Gujarat High Court
National vs Hadabhai on 19 February, 2010
Author: H.K.Rathod
Bench: H.K.Rathod
Gujarat High Court Case Information System
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FA/794/2000 13/ 19 ORDER
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
FIRST
APPEAL No. 794 of 2000
With
FIRST
APPEAL No. 795 of 2000
To
FIRST
APPEAL No. 798 of 2000
With
CIVIL
APPLICATION No. 5327 of 2000
In
FIRST APPEAL No. 794 of 2000
To
CIVIL
APPLICATION No. 5331 of 2000
In
FIRST APPEAL No. 798 of 2000
=========================================================
1
Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2
To be
referred to the Reporter or not ?
3
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
5
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
=========================================================
NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED - Appellant(s)
Versus
HADABHAI
CHHANABHAI PARMAR & 2 - Defendant(s)
=========================================================
Appearance
:
MS
MEGHA JANI for
Appellant(s) : 1,
NOTICE UNSERVED for Defendant(s) : 1,
NOTICE
SERVED for Defendant(s) : 2 - 3.
MR RC JANI for Defendant(s) :
2,
MR HARESH H PATEL for Defendant(s) :
3,
=========================================================
CORAM
:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE H.K.RATHOD
Date
: 19/02/2010
ORAL
ORDER
1. Heard learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani appearing for appellant Insurance Co.
2. In all the cases, notice has been issued by this Court by substitute service which has been served to claimants by publication but, no appearance is filed by any of the claimants.
3. Present first appeals are preferred challenging Rs.25,000/- by appellant Insurance Co. The claims Tribunal, Amreli has decided application u/s.140 of MV Act filed by claimants being MACP Nos.620 to 624 of 1999, Exh.17, decided on 5.1.2000.
4. Learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani has raised contentions in appeals that claims Tribunal has failed to appreciate oral as well as documentary evidence and claims Tribunal has failed to appreciate that there is nothing on record which would even prima facie establish that the claimants was travelling in Chhakado rickshaw bearing registration No.GTP 7991 at the time of accident or that the claimants suffered permanent disability as a result of injuries sustained in accident. She also raised contention that claims Tribunal has failed to appreciate that requirement of Section 140 of MV Act having not been fulfilled in present case and hence, claims Tribunal ought not to have passed impugned award. The claims Tribunal has erred in passing award in view of the fact that claimants have not filed application under Section 166 of MV Act. She also submitted that claims Tribunal has failed to appreciate that if the evidence is recorded,the claimants would not be in a position to establish that claimants were travelling in the rickshaw at the time of accident. It appears that it is for this reason claimant has deliberately not filed application under Section 166 of MV Act. The claimants have not joined driver and Insurance Co. of rickshaw as a respondents and on such other and further grounds, as may be urged at the time of hearing of these appeals.
5. Today, learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani submitted that FIR has been filed by one Ishabhai Jusabbhai on 11.5.1995 at about 4.45 p.m. and accident occurred on 10.5.1995 at about 17.30 p.m. The place of accident is on eastern side, 2 km. away from Thana on the road of Ajitkhana Sari, Town Bit, Jamjodhpur. She relied upon statement made by complainant that on date of accident, they were travelling in chhakado rickshaw bearing registration No.GTP 7991 going to Ajit Pansari, meanwhile one matador of Water Resources Department, Jamjodhpur came from opposite side of Gigni village and dashed with chhakado rickshaw on right side and because he was sitting on left side that dash has been given to complainant by driver of matador and therefore, he received injuries of fracture and except him, no other persons received injury and matador driver has left place of accident and thereafter, he obtained primary treatment from Government Hospital and then, was shifted to Irvin Hospital. These are the facts stated by complainant in FIR. Relying upon this FIR, she submitted that in all five claim petitions under Section 140 of MV Act were filed by claimants. The FIR suggests that except one complainant, nobody was travelling in chhakado rickshaw. Therefore, according to her submission, all the claim petitions filed by claimants under Section 140 of MV Act is clearly a case of fraud committed by claimants against Insurance Co. just to receive an amount on basis of 'no fault liability'. Therefore, she having apprehension that though notice has been issued by this Court but, respondents claimants not served. Therefore, this Court has called for report from the District Judge, Amreli which has been received by this Court on 18.8.2001 where Advocate has supplied fresh and correct addresses of each claimant which is as under :
[TO BE SENT TO THE FIRST APEAL BRACH ] Below High Court Writ No.16249/2001 dated 01.08.2001 in High Court C.A. No.5331/00 in First Appeal No.1626/2000.
Forwarded with compliments to :
The Registrar, High Court of Gujarat At : Sola Ahmedabad.
[1] The writ is received on 17.08.2001 at 13-27 pm by fax. [2] A note has been made in the relevant Register. [3] Copy of this writ has been kept in the office file. [4] As per direction laid
down in the High Court C.A. No.5331/2000 in First Appeal No.1626/2000, the undersigned has made an inquiry about the correct addresses of the original claimants of M.A.C.P. (Claim Misc. Applications) No.620/1999, 621/1999, 622/1999, 623/1999 and 624/1999 by issuing notice to the original claimants and send a special Bailiff to serve the notices to the original claimants.
As per the report of the Bailiff, the original claimants are not residing at the addresses shown by the claimants in their claim petition. In pursuance of that in claim Misc. Application No.620/1999 the Bailiff has obtained authentic signature of Vallabbhai Valabhai, Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Kotada pitha. In Claim Misc. Application No.621/1999 and 622/1999 the Bailiff has obtained authentic signature of Shri Shashikant S. Malkan, Petition writer of Civil Court, Babra and Claim Misc. Application No.623/1999 and 624/1999 the Bailiff has obtained authentic signature of Jivabhai Karsnabhai, Member of Gram Panchayat, Untvad to the extent that the original claimants are not residing on the addresses shown by the claimants.
In further, the notice was also issued to the Learned Advocate for the original claimants. The notice was duly served on the Learned Advocate for the claimants to remain present before the Tribunal on 18.08.2001 at 10-30 a.m. positively, but the Learned Advocate for the claimants has given an application to the extent that his health is not well, hence he can not be remained present before the Tribunal. He has submitted a purshis of new addresses of the original claimants which is enclosed herewith. The new addresses of the original claimants are as mentioned below:
[1]Claim Misc. Appli. No.620/99Hadabhai Chhanabhai Parmar B/h. S.T. Bus Station Gondal.
Dist. Rajkot.
[2]Claim Misc. Appli. No.621/1999Daxaba hardevsinh Gohil Rupavati Road, Maftiyapara Gondal.
Dist. Rajkot.
[3]Claim Misc. Appl. No.622/1999Hardevsinh Ratansinh Gohil Rupavati Road, Maftiyapara Gondal.
Dist. Rajkot.
[4] Claim Misc. Appi. No.623/99Gangaben Govindbhai Harijan Bhagvatpara, Main Road,Same Kanthe, Gondal.
Dist. Rajkot.
[5]Claim Misc. Appli. No.624/1999Govindbhai Najabhai Harijan Bhagvatpara, Main Road,Sam Kanthe, Gondal.
Dist. Rajkot.
Encl : Copy of pursis of new
addresses of original claimants No.1 to 5
Dated 18.08.2001 District
Court, Amreli [ P.U. Rana ]
District Judge,
No.2347
of 2001
Amreli.
6. Learned
advocate Ms.Jani also submitted that this Court has passed an order on 30.9.2002 directing Insurance Co. to deposit entire awarded amounts and same is to be invested in a nationzlied bank by the Registry of this Court. Meanwhile, this Court has observed that Insurance Co. will take necessary steps to serve the claimants.
7. Civil Application Nos.3647 to 3651 of 2004 are filed by Insurance Co. with a prayer to permit substitute service as per Para.2A to respondent No.1 by publication of advertisement in daily newspaper circulated in the locality of Rajkot. Said applications have been preferred on 23.4.2004. Thereafter, she submitted that public notice was published on 2.9.2004 in local newspaper Fulchhab . She also submitted that after publishing notice to respondent No.1 in Fulchhab, as referred above, no appearance is filed by any of the respondents in these appeal means claimants have not appeared.
8. In view of aforesaid facts, she submitted that it is a clear case of fraud committed by claimants with the help of Advocate and also pointed out past incidents in respect to same Advocate where prosecution has been lodged against such advocate. Therefore, she submitted that on this ground, interim order passed by claims Tribunal may be set aside, because this interim order is as good as final because there is no other proceeding is initiated by claimants which can be tested the fact stated by claimants. In short, her submission is that because notice issued by this Court is not served to claimant and it has been served by publishing notice in Fulchhab and thereafter also, appearance is not filed and therefore, order passed by claims Tribunal is challenged in these appeals may bet set aside. Except that, no other submission is made by learned advocate Ms.Jani before this Court.
9. I have considered submissions made by learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani and also perused FIR which has been relied upon by her and interim order passed by claims Tribunal and also considered each ground mentioned in appeal memo. The question to be decided by this Court as an appellate Court is that merely claimants have not appeared in present proceedings, can it be presumed that claimants have committed fraud ? It is the duty of this Court to examine legality and validity of order under challenge independently, whether claimants can appear or not. This Court has also to consider the fact that whether any error committed by claims Tribunal while deciding application under Section 140 of MV Act or not, independently and without presence of claimants. Merely claimants have not appeared even in response to public notice in Fulchhab, the presumption cannot be drawn against them that they are lier and wrongly filed claim petitions and also committed fraud with claims Tribunal. I failed to understand the submissions made by learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani. Unless and until some concrete evidence is produced on record, such presumption cannot be drawn by this Court because the submission of appellants is that in FIR only one person mentioned the fact that he has received only injury because of dash by matador to chhakado rickshaw and no other persons' name is mentioned. Therefore, it should have to be presumed that in chhakado rickshaw except complainant nobody was travelling, cannot be accepted because in FIR even it is mentioned that no other person has received injury which suggests that some other persons were travelling on date of accident in chhakado rickshaw, those who have not received any injury. But it cannot be presumed that no other persons were travelling in chhakado rickshaw. Therefore, that submission factually incorrect, cannot be accepted.
10. The order which has been passed by claims Tribunal based on facts and pleadings of both parties. The claim petition was filed on 25.11.1999 which was examined and ordered to be registered by Registrar of claims Tribunal on 25.11.1999. Thereafter, notice has been issued by claims Tribunal to other side.
11. Learned advocate Mr.G.S.Suraiya was appearing on behalf of claimants, learned advocate Ms.B.R.Oza was appearing for respondent No.2 Insurance Co. and learned advocate Mr.S.N.Trivedi for respondent No.3. The opponent No.1 being an owner of matador has not chosen to appear in present claim petition. These applications preferred by claimants under Section 140 of MV Act. The opponent No.3 being the owner of rickshaw No.GTP 7991 has appeared through learned advocate Mr.S.N.Trivedi but he has chosen not to file written objection against present claim petitions. The opponent No.2 being Insurance Co. of matador has appeared through its learned advocate Ms.B.R.Oza and resisted the claim petition by filing written objection vide Exh.10. The claims Tribunal after hearing learned advocates appearing for respective parties, made following observations in Para.6, 3 and 4 as under :
6. Read the application and the documents produced in this case consist of copy of FIR at Mark 16/1, copy of Panchnama of scene of accident at Mark 16/2, copy of insurance policy of matador No. GRU 3229 of National Insurance Co. at Mark 16/3, copy of injury certificate issued by Dr. Rasesh Suchak, Orthopedic Surgeon, Rajkot at Exh.16/4, Copy of disablement certificate issued by Dr. Rasesh Suchak, Orthopedic Surgeon at Mark 16/5 and copy of RC Book of matador is at Exh.16/6. It appears from the pleadings that the accident and the involvement of the vehicles in question have not been disputed. Even from the material on record, it has been prima facie established that the accident in question is occurred. It appears on record that the matador No.GRU 3229 is insured with opponent No.2 Insurance Co.
3. Section 140 is a piece of beneficial and ameliorative legislation providing for immediate aid to the victims. The claimant is not required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned or of any other person. In construing social welfare legislation the Court should adopt a beneficial rule of construction and in any event, that construction should be preferred which the policy of the legislation. Moreover, while making an order under Sec.140 the Tribunal is not required to follow the procedure contained in Rules 211 to 230 and
232. Further no regular trial is to be held for awarding compensation under Sec.140. The Tribunal would be entitled to make award under Section 140 as soon as it comes to the conclusion that the owner of the vehicle was involved and insured.
4. Thus, the two ingredients attracting the provisions of Sec.140 of the MV act and the involvement of the vehicles and the injuries sustained to the applicant resulting from the accident is clearly established. In the result, I pass the following order.
12. The observations made by claims Tribunal after considering documents produced by claimants. Copy of FIR is at Mark 16/1, copy of Panchnama of scene of accident is at Mark 16/2, copy of insurance policy of matador is at Mark 16/3, copy of injury certificate issued by doctor is at Exh.16/4, Copy of disablement certificate is at Mark 16/5 and copy of RC Book of matador is at Exh.16/6. The following observations are very relevant and therefore, quoted as under :
It appears from the pleadings that the accident and the involvement of the vehicles in question have not been disputed. Even from the material on record, it has been prima facie established that the accident in question is occurred. It appears on record that the matador No.GRU 3229 is insured with opponent No.2 Insurance Co.
13. In view of aforesaid observations made by claims Tribunal, Amreli, the appellant Insurance Co. has not filed any application subsequently after receiving order from the claims Tribunal that aforesaid facts have been wrongly noted or observed by claims Tribunal. It is also necessary to note that before claims Tribunal, no such contention was raised that application u/s.166 of MV Act is not filed by claimants and in absence of that, application u/s.140 of MV Act is not maintainable. Therefore, now to raise such kind of contentions before this Court when Insurance Co. totally remained silent before claims Tribunal and its Advocate has not argued the matter properly before claims Tribunal, then it is not open for Insurance co. as an appellant to argue such kind of new contentions which have not been raised before claims Tribunal. Therefore, according to my opinion, claims Tribunal has rightly examined the matter under Section 140 of MV Act, coming to conclusion after considering documents which are produced by claimants that ingredients of Section 140/ 142 of MV Act has been satisfactorily established by claimants. Therefore, claimants are entitled amount of compensation in case of injury on principle of 'no fault liability'. Therefore, contention raised by advocate of appellant before this Court cannot be accepted. If any error in recording submissions or observations which is found to be incorrect or contrary to record, then immediate reaction of appellant would be to approach the claims Tribunal in stead of approaching this Court by filing appeal under Section 173 of MV Act.
14. The Apex Court has considered aforesaid aspect in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr. reported in AIR 1982 SC 1249. Relevant observations are in Para.4 to 8 which is quoted as under :
4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena.
"Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation".(1) We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call attention of the very judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error.(2) That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate (I) Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian, A.I.R 1926 P.C. 136. (2) (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan v. Chanderwati, A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 30. Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.
4-A. In Rev. Mellor, 7 Cox. P.C. 454 Martin was reported to have said: "we must consider the statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought to take his statement precisely as a record and act on it in the same manner as on a record of Court which of itself implies an absolute verity".
5. In Ring Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose (1): said, ".. these proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned judge as to what took place during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive; it is not to be criticised or circumvented; much less is it to be exposed to animad version".
6. In Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debi (2) Sir Asutosh Mookerjee explained what had to be done:
"It is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the Judge without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment"
7. So the judges, record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the judge himself, but nowhere else.
8. On the invitation of Mr. Sen, we have also perused the written submissions made by him before the High Court. We have two comments to make: First, oral submissions do not always conform to written submissions. In the course of argument, counsel, often, wisely and fairly, make concessions which may not find a place in the written submissions. Discussion draws out many a concession. Second, there are some significant sentences in the written submissions which probabilise the concession. They are: "If in the existing case, the entire Council of Ministers becomes interested in the use of the statutory power one way or the other, the doctrine of necessity will fill up the gap by enabling the Governor by dispensing with the advice of His Council of Ministers and take a decision of his own on the merits of the case. Such a discretion of the Governor must be implied as inherent in his constitutional powers.. The doctrine of necessity will supply the necessary power to the Governor to act without the advice of the Council of Ministers in such a case where the entire Council of Ministers is biased. In fact, it will be contrary to the Constitution and the principles of democratic Government which it enshrines if the Governor was obliged not to act and to decline to perform his statutory duties because his Ministers had become involved personally. For the interest of democratic Government and its functioning, the Governor must act in such a case on his own. Otherwise, he will become an instrument for serving the personal and selfish interest of his Ministers." We wish to say no more. As we said, we cannot and we will not embark upon an enquiry. We will go by the judges' record.
15. The Apex Court has considered aforesaid aspect in the case of Daman Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, reported in AIR 1985 SC 973. Relevant observations are in Para.13 which is quoted as under
:
13.
The final submission of Shri Ramamurthi was that several other questions were raised in the writ petition before the High Court but they were not considered. We attach no significance to this submission. It is not unusual for parties and counsel to raise innumerable grounds in the petitions and memoranda of appeal etc. , but, later , confine themselves , in the course of argument to a few only of those grounds , obviously because the rest of the grounds are considered even by them to be untenable. No party or counsel is thereafter entitled to make a grievance that the grounds not argued were not considered. If indeed any ground which was argued was not considered it should be open to the party aggrieved to draw the attention of the court making the order to it by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The time of the superior courts is not to be wasted in inquiring into the question whether , a certain ground to which no reference is found in the judgment of the subordinate court was argued before that court or not ?
16. The Apex Court has considered aforesaid aspect in the case of Shankar K. Mandal and Others v. State of Bihar and Others reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519 wherein it is held that It is not open for the appellants to take such stand before the Supreme Court, as they are bound by the observations of the High Court. If there was any wrong recording of the stands, the only course to the appellant was to move the High Court. Statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. It is also not open to contend that a plea raised was not considered.
17. The contention raised by learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani that application u/s.140 of MV Act is preferred by claimants but, application u/s.166 of MV Act is not preferred. Therefore, application u/s.140 of MV Act is not maintainable.
18. No doubt, no such contention was raised by appellant Insurance Co. before claims Tribunal, Amreli, even though this Court is considering such contention in light of decision of Full Bench of this Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kadviben Udabhai Rathwa and Anr. reported in 2006 (2) GLR 1257. Relevant observations are in Para.24 is quoted as under :
24. Having taken the bull by horns, conclusions irresistible may be summarized.
Section 140 (Chapter X)) provides for fixed sum of compensation in cases of no fault liability. It is independent of Section 161 (payment of compensation in cases of hit and run motor accidents), Section 163-A (payment of compensation on structured formula basis/fault liability Chapter XI) and Section 166 (fault liability Chapter XII). Application for compensation under Section 140 is maintainable without there being application for compensation under Section 163-A or under Section 166 and disposable accordingly, and compensation awarded shall be final. But, where two applications are filed under Section 140 and 163-A or under Section 140 and under Section 166, compensation awarded under Section 140 shall be reduced from the amount of compensation awarded under Section 163-A or under Section 166 provided the compensation awarded under the latter provisions are higher, otherwise, compensation paid under Section 140 would be final. Further, where claim is preferred only under Section 140 and not any other provision, compensation awarded under Section 140 shall be final. Section 140 does not provide for interim/ad-hoc compensation because compensation paid under this Section is final. `Interim/ad-hoc compensation' is used when apart from application under Section 140 there is also application under Section 163-A or under Section 166, since the amount of compensation paid under Section 140 is made deductible. Where in addition to application for compensation under Section 140 there is application under other provisions on principle of fault liability, application under Section 140 shall be disposed of in the first place, since expeditious disposal of application under Section 140 is the basic theme of this beneficial piece of legislation. But, where claimant has filed application under Section 140, but not under any other provision claiming compensation on fault liability principle, application is maintainable and compensation awardable, but not recoverable from the claimant. The insurance company is not entitled to seek trial on merit of any legal defences available to it under Section 149(2) of the Act. Remedy of insurance company is against the owner of the vehicle invoking defences available to it, but not against the claimant. Law laid down by this Court in Munshiram D.Anand Vs. Pravinsinh Prabhatsinh Anand Society, Navagamgedh, Jamnagar (Coram: S.D. Shah J.) (AIR 1997 GUJARAT 60), United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Maganlal Hirabhai Patel and others (S.D. Shah J.) (1999 ACJ 268), New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mithakhan Dinakhan Notiyar (Coram: J.M. Panchal J.) (1995(2) GLR 1111), Mahendrakumar Kalyanjibhai Vs. Haresh Bipinchandra Pathak (Coram:
M.S. Shah J.) (1998(2) GLR 1199) and Division Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Babubhai Purshottambhai Harijan and others (F.A.No.133 of 2006 with C.A. 527 of 2006) (Coram: Bhawani Singh C.J. and Abhilasha Kumari J.) is correct, contentions to the contrary untenable. Reference is answered accordingly.
What emerges out of the aforesaid conclusion is that there is no merit in these appeals. They are dismissed leaving the parties to bear respective costs of these appeals.
Since we have dismissed the Appeals, Shri Nanavati seeks stay of the judgment, which we hereby decline.
18.1 The net result of decision of Full Bench of this Court, as referred above, application u/s.140 of MV Act in absence of application u/s.166 of MV Act is maintainable in law which has been rightly examined by claims Tribunal, Amreli mostly on undisputed facts.
Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani cannot be accepted.
19. In light of this background and considering the observations made by Apex Court as well as this Court, it appears that no such efforts made by appellant to file such application before claims Tribunal. Therefore, contentions raised in memo of appeal as well as in oral by learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani cannot be accepted. While deciding application u/s. 140 of MV Act, it is not necessary to examine matter on merits which has rightly not decided by claims Tribunal and it required to be considered ingredients of Sections 140/42 of MV Act which has been satisfied claimants while producing relevant documents on record which has not been objected by advocate of Insurance Co. before claims Tribunal. Therefore, according to my opinion, there is no substance in first appeals. Accordingly, all first appeals are dismissed.
20. Learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani having an apprehension in light of the conduct of claimants as suggested by her before this Court that such type of application normally filed by claimants with help of Advocate and no such claimants are in fact available but, somebody else will take away the amount. This being a circulated fraud committed by some persons with the help of lawyer. Therefore, this being a same type of case where appeals are preferred by appellant Insurance Co.
20.1 I have considered the apprehension. This Court may take sufficient care by not disbursing the amount to any person without prior permission of this Court.
22. Learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani submitted that entire amount awarded by claims Tribunal together with cost and interest is deposited before this Court in all five appeals.
23. Therefore, the Registry of this Court is directed that whatever amount is deposited and invested by it in name of Registrar, same shall remain as it is and require periodical renewal with cumulative interest till this Court passes appropriate orders of disbursement. It is further directed to Registry in respect of all five appeals, not to disburse any amount to any claimant without prior permission of this Court. It is also directed to Registry not to accept any application of disbursement from any Advocate and claimant unless such copy of application is served to learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani.
24. It is made clear that aforesaid directions are issued just to safeguard the interest of appellant Insurance Co. against apprehension which has been voiced by appellant Insurance Co.
25. Since main first appeals are dismissed, no order is required to be made in CA Nos.5327 to 5331 of 2000. Accordingly, CA Nos.5327 to 5331 of 2000 are dismissed.
(H.K.RATHOD,J.) (vipul) Top