissible to the landlord to ask for a decree for eviction against both the tenant and the sub-tenant in the same proceeding by making both of them parties thereto. This Court after considering decisions of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court observed as follows: -
"We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid elucidations by the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta. Section 22 of the Act which provides that the sub-tenant becomes the tenant on determination of the tenancy, merely protects the interest of the sub-tenant when the tenant in chief surrenders the tenancy to the landlord or where the tenant in chief commits any default or otherwise incurs forfeiture of the tenancy or any ground personal to him, which entitles the landlord to determine the tenancy. Section 22 of the Act is not intended to defeat or delay the landlord obtaining possession of the premises for his own occupation or for demolition and reconstruction of the premises. We are unable to read aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Kasturbhai (supra) as laying down that where the landlord wants to occupy his premises which have been sublet by his tenant in chief and brings a petition or suit for eviction impleading both the tenant in chief and the sub-tenant as parties, a decree for eviction passed in such proceeding will be effective only against the tenant in chief and that thereafter the sub-tenant will become the tenant in chief for evicting whom the landlord should take separate proceeding."
In my view the law as declared by this Court does not help the landlords in the instant case. The ground on which the eviction of the tenant has been ordered is a ground personal to him, namely, that the tenant had acquired another suitable premises for his occupation. The ground on which eviction was sought was not common to the tenant and the sub-tenants. It has not been found that all the sub-tenants had also acquired suitable alternative premises. The aforesaid Judgment of this Court therefore is of no help to the landlords. If the eviction of the tenant as well as the sub-tenants was claimed on a ground common to all of them, such as on the ground of bonafide personal need for his own occupation or for demolition and reconstruction of the premises, it may not have been necessary for the landlords to file separate applications for the eviction of the tenant and the sub-tenants. That however, is not the case here, and the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid Judgment are therefore of no help to the landlords.
19. I therefore hold that under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, eviction of the tenant and sub-tenant can be claimed if the landlord establishes that the tenant has unlawffully sublet the premises to the sub-tenant. A case of lawful subletting will not attract Section 21(1)(f) of the Act as a ground for ordering the eviction of the tenant and the sub-tenant. Having regard to the provisions of Section 21 (1)(f) read with Section 21 (3) and Sections 22 and 23 of the Act it must be held that a sub-tenant, who is inducted by a tenant with the prior written consent of the landlord is a lawful sub-tenant. Such a sub-tenant becomes a deemed tenant when the interest of the tenant is determined for any reason. The protection afforded to a deemed tenant under Section 22 of the Act is equally available to a lawful sub-tenant inducted after coming into force of the Act, upon determination of the interest of the tenant in the premises. Such a lawful sub-tenant can therefore seek the protection of the Act including those under Section 21 of the Act. In the instant case, therefore, the learned Judge erred in law in holding that since the ground for the eviction of the tenant was made out under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act, the sub-tenants could also be evicted having regard to the provisions of Section 30 of the Act. If the tenants acquired the status of a deemed tenant upon termination of the interest of the tenant in the premises, they acquired an independent title to such premises and therefore Section 30 was inapplicable to their cases.
20. In this view of the matter, these Revision Petitions are allowed and the order of the First Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, dated 3rd of August, 1989 in H.R.C. No. 392/1986 in so far as it relates to the petitioners herein, is set aside, and the petition as against the petitioners herein filed by the landlords is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.