Allahabad High Court
Ram Gopal @ Guddu vs The State Of U.P. on 24 November, 2022
Bench: Ramesh Sinha, Renu Agarwal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Reserved on 18.11.2022 Delivered on 24.11.2022 Court No. - 1 Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2362 of 2018 Appellant :- Ram Gopal @ Guddu Respondent :- The State Of U.P. Counsel for Appellant :- Arun Sinha Counsel for Respondent :- G.A. With Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1993 of 2018 Appellant :- Munnu Pandit Alias Mahesh Kumar Respondent :- The State Counsel for Appellant :- Jai Narayan Pandey,Abhishek Tiwari,Amarjeet Singh Rakhra,Anurag Tiwari,Aprajita Tiwari,Arun Sinha,Kuldeep Rawat,Mradul Kumar Tiwari,Shashank Pandey,Subhashish Sen,Suresh Chandra Shukla,Sweta Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- Govt. Advocate With Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2242 of 2018 Appellant :- Pappu And 3 Others Respondent :- The State Counsel for Appellant :- Arun Sinha Counsel for Respondent :- Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha,J.
Hon'ble Mrs. Renu Agarwal,J.
[Per Renu Agarwal, J. for the Bench]
1. The present criminal appeal No. 2362 of 2018 has been filed on behalf of appellant-Ram Gopal @ Guddu under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order dated 24.10.2018 passed by Mukesh Kumar Singh, Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge Anti Corruption, Court No. 6, Lucknow in Sessions Trial No. 1042 of 2010 (State Vs. Ram Gopal @ Guddu), arising out of Case Crime No. 168 of 2010, under Sections 147, 302 IPC, Police Station Hasanganj, District Lucknow, convicting and sentencing the appellants to undergo imprisonment for two years under Section 147 IPC and further convicting and sentencing the appellants to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 5000/- under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and in default of payment of fine to undergo a further period of three months additional imprisonment in addition.
2. Criminal Appeal No. 1993 of 2018 has been filed on behalf of appellat-Munnu Pandit @ Mahesh Kumar against the judgment and order dated 24.10.2018 whereby the appellant-Munnu Pandit @ Mahesh has been convicted and sentenced as above.
3. Criminal appeal No. 2242 of 2018 has been filed on behalf of appellants, Pappu, Mangla, Smt. Radha and Kamla Devi against the judgment and order dated 24.10.2018 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as above.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order dated 24.10.2018, the accused-appellants have preferred the aforesaid three appeals. Since, common factual matrix and law involved in the aforementioned appeals and they have been filed against the same impugned judgment, therefore, they are being decided by a common order.
5. Wrapping the facts in brief is that the complainant of the case Lal Ji lodged an FIR to the effect that on 25.04.2010 Ram Gopal @ Guddu, Pappu Sons of Mahavir, Mangla daughter of Mahavir, Munnu Pandit and wives of Guddu @ Ram Gopal and Pappu called and carried his mother to the house of accused-Ram Gopal @ Guddu and sprinkling kerosene oil upon her, set her ablaze. Her mother was badly injured. He admitted his mother in serious condition in Civil Hospital, Hazaratganj, Lucknow with the assistance of his neighbours. Neighbours Shravan Kumar Dixit S/o Ramesh Chandra Dixit, Sanjay Kumar S/o Laddan Gupta and my wife Ramawati Devi had seen the whole incident and tried to save his mother. On hue and cry, many of his neighbours gathered at the place of occurrence. His mother is hospitalized and later on died due to injuries caused by the accused persons.
6. On the basis of written report, a Case Crime No. 168 of 2010, under Sections 307 IPC, Police Station Hasanganj, District Lucknow was registered on 25.04.2010 and after the death of injured Durga Devi again a written information was given by the complainant to the police station that his mother died due to injuries caused by the accused.
7. Autopsy of the deceased was conducted by Hasanganj police and on the same day, the deceased was sent for getting postmortem through Constable Chandra Kumar, Police Station Hazaratganj, Lucknnow. The fact is recorded in ''Nakal Rapat' No. 49 at 20:50 dated 01.05.2010, alongwith necessary papers, memo, copy of GD, copy of report, photonash, Chalannash, namuna nash. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement of injured Smt. Durga Devi and prepared the site plan and after collecting the sufficient evidences against the accused, filed chargehseet no. 162 of 2010 in the Court concerned.
8. The Magistrate concerned had taken cognizance of the case and summoned the accused persons and committed the case to the court of Sessions after compliance of provisions under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. On the basis of written report, the chik report was prepared and endorsed in GD no. 35 at about 16:40 hours.
9. The accused were summoned by the court of Sessions and charge framed under Section 302 read with Section 149 Cr.P.C. against Ram Gopal @ Guddu, Pappu, Mangla, Munnu Pandit @ Mahesh Kumar, Radha and Kamla and read over to accused. The accused abjured from the charges levelled against them and claimed to be tried.
10. In order to prove this case against accused, prosecution adduced 9 witnesses, namely, PW-1 Lal Ji, the complainant of the case, PW-2 Shravan Kumar Dixit, eye witness of the case and witness of fact, who tried to save the deceased, PW-3 Neeraj, PW-4 Dr. S.N. Pandey who conducted postmortem in the body. PW-5 HCP Asharaf Ali Khan who prepared the chik report and GD, PW-6 SI Kameshwar Singh who prepared the inquest and conducted autopsy, PW-7 SI Shambhu Nath Tiwari who recorded the statement of witnesses, inspected and prepared the site plan and recovered the towel and ''Dhibari' and prepared recovery memo thereof (Exhibit-Ka-12), PW-8 SHO Vinay Kumar Gautam who recorded the statement of accused Ram Gopal @ Guddu son of Mahavir, Kamla W/o Pappu, Mangla W/o Ram Chandra and recorded the statements of witnesses of inquest, namely, Srilal, Ram Adhar, Ram Kumar, Budharam and Santram. He recorded the statement of witnesses Rameshwar, Tuntun and Rajesh Kumar and scriber of the FIR and statements of SI Shambhu Nath Tiwari and SI Rameshwar Singh and Constable Bheemsen and filed chargesheet.
The prosecution adduced and proved the following papers:
(i) Written reports, Exhibit Ka-1 and Ka-2
(ii) Inquest report, Exhibit Ka-6
(iii) Site Plan, Exhibit Ka-12
(iv) Copy of GD, Exhibit Ka-5
(v) Chalan Nash, Exhibit Ka-7
(vi) Photo Nash, Exhibit Ka-8
(vii) Specimen Seal, Exhibit Ka-9
(viii) Letter to Kotwali, Hazaratganj, Lucknow, Exhibit Ka-10
(ix) Death report, Exhibit-Ka11
(x) Chargesheet, Exhibit Ka-14
11. After conclusion of the evidence, the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. All the accused denied from the commission of crime and stated that they are falsely implicated due to enmity. Accused Ram Gopal stated that he was not present at the place of occurrence as he went to Kanpur for purchasing Coconut in answer to the question no. 2.
12. After perusal of the record and hearing of the submissions advanced by the learned Government Counsel and learned Counsel for the accused, the trial court reached to the conclusion that all the accused are named in the First Information Report. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the injured Smt. Durga Devi on the same day on which day the incident occurred i.e. 25.04.2010 and learned court treated the statement of injured as her dying declaration under Section 162(2) of Cr.P.C and Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act as she died due to injuries caused to her by the said accused. Learned trial court found that deceased stated about the role of all the six accused and their participation in the incident. PW-2, Shravan Kumar Dixit is an independent witness who corroborated the testimony of the deceased Durga Devi. Recovery of Towel and ''Dhibari' was made from the threshold of the house of the accused Ram Gopal, therefore, the court convicted and sentenced all the six accused persons under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and punished them accordingly.
13. Heard Sri Arun Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants in the present appeal as well as in Criminal Appeal No. 2242 of 2018, Sri Amarjeet Singh Rakhra, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1993 of 2018, Sri Arunendra, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and perused the record.
14. Learned counsel for appellant-Munnu Pandit @ Mahesh Kumar argued that he is not named in the FIR. He is not implicated in the case. No role is assigned to him during the course of incident. He has no motive to commit the crime. PW-3 is completely hostile and PW-2 who is said to be eye witness of the incident also denied his role in the commission of crime.
15. Learned counsel for rest of the appellants stated that learned court below misinterpreted the evidence as there is no dying declaration of the deceased. The date of incident is said to be 25.04.2010 and the deceased expired on 01.05.2010. There was ample time to record the statement of the deceased in the form of dying declaration but the Investigating Officer made no effort to do so and the trial court relied on the statement of the deceased while being alive recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. There are many discrepancies in the statement the deceased herself and the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 recorded in the course of trial.
16. On the contrary, learned AGA vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and stated that PW-2, alongwith PW-3 and two others, namely, Sanjay and Vikki was standing in front of his house with the intention to have a bath in the river when he saw the incident and tried to save the victim and took the victim, injured to the hospital. The statement of the victim was recorded by the Investigating Officer on very day of incident in hospital which was rightly believed by the trial court. The judgment passed by the trial court is in consonance with the facts and law and is liable to be uphold.
17. The PW-1, Lal ji stated on oath that accused Ram Gopal, Pappu and their wives Radha, Kamla and sister Mangla took her mother forcibly to their house, tied her hands, sprinkled kerosene oil and set her ablazed. His mother came out of their house raising alarm to save her. Shravan Kumar Dixit , PW-2 alongwith other neighbours gathered and informed the police. The complainant was informed by one Tuntun, brother of Shravan Kumar, about the incident. He reached to Daliganj bridge on the information received from Tuntun, the brother of Shravan Kumar Dixit where Shravan Kumar Dixit was taking his mother to the Trauma Centre, Medical College, Lucknow. Doctor refused to admit her and referred her to Balrampur Civil Hospital. The victim was carried to Civil Hospital Balrampur by police Jeep and got her admitted, then the complainant lodged the FIR in the concerned police station. This witness proved the written report as Exhibit Ka-1. It is also stated by this witness that his mother informed him before her death that Ram Gopal, Pappu and their wives and sister Mangla set her ablazed. He alleged that there was previous enmity between his mother and the accused as the accused wanted to grab her house and have also taken the earnest money for her house.
18. PW-2 Shravan Kumar Dixit deposed that he was standing in front of his house alongwith Vikki, Neeraj, Sanjay and Kapil. Ram Gopal called Durga Devi, the deceased to his house. After some time, Durga Devi came out of the house in burning condition followed by accused Ram Gopal @ Guddu, Pappu, Mangla, Munnu Pandit, Radha and Kamla who were threatening her. He alongwith his friends tried to save the victim by their Towel. They too sustained injuries by ''Danda' inflicted by Ram Gopal @ Guddu, Pappu, Mangla, Munnu Pandit, Radha and Kamla. They rescued the victim to Balrampur hospital. On the way, he was told by the victim Durga Devi that Ram Gopal called her to his house, where Mangla, Munnu Pandit, Radha and Kamla were already present. All of them sprinkled kerosene oil on her and set her ablazed. Both hand of the victim were tied with piece of cloth which he released. PW-2 stated that she was taken to said hospital by police jeep and during the treatment she expired on 01.05.2010. The witness identified all the accused during the trial in the court. PW-3 Neeraj was declared hostile by AGDC, however he stated that when he came out from his house, he saw a woman buring and people were gathered around her. He stopped for 5 to 10 minutes and then he went away.
19. PW-4 Dr. S.N. Pandey, Senior consultant, radiologist conducted the autopsy of the body of the deceased in the mortuary of medical university, Lucknow on 01.05.2010 at 2:40 p.m. which was brought by Constable 1670 Bheemsen and Head Constable 1817 Chandra Kumar.
20. Following antemortem injuries were found on the body of deceased:
(i) Superficial to deep septic burn would present on all over the body except both buttock sacral region public region, both back of thigh and both leg with both sole.
(ii) Pus slugh debris with unhealthy granulation tissues present in burn wound. On opening and section cutting of both lung, liver, spleen and both kidneys.
(iii)Multiple pus foci seen at places. Membranes, brain and pleura, left lung and pericardium congested. The death of deceased opined by the doctor "due to septisemia as a result of antemortem burn wound".
21. PW-5 HCP Ashraf Ali deposed in Court that on 25.04.2010 at about 16:50 p.m., Lal Ji son of Late Rameshwar submitted a written report sighed by him on police station. On the basis of written report, Crime No. 168 of 2010, under Section 307 IPC was registered against Ram Gopal @ Guddu, Pappu, Mangla, Munnu Pandit, Radha and Kamla. The written report was endorsed in GD No. 35 at 16:50 p.m. by Head Constable Ram Prakash Prajapati as Exhibit Ka-5 and investigation was handed over to SI Shambhu Nath Tiwari.
22. PW-6 SI Kameshwar Singh deposed that he conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased in the presence of witnesses and proved the inquest report as Exhibit Ka-6.
23. PW-7 SI Shambhu Nath Tiwari deposed in Court that he recorded the statements of the witnesses and wife of the complainant and recovered ''Dhibari' and Towel from the house of the accused Ram Gopal and prepared recovery memo as Exhibit Ka-12.
24. PW-8 SHO Vinay Kumar Gautam stated on oath that he arrested the accused and recorded the statements of witnesses of inquest and statements of Rameshwar, Tuntun and Rajesh.
25. When the accused were asked to adduce evidence in their defence, the accused adduced DW-1 Ramesh Chandra Srivastava who deposed in Court that he was not summoned by the Court but accused Munnu was present in his house and joined the uninterrupted recital of Ramcharitmanas. He remained there from 7:00 a.m. till 8 to 9 p.m. alongwith his family members.
DISCUSSIONS:
26. PW-1 is not eye witness. It transpires from the record that he was informed by Tuntun, the brother of Shravan Kumar Dixit, PW-2 regarding the incident and when he reached to the bridge of Daliganj, Shravan Kumar was taking his mother to Trauma Centre, KGMU. PW-2 is eye witness who was standing in front of his house and was preparing for taking bath in river, when he saw the victim coming out from the house of the accused Ram Gopal in burning condition. Immediately they tried to put off fire by their Towel and carried her to Balrampur Hospital by Riksha to Trauma Centre and thereafter he accompanied victim and complainant to Civil Hospital, Balrampur alongwith police constables.
27. PW-3, however declared hostile but he proved this fact that when he came out from his house, he saw a woman in burning condition and there was crowed also.
28. Learned counsel for all the accused stated that there is no dying declaration as contemplated by the law and learned trial court treated the statement of victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by Investigation Officer as evidence under Section 162(2) Cr.P.C. and Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. It also argued that there are multiple dying declaration. One is recorded by the Investigating Officer, the second which victim told to her son, the complainant after three days of incident and third she revealed the incident to PW-2 Shravan Kumar Dixit when he was taking her to KGMU. All the three dying declaration have sharp contradictions and they do not build confidence to be believed to the extent to convict, the accused in the crime. PW-1 admitted in his cross-examination that her mother told him that the accused sprinkled kerosene oil and set her ablazed, after three days of incident. PW-2 stated that the victim told him about this incident when he was taking her to Balrampur Hospital that Ram Gopal @ Guddu called her to his house where Pappu, Radha Devi, Kamala Devi, Mangala and Munnu all were already present and all of them collectively set her ablazed. Learned trial court mentioned the statement of the victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and made it part of judgment. Smt. Durga Devi, the injured stated that at about 02:30 p.m. when she was at her home, her cousin Ram Gopal @ Guddu, Pappu and her sister Mangla and wives of Ram Gopal @ Guddu and Pappu and their neighbour Munnu Pandit came and called her for consultation, as soon as she entered their house, all of them put plastic sheet on her and tied her hand, Ram Gopal sprinkled kerosene oil and when she shouted that what are they doing, the wife of Ram Gopal set her ablazed and her body started burning. Shouting and crying when she came out of the house, whole of her body had burnt. One of the boy put his towel on her and tried to put off the fire. She was crying, her daughter-in-law was weeping and the victim was admitted in hospital and she stated in her statement that she has no hope of life as the accused burnt her like monsters and her body was paining and throat is drying. The statement of victim was recorded on the date of occurrence itself, so there is no probability to distort the actual incident.
29. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that there are contradictions in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 as the PW-1 told that Pappu, Mangla, Smt. Radha and Kamla Devi came to call her while PW-2 stated that injured told him that Ram Gopal @ Guddu came to call her alone and Co-appellants Mangala, Radha, Kamla were sitting in the house, however, the deceased herself stated to the Investigating Officer that all the accused came to her house to call her. Of course there is discrepancies in the statements of PW-1, PW2 and in the statement of the victim given to Investigating Officer but in all the three statements, the presence of all the accused is found there. The statement recorded by the Investigating Officer is victim's first hand statement, however the statement given by PW-1 and PW-2 is reproduced by them on the basis of their memory.
30. It is pertinent to mention here that the statement of PW-1 is recorded on 21.01.2011 and concluded on 11.05.2011, approximately after one year of the incident. The statement of PW-2 Shravan Kumar Dixit was recorded from 26.05.2011 to 04.07.2013 in segments. However, the statement of victim was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on the date of incident, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of victim. Moreover, it is also pertinent to mention that while recording the statement of the victim, the Investigating Officer recorded the demeanour of the victim also. The statement of the victim is also aspire confidence as in her own statement she stated that she has no hope of life and Hon'ble Apex Court held in several judgments that no one would lie on the last bed. The discrepancies in the statement of the PW-1 and PW-2 and the victim are not of such a nature that the statement of the victim could be disbelieved.
31. The deceased in her statement mentioned that accused tied her hands by plastic sheet that also corroborates by the evidence of PW-2 Shravan Kumar Dixit who stated in his statement that the hands of the victim were tied which she released thereafter. The deceased victim assigned the role of setting fire on the wife of Ram Gopal. Learned trial court explained that the accused Radha Devi is wife of Ram Gopal who was medically examined at time of arrest and abrasions were found on her head and nose which also proves her involvement in the commission of crime.
32. Learned trial court mentioned in its judgment that if the statement of the victim is recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 162(2) of Cr.P.C. and later on the victim expires due to the injuries caused, the statement shall be admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. For ready reference Section 162(2) of the Cr.P.C. is quoted hereunder:
Section 162(2) in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 "(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of clause (1) of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872 ), or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act. Explanation.- An omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in sub- section (1) may amount to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the particular context shall be a question of fact."
33. It is argued by learned counsel that the victim expired on 01.05.2010, seven days after the incident but no dying declaration recorded during this period which shows that there was no such injuries and no need to record the dying declaration.
34. It is true that the statement recorded by the police has lesser important than the statement recorded by the Tehsildar, doctor or any other person as it is generally signed by the scriber and doctor and the patient itself but if there is no such statement and she is died on account of the injuries caused to her in the incident, the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. becomes relevant and the conviction can be solely based upon such statement if it inspire confidence. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act is quoted as under:
Section 32(1) in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 "When it relates to cause of death--When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question."
35. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [(2007) 13 SCC 112], wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying declaration. But, before it can be acted upon, the same must be held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully. Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor for placing full reliance thereupon. In this case, the deceased herself had taken contradictory and inconsistent stand in different dying declarations. They, therefore, should not be accepted on their face value. Cation, in this behalf, is required to be applied.
36. Hon'ble Apex Court relying upon the case law of Balbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in [(2006) 12 SCC 283] and in the case of Muthu Kutty Vs. State reported in [(2005) 9 SCC 113] held: (Balbir Singh Case, SCC Page 291, Para 34 as under:
We are of the opinion that whereas the findings of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court in regard to the guilt of appellant I must be accepted, keeping in view the inconsistencies between the two dying declarations, benefit of doubt should be given to Appellant 2. We, however, uphold the conviction and sentence of both the appellants under Section 498-A IPC."
37. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment given the case of State of Punjab Vs. Praveen Kumar in Criminal Appeal No. 633 of 1999 decided on 18.11.2004 published in Manupatra, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"While appreciating the credibility of the evidence produced before the Court, the Court must view evidence as a whole and come to a conclusion as to its genuineness and truthfulness. The mere fact that two different versions are given but one name is common in both of them cannot be a ground for convicting the named person. The court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful. If there are two dying declarations giving two different versions, a serious doubt is created about the truthfulness of the dying declaration. It may be that if there was any other reliable evidence on record, this Court could have considered such corroborative evidence to test the truthfulness of the dying declarations."
38. Learned counsel relied upon the case of Sanjay Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in [(2007) 9 SCC 148]. In this case Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"In our opinion in view of the different dying declarations, it would not be safe to uphold the conviction of the appellant and we have to give him the benefit of doubt. It cannot be said in this case that prosecution has proved the appellant's guilt under Section 306 IPC of abetting the suicide beyond reasonable doubt."
39. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Amol Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [(2008) 5 SCC 468], wherein Hon'ble Apex Court Ruled that:
"If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinizing the contents of various dying declarations, in such situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances."
40. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided that if there are multiple dying declaration, the dying declaration becomes doubtful and such a dying declaration cannot be relied upon for the conviction of the appellants.
41. We are agree with the point of learned counsel and the law laid down by the Apex Court that when there are multiple dying declaration, such dying declaration becomes doubtful but in all the law laid down and cited before this Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where there are inconsistency and contradictory statements in the dying declaration, they should be examined in the light of surrounding and corroborating evidence, therefore, the multiple dying declaration cannot be thrown away on the very threshold. The only rider is that the multiple dying declaration should be examined in the light of other evidence produced by the prosecution during the trial or appeal.
42. In the instant case, the date of occurrence is 25.04.2010 and the victim expired on 01.05.2010 and the dying declaration as such argued by learned counsel for appellants is not recorded by Tehsildar, Doctor or any other person and the trial court treated the statement of victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as dying declaration as admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
43. The victim told for the first time to PW-2 Shravan Kumar Dixit about the manner of incident and when PW-1, the son of the victim, joined him while PW-2 was carrying the victim to hospital, she also informed his son about the incident. PW-1 and PW-2 had reproduced in court what the victim told them. However, the statement of victim herself was recorded on the date of incident itself on 25.04.2010 and it was first hand information given to Investigating Officer. We are aware of the fact that any information passes through many person then some changes occurr in the subsequent statement.
44. PW-7, Shambhu Nath Tiwari deposed in Court that he recorded the statement of the victim in hospital and due to paucity of time, the statement of doctor was not recorded and the statement of victim could not be recorded in the presence of Magistrate. He also stated in his statement that victim was badly injured when he recorded her statement, hospital employees and neighbours of the victim were not present. They were outside of the room. This fact is also to be taken into account that Investigating Officer did not record the statement of victim in the form of dying declaration. He simply recorded the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., therefore the formalities to be at the time of dying declaration were not made. Later on when the victim died, the statement was read as dying declaration by the court. While relying on the dying declaration, the court has to look into whether the statement was given by the victim voluntarily as PW-7 stated that hospital employees and neighbours were not present in the room, it cannot be said that the statement given by the victim was under any duress, tutoring or prompting.
45. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 3 of the judgment rendered in the case of Heikrujam Chaoba Vs. State of Manipur reported in [(1999) 8 SCC 458] has held as under:
"3.An oral dying declaration no doubt can form the basis of conviction, through the Courts seek for corroboration as a rule of prudence. But before the said declaration can be acted upon, the Court must be satisfied about the truthfulness of the same and that the said declaration was made by the deceased while he was in a fit condition to make the statement. The dying declaration has to be taken as a whole and the witness who deposes about such oral declaration to him must pass the scrutiny of reliability......"
46. Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment given in the case of Uttam Vs. The State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2012 has held in Para nos. 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21 and 23 as under:
12. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in [(1993) 2 SCC 684]14, this Court had highlighted the significance of a dying declaration in the following words :
"18. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence and unless evidence is tested by cross-examination, it is not creditworthy. Under Section 32, when a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances which result in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that category provided it has been made by the deceased while in a fit mental condition. A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration......."
13. In Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in Shudhakar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [(2012) 7 SCC 569], this Court had opined that once a dying declaration is found to be reliable, it can form the basis of conviction and made the following observations :
"20. The "dying declaration" is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his death and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth. Normally in such situations the courts attach the intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. Once such statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by the deceased to cover up the truth or falsely implicate a person, then the courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction. More so, where the version given by the deceased as dying declaration is supported and corroborated by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for the courts to doubt the truthfulness of such dying declaration."
14. In Paniben (Smt.) v. State of Gujarat reported in [(1992) 2 SCC 474], on examining the entire conspectus of the law on the principles governing dying declaration, this Court had concluded thus :
"18. ........ (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 scc 104].
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552]; Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar[(1983) 1 SCC 211].
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618].
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.[(1974) 4 SCC 264].
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M. P.[(1981 Suppl. SCC 25].
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.[(1981) 2 SCC 654].
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [(1980) Suppl. SCC 455].
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar[1980 Suppl. SCC 769].
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Suppl. SCC 152].
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390].
47. 16. In Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [(2010) 8 SCC 514, where the deceased was burnt by pouring kerosene oil on her and was brought to the hospital by the accused and his family members, the Court noticed that she had made two varying dying declarations and held thus :
"9. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire, which means "a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth". The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as "the Evidence Act") as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore, cannot be cross-examined. Such statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases.
10. This Court has considered time and again the relevance/probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has been recorded. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.
17. In Amol Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [(2008) 5 SCC 468], when faced with two dying declarations containing inconsistencies, the approach to be adopted by the Court was summarized as under:
"13. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. (See Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P [(1993) 2 SCC 684]. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances."
18. In Sher Singh and Another v. State of Punjab reported in [(2008) 4 SCC 265] , this Court has held thus :
"16. Acceptability of a dying declaration is greater because the declaration is made in extremity. When the party is at the verge of death, one rarely finds any motive to tell falsehood and it is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with in case of a dying declaration. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court would insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court should ensure that the statement was not as a result of tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is for the court to ascertain from the evidence placed on record that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had ample opportunity to observe and identify the culprit. Normally, the court places reliance on the medical evidence for reaching the conclusion whether the person making a dying declaration was in a fit state of mind, but where the person recording the statement states that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. What is essential is that the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement without there being the doctor's opinion to that effect, it can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certificate by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of a statement can be established otherwise."
21. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Veerpal and another reported in [(2022) 4 CSS 741], this Court has clarified that a dying declaration can be acted upon without any other corroboration and observed as below :
"16. Now, on the aspect, whether in the absence of any corroborative evidence, there can be a conviction relying upon the dying declaration only is concerned, the decision of this Court in Munnu Raja41, and the subsequent decision in Paniben v. State of Gujarat42, are required to be referred to. In the aforesaid decisions, it is specifically observed and held that there is neither a rule of law nor of prudence to the effect that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon without a corroboration. It is observed and held that if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base its conviction on it, without corroboration. Similar view has also been expressed in State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211]. Therefore, there can be a conviction solely based upon the dying declaration without corroboration."
23. In Arvind Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in [(2001) 6 SCC 407], this Court has held that:
"Dying declaration should be dealt with care and caution and corroboration thereof, though not essential, is expedient in order to strengthen the evidentiary value of the declaration. Even where independent witnesses may not be available, all the precautions should be taken when it comes to acceptance of such a statement as trustworthy evidence. In other words, even though direct evidence may not be available, circumstantial evident without a break in the chain of events, would add weight to the evidentiary value of the dying declaration."
48. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that PW-1 did not mention the name of Mannu Pandit in his statement and merely mentioned the name of appellant Ram Gopal, Pappu and their wives and sister Mangla, however PW-2 did not mention the name of Pappu and included the name of Munnu Pandit. So far as the statement of victim is concerned, she stated the name of all the accused including Munnu pandit and Pappu. Therefore, (i)there is contradiction in the statements of both the witnesses and the statement of the victim (ii)It is argued that PW-1 and PW-2 did not clarify the roles of the appellants individually, however the victim stated that Ram Gopal sprinkled kerosene oil and his wife set her ablazed and there is omission in the statement of PW-1 and PW-2 regarding this fact (iii) PW-1 and PW-2 did not mention the use of ''Panni' (Polythene), however victim herself stated that as soon as she entered the house of appellant, all the accused covered her with a plastic Panni, therefore it is argued that there is omission of use of plastic panni in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 and omission of the name of Munnu Pandit and Pappu in the statement of PW-2 and PW-1 respectively.
49. Now while considering the evidence on record, as it is said earlier, that the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 is secondary statement while the statement of the victim is first hand statement given on the same day of incident and she named all the appellants in her statement, therefore, if the name of Pappu and Munnu is omitted in the evidence PW-1 and PW-2 cannot be given much importance.
50. So far as the manner of putting her on fire is concerned, PW-1 and PW-2 are not eye witnesses of the fact and they were not present when the appellants set the victim ablazed. Therefore, if there is omission in the manner of incident in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 that is immaterial because the statement of victim is intact regarding the manner of incident. It is also pertinent to mention here that the victim herself given only one statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and no other than this statement is recorded by any other person. Therefore we are not agree with the argument of learned counsel that there are multiple dying declarations. The statement of the victim is recorded once for all during the investigation. Therefore, there is no question of contradiction in the statements of victim.
51. The statement of victim is corroborated by the statement of PW-1 and PW-2 to the extent that the victim told them that accused sprinkled kerosene oil and set her ablazed in their home. PW-2 stated that when he was standing in front of his house to have bath in the river, he himself saw an woman coming out of the house of the accused-appellants and he with his four friends rushed towards the place of occurrence and collectively were trying to put off the fire on the body of victim by his towel which was recovered from the threshold (Dehari) of the house of the appellant Ram Gopal.
52. From the site plan, it transpires that Investigating Officer recovered the towel and dhibari from the threshold of the appellant Ram Gopal. In the six number of index, he had mentioned that he recovered the Towel and Dhibari from the place shown on the gate of Ram Gopal. However, in his statement, the Investigating Officer stated that he recovered the towel from ''Tiraha' of lane near place of occurrence and he did not sent this towel for FSL report but there is no explanation as how he shown to have recovered this towel from the threshold of the appellant.
53. The victim stated in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. treated as dying declaration that as soon as she entered into the house of the appellant Ram Gopal, all the accused covered her with Panni and tied her hands. The statement is corroborated with the statement of PW-2, Shravan Kumar who stated in examination-in-chief that when the victim came out of the house of appellant Ram Gopal, her hands were tied with chit and he released her hands.
54. The towel was produced in the court. The statement of PW-2 corroborates the recovery of towel as is also evident from the recovery memo Exhibit Ka-13.
55. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that when she was admitted in the hospital for treatment, no remains of polythene was found on the body of the victim. Learned counsel draw attention towards the statement of PW-4 Dr. S.N. Pandey who conducted the postmortem of victim.
56. Learned AGA replied to the argument that when the postmortem was conducted on the body of the victim (deceased) then her body was found burnt and on all the burnt parts dressing was found. It is also argued by AGA that when she was admitted, the doctor must have wash her wound, therefore it is not possible to have polythene remains on her body.
57. We agree with the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that doctor admitted in his cross examination that the piece of polythene may struck to the wounds of deceased if polythene sheet is used while ablazing but it is not clarified from the doctor whether there was any polythene remains on the body or not. Therefore, it is quite possible that when she was treated in the hospital, her wounds must have been washed by the doctor.
58. From the evidence on record, it is found that dying declaration by the statement of victim recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and relied by the Court under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act are reliable evidence and the evidence is corroborated by the medical evidence as well as the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2.
59. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that PW-3 Neeraj has turned hostile during trial. From the perusal of the statement of PW-3 it transpires that PW-3 is declared hostile by ADGC.
60. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Yadav and Another etc. Vs. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 339-340 of 2014 decided on 04.02.2022 has held as under:
"82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra [(1996) 10 SCC 360: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1278] this Court held that (at SCC p. 363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra [(2002) 7 SCC 543: 2003 SCC (Cri) 112], Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab [(2006) 13 SCC 516: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 109], Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 2 SCC 450: (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 661], Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [(2007) 13 SCC 360: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] and Subbu Singh v. State [(2009) 6 SCC 462: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1106].
83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence."
61. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Attar Sinsgh Vs. State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 1091 of 2010, decided on 14.12.2012 has held as under:
".....It could not be ignored that when a witness is declared hostile and when his testimony is not shaken on material points in the cross-examination, there is no ground to reject his testimony in toto as it is well- settled by a catena of decisions that the Court is not precluded from taking into account the statement of a hostile witness altogether and it is not necessary to discard the same in toto and can be relied upon partly. If some portion of the statement of the hostile witness inspires confidence, it can be relied upon. He cannot be thrown out as wholly unreliable. This was the view expressed by this court in the case of Syed Akbar vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 SC 1848 whereby the learned Judges of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Karnataka High Court which had discarded the evidence of a hostile witness in its entirety. Similarly, other High Courts in the matter of Gulshan Kumar vs. State (1993) Crl.L.J. 1525 as also Kunwar vs. State of U.P. (1993) Crl.L.J. 3421 as also Haneefa vs. State (1993) Crl.L.J. 2125 have held that it is not necessary to discard the evidence of the hostile witness in toto and can be relied upon partly. So also, in the matter of State of U.P. vs. Chet Ram reported in AIR 1989 SC 1543 =(1989) Crl.L.J. 1785; it was held that if some portion of the statement of the hostile witness inspires confidence it can be relied upon and the witness cannot be termed as wholly unreliable. It was further categorically held in the case of Shatrughan vs. State of M.P. (1993) Crl.L.J. 3120 that hostile witness is not necessarily a false witness. Granting of a permission by the Court to cross-examine his own witness does not amount to adjudication by the Court as to the veracity of a witness. It only means a declaration that the witness is adverse or unfriendly to the party calling him and not that the witness is untruthful. This was the view expressed by this Court in the matter of Sat Paul vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1976 SC 294. Thus, merely because a witness becomes hostile it would not result in throwing out the prosecution case, but the Court must see the relative effect of his testimony."
62. But it is settled proposition of law that the statement of hostile witness can be relied upon to the extent that he supports the prosecution case. PW-3 is a person who PW-2 stated that he was present with him. PW-3 stated that he saw that an woman was burning and many people gathered around on the place of occurrence. He stopped there for 5 to 10 minutes and then he went away as he was a driver by profession. This witness did not name any appellant. He also denied that he helped in the rescue of victim but he proved the incident of burning of victim at the place of occurrence in the lane which corroborates further the statement of PW-1 and PW-2.
63. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that witnesses Ramawati, Sanjay are not produced in Court. Ramawati, daughter-in-law of the deceased and Sanjay is said to have independent witnesses. It is the prerogative of the prosecution to prove their case by single witness or the multiple witnesses and it is the reliability and credibility of the witnesses and not the number.
64. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Amar Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh and Others in Criminal Appeal No. 1671 of 1995, decided on 31.01.2003 has held as under:
"It is true that the witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be called by the prosecution, whether effect of their testimony is for or against the case of the prosecution. However, that does not mean that everyone who has witnessed the occurrence, whatever their number be, must be examined as a witness."
65. Learned counsel for the appellant Munnu Pandit argued that he has no motive to commit this crime as the motive accrued to Ram Gopal and his family members. PW-1 has stated in page 11 that accused appellants have taken advance money of his house and when her mother objected to it, the appellants set her ablazed. Therefore, motive is available to the appellants but from the evidence it is clear that the presence of Munnu Pandit was established by the statement of the victim herself. PW-2 also stated on oath that when he saw all the accused including Munnu Pandit while the victim was burning. However, in cross examination on 10.05.2012 PW-2 stated that Munnu Pandit was not present where the victim was burning and he stated that he saw no accused at the time in his statement recorded on 04.07.2013. He further stated that appellant-Munnu Pandit was on bail during trial and he did not misuse the same.
66. Learned counsel for the appellant Munnu Pandit also draw attention that witness Neeraj did not named him present at the place of occurrence but as has been discussed earlier, PW-3 Neeraj has been declared hostile and he did not fully support the version of prosecution, hence the role of Munnu Pandit is not distinguishable from the role of other appellants as all the accused were present when the victim was being burnt.
67. It is also vehemently argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the measurement of Dhibari is 180 ml. and 180 ml. oil is not sufficient to burn any person. In this regard it is stated by the victim that her body was covered by polythene and Ram Gopal sprinkled kerosene oil and his wife Radha set the victim ablazed. When the kerosene oil is used alongwith polythene sheets as it is also proved by the recovery memo as Exhibit Ka-13, it is immaterial that 180 ml. Kerosene oil cannot burnt any person.
68. Learned trial court addressed all the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants during the submissions of their arguments. The accused are charged with Section 302 read 34 IPC and prosecution proved their case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial court relied upon the case laws of Anant Mohanto Vs. State of Orrisa reported in AIR 1979 SC 1433 and in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Case of Vishram Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1993 SC 250. In these cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that oral statements are also admissible as evidence because no one lies at the time of his death. Therefore, in the light of evidence discussed above and being mindful of the principal of governing appreciation of evidence, related to multiple dying declarations, we are of the view that learned trial court discussed all the factors of multiple dying declaration, recorded by the Investigating Officer and it's value and its admissibility and there is no reason to intervene in the judgment and order passed by the trial court.
69. Accordingly, the above captioned criminal appeals are hereby dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.10.2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge Anti Corruption, Court No. 6, Lucknow in Sessions Trial No. 1042 of 2010 (State Vs. Ram Gopal @ Guddu), arising out of Case Crime No. 168 of 2010, under Sections 147, 302 IPC, Police Station Hasanganj, District Lucknow, is confirmed.
70. The appellants, Muunu Pandit @ Mahesh Kumar, Pappu, Mangla, Smt. Radha and Kamla Devi are on bail. Their bail bonds are canceled and sureties discharged. They are ordered to surrender before the trial court within two weeks from today to serve out the sentence awarded by the trial court failing which the trial court is directed to get them arrested and sent to jail.
71. So far as appellant Ram Gopal @ Guddu is concerned, he is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out sentence as awarded by the trial court.
72. Office is directed to send a copy of this order along with lower court record to the trial court concerned for necessary information and compliance forthwith.
[Mrs. Renu Agarwal,J.] [Ramesh Sinha,J.]
Order Date :- 24.11.2022
kkv/