Delhi District Court
The vs The on 21 February, 2008
COURT OF MS. SUJATA KOHLI
PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT II,
ROOM NO. 48, KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
No. : 329/97
I.D.
Date of Institution of the case : 16/08/1997
Date on which Judgment was reserved : 31/01/2008
Date on which Judgment was pronounced : 21/02/2008
B E T W E E N
The Workman, Sh. Daniel Allen Masih R/o 22A, PktA, Jail Road,
Opp. Hari Nagar Depot, New Delhi64.
A N D
The Management, M/s Church's Auxiliary for Social Action (CASA)
2, Rajindra Place, Pusa Road, Rachna Building, New Delhi8.
A W A R D
1.Reference was sent by Sh. A.S. Awasthi, Secretary Labour, Government of NCT, Delhi on 12/06/97 vide reference No. F.24 (52)/97Lab./1212832 pertaining to an Industrial Dispute between the management of M/s Church's Auxiliary for Social Action (CASA) and its workman Sh. Daniel Allen Masih, in the following terms of reference: "Whether the termination of Shri Daniel Allen Masih from service is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?".
2. Pursuant to the reference, claim was filed by the workman stating therein that he was appointed by the management as Field Officer after due process on 01/07/83 at a consolidated salary of Rs. 850/ per month, as per the letter of appointment dated 30/06/83.
3. Workman pleads that he was exploited as Field Officer for about three years as he was not confirmed even after six months of continuous service and even as per the letter of appointment which mentioned it and despite many assurances by the management in this regard, management failed to confirm him. It was only vide subsequent letter of appointment dated 14/04/86 that workman was appointed to the confirmed and substantial post as Assistant Social Education Officer with basic pay fixed at Rs. 530/ per month in the CORE programme of the projects department, as Incharge of Parliament to People Programme (PPP).
4. Workman describes the management as an incorporated body registered under the Societies Act, and governed by the memorandum of articles and the rules framed thereunder.
5. Workman also states in para 4 of his claim that the terms and conditions of appointment are governed by the Standing Orders/Personnel Manual of CASA (management). Workman has also emphasized that the Standing Orders which were mandatory to be supplied were not supplied and far from this they were not even shown to him ever inspite of many oral and written requests in this regard from the workman and also inspite of the written instructions of the labour inspector on 24/07/95. Workman was thus deprived of knowing his rights privileges, entitlements and duties, in short the full terms and conditions of his employment. It is further alleged that this illegal act of the management enabled the management and its Senior Officers to function malafidely, whimsically, arbitrarily, in partisian and biased manner against principles of natural justice and to indulge in unfair labour practices.
6. Workman avers that throughout his service tenure, he served the management diligently, honestly, without fear or favour, efficiently and with utmost dedication and beyond call of duty.
7. He also claims that he always observed propriety, integrity and accountability in his functioning. His service record is stated to be unblemished.
8. Workman states that he gave authentic unslanted, honest and genuine reports, memos, notesheets and the like and did not burden the management by giving or making slanted, inflated, coloured or made up reports etc. In fact, he did not abide by the suggestions/desires and advice by the CPO, others and the Director to prepare false, fictitious, and exaggerated figures of various achievements in the quarterly reports prepared by the workman, specially regarding training programmes.
9. Workman also claims that he was never encouraging corruption and that he always acted whenever and wherever any misutilisation or such acts came to his knowledge. He also exposed many acts of commission and mischiefs, specially by the immediate superior of the workman i.e Chief Projects Officer and selected few, whenever such acts disrupted, derailed or jeapordised the arduously and assiduously built programme which were also detrimental to the image of CASA being inconsistent with its aims and objects.
10. As per the workman his zeal to pinpoint wrong acts of the officials was not appreciated by the management and was termed 'zeal for finding faults". Workman was advised/guided and also warned not to mention such lacunae or to point out such things wrong practices and totally ignore them.
11. Workman started being harassed and victimized as he refused to agree to ignore wrong practices. Workman brought this fact of harassment being caused to him in writing to the management, but the said communication was never rebutted, questioned or even responded to by the management.
12. The workman was harassed, humiliated and victimized by the CPO, his chosen few subordinates and the management. The CPO is stated to be working under the direct supervision and control of the Director and has unhindered and constant contact with the Director.
13. The CPO instructed the petitioner to prepare a notesheet for the Director regarding the funds for the Nutrition Programme and he prepared the notesheet amounting to Rs. 1,53,968/ and also stated that the nutrition materials will be purchased by the workman along with workers at filed and not once but twice. However, the CPO refused to sign this note sheet and insisted that workman makes the purchase by himself alone and carries the whole amount instead of in two halves. Workman declined to do so.
14. On 01/07/92, the CPO wrote a memo to the Director informing him about the notesheet prepared by the workman stating that the amount will be carried and purchased by the workman himself significantly it is stated that Director in contravention of the usual practice approved this memo and not the original notesheet of the workman. The workman was instructed by the CPO to take further action on the basis of the approved memo. The workman following the usual practice, processed the approval by his memo dated 02/07/92 but only for Rs. 80,384/.
15. Between 3rd to 9th July, 1992, the Director summoned the workman to his room and told him that he was interested to promote the workman and recommended his training at Bhuvneshwar. He also stated that he had earlier also on two occasions almost signed the papers of the workman's promotion but had withdrawn at the last moment as the workman did not seem to be interested in making "money" and it is also the allegation of the workman that he was advised to start manipulating the accounts. It is throughout the stand of the workman that he kept resisting for involving himself in such wrong practice.
16. In July 1992 thereafter, it is stated that Director summoned the workman to his room and threatened to hold an enquiry against him. A farce of an enquiry was in fact held in mid July 1992 in which workman was not even allowed access to his witnesses and during which the CPO was allowed to snatch away and seize 44 official documents of the workman. This fact was even brought to the knowledge of the CASA, Board Members by the workman vide Registered letters. However, workman presented his version to the inquiry officer along with file containing certain documents to show his victimization and also the malpractice of the management.
17. Workman was not able to discharge his duties. He wrote a confidential memo to the Director on 14/09/92 and same was neither denied nor responded in any manner whatsoever. Unable to find any grounds or means to dismiss the workman, his transfer orders were issued and it is alleged that the transfer orders were patently, malafide and unreasonable and by way of further harassment and victimization.
18. Workman appeal to the Director against the transfer orders and simultaneously asked for Personnel Manual/Standing Orders. Workman also wrote to CASA Board on 06/11/92 by Registered Post. This further infuriated the Director.
19. On 03/02/93, workman was most shocked when his services were terminated simplicitor. The termination order mentioned no reason or clause of the Personnel Manual/Standing Orders. Workman wrote to the Director to at least disclose the reason for termination but he was not informed. After getting rid of the workman, the Director got inducted his soninlaw into CASA directly at a very high post even though the said son in law was neither qualified nor experienced in any branch of development or relief for which the society is registered.
20. On 25/02/93, workman was again compelled to write to CASA Board about the termination and workman also requested for personal hearing and stay of termination order till final verdict of the board, but to no avail.
21. Workman also states that he suffered immensely in terms of finances, mental and physical agony and distress also on account of abrupt unemployment and he could not find any suitable employment at the age of 42 inspite of all out and desperate efforts. Securing employment was found even more difficult as workman was not able to show any reason for his termination to potential employers.
22. In lieu of thee month's notice, the management unilaterally paid three months salary which was not a term of employment in the appointment letter.
23. On 19/05/95, workman sent a demand notice to the management who failed to respond to the same inspite of receiving it. Management participated in the conciliation proceedings on 02/07/95 and 12/07/95 and absented themselves on 24/07/95 when they were ordered to produce the Personnel Manual. Though an all out defamatory response was sent to the demand notice which was received by the workman on 26/07/95.
24. As per the workman he was not assigned any administrative, managerial duties nor he had any authority. The last drawn wages of the workman is stated to be Rs. 3120/ per month.
25. The matter was placed before the conciliation officer, Government of NCT Delhi, but due to the adamant and uncooperative attitude of the management, the conciliation could not be effected and ultimately the dispute was referred for adjudication to court.
26. Workman claims the termination to be absolutely illegal and violative of principles of natural justice. He claims to be entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages as well as all other consequential benefits, seniority and other entitlements. He prays accordingly.
27. Management, in their W/s, has raised preliminary objections; firstly that management does not fall within the definition of industry as under section 2 (j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is elaborated that the management is a society which is engaged for the upliftment of poor and mentally and physically deprived persons and as such is not a profit making body.
28. Secondly, it is stated that claimant was working as an Officer and was performing the duties of managerial and administrative nature and hence he is not a workman as defined U/s 2 (s) of I.D. Act, 1947. As per the management, the claimant had already filed a civil suit before Ld. Civil Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in connection with termination of his service and since he has concealed about this material fact, he is not entitled to any relief otherwise also. Claimant cannot seek relief, if any, from two forums simultaneously and as such the present claim is stated to be an abuse of process of law and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
29. In their reply on merits, the contents of para 1 of statement of claim has been denied as being wrong and misconceived. However, it is admitted that claimant was appointed as a Field Officer on 07/07/83. It has been specifically denied that he was exploited or that he was being extended false assurances regarding his confirmation.
30. In response to para 2 & 3 of the claim, it is not denied that claimant was appointed to the post of Assistant Social Education Officer in the CORE programme of project department and was Incharge of Parliament to People Programme.
31. As regards the allegation of the workman that he was never shown the Personnel Manual Standing Orders, it is denied vehemently and it is stated on behalf of management that the Personnel Manual is a public document available in the Personnel Department of the management and the same is very much available for reference to all the employees of the management.
32. It is also denied specifically that claimant served the management diligently, loyally & honestly. On the contrary, it is stated that the service record of the claimant was not at all good as depicted by him in the claim and that he had been issued various memos for unsatisfactory/nonperformance of his duties.
33. The contents of para 6 also stands denied. All the contents of para 7 also stand denied and it is submitted on behalf of the management, the claimant's avernments regarding preparing of alleged report is nothing but a concocted story as the claimant was discharging his usual duty assignments given to him and no exceptional duty was being performed by him. The contents of para 8, 9 & 10 of the claim also stand denied specifically.
34. In para 11 of the W/s on merits, it is submitted that there was no exceptional performance of duty on the part of the claimant and that progress of PPP is made due to the collective efforts of CASA and its employees. In para 12 it stands denied that claimant was ever harassed or humiliated by the CPO or the management. The claimant's allegations against the Director have been denied as being absolutely wrong and without any substance. It is also stated that there was no harassment or victimization of the claimant and on the contrary it was the claimant who constantly obstructed the smooth functioning of the department for which he was time and again issued memos. The allegation of the workman regarding his having been summoned by the Director on 3rd and 9th July 1992 and his being threatened stands denied. All the contents of the alleged talk stand denied.
35. As regards receipt of the letter dated 14/09/96, written by the claimant to the Director, same has also been denied. As regards the allegations of the workman regarding his transfer being malafide and to harass him same is denied and it is stated that his transfer to Godra, Gujarat was on account of administrative requirement and exigencies of work and same was as per the terms of employment of the claimant under which his services were transferable anywhere in India. However, it is also stated that claimant chose not to obey the transfer order on one pretext or the other and ultimately failed to report for duty at Godra, Gujarat. It is stated that appeal of claimant against his transfer to Godra was also duly entertained by the Board Members and the decision of the Board was duly communicated to the claimant through administrative office CASA. It is also denied that the claimant's representation to the Board against the transfer infuriated the Director. It is also denied that claimant had ever asked for Standing Order/Manual as alleged by him.
36. As regards the payment of three month's salary to the workman, it is stated that as per the terms of contract, claimant was tendered three months' salary in lieu of notice in clause II (8) of the Personnel Manual. As such, the termination is stated to be legal, valid and justified in all respects. It is also denied that Director's soninlaw had been appointed in place of claimant. The claim of the workman remaining unemployed since his termination also stands denied. On the contrary, it is stated that claimant has been practicing as an advocate.
37. Demand notice is admitted to have been received by the management and it is stated that it also sent reply thereof. It is denied that management absented themselves on 24/07/95 as they had been ordered to produce the Personnel Manual before the conciliation officer. It is stated that management participated in the conciliation proceedings and their participation is a matter of record.
38. As regards termination of service of the claimant, it is stated that it was due to his not carrying out the transfer order to Godra, Gujarat given to him.
39. In the rejoinder, workman has denied the contents of the W/s and reiterated those of the claim as true and correct.
40. On the basis of the pleadings, following issues were framed by my Ld. Predecessor: (1) Whether claimant is not a workman as defined U/s 2 (s) of I.D. Act, as pleaded by the management in para 2 of its W/s, if so, to what effect?
(2) To what relief, if any is the claimant/workman entitled against the management in terms of reference?
41. During evidence, workman examined himself as WW1 on his affidavit Ex.WW1/A and besides he tendered the following documents in his evidence being as under:
1. Copy of letter of workman to management dated 13/10/92, Ex. WW1/1.
2. Copy of letter from the Director to the workman dated 13/12/86, Ex. WW1/2.
3. Letters from management to workman dated 05/10/88, 28/02/92, 10/10/92, Ex. WW1/3 to Ex. WW1/5.
4. Statement of reimbursement of medical expenses, Ex. WW1/6.
5. Letters dated 15/12/92 & 08/01/93 from the workman to the management, Ex. WW1/7 to Ex. WW1/9.
6. Letter from management to the workman dated 28/04/92, Ex. WW1/10.
7. Letters from workman dated 07/07/92, 05/03/91 & 28/04/92, Ex. WW1/11 to Ex. WW1/13.
8. Office memorandum dated 29/04/92, Ex. WW1/14.
9. Reply of workman dated 08/05/92, Ex. WW1/15.
10. Office memorandum dated 28/04/92, Ex. WW1/16.
11. Letters of workman dated 08/01/92 & 29/04/92, Ex. WW1/16 & Ex. WW1/17.
12. Office memorandum dated 08/07/91, Ex. WW1/17.
13. Letter of workman to CPO dated nil, Ex. WW1/18.
14. Letter of workman dated 08/01/92, Ex. WW1/18.
15. Office memorandum dated 02/12/91, Ex. WW1/19.
16. Letter of workman dated 04/10/91, Ex. WW1/20.
17. Letter from management dated 12/12/90, Ex. WW1/21.
18. Letters from workman dated 15/07/91, 03/04/91, 06/04/90, 28/08/92, 18/08/92, 02/06/88, 23/07/92 & 16/10/91, Ex. WW1/22 to Ex. WW1/31.
19. Letters from workman dated 25/02/93, Ex. WW1/32.
20. Letter of management dated 15/01/91,Ex. WW1/33.
21. Copy of application of management filed in the Civil Suit, Ex. WW1/34.
22. Letters of management to workman dated 13/12/86, 28/02/92, Ex. WW1/34 & Ex. WW1/35.
23. Letters from workman dated 14/09/92, 09/10/92, Ex. WW1/36 to Ex. WW1/38.
24. Letter from management dated 13/10/92, Ex. WW1/39.
25. Letter from workman dated 13/10/92, Ex. WW1/40.
26. Letter from management dated 23/11/92, Ex. WW1/41.
27. Appointment letters dated 30/06/83 and 14/04/86, Ex. WW1/42 & Ex. WW1/43.
28. Letter dated 03/02/93, Ex. WW1/44.
29. Copy of labour inspector's report, Ex. WW1/45.
30. Copy of demand notice dated 19/03/95, Ex. WW1/46.
31. Reply to demand notice dated 25/07/95, Ex. WW1/47.
42. Management, on the other hand, examined Sh. R.P. Singh, Chief Project Officer on special duty, the then Chief Project Officer in the management as MW1 on his affidavit Ex. MW1/A. Besides, he tendered the following documents in his evidence: (1) Original memorandum and rules and regulations of CASA, Ex. MW1/1.
(2) Personnel Manual, Ex. MW1/2.
(3) Copy of letters of management to workman dated 30/06/83, 14/04/96, 25/07/85, Ex. MW1/3 to Ex. MW1/5. (4) Office memorandum dated 09/07/92, Ex. MW1/6. (5) Transfer letter dated 07/10/92, Ex. MW1/7. (6) Office memorandum dated 09/10/92 & 13/10/92, Ex. MW1/8 & Ex. MW1/9.
(7) Copy of written communication from the workman, Ex. MW1/10.
(8) Copy of letters from the management to the workman dated 15/10/92, 28/10/92, 17/11/92, 11/12/92, 03/02/93, 23/03/03, 25/07/95, Ex. MW1/11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 & Ex. MW1/19 respectively.
(9) Letter from workman to CPO dated 23/12/92, Ex. MW1/12.
(10) Appeal of workman before the CASA National Board dated 06/11/92, Ex. MW1/14.
(11) Letters from CPO dated 23/01/92, 12/10/90 & 16/01/87, Ex. MW1/20 to Ex. MW1/22.
(12) Office memorandum dated 05/06/90, Ex. MW1/23. (13) Recommendation letter dated 19/09/90, Ex. MW1/24.
(14) Letter dated 18/09/92, Ex. MW1/25. (15) Letters dated 24/09/92, 21/09/92, 28/09/92, 07/10/92, 05/10/92, Ex. MW1/26 to Ex. MW1/34. (16) Letters to CPO dated 24/08/92 & 05/03/91, Ex. MW1/35 & Ex. MW1/36. (17) Extract of resolution dated 23/09/96, Ex. MW1/37.
Besides, management produced the following documents in cross examination of the workman being as under: (1) Copy of recommendations letters from the workman/claimant, Ex. WW1/M1 to Ex. WW1/M4.
43. No arguments were addressed on behalf of workman inspite of repeated and almost innumerable opportunities extended to him one after another on his various verbal requests and also on his applications time and again. On the other hand, Ld. AR for management was ready with the arguments almost on every date and ultimately vide separate detailed order dated 29/01/08, once again, workman was given one last opportunity, but that also remained unavailed. In view of the long pendency of the case i.e 11 years, there was no scope for further adjournment and as such arguments were heard on behalf of management. Management also tendered written synopsis along with some authorities. Even at the time of reserving this matter for award, liberty was extended to workman to file any written submissions within one week if he so wanted, but that opportunity was also not availed.
44. It is quite painful that workman himself has made quite a mockery of the entire court process and seeking adjournments happily one after other in his own case. He is an advocate appearing in other cases, cross examining the witnesses at length and yet he has deliberately chosen not to make any submission on merits in this case.
45. I have perused the file. Now, I proceed to decide this claim on merits on the basis of material on record, in the light of arguments addressed on behalf of management. My findings on each issue are as under: ISSUE No. 1
46. The burden to prove a fact asserted by a party lies upon that party and as such the burden to prove that claimant was a workman lay upon the workman/claimant. Even though the language in which the issue is framed by my Ld. Predecessor on 20/03/2002, with due respect, the onus to prove being purely a question of law is to be proceeded with in accordance with law and as such irrespective of how an issue framed by a court cannot change the law as it stands. As such the burden to prove that claimant was a workman lay upon the claimant.
47. Workman in his examination in chief has tendered his affidavit wherein he has reiterated the contents of the claim. This affidavit was Ex. WW1/A. Out of all the documents tendered on behalf of the workman not even one document indicates in any way that the claimant was doing the duties which would bring him in the category of workman as defined U/s 2 (s) of I.D. Act. Section 2 (s) I.D. Act gives the definition of workman as under: " workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person (I) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
48. On the contrary, the documents relied upon by workman himself like Ex. WW1/15 shows that claimant was working at the level of taking important decisions and making important recommendations. The language of this office memorandum is being reproduced to highlight this point: " Office Memorandum : Mr. Deniel Allen Date : 28 Apr 92 : Chief Projects Officer Ref. No. PPP/Mungel :FUNDS FOR WOMEN'S TRAINING PROGRAMME This refers to the notesheet of 20th March 1992 in regard to the request received from the President of Chattisgarh Nat Samaj Sewa Samiti. Your have proposed a sum of Rs. 2,000/ for this training programme.
Subsequently, we have also received a letter from the President of Chattisgarh Nat Samaj Sewa Samiti in which the budget is Rs.
5,005/ for a three day training programme. On the above subject, we wish to make the following observations:
1. That the budget as presented by you and as presented by the President of the Samiti differs.
2. The training programme period also differs.
3. How is our programme going to be benefitted by providing funds to the Samiti?
4. Since the samiti does not have a registration under FCRA, the question of approving fund for the same does not arise.
In view of the above, I would request you that in future such request should not be placed for approval of the Director.
Thanking you, cc : Director DA: kj
49. Similarly, letter Ex. WW1/19 also goes against the claim of the claimant that he was a workman. The relevant part of the letter is being reproduced hereunder: " Office Memorandum TO : Mrs. Rajshee Thakur DATE : 2 Dec 91 FROM : Chief Projects Officer Ref. No. :
HP/PPP13893 SUBJECT : Implementation And Monitoring Of Parliament To People Programme In Himachal Pradesh We give below the relevant extract of our note sheet of 26th November 1991, duly approved by the Director:
' Taking into account, the sensitivity of situation as well as the fact that the entire programme is being run through the mahila mandal and through lady volunteers, it is recommended that atleast for the time being, the programme be handled from Delhi office by a lady officer. Therefore, the name of Mrs. Rajshree Thakur, our Monitoring Assistant is being recommended.
' That as per discussion with you, Mrs. Thakur will visit the programme every two months for proper monitoring and followup".
You are therefore required to take briefing from Mr. Daniel Allen and take charge of all the files connected with the HP programme.....
50. At the same time, management has come up with the appointment letter of the claimant dated 30/06/83 which is Ex. MW1/3. The title shows the appointment of the claimant as a field officer. The relevant portions for the purpose of issue no. 1 are being reproduced hereunder: " In addition to consolidated salary, you will also draw travel and Daily Allowance while on tour as for C1 Grade Offices as per CASA Personal Manual. You are liable to serve anywhere as administrative necessity demands".
51. The personnel manual has also been tendered on behalf of management which is Ex. MW1/2 and this describes C1 Grade Officers as Personal Secretary (to senior officers), Accountants, Field officers and Development Assistant.
52. Vide Ex. MW1/4, the claimant was appointed as Assistant Social Education Officer. Ex. WW1/M1 and Ex. WW1/M4 are some applications of candidates for different jobs with CASA and on which recommendations are there by the endorsements 'found suitable' under the signatures of the claimant.
53. Ex. MW1/22 is a letter from Chief Project Officer to the Director seeking approval of appointments of three persons and a copy of this letter has been sent to the claimant also. The relevant extracts of this letter are being reproduced hereunder: "We have received three applications for PPP volunteership. The candidates have been duly recommended by church/lay leaders who are conducting our Parliament to People Programme in M.P. The candidates are:........."
The candidates have been found suitable
by our Assistant Social Education
Officer. They will be appointed on an
honorarium of Rs. 350/ per month as
soon as your kind approval is
given............
Rana R.P. Singh
Chief Projects
Officer
cc : Mr. Daniel Allen, ASEO
DA:en
APPROVED
DIRECTOR
21/1/87"
54. Ex. MW1/23 again highlights the power of the claimant to recommend, removal of employees. The relevant part of this letter is being reproduced: "Office Memorandum TO : Chief Projects Officer DATE :
5/6/90 FROM : ASEO Ref. No. :
VOL/GPM/5396 SUBJECT : LAPSES BY MR. SHANSHYAM PRASAD MESHRAM From time to time I have brought to your kind attention the following lapses on the part of volunteer Mr. G.P. Meshram.
Seven bags of wheat meant for FFW in another village were found lying in the house of the volunteer in '89. And inspite of our seeking written clarification the volunteer did not inform us the status of the same..........
In the light of above, it is recommended that the services of volunteer Mr. G.P. Meshram should be terminated with effect from 1st June 1990.
With kind regards, cc : Director DA : aj
55. Ex. MW1/24 is a letter showing concurrence of the Chief Project Officer with the recommendations of Mr. Allen Daniel to terminate the service of employee in question.
56. The entire tone and tenor of Ex. MW1/25 to Ex. MW1/34 also reflect in totality the nature of duties of the claimant. He was clearly vested with power to take decisions in various matters including appointments of employees and about various programmes and schemes. His recommendations used to be relied upon by the Director while approving and in all cases approval has been granted on the basis of recommendations from the claimant, not only for appointment but for removals also of employees/contractors etc.
57. The documents relied upon by both parties have already been referred above. In the light of the above documents, the relevant portions of cross examination of workman are being reproduced hereunder: " It is correct that I am enrolled as an advocate in 1976 but I revived my certificate. But I do not remember the date of my revival of my membership..... It is correct that I was appointed as an officer with CASA......I used to receive salary as an Officer. I never made complaint or protested for being designated as Officer. Vol. There was no occasion..... It is correct that I used to send reports to CASA about the work of other employees and the activities carried out by me. It is correct that on the application of Brinder Kumar John dated 09/08/86 I wrote the word 'found suitable' same is Ex. WW1/M1. It is correct that on the application dated 26/05/88 of Anil Geroge I recorded my observation 'found suitable'. Same is Ex. WW1/M2. It is correct that on the application dated 25/01/90 I again recorded the words 'found suitable'. Same is Ex. WW1/M3. Similar is my reply (with regard to) other application dated 22/09/90. Same is Ex. WW1/M4".
58. As against this, the relevant portions of cross examination of MW1 are also being reproduced on the issue no. 1:
"It is correct that workman interviewed any of the volunteers. I have filed the documents Exb. WW1/M1 to M4 to show that workman took interviews and put his remarks. The claimant was assigned managerial duty like supervising and planning of the programme. The claimant was assigned administrative duties i.e checking volunteers reports, tour programmes and travel statements.......Any officer of the CASA is the part of the management. The claimant never signed any cheque, never sanctioned any leave, nor issued any appointment letter or signed termination letter. The claimant could not take any disciplinary action but could only recommend. The management did not issue job description of the claimant".
59. See :
1. K.H. Pandhi Vs. The Presiding Officer, Addl. Labour Court and Anr ; 2004 LLR 409; Hon'ble High Court: "On a review of the above discussion of the Supreme Court, it is quite clear that the designation of an employee is of no consequence. To determine whether an employee is a workman or not what is of consequence is his main or primary duties. If the employees performs some duties which are incidental or even in addition to his main or primary duties, that by itself will not take away his status as "workman" provided, as a result of his main or primary duties, he falls within the definition of workman under the Act".
(2) Arkal Gobind Raj Rao Vs. CIBA Geigy of India & Ors; 1985 II LLJ 401, Hon'ble Supreme Court para 16: "The test that one must employ in such a case is what was the primary basic or dominant nature of duties for which the person whose status is under enquiry was appointed. A few extra duties would hardly be relevant to determine his status".
(3) Addison Paints & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Workman; 2001 I LLJ 957, Hon'ble Supreme court: "the claimant could challenge his transfer order only after carrying out the order of transfer. The action of the management is valid where the termination is in terms of the contract of employment".
(4) Sadanand Ramesh Samsi Vs. Kirloskar Cummins Ltd. & Ors; 2003 1 CLR 50, Bombay High Court: "The labour court has dealt with the evidence on the point of workman superficially and has not applied its mind to the important aspects of the duties of the petitioner. The labour court has also lost the sight of the structure of the management in the modern factories where the management or the managerial or the administrative functions divided and sub divided vertically down below. The total management function gets subdivided amongst the several layers working at various levels. There is a division of functions like division of labour and by such method the managerial role of each individual does not cease to be managerial or administrative merely because the acts or the functions of each individual incumbent are restricted. The conventional tests cannot be applied in the modern scientific management that there is only one General Manager who controls the entire factory and all the managerial administrative functions are concentrated at on point. He may be one head of the organization but at the same time his powers and duties are scattered and spread over by percolation down below. We therefore have to consider the facts and circumstances of each and every case and decide the duties whether they fall within the main definition of the workman or they fall within the main definition of the workman or they fall in the exceptional portion of the definition of workman. It is not always that he should have powers to appoint and dismiss the employees. The functions might be assigned to a particular specialized department.
(5) Benet Coleman & Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri Yadeshwar Kumar; 2007 LLR 62; Delhi High Court para 11: "A supervisor may occupy a lower position in the organization chart of the Company where in the descending order may be CMD, MD, General Manager, Deputy Managers, Managers, Administrative Officer and supervisor, etc. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court that in order to be a workman a person must be performing one of the function as specified in Section 2
(s) of the Act and it was not sufficient that he was not performing administrative functions..."
60. In view of the above, applying the ratio of these decisions i.e entire facts that have emerged after evidence, show that claimant did not fall within the category of workman as defined U/s 2 (s) of I.D. Act and as such the present claim would not fall under the definition of Industrial Disputes. Issue no. 1 is decided against the workman and in favour of the management.
61. Although no specific issue as such has been framed by my Ld. Predecessor on the point as to whether the management is or is not an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) I.D. Act, but from the objections taken in the W/s, the question of management of being or not being an industry has to be decided. The management in para 3 of their preliminary objections in the W/s have stated that the management is a society registered under Societies Registration Act 1860 and after stating its various objects it is stated that the society is engaged for the upliftment of the poor and deprived persons and therefore, not an industry as defined in section 2 (j) I.D. Act and for this the statement of claim is beyond the scope of I.D. Act. No prejudice shall be caused to either side as evidence thereon has been led by both parties and both sides knew what case they had to meet on the basis of pleadings. On this issue, the objects of society are stated in para 2 of the affidavit of MW1 as under: "The objects of the Society are stated in para 2 of the affidavit of MW1 and Exb. MW1/1 gives details of the Memorandum and Rules & Regulations of CASA. It will be observed that the prima objective of the CASA is to undertake and assist in development programmes and projects among the poor, needy, backward, under priviledged and handicapped irrespective of caste, creed or colour by itself. Therefore, CASA is engaged in the charitable work solely for upliftment of the poor. For this purpose, the CASA gets donations to execute these projects. In the case of Physical Research Laboratory vs. K.G. Sharma (1997 LLR 401) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"It is nobody's case that PRL is engaged in an activity which can be called business trade or manufacture. Neither from the nature of its organization nor from the nature and character of the activity carried on by it, it can be said to be an 'undertaking' analogous to business or trade. It is not engaged in a commercial industrial activity and it cannot be described as an economic venture or a commercial enterprise as it is not its subject to produce and distribute services which would satisfy wants and needs of the consumer community. It is more an institution discharging Governmental functions and a domestic enterprise than a commercial enterprise. We are, therefore, of the opinion that PRL is not an industry even though it is carrying on the activity of research in a systematic manner which the help of its employees as it lacks that element which would make it an organization carrying in an activity which can be said to be analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business because it is not producing and distributing services which are intended or meant for satisfying human wants and needs, as ordinarily understood."
Mere disposal of obsolete items, e.g. trucks, cars, room coolers, computers, fans, water coolers, old empty bags, etc. which are junk and have no utility of service to CASA cannot be termed as manufacturing or trading activities. Moreover, this is only an isolated occasional incidental work and not the main or principal work of CASA. Therefore, CASA does not come within the definition of 'industry' under Section 2 (j) of the I.D. Act.
62. Moreover, the management witness has not been cross examined on this aspect and his statement in the affidavit on this aspect remains unrebutted. The entire portion of the affidavit of MW1 from para 2 with all its sub paras onwards till para 3 have remained unrebutted. As such, it stands established that management does not fall in the category of industry as defined in section 2 (j) I.D. Act. ISSUE No. 2
63. In view of my findings on above issue of the fact that claimant was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 (s) I.D. Act, present dispute does not fall within the category of Industrial Dispute as defined under section 2 (k) I.D. Act as under: "'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment of nonemployment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any persons".
64. It is also relevant to mention here that the present claimant had also filed a civil suit against termination from service before a Civil Court and therein he had also filed an appeal against an order. Certified coy of the reply of the management filed before Ld. Senior Civil Judge has also been placed on record showing the filing of such parallel proceedings by the claimant, during the pendency of the claim before this court.
65. In any case, in view of the above finding that claimant is found not to be a workman within the definition of section 2 (s) I.D. Act, the present dispute does not fall within the category of Industrial Dispute as defined U/s 2 (k) I.D. Act, the claim not being maintainable, the claimant is clearly not entitled to any relief under the Industrial Disputes Act.
66. Even otherwise, it is not disputed by the claimant that he received the transfercumpromotion order dated 07.10.92 (Exb.MW1/7). The transfer order mentions the post of Asstt. Project Officer for Gujarat. He was granted additional increment of Rs. 100/ p.m., basic salary of Rs. 2900/ plus ad hoc payment of Rs. 360/ per month on joining the post. Besides this, entitlement towards food and accommodation per day is also mentioned in the said order. The Claimant was required to report to the Chief Zonal Officer, West Zone, Bombay by 23rd October, 1992. Thereafter, he was proceed to Godhra under his instructions.
67. The Claimant did not report for duty. He made representation dated 9.12.92 (Exb. MW1/8), then sent a telegram (Ex. MW1/10) for being unwell, thereafter sent leave application dated 23.10.92 (Exb. MW1/12). The claimant sent an appeal to the CASA Board on 6.11.92 (Exb. MW1/14). The Management in its letter dated 13.10.92 (Exb. MW1/9) rejected the claimant's appeal, allowed the leave vide letter dated 28.10.92 (Exb. MW1/13). In letter dated 17.11.92 (Exb. MW1/15), the Management informed the claimant that "we are not in a position to withdraw your transfer order." His joining time at Godhra was extended till November, 1992. Thereafter, the Director, CASA in his letter dated 11.12.92 (Exb. MW1/16) informed the Claimant that last opportunity was being given to him to join his duties at Godhra by 4.1.93, failing which it would be assumed that he was not interested in proceeding on transfer and joining his duties there.
68. Despite ample opportunities given to the Claimant, he did not join at the place of his transfer. As such, his services were terminated vide letter dated 3.2.1993 by the Management and Rs. 9780/ being three months salary in lieu of notice, was tendered to the Claimant. Clause of the CASA Personnel Manual provides as under:
"8. The services of a confirmed employee may be terminated by the appointing authority or be relinquished by the employee on either three months notice to the other party or payment of three months basic pay. Either party may waive the condition in whole or in part in appropriate circumstances."
Since the contract of service provides for termination of service of a confirmed employee by either three months notice to the other party or payment of three months basic pay", the termination of the service of the Claimant was in accordance with law and his termination is valid in the eyes of law.
It has been repeatedly held that transfer is an incidence of service. No employee has a vested right to serve in a particular place. A transfer order cannot be said to be invalid unless it is issued by an incompetent authority or in violation of mandatory statutory duties or is tainted by mala fide. Hardship or inconvenience to an employee as a result of a transfer are not matters for the Court to consider but for the administration in the interest of good and efficient administration. Very recently, the Apex Court has observed that ordinarily courts cannot interfere with transfer orders. Similarly, in the case of Addison Paints & Chemicals Ltd. vs. Workman (2001 I LLJ 957), the Apex Court held that the Claimant could challenge his transfer order only after carrying out the order of transfer. The action of the Management is valid where the terminatin is in terms of the contract of employment as held in the case of Arun Kumar Bali vs. Govt. of N.C.T. Of Delhi (2003 (1) SLJ 54) by Hon'ble Delhi High Court.
69. In view of the above, the transfer order of the Management in transferring on promotion the Claimant was just, proper, valid, bona fide and in accordance with law.
70. The disobedience of claimant to the transfer order renders the order of termination justified besides being legal and valid.
71. In view of the above discussion, claim stands dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly. Award is passed. Copy of the award be sent to appropriate government for publication within 30 days from the receipt of the award.
72. At this stage, I shall also proceed to decide the application of the workman filed U/s 340 Cr. P.C dated 31/10/2000.
73. Vide this application, it has been stated by the workman that at the conciliation proceedings, before ALC Mr. Kanojia on CASA being illegally represented by advocates Sh. S.K. Singh and Shri Gulshan Chawla, the workman took written objections U/s 36 vide his application dated 16/04/96 and its reply CASA had stated that it was a member of Northern India Employers Association and ARs were office bearers of NIEA. However, no supportive documents were filed with the said reply.
74. It is also stated that before labour court also the workman opposed application dated 28/10/98 and had taken objection U/s 36 I.D. Act and in the reply to the said application, CASA once again asserted about the membership of NIEA itself and also of its three practicing advocates namely Sh. B.K. Singh, Sushil Kumar Sharma & Sh. A.K. Thakur.
75. As further stated in this application, court gave directions by four indulgent opportunities to the CASA to file relevant certificates/documents in support of their reply, but the said directions were not complied with by the CASA or its A/Rs. On 06/09/99, the court concluded that CASA was neither a member of NIEA nor its A/Rs were office bearers of NIEA and the court debarred and disentitled the CASA from being represented by the said A/Rs. CASA filed a civil writ petition against the said order, but again they did not support the petition with the required certificates/documents of membership.
76. In the counter affidavit filed before Hon'ble High Court, workman had averred that NIEA was a fictitious and nonexistent entity. As per the workman, in his application U/s 340 Cr. P.C and its representatives have obviously repeatedly, knowingly and intentionally made wrong, false and misleading statements in writing before various judicial forums about their membership of a non existing association and have caused interference, undue administration of justice. Workman prays by this application for prosecution under relevant provisions of IPC r/w provisions of Cr.P.C, of CASA through its Directors and also all its advocates Sh. Gulshan Chawla, B.K. Singh, Sushil Kumar and Sh. A.K. Thakur, who all according to him illegally represented the CASA before this court. This application is supported by an affidavit of the workman.
77. In their reply to this application, management has taken certain preliminary objections; firstly that labour court is not a court within the ambit and scope of section 340 Cr.P.C and as such the application is not maintainable. Secondly, that claimant/applicant has himself admitted in his statement of claim that he was working as an officer under the management and as such he was not a workman under I.D. Act and was not entitled to invoke machinery provided under the said act and that the present reference made at his instance was, therefore, bad in law. It is also stated that pending decision of this court on the main case, the application U/s 340 Cr.P.C should be kept in abeyance. The application is also stated to be bad in law and not tenable for the reason that no offence referred to any clause (b) of subsection 1 of section 195 Cr.P.C has been committed by the management and that no offence has been recorded in the present reference by this court. The allegation that perjury has been committed by the management is absolutely misconceived. Thirdly, that the application is ambiguous and does not disclose any particular offence committed by the management, neither the name of the management official nor the time or place of commission have been mentioned. Criminal offence being personal in character name of the concerned official ought to have been mentioned.
78. In the reply on merits, except matters of record, the contents of each para have been denied in so far as they relate to matters of facts. It is also stated in para 45 pf the application that claimant has himself suppressed the fact that he is enrolled as an advocate and in the interest of justice and equity, both the parties ought to be represented equally and there ought to be no discrimination in representation. It is further stated in reply to para 10 & 11 that the civil writ petition no. 678/99 has already been decided by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and vide their order management has been allowed to be represented by an advocate before this court and management is not required to furnish any such details as stated therein i.e certificates and documents in support of their membership of NIEA.
79. Workman has denied the contents of the reply and has reiterated those of his application as correct. However, as regards order of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, workman has replied that the Hon'ble High Court in its order dated 02/11/01 has not interfered regarding the issues raised in these paragraphs by the workman i.e regarding false statement with respect to membership of NIEA.
80. As already stated, workman neither came forward to argue on the merits of the case nor on his application.
81. I have perused the order of my Ld. Predecessor on section 36 I.D. Act dated 06/09/99. As per this order, it was presumed that neither management nor the advocates Sh. B.K. Singh, Sh. Sushil Kumar were office bearers of M/s Northern India Employers Association and therefore the said advocates were held not entitled to represent the management under sub section 2 of section 36 of the Act and as such both the advocates were debarred from appearance on behalf of the management.
82. I have also perused the order of Hon'ble High Court. The Hon'ble High Court came to the conclusion that the workman did not raise any objection on the first day of appearance of the A/Rs of the management and thereby he impliedly consented to their appearance and therefore, the subsequent objection taken to their representation by the lawyers could not be taken as valid objection, as such, the order of my Ld. Predecessor was set aside and holding specifically therein that since the management was allowed to be represented by a lawyer at commencement of hearing without any objection to appearance of lawyer, such objection raised at a subsequent stage is not permissible. As such, the order of the labour court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the court for trial.
83. At this stage, it would not be out of place to mention here that the Hon'ble High Court while disposing of the matter had observed that since the matter was an old one and was pending for a long time, all necessary steps shall be taken by the labour court to dispose of the proceedings as very well as possible preferably within a period of six months. These directions were passed as long back as in the year 2001, but even seven years thereafter the proceedings in the case were delayed to no end and mostly at the instance of workman himself.
84. Coming back to the application of the workman U/s 340 Cr.P.C, neither my Ld. Predecessor in his order dated 06/09/99 on the application U/s 36 I.D. Act nor the Hon'ble High Court in its order above referred, made any reference to the question as to whether the advocates in question were or were not found to be member of NIEA and more so there were no findings by the labour court that NIEA was a fictitious association. All that was done was to draw inference that since the advocates had failed to produce the documents of membership, it could be inferred that neither management nor its A/Rs were office bearers of Northern India Employers Association and accordingly the application U/s 36 I.D. Act had been allowed by my Ld. Predecessor.
85. It is only an averment on behalf of the workman/applicant that NIEA is a fictitious and nonexistent entity, while there is no such finding either by my Ld. Predecessor or by the Hon'ble High Court. The situation only happens to be that the A/Rs/advocates of management failed to prove a point and just because any party fails to prove a point would not render him for action U/s 340 Cr.P.C. The relevant provisions of 340 Cr.P.C are being reproduced hereunder: "Procedure in cases mentioned in section
195. (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause
(b) of subsection (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be in respect of a document produce or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction.
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is nonbailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate;
and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate".
Section 195 (1) (b) Cr.P.C: "Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. (1) No Court shall take cognizance_ _ _ _ _ _ _
(b) (I) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ __".
Section 193 IPC: "Punishment for false evidence. Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine".
Section 191 IPC: "Giving false evidence. Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.
Explanation 1. A statement is within the meaning of this section, whether it is made verbally or otherwise.
Explanation 2 - A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not know".
Section 11 subsection 3 of I.D. Act: "Procedure and power of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals. (1) _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ (2) _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ (3) Every Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal] shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects;
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed, and every inquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
86. As regards the objection of the management, in their reply, regarding the labour court not being a court is devoid of any substance in view of the above provisions of I.D. Act.
87. However, going by the language of section 340 Cr. P.C it is evident that it is only when court is of an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry is to be made. Firstly, in the present case, there is no finding even which may have been come on record that NIEA is nonexistent association. It is simply a situation where the management A/Rs and the management failed to produce any document in support of their statements that they were members and office bearers of the association. Many a times parties in a case make statements which they are not able to prove, but this by itself would not render them liable for an offence under the category of section 195 (1) (b) (i) Cr. P.C. There are two conditions of fulfillment of of which a complaint can be filed against a person who has given a false statement or evidence in a proceeding before a court. The first condition being that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court and secondly in the opinion of the court, it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an enquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him and so held in B.K. Gupta Vs. Damodar H. Bajaj; 2002 SCC (Cri.) 1103.
88. Section 340 Cr. P.C confers an inherent power in the court to make a complaint in respect of an offence committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect of the document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, if that court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into an offence referred to in clause (b) of section 195 (1) Cr. P.C. This section authorises the court to hold a preliminary enquiry and then to make a complaint K.T.M.S. Mohd. Vs. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1831. The purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed - Pritish Vs. State of Maharashtra; AIR 2002 SC
236.
89. The mere fact that deponent had made contradictory statement at two different stages in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution for perjury U/s 193 IPC. But it must be established that the deponent has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceeding or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of judicial proceeding. Further, such prosecution shall be taken only if it is expedient in the interest of justice K.T.M.S. Mohd. Vs. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1831. When there was no prima facie proof of alleged fraudulent dishonest acts as alleged in the petition, the court is justified in refusing to make complaint - Muckson Engineering Corpn. Vs. State of Rajasthan; 1996 Cr LJ 3758 (Raj).
90. In the present case also there is no prima facie proof also for the applicant/workman to support his averment that NIEA is a non existent association or it is a fictitious entity.
91. In the present set of facts and circumstances that emerge, there is no prima facie case even made out for any preliminary inquiry or any other criminal proceeding for perjury against the management or its A/Rs in question particularly in view of the fact that the Hon'ble High Court has also allowed the management to be represented by the A/Rs and solely on the ground that workman had not objected to their appearance and not on any other ground i.e of membership of A/Rs of NIEA or otherwise.
92. It is also relevant that workman himself is a lawyer, as admitted by him throughout. At this stage, the question whether NIEA exists or exists not, whether A/Rs were members of NIEA and office bearers, has become quite irrelevant and certainly it is not expedient in the interest of justice to carry out any inquiry U/s 340 Cr. P.C against them. The application U/s 340 Cr. P.C stands dismissed. File be cosigned to record room.
Announced in the open court Today on 21/02/2008 (SUJATA KOHLI) Presiding Officer Labour CourtII, Court No. 48, KKD Courts, Delhi.