Madhya Pradesh High Court
Devi Chamar And Anr. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 September, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1993(0)MPLJ698
ORDER Shacheendra Dwivedi, J.
1. The conviction and sentence of the two petitioners stood confirmed in appeal preferred by them against the order of conviction and sentence passed by Magistrate 1st Class, under Section 509, Indian Penal Code to 4 months' S.I. (though in the impugned order it has been described as R.I.).
2. According to the prosecution, on 24-7-1982, while the complainant Mewa Bai (PW-1) was returning to her house after purchasing Kerosene oil, the two petitioners asked her for sexual intercourse by saying 'Bur De De', to which she abused them and on reaching home, she narrated the incident to her mother Halki Bahu (PW-3). The report Ex.P-1 was lodged with police and after the investigation a challan was filed under Section 509, Indian Penal Code against the accused/petitioners.
3. The bone of contention of Shri Kochar counsel for the petitioners in this revision is that the age of accused/petitioners being below 21 years, they could not be sentenced to imprisonment as the offence was not punishable by death or life imprisonment and therefore they deserved the benefit of Section 6 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Shri Kochar further submits that the provision operates as an injunction against the Court for sentencing an accused aged under 21 years to a sentence of imprisonment. Section 6 of the Act may be reproduced with profit:
"6. Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age. --(1) when any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it should not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so.
(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under Section 4 with an offender referred to in Sub-section (1), the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender."
It is manifest from the plain reading of Section 6 that the age of the accused relevant to this provision, would be the age on the date when he is to take the sentence. The age at the time of commission of the offence is not material for the section. The words 'when any person under 21 years of age is found guilty' denote that the accused on the date of order of conviction, when he is found guilty, ought to be under 21 years, so as to attract the operation of the section. The crucial date for reckoning age would be the date on which trial Court had to deal with the offender as held by Supreme Court in Ramji Misser v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088. Admittedly, the petitioners No. 1 and 2 were aged 19 and 20 years respectively at the time of commission of offence in the year 1982, but when the order of their guilt was passed on 29-4-1988, by the trial Court they were aged more than 25 years. Section 6, draws a distinction between the accused, aged more and less than 21 years. It is only under Section 4 of the Act that no distinction is drawn in this regard and it applies to accused of all ages, subject to certain conditions specified therein. It would be relevant to reproduce Section 4 which reads thus:--
4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. -- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under Sub-section (1), the Court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under Sub-section (1) is made, the Court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The Court making a supervision order under Sub-Section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with repect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the Court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The Court making a supervision order under Sub-Section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probatiton officer concerned.
4. A duty is till cast on the Court that on finding an accused, guilty of offence which is not punishable with life or the death sentence, for releasing him on probation the regard is to be had to the circumstances of the case and the character of the accused, with the nature of offence, that his release was necessary for advancing the interest of justice. No doubt can be expressed about the 'Act' being a benevolent legislation and as such its beneficial provisions should not be read in a restricted sense and should receive a wide interpretation, but when the language of any particular provision be clear to convey the meaning and its object, it should be accepted in that form only. It is not each and every accused of an offence, not punishable with death or life imprisonment, who is to be extended the benefit. Therefore, it has been made obligatory on the Court to consider the other aspects also such as the nature of the offence and the character of the accused, on regard being also had to the other circumstances of the case.
5. In view of the above discussion the provisions of Section 6 and Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be construed in the manner as contended by the petitioner's counsel. The principle is well settled that if there be no ambiguity in the language of a provision, its literal construction should be adopted as observed by Apex Court in Prithvisingh Bedi etc. v. Union of India and Ors., 1983 (1) SCR 393.that:--
"The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision, the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity."
6. The mere fact that one is a first or a youthful offender, would by itself be not sufficient to invoke the Section 4. The provisions of the section are generally made applicable where such offender succumbs to sudden temptation or uncontrollable impulse or does a thoughtless act or acts under the influence of others. The provisions of the Section 4 are not to be applied to cases where the offence was an act of daring and reprehensible nature, or the commission of offence implied previous preparation or deliberate effort on the part of the accused.
7. The incident of instant case is from a small village named Naindhara. In this part of the country each small village is a family unit by itself, where the women folk move freely and fearlessly with modesty, even in isolation as they have to work at the house and in the fields as well. Having regard to the culture and tradition of this country, an attempt to outrage or even insult the modesty of a woman, has to be viewed by Courts, strictly and dealt with sternly. The act of the accused persons in asking Mst. Mewa Bai for sexual intercourse is a deliberate and designed offensive act.
8. I have also found no merit in the contention advanced feebly against the conviction of the petitioners based on the facts. Though the law is well settled now that the appellate Court as also the revisional Court under Section 11, have powers to extend the benefit of the provisions of the Act to an accused as observed by the Apex Court in Rattan Lai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, in yet considering the nature of offence and the circumstances of the case, I do not deem it desirable to deal with the accused persons under Section 4 of the 'Act', but instead of at once sentencing them to imprisnoment, I consider it proper to sentence them to pay the fine only, so as to avoid, as far as possible, the pernicious influence of hardened criminals, on their being incarcerated in prison.
9. As sequel of the above discussion, the sentence of imprisonment is modified and the petitioners are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 250/- each or in default to undergo S.I. for two months. With the above modification revision is dismissed.