Madras High Court
M.S. Ramanathan vs The State Represented By Inspector Of ... on 1 September, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996CRILJ2273
JUDGMENT
1. In C.C. No. 5/83 on the file of the First Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Madurai, appellant Ramanathan, who was then a Superintendent in the Office of Central Excise (D Range) at Sivakasi, was convicted under Section 161 I.P.C. as well as under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the former offence and one year rigorous imprisonment for the latter offence, with an added fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three more months. Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.
2. Prosecution case in brief needs narration P.W. 2 Akkal Naicker is the owner of a match factory sitauted in Perianaickenpatti village. The match works was being run under the name and style 'Tamil Nadu Match Works'. He was running it from 1959. He had initially obtained a licence, which was current till 31-12-1985. Ex. P. 2 is the xerox copy of the said licence. At the time of receiving the licence in 1959, P.W. 2 had executed a bond for Rs. 500/- apart from taking a National Savings Certificate for Rs. 50/-. He knew the appellant. P.W. 2 became aware from traders similarly placed like him, that he may have to execute q bond for Rs. 2,000/- due to change in rules and regulations.
3. On 25-1-1983, P.W. 2 handed over an application to the appellant, seeking permission to use the label with inscription 'Nandi' on the matches manufactured in his factory. Appellant, on receipt of the application, appears to have acceded to the request made by P.W. 2, and Ex. P. 3, the photostat copy produced by the prosecution, substantiates granting of such permission. It was at that time, appellant had allegedly informed P.W. 2 that he will have to execute a bond for Rs. 2,000/- and the bond executed earlier by him for a lesser sum may not suffice. Appellant also allegedly directed P.W. 2 to prepare the bond and bring it to him. Approximately three months thereafter on 12-4-1983, P.W. 2 went over to the appellant over again and handed over a petition, informing him that work had to be suspended in his factory, since some repairs were being carried out. Ex. P. 4 is the letter handed over by P.W. 2 to the appellant. This document shows receipt by the appellant, in view of the initials put therein by the appellant. It is the case of P.W. 2 that even on this occasion, appellant reminded him about the execution of the bond for a greater value.
4. Meanwhile, in the third week of April, 1983, P.W. 8, an Inspector of Central Excise, inspected the factory of P.W. 2, and informed him that the appellant had gone on leave and was expected to join duty only on 3-5-1983. P.W. 8 also directed P.W. 2 to meet the appellant on that date. Accordingly, between 11 a.m. and 12 noon, P.W. 2 met the appellant at his office. Appellant directed P.W. 2 to produce the bond, with a copy, on the next evening and further demanded payment of Rs. 50/-, as bribe to him. It is also the case of P.W. 2 that the appellant then told him, that he would sign the bond only in the event of payment of Rs. 50/-, for otherwise, he would keep the matter pending. Appellant had also instructed P.W. 2 to have the matter typed in stamp papers valued at Rs. 31/-. Since, P.W. 2 was averse to payment of bribe, he complained to the Sivakasi Police Station orally. He was informed by the local police that they had no power to take action and hence directed him to P.W. 6 Subbiah Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, whose office was situated at Madurai. P.W. 2 proceeded to Madurai and met P.W. 6. In his turn, P.W. 6 informed P.W. 2 that he too did not have jurisdiction, since the offence complained of related to an officer of Central Government. However, he introduced to P.W. 2, P.W. 9 Krishnan, Deputy Superintendent, C.B.I., Madras, who was then available at Madurai, in connection with an enquiry, in a crime registered by his Bureau. P.W. 9 escorted P.W. 2 to a lodge, where he was halting at Madurai. He scribed the complaint narrated by P.W. 2 and on an affirmation that the statement had been correctly recorded, P.W. 9 obtained the signature of P.W. 2 in the said compliant, which stands marked as Ex. P. 6. Thereafter, P.W. 9 instructed P.W. 2 to be present at Sivakasi Bus stand at 12 noon on the next day with Rs. 50/- to be handed over to the appellant, in the event of a demand being made. P.W. 2 was also directed to have a witness along with him. As advised by P.W. 9, on the next day at noon, P.W. 2 was present at the bus stand, Sivakasi, along with Ramaswamy Naicker of his village (not examined). On the same day, P.W. 2 had the bond Ex. P. 7 typed, with a copy Ex. P.S. P.W. 9 arrived at Sivakasi at 2 p.m. on 4-5-1983 and on the basis of pre arrangement, P.W. 2 was escorted to Nadar Lodge. Where in the presence of P.W. 3 Venkatarama, a Postal Inspector and another, P.W. 9 demonstrated the procedure to be followed in handing over of the phenolphthalein powdered notes to the appellant, in the event of demand. P.W. 2 and the other witnesses present were made aware of the Chemical reaction that would set in due to smearing of the currency produced by P.W. 2 (3 ten rupee notes and 4 five rupee notes - M.Os. 2 to series) with phenolphthalein.
5. On the directions of P.W. 9, P.W. 3 and P.W. 2 went over to the office of the appellant, which they reached at 3.10 p.m. Appellant was in his office room P.W. 2 handed over Exs. P. 6 and P. 7 to the appellant and the appellant asked P.W. 2 "to give him all that had to be given to him". P.W. 2 signed in each page of Ex. P. 7 in the presence of the appellant, inside his office room. P.W. 3 and another affixed their signatures as witnesses in that document. Appellant also signed, in Ex. P. 7 as well as Ex. P. 8. While remaining Ex. P. 7, appellant handed over Ex. P. 8 to P.W. 2. Then the appellant asked for money, which promptly P.W. 2 handed over by removing it from his shirt pocket. Appellant allegedly received it in his right hand and tucked it down under a file, which was lying on the left side, apparently on his table. P.W. 2 came out and gave the pre arranged signal to P.W. 9, by tying his towel on his hand. P.W. 9 was quick enough in reaching the office of the appellant. He directed P.W. 2 to remain outside for sometime. P.W. 9 after introducing himself to the appellant, enquired of him if it was true that he had received Rs. 50/- as bribe. Appellant was shocked and expressed regret for that incident. Thereafter, sodium carbonate solution was prepared in a glass tumbler, which was initially colourless. P.W. 9 asked the appellant to dip his fingers, in that solution. Appellant refused to do so initially. P.W. 9 persuaded him to dip his fingers, since Officers of Postal Department were present and it will be erroneous on his part not to accede to his command. Appellant is alleged to have half heartedly dipped his fingers (right hand) in that solution, resulting in the liquid turning pink in colour, P.W. 9 asked the appellant to produce the money. Appellant remained silent. P.W. 9 then questioned P.W. 3 as to where the appellant had kept the money. P.W. 3 pointed out the file underneath where the money had been secreted. P.W. 9 directed the appellant to retrieve the money and give it to him. Appellant did not do so. Hence, P.W. 9 himself took away M.Os. 2 to 8 series from underneath the file and prepared mahazar. Ex. P. 11 for such seizure. The numbers of notes (M.Os. 2 to 8 series) tallied with the numbers mentioned in the initial entrustment mahazar, Ex. P. 10, M.O. 9 is the bottle, which contains the sodium carbonate solution, pink in colour. Appellant had in his pocket his own money of Rs. 35/-. House search of the appellant did not reveal anything incriminating. During the course of the investigation, P.W. 9 obtained from the concerned authority, Es.P. 1 sanction to prosecute the appellant. Initially Ex. P. 1 was sought to be proved through P.W 4 Sampath Kumar, Personal Assistant to the Collector of Central Excise, but, later the Collector himself was examined as P.W. 4. After completion of investigation, final report was laid before the Special Court.
6. During the course of trial, apart from examining P.Ws. 1 to 10, the prosecution brought on record Exs. P. 1 to P. 18. The nature of those documents already form part of the narration of facts.
7. Appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in evidence. While choosing to deny his complicity in the crime, he stated, that P.W. 2 and his son Venkataswamy had falsely involved him, in this crime, due to previous enmity. According to the appellant, he had taken action against Venkataswamy, son of P.W. 2, for violation of the provisions of the Excise Rules, in or about 1981, resulting in Venkataswamy approaching the Court for anticipatory bail, which was however cancelled to a later point of time, due to non abiding of conditions imposed. Ultimately, departmental action also was taken against Venkataswamy and during the latter part of 1982 penalty was imposed. To substantiate his case, appellant examined himself as D.W. 1 and brought on record Exs.D. 1 to D. 4.
8. Learned trial Judge, on assessment of the oral and documentary evidence placed before him, chose to accept the prosecution case while rejecting the defence and dealt with the appellant as stated earlier.
9. Mr. S. Govindswaminathan, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, contended, that the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 cannot be accepted on any reasonable standard, that P.W. 2 was inimical towards the appellant, was a matter of record. He pointed out, that P.W. 3 was a witness of very poor moral fibre and his version could not have been accepted, by the learned trial Judge. He also submitted, that P.W. 9, the investigating Officer, had wrongly claimed, that his enquiries, revealed that the information, about the appellant was correct, for admittedly there was no complaint at any point of time or any proceeding taken against the appellant during his service, except the instant prosecution. He pointed out, that the prosecution had chosen to treat P.W. 2 as hostile, since there was discrepancy as to the time and date of preferring a complaint before P.W. 9. He also submitted, that on mere recovery of M.Os. 2 to 8 series, a conviction cannot be founded, more so, when the entire evidence brought on record looked so artificial and incredible.
10. On these contentions, I have heard Mr. N. Ranganathan, learned Advocate representing Mr. P. Rajamanickam, learned Senior counsel on record for the respondent. He submitted that, it will be for this court, to appreciate the credibility that could be attached to the versions of P.Ws. 2 and 3 on the basis of infirmities pointed out by learned Senior defence counsel. However, he was at pains to submit, that as far as the trap proper is concerned, the evidence of P.W. 9 was available, which had assurance lent to it, by the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 and it will not be impossible in law, to convict the appellant, if the court was prepared to unhesitatingly accept the evidence of the Investigating officer.
11. Counsel on either side have relied upon certain decided cases, which I will refer to at the appropriate stage. I have audited the merits of the rival contentions, on the foundation of the evidence adduced. The superstructure of the prosecution case, is built on the core of the versions of P.Ws. 2 and 3. The laying of a trap and its success or otherwise, will become relevant ordinarily, only in the event of, the acceptability or otherwise of the prosecution case, based on the evidence of the bribe giver and the other trap witnesses. It may be possible in rarest of rate cases, as pointed out by the Supreme court, to base a conviction, on the basis of recovery alone, on the foundation of the evidence of the Investigation Officer, if it could be accepted without any reservation whatever.
12. It will be necessary for us therefore, to scrutinise, the basic evidence in this prosecution, brought on record, through P.Ws. 2 and 3. P.W. 2 is certainly an experienced trader, who was running an organisation under the name and style of Tamil Nadu Match Works, since 1959. At the relevant time, he was also aged about 85 years and naturally a businessman with ripe experience. That P.W. 2 with all his experience, would always have matters verified, before acting either way, has also been brought in evidence, in that he had enquired proprietors of certain match factories before deciding to execute a bond for Rs. 2000/- as directed by the appellant. It has not been disputed by the appellant, that P.W. 2 had been permitted to use the label "Nandi", but it is certainly only after verification, as is clear from the endorsement made on Ex.R. 3, which is dated 31-12-1982, while the recommendation was on 25-1-1983. It is not as though P.W. 2 had just handed over an application on 25-4-1983 (Ex. P. 3), and obtained instantaneous orders, from the appellant. That P.W. 2 was well aware about the procedure to be followed is also evident from the letter Ex. P. 4 presented to the appellant., bringing to his notice, that work stood suspected in his factory. In other words, P.W. 2 was anxious to inform the authorities concerned, that he cannot be made liable for excise duty and other commitments, so long as work stood suspended in his factory. It can easily be held, that P.W. 2 is an experienced and dexterous trader, knowing clearly the procedure, that had to be followed, for conducting his business, without any problem. If a man of that caliber, when cross examined, pretends absence of any knowledge, about the search conducted in 1981 in his son's factory 'Kannan Match Works', by the appellant, leading to his son seeking anticipatory bail, which was later cancelled by this Court, we have to necessarily hold, that P.W. 2 would not be averse, to suppress material information. It is not as though it was a proceeding in Court, on a single day, as far as his son Venkataswamy was concerned, for the evidence discloses, that Venkataswamy had initially obtained bail, in the event of arrest, and later met with cancellation of that order, due to his non appearance before the appellant, for interrogation. It is rather amazing that P.W. 2 claims lack of knowledge about seizure of counter feit band rolls from the factory of his son, in spite of such factory being situated just two hundred yards away from his factory. Apart from it, it has been admitted by P.W. 2, that only a common wall separates his factory and the residence of his son. It was specifically suggested, that the seizure from Kannan Match Factory belonging to his son, found to be counterfeit band rolls, by the Nazik Export. Equally his presumed lack of awareness, about his daughter in law having complained to the superior Officer, about Central Excise Officials visiting her house often and causing nuisance, at about the time when her husband was taken to task, by the officials, for violation of Central Excise Law, cannot easily be swallowed. May be in cases of rustic villagers, who do not attach importance to every minor detail, a certain amount of loeway can be given while appreciating their evidence, but we have in the witness box, a person or capacity, experience and necessarily it an intelligent person. It will be odd to hold him, as a witness of truth, in spite of his choosing to deny knowledge about important events in the factory of his son, not general in nature, but connected with the local Central Excise Office, and more particularly, when the appellant was responsible for initiating action against his son Venkataswamy. Without fear, of divergence, it can easily be held that P.W. 2 is certainly motivated witness and there was no love last between the appellant and him.
13. Equally, the appellant must have been aware, that he was dealing with P.W. 2, the father of Venkataswamy, whom he had prosecuted earlier, and in that background, it certainly appears odd that he had allegedly demanded Rs. 50/- as bribe from such a person like P.W. 2 for affixing the signature in a bond to be executed.
14. Let us test the evidence of P.W. 2 from yet another angle. P.W. 2 had known the appellant for a long long period. P.W. 2 had admitted, that never in the past, the appellant whom he had met quite often, had ever demanded any bribe for any purpose. It was for the first time that the demand was made on 3-5-1983. He is also very categoric in his evidence, that it struck to him that he should not be given any bribe and he had also told the appellant on his face, that he was not in the habit of giving bribe and he would not offer it. If such exhibition of aversion to the demand of the appellant, had in fact been made by P.W. 2 on 3-5-1983, the appellant would have certainly been in guard, especially when he was aware that P.W. 2 would not have a soft corner for him in view of his having dealt with Venkataswamy, the son of P.W. 2, in respect serious violations committed by him in the not far off past. Inimical feelings must have certainly been lurking in the minds of P.W. 2 and his son and equally, the appellant must have been conscious of the positive termination of the action taken by him against the son of P.W. 2 towards the fag end of 1982.
15. It is still more surprising that P.W. 2, had not told his son, who was also residing in Perianaickenpatti, about the bribe demanded by the appellant. It appears to be opposed to normal human conduct, that P.W. 2 had not mentioned about this episode to any one from 3-5-1983, till the time he appeared in Court in September 1984, to depose in this prosecution. Though it is possible to hold that there can be failure of memory, especially when a witness is put into the box after several months, of the happening of an occurrence, in the case of P.W. 2, it will be very difficult to give him such benefit. Probably that is the reason why the prosecution itself chose to treat P.W. 2 hostile, since he would have it in his substantive evidence, that the complaint was preferred before P.W. 6 only at 10 a.m. on the morning of 4-5-1983. On this aspect, I am not inclined to suspect the evidence of P.W. 9, the Police Officer concerned, that infact Ex. P. 6 was taken down to the dictation of P.W. 2 on 5-5-1983 at 7 p.m. This aspect only shows that P.W. 2 would not hesitate to change his version when occasion so demanded. In other words, P.W. 2 appears to be a person, who has no respect for truth whatever. When the courts deal with witnesses of this caliber, it always happens that they look for some assurance before acting on evidence of this nature, which does not have an impressive impact at once. It cannot be gain said, that demand of bribe is primordial requisite based on which the acceptance follows. In this case, demand was admittedly made on two occasions, one on 3-5-1983 and again on 4-5-1983, during the course of the trap. As far as the demand on 3-5-1983 is concerned except the version of P.W. 2 there is no other corroborating link. I have already stated that the evidence of P.W. 2 cannot be accepted at its face value, since he appears to be a dubious witness. It can safely be held that for the alleged demand on 3-5-1983, there is practically no corroboration whatever. I have already pointed out that the appellant could not have demanded a bribe from P.W. 2, in view of the past record of his son and in any event if P.W. 2 had brought to his notice that he was averse to demand of bribe, the chapter would have stood closed, without giving rise to any further negotiations. Despite all that had happened on 4-5-1983 inside the room of the appellant. P.W. 2 wants to feign ignorance about the presence of others at the relevant time. In an office, on a working day, it will be odd for one to expect total solitude. Normally, bribes are demanded in secret, but P.W. 2 is specific that the appellant had asked for a bribe in an ordinary tone and there was no secrecy about it. I have no hesitation whatever in rejecting the version of P.W. 2 as totally unworthy of credit.
16. The version of P.W. 3 seems to outscore the evidence of P.W. 2. It is not known as to why P.W. 9 a responsible police officer, had thought it fit to take a witness from Madurai and that too from the Postal Department, to Sivakasi, situated miles away. It is not as though responsible public servants would not be available at Sivakasi to present themselves for a trap, more so when requested by a public Officer of the Vigilance Department. Let us take it that P.W. 9 was particular about the presence of fairly High ranking officials to witness the trap, but, if that be so, it would not have been difficult for P.W. 9 to have verified the antecedents of P.W. 3, which on his own admission, to say the least, is stinking. P.W. 3 has admitted that he has signed in Ex. P. 7 by furnishing a false address as well false details as to the nature of his job. He was aware that it was wrong to write false details in Ex. P. 7, but yet he would do so, since he had no other go. He is specific that it was a clear lie, when he stated his address as 43, South Temple Car street, Srivilliputhur, in his own handwriting in Ex. P. 7. He has admitted that it was a lie, when he chose to write in Ex. P. 7 that he was a lorry accountant. He claims to have given false address at the instance of P.W. 9. If P.W. 3 had given false address at the instance of P.W. 9 naturally the weight that could be attached to the evidence of P.W. 9 also gets substantially reduced. On the other hand, if we take it that P.W. 9 could not have given such instructions it is not known as to how P.W. 9 was prepared to choose a witness of such poor moral fibre to be present during a trap. It is not as though P.W. 9, who claims to have found out within a very short duration, on secret enquiry, that the accused was corrupt without any material, could have overlooked the overwhelming bad record of P.W. 3, pointing out that he was most unsuitable, to be taken as a witness for a trap. It is on this basis, I am unable to clearly hold that the evidence of P.W. 9 alone would be sufficient, on the basis of recovery of M.Os. 2 to 8 series, to clinchingly hold that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
17. Let us now look into the admissions of P.W. 3, who seems to be quite clever enough, for in spite of forgery committed by him he was able to wangle a promotion to a higher post in his Department. It is rather unfortunate that a person like P.W. 3, after suffering initial reversion, was still taken to hold a higher post, when his admissions reveal that he was indulging in activities, which would be offences under the Indian Penal Code. He has admitted that there was a charge against him regarding radio licence of V. Abdul Jaffar. In the place, in a register where a licence belonging to Chellammal should have been written he had inscribed the name of Abdul Jaffar, though the latter did not have a licence. Even regarding renewal of that licence, a similar charge is made against him. He has also admitted that in the application relating to this transaction, he had himself affixed a false signature of Abdul Jaffar. He had himself signed for him and issued a duplicate licence. He was charged for having received a bribe for doing all that stated above. He was reverted on proof of charges, and such reversion existed for three years. In 1974, when he was a Wireless Inspector, he was charged for having transferred the radio for commercial purposes, after obtaining a bribe. Less said about P.W. 3 the better it would be for the prosecution. The evidence of P.W. 3 cannot be accepted on any reasonable standard for rejection outright, would be the dictum of any normal judicial conscience.
18. Once another important aspect cannot be lost sight of in this prosecution. Let us assume that the appellant was interested in taking a bribe from P.W. 2 and he had also told P.W. 2 that only in the event of receiving the bribe, he would affix his signature in the bond concerned. The evidences of P.Ws. 2 and 3 clearly show that even before the receipt of Rs. 50/- from P.W. 2, the appellant had handed over Ex. P. 8 to P.W. 2, P.W. 2 does not want to be clear, if even initially on 4-5-1983, the appellant had asked for payment of Rs. 50/- from him, for he would dubiously state that the appellant had asked him to give him all what had to be given to him. It would be odd for the appellant to have asked for the money, after the whole transaction was complete and P.W. 2 was in possession of Ex. P. 8. Even the evidence of P.W. 3 affirms that the appellant had asked P.W. 2 whether he had brought the forms and whether the other things were ready, to which he replied in the affirmative. P.W. 3 is also specific that Ex. P. 8 was handed over to P.W. 2 before Rs. 50/- was delivered. There is a lurking suspicion about demand of bribe on 3-5-1983 as well as 4-5-1983.
19. The all that is left is the evidence of P.W. 9, the Officer who conducted the trap. I have already given certain reasons as to why I am unable to place implicit reliance on the version of P.W. 9. The evidence of P.W. 9 himself will disclose that as far as he knew except this case no other anti-corruption case stood filed against the appellant. It is not known as to how even after conduct of investigation, he could state, that he did not know anything about P.W. 2 and his son Venkataswamy having enmity against the appellant. An impartial investigation must have unearthed such details. It is only on that basis, that it does not appear to be an impossibility that the complaint of P.W. 2 had not come into existence at the time and in the manner as spoken to but obviously differently, though not on the next afternoon. There are so many loose ends in this prosecution sufficient to cast a doubt on its authenticity.
20. Now let us look into the positive colouration of the sodium carbonate solution when the trap was organised. The appellant would have it that the solution did not turn pink, while P.Ws. 2, 3, and 9 would depose contra. All that the appellant will have to do is to probabilise his case so long the onus does not shift at him which would arise only after the prosecution had discharged its initial burden. It is not as though the notes were seized from the person of the appellant. Admittedly, the appellant was wearing a pant and shirt with pockets. The normal human tendency will be to tuck the currency into the pant or shirt pocket and not to leave them underneath a file in the office. If the appellant had, in fact, tucked it underneath a file and he was prepared to dip his fingers in the solution, on the direction of P.W. 9, it is not known as to why he should have refused to pull out the notes from underneath the file and hand over the same to P.W. 9. It is here that the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 9 become relevant. Both the them state that since the appellant was not inclined to pull out the currency and hand them over to P.W. 9, P.W. 9 asked P.W. 3 as to where the currency had been kept and on becoming aware, choose to take the currency all by himself for preparing a mahazar. The case of the appellant as D.W. 1 that he had pushed aside the currency, when it was sought to be trusted by P.W. 2 an inimical witness, can certainly make the solution turn pink. Merely because the solution turned pink, on the facts and circumstances available in this case, it cannot be held that the appellant had accepted the bribe after making a demand from P.W. 2. It will be hazardous, in my opinion to base a conviction merely on the basis of seizure of currency notes from underneath a file, divorced from other circumstances, which stare at our face. The evidence of D.W. 1 about the prior proceedings initiated against Venkataswamy, the son of P.W. 2, substantiated by documentary evidence, would certainly clinch the issue in favour of the appellant, that P.W. 2 and his son were inimically disposed against him. I am unable to accept the arguments of Mr. Ranganathan, that recovery of currency, coupled with the evidence of P.W. 9 with limited corroboration from P.W. 2 and 3 would suffice to sustain the conviction.
21. An unsavoury impression gets impacted, on the totality of evidence that the entire truth about the occurrence had not been placed before Court and P.W. 2, with an ulterior motive, had sought to somehow or other initiate a prosecution against the appellant. It is rather unfortunate, that the charges framed, do not refer at all to any demand made by the appellant.
22. Let us now have a quick look at the law available. Mr. Ranganathan, learned prosecuting counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hazart Lal v. State (Delhi Admn). . In that case, it was observed by the Supreme Court, that "Where the evidence of the Police Officer, who laid the trap was found entirely trust worthy, there was no need to seek any corroboration .... In the facts and circumstances of a particular case, a Court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration but equally, in the fact and circumstances of another case, the court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such an officer. It is all a matter of appreciation of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast rule nor can there be any presidential guidance."
Law has been succinctly stated by the Supreme Court and I have applied the said principle to the instant facts and I am unable, as stated already, to act on the evidence of the investigating Officer alone without corroboration.
23. Now follows the decisions cited by the learned defence counsel. In Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration , the following observations were made. That was a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
"There is no absolute rule that the evidence of an interested witness cannot be accepted without corroboration. But where the witnesses have poor normal fibre and have to their discredit a load of bad antecedents which indicates their having a possible motive to harm the accused who was an obstacle in their moral activities, it would be hazardous to accept the testimonies of such witnesses without corroboration of crucial points from independent sources.
24. In Raghbir Singh v. State of Punjab , the observations made by Supreme Court are very relevant. They read as hereunder :
"The Officer functioning in the anti-corruption department must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspired confidence in the mind of the Court and the Court is not left in any doubt as to whether or not any money was paid to the Pubic servant by way of bribe. They should insist on observing, this safeguard for the protection of public servants against whom a trap may have to be laid."
On facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court discredited the evidence and exonerated the accused therein.
25. In Surai Mal v. State (Delhi Admn). , Supreme court stated that "In a case of bribery, mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid was not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable."
These factors underlined by the Supreme Court have passed through the process of my appreciation of evidence, brought on record.
26. I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge had not considered the evidence in the right perspective and had also omitted to follow the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. The net finding is that this impugned judgment has led to grave miscarriage of justice. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant shall stand set aside. The appellant is acquitted. This appeal is allowed.
27. Appeal allowed.