Bombay High Court
Gangwani And Co. vs Saraswati Wd/O Maniram Banewar on 12 April, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001ACJ1295, [2001(90)FLR1100], (2001)IILLJ1022BOM
Author: D.D. Sinha
Bench: B.P. Singh, D.D. Sinha, S.D. Gundewar
JUDGMENT D.D. Sinha, J.
1. The Division Bench of this Court vide order dated September 28, 2000 passed in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 66/1993, 3/1996 and 11/2000 made a reference to the larger Bench in view of conflicting judgments of the earlier Division Benches of this Court in the case of Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinazie & Co. Pvt. Ltd., and Dhondubai Murlidhar Reddi v. Proprietor Jankidas Khandsari Sugar Factory and others, 1991 Mh.LJ. 624. The question involved is -
"Whether Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Court and his order a judgment and order passed by the single Judge of the High Court under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay)?"
Since common question of law is involved, the reference is disposed of by common judgment.
2. The contentions raised by Shri Jaiswal, learned Counsel for the appellant, in nutshell are that an order made by the learned single Judge of this Court in an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a judgment and the Commissioner exercising power under Section 20 of the Act discharges his duties and functions as a Civil Court is expected to discharge its functions and, therefore, he acts as a Court and not as an Arbitrator, It is further contended that adjudication done by the Commissioner under Section 19 of the Act is analogous and similar to that of the Court in view of the following factors/circumstances:
The disputes need to be settled by the Commissioner are disputes in regard to liability of employer to pay compensation or as to amount or duration of compensation between him and his workman or his legal representative and Rules, which are framed and procedure contemplated by such Rules require that aggrieved employee needs to file written application before the Commissioner and other side has to file written statement. The Commissioner thereafter is required to frame and record issues on which decision of the case depends and has to record documentary and oral evidence, which may be adduced by the parties to the dispute. The Commissioner has to maintain a brief record of the proceedings and is required to pronounce his "judgment" recording findings on each issue and reasons therefor. It is further contended that under Section 23 of the Act, the Commissioner has all the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing attendance of the witnesses and compelling production of documents and material objects, examining witnesses on oath and coming to the conclusion on the basis of evidence adduced and arguments advanced. Under Section 24, parties can be represented before the Commissioner by the legal representatives. Under Section 27, Commissioner can also submit any question of law for decision of the High Court. The Commissioner can recover as arrears of land revenue any amount ordered to be paid by him, which demonstrates that judicial pronouncement made by the Commissioner is almost in the form of decree pronounced by a Court of law. It is further contended that Section 19(2) of the Act ousts jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any question required to be decided by the Commissioner under the Act. The learned Counsel contended that proceedings before the Commissioner are almost analogous as well as in close proximity to proceedings in the Civil Court. Hence, adjudication done by the Commissioner and recording of his findings on each of the issues and reasons therefor is nothing but a judgment and not an award. In order to substantiate his contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on the judgment in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr., .
3. It is contended that the Apex Court in the above referred case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Anr., (supra) observed that quasi judicial Tribunal is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. It is further submitted that the above referred test, if applied to the functions discharged by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, would show that the adjudication done by the Commissioner under Section 19 of the Act and proceedings before the Commissioner are quite distinct from adjudication by the Tribunal or Arbitrator and are almost analogous to the functions of the Court. Therefore, the Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Court and his decision is a judgment and not an. award.
4. Shri Jaiswal, learned Counsel further submitted that in the case of Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinazie and Co. Pvt. Ltd., (supra) the Division Bench of this Court basically considered the ratio laid down by Apex Court in Brajanandan Sinha v. Jyoti Naraen, , Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, and Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank, (supra) and in the light considered various provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Rules framed thereunder. It is submitted that Division Bench after due deliberations in this regard, rightly held in para (12) that Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a "Court" and his decision is a judgment and that order passed by the High Court in appeal under Section 30 is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent.
5. It is submitted that power exercised and function discharged by the Registrar under the provisions of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act are similar to those of the Commissioner under Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and, therefore, Commissioner is a Court and decision given by him is a judgment. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Limited and Ors. (supra).
6. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in the case of Shantidevi and Ors. v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, , the Full Bench has held that though under the relevant Rules, words "judgment" and "award" have been used separately in Rules 21 and 19 of the Motor Accident Claims Rules, still the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are not in the nature of arbitration proceedings and Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims acts as a Court. It is further observed that an appeal lies under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of the learned single Judge of High Court in appeal filed against the Award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal given under Section 110-D of the Act.
7. Shri Jaiswal further contended that in the case of Mahildevi v. Chandrabhan and Ors., , Full Bench of Delhi High Court has held that unless a statute itself bars a second appeal in the High Court or makes the judgment of a single Judge of High Court final (as in the case of Section 43 of Delhi Rent Control Act), the Letters Patent Appeal shall lie from the judgment of the single Judge of the High Court to Division Bench of the High Court. Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides appeal to the High Court from the order of the Commissioner and does not specifically bar second appeal and, therefore, Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the single Judge is maintainable.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondents Shri Gilda and Shri Kothari canvassed that the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Tribunal and not a Court. The provisions of Section 19(2) of the Act clearly bar jurisdiction of the Civil Court, which demonstrates that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is not a Court. Similarly Section 3(5) of the Act also makes it further clear that the Commissioner is not a Civil Court. Section 23 of the Act does not confer on Commissioner all the powers of the Civil Court and confers only those powers, which are specified in the Rules framed under the Act. It is further contended that though there is an appeal to the High Court provided against certain orders of the Commissioner under Section 30 of the Act, that by itself does not take away efficacy of Sections 3(5) and 19(2), of the Act and the Commissioner, therefore, cannot be termed as a Court.
9. It is further contended by Shri Gilda that in the case of Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, , the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not a Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an order passed by him under Section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not revisable by the High Court. The learned Counsel contended that this is a direct judgment on the issue in question wherein the Full Bench has considered the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr., (supra) in the light of ratio laid down by the larger Bench of the Apex Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, and Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Anr. v. Hind Cycles Ltd., . It is further contended that the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra) case also considered the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinazie & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (supra) and respectfully differed from the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the above referred case that the Commissioner is a Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is further contended that in the case of Smt. Rajiyabi, Division Bench of the Bombay High Court primarily relied on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr., as well as two of the Apex Court in Brajanandan Sinha v. Jyoti Naraen, (supra) and Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, (supra). It is argued that the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra) considered the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Thakur Jugal Kishor 's case in the light of decision rendered by the larger Bench of the Apex Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, (supra) and Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Anr. v. Hind Cycles Ltd., (supra) and held that the Commissioner is not a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and order passed by him under Section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not revisable by the High Court.
10. Shri Gilda further argued that the Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Bashir Khan v. Ranger Social Wanike and Ors., 1966 ACJ 115 after considering the ratio laid down in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, (supra) and Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra) held that the Commissioner acting under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act is not a Court subordinate High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. Shri Gilda further submitted that in the case of Dhondubai Murlidhar Reddy v. Proprietor Jankidas Khandsari Sugar Factory and Ors., (supra) the Division Bench of this Court after considering the ratio laid down by Nagpur High Court in Secretary of State v. Mt. Geeta w/o Imam Musalman, AIR 1939 Nagpur 122 as well as ratio laid by Apex Court in the case of South Asia Industries Pvt. v. S.B. Samp Singh and Ors., has held that the Commissioner is not a Civil Court as envisaged under Clause 16 of the Letters Patent and judgment delivered by the learned single Judge in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act could not be pursuant to Section 108 of the Act of 1915 as envisaged under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and further held that the Letters Patent Appeal against such decision would not lie.
12. We have given our anxious thought to the various contentions raised by the respective learned Counsel as well as ratio laid down by the various judicial pronouncements in the judgments cited hereinabove. The following legal position emerges:
A judicial decision pre-supposes an: existing dispute between two or more parties and presentation of the case by the parties to the dispute, if dispute between them is a question of fact, ascertainment of fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute. If the dispute between them is a question of law, submission of legal arguments by parties and decision, which disposes of the whole matter by finding upon facts in dispute including disputed question of law. All these are the functions of the Court and Authority created under special statute for settlement of dispute as per provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act also discharges similar functions. The procedure is also more or less similar except that the procedure of the Court is regularly prescribed and procedure in respect of Tribunal/Authority is prescribed as per provisions of the special legislation/statute and rules framed thereunder. However, the approach adopted by the Tribunal is also same as adopted by the Court.
13. In the backdrop of these circumstances, it is necessary to consider the intention of the Legislature in creating such separate/special forum by enacting a special statute for settlement of disputes under the scheme of the statute. The regular Civil Courts undoubtedly are vested with the plenary powers to settle all kinds of civil disputes and are under the normal hierarchy of the Civil Court. If that is so, it is necessary to consider as to why Legislature thought it fit to create alternate forum by enacting a special Act or statute for settlement of disputes and ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In order to get answers to these questions, we need to consider the aims and objects of the special legislation and the purpose required to be achieved by such legislation.
14. The Workmen's Compensation Act (special legislation) was enacted with the object to provide a separate, speedy and cheap forum to the workman or his dependents for claiming compensation and for that purpose, wide powers are given to the Commissioner, who is entrusted with the adjudication of the claim. The Act undoubtedly was enacted with the object of achieving all ideals of social security of the workmen employed in the industry and protecting the hardships of the employees arising from accidents. The Act creates a special type of liability on employer to pay compensation at the fixed rate to his employee, who is rendered incapable of working due to an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The purpose of the Act is to compensate actual loss, which the relatives have suffered. In fact, the Act is a piece of social security legislation and if any provision of the Act is capable of two interpretations, it ought to be construed liberally in favour of employee in order to achieve the objective of the Act, for whose benefit, the Legislature in its wisdom has enacted this special legislation.
15. The settlement of disputes before the regular Civil Court is a long drawn process particularly because of hierarchy of the Courts provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. Strict compliance of the procedure contemplated by the Code is required to be followed by the Court. The order or decision whether final or interlocutory of the Court is always subject to revision or appeal and, therefore, settlement of dispute in the regular Civil Court takes unreasonably long time. The workman though is entitled to institute his claim for damages in respect of injuries against employer or other person in the Civil Court by filing suit, settlement of his claim undoubtedly would take number of years and process is also expensive. The Legislature, therefore, in its wisdom thought it fit to provide a separate, speedy and cheap forum to the workman or his dependents for settlement of compensation and, therefore, created a special legislation, i.e. Workmen's Compensation Act. The intention of the Legislature in providing such alternate forum is undoubtedly with a specific purpose to avoid the lengthy procedure of the Civil Courts and to exclude them from normal hierarchy of the Civil Courts in order to provide speedy, cheap and effective alternate remedy and to give finality to the decision rendered by such alternate forum, which should not be subjected to revision or appeal, provided under Code of Civil Procedure.
16. It is, however, true that these alternate fora provided by special statutes are vested with the powers and functions, which are quite similar to those of the Court and are also empowered to give binding decisions. However, these aspects should not be confused to hold that the Legislature intended to create alternate fora as Courts, which fall within the ambit of normal hierarchy of Courts merely because they are also required to act fairly and judiciously. This, in our opinion, will frustrate the very object of such special statute. Some of the relevant provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act render active assistance to ascertain intention of the Legislation to treat the Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Act, a forum separate and distinct from the Court.
17. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question, which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under this Act. The cognizance by the Civil Court is barred in regard to matters, which are expressly enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act. They are settling, deciding or dealing with any question and enforcing any liability incurred under this Act. The scope and scheme of this provision is not to take away from the Civil Court its jurisdiction to give relief in tort, but to provide alternate optional remedy for certain classes of persons in certain special circumstances and for certain happenings.
There are two requirements, which need to be satisfied by the Commissioner to act under this Act:
(1) The party must forego its right under the common law of the land, (2) The facts giving jurisdiction to the Commissioner must also exist side by side.
When these two conditions are strictly fulfilled, the Act seeks to bar jurisdiction of the Civil Court on the aspects, namely, settling, deciding and dealing with any question involved in the proceeding. Under the scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the bar created rests on doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence in the same way that a person submits to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The word "Commissioner" in the English statute is "Arbitrator". In view of the above referred facts and circumstances, it is undoubtedly clear that appointment of the Commissioner under Section 20 of the Act is with a view to provide a separate and distinct forum other than the Civil Court for the purpose enumerated in Section 19 of the Act and at the same time, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon and determine liability in tort is not barred. The Legislature, therefore, has created this alternate forum for a specific purpose and in order to achieve definite objective totally separate from the regular Civil Court. Merely because certain provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the procedure required to be followed by the Commissioner and thereby clothe him with the trapping of a Court, it does not bring the functions discharged by the Commissioner within the ambit of "Court" and decision rendered by him cannot be a judgment as envisaged in the Letters Patent.
18. Similarly Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act puts a bar on making two separate claims by the workmen, such as one before the Commissioner under the Act and another in the Civil Court. If a workman institutes a suit for damages in the Civil Court, he will not be entitled to claim compensation under the Act. In the Civil Court, a workman can claim compensation beyond the amount, which has been specified under the Act by proving, amongst other things, the extent of not only loss of his earning capacity, but also actual and probable loss of his earnings. However, under the Act, amount of compensation that he can claim, even when he proves hundred per cent loss of his earning capacity is restricted to what is specified in Schedule IV of the Act. The remedy in the Civil Court, though alternative, in terms of amount of damages that the workman can claim is costly and dilatory and once the workman chooses the forum under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the damages are restricted to a specified amount. It is once again quite evident that the intention of the Legislature is to provide alternate forum other than regular Civil Court under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act for the purpose of giving speedy, effective and cheap remedy for settlement of claim of an employee in respect of compensation and at the same time giving finality to the decision rendered by such alternate forum, i.e. Commissioner. When the intention of the Legislature is to treat this Forum separate and distinct than that of the regular Civil Court, for the obvious reason stated hereinabove, it will not be proper to treat the Commissioner as a Court and to hold that decision rendered by him is a judgment, which undoubtedly would destroy the very intention of the Legislature in enacting this special legislation and also frustrate its objective. For the reasons stated hereinabove, it can safely be inferred that the Legislature while enacting the special statute, i.e. Workmen's Compensation Act intended to provide alternate forum for settlement of disputes regarding compensation distinct and separate from the regular Civil Court.
19. Even otherwise, the word "Court" used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has a restrictive meaning and referable only to the Civil Court in the normal hierarchy of the Courts and does not include in its ambit fora, which are constituted under the special Acts and exercising special jurisdiction. As stated hereinabove, by and large the essential features of the Court and special fora are quite similar in regard to exercising judicial powers of the State. Their decisions are binding in nature. The procedure is almost similar except in case of special fora, the same need not be strictly followed as in the case of Courts. The approach also needs to be adopted by both is also more or less the same. The distinguishing feature between Court and Tribunal or special forum is that a Court is constituted by the State as a part of the normal hierarchy of Courts of Civil Judicature maintained by the State under its Constitution exercising judicial powers of the State and perform all the judicial functions of the State except those, which are excluded by law from their jurisdiction, whereas Tribunal is constituted under the special Act to exercise special jurisdiction in order to decide controversy arising under certain special laws and, therefore, by its very composition and formation, is distinct and separate and cannot be treated as Court by necessary implication.
20. It will be appropriate to consider at this stage judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd., (supra) wherein Division Bench has held that the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Court and his decision is a judgment and not an award and that an order passed in appeal under Section 30 of the Act by the single Judge is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench of this Court primarily placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr., (supra) for the purpose of finding out essential test that distinguishes a Court from quasi judicial Tribunal considered the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the light of ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha's case and held that Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Court and his decision is a judgment.
21. In the case of Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra) the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court had an occasion to deal with identical issue and after adjudication, the Full Bench in para (7) has observed thus :
"In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr., , it was held that Assistant Registrar functioning under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act is a Court subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In that case, the word "Court" was construed in a generic sense having regard to context of that Act. Jugal Kishore's case was decided by a Bench of two Judges. That case cannot be so read as to overrule the distinction between the Court and Tribunal as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies' case and Engineering Mazdoor Sabha's case which were decided by the larger Benches."
The Full Bench, therefore, held that the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and order passed by him under Section 19 is not revisable by the High Court. Similarly Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court also considered the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd., (supra) and for the similar reason, differed from the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the said case.
22. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Anr. v. Hind Cycles Ltd. (supra) the question which arose for decision of the Apex Court was whether an Arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 can be said to be a Tribunal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The Apex Court answered the question in negative and observed that apart from the importance of the trappings of the Court, the basic and essential condition which makes an authority or a body a Tribunal under Article 136, is that it should be constituted by the State and should be invested with the State's inherent judicial power. It has been further observed that sometimes a rough and ready test is applied in determining the status of an adjudicating Body by enquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with the trappings of the Court. In that connection, it was added that presence of said trappings does not necessarily make the Tribunal a Court.
23. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha's case is considered by the Apex Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and Anr. (supra) and in para 33, it is observed thus:
"......... But as we have already stated, the consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a Court is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the Authority which possesses the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The main and basic test, however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular Authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial functions."
24. In Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra) the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha's case, has observed in para 6 thus:
"The same distinction was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Anr. v. Hind Cycles Ltd., (supra). In that case, it was laid down that the expression "Court" in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts, which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. It was also laid down that the Tribunal as distinguished from a Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a Court in the technical sense."
25. In the case of Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra), the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh agreed with the opinion expressed by Their Lordships in case of Sawatram Ramprasad Mills v. Vishnu Pandorang, AIR 1950 Nagpur Hand Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in H.C.D. Mathur v. E.I. Railway, and held that the word "Court" in Section 115 is restricted to Civil Code and does not include Tribunals. In para 9 of its judgment, the Full Bench has further observed that the Commissioner appointed under this Act is a Tribunal and not a Civil Court.
26. We respectfully agree with the view expressed by the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yeshwantrao v. Sampat, (supra) that the word "Court" as used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is used in a narrow sense, meaning only a Civil Court in the normal hierarchy of Courts. The word "Court" as it occurred in Section 115 does not include Tribunals, which are. established under the special Acts and exercising special jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a special legislation and the Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Act discharges powers and functions as Tribunal and is not a Civil Court. As we have already stated hereinabove, provisions of Section 19(2) contemplate that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question, which by or under the Act is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under this Act. The Commissioner appointed is an Authority, which is separate and distinct from the Civil Court, which is further evident in view of provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which excludes jurisdiction of the Commissioner in the event of suit instituted in a Civil Court by the employee for damages in tort. Necessary inference in the situation is that the Commissioner is empowered to exercise powers conferred on him under Section 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, acts as a Tribunal and is not a Court.
27. For the purposes of controversy in question, the observations of the Apex Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder, are of great assistance. The Apex Court in para 30 of its judgment has observed thus:
"All Tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are Tribunals. The word "Courts" is used to designate those Tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed."
Similarly, in para 33, the Apex Court has observed thus:
"In my opinion, a Court in the strict sense is a Tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of Civil Judicature maintained by the State under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by law from their Jurisdiction."
28. The above referred observations make it undoubtedly clear that only such forum/Tribunal /Authority can be called as Court, which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of the Courts of the Civil Judicature and exercise the judicial power of the State as well as perform all the judicial functions of the State. While applying these characteristics in respect of the question in issue, it is difficult to hold that the Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, can be called the Court, firstly, because the Workmen's Compensation Act is a special statute enacted by the Legislature for a specific purpose and with definite objectives. The Commissioner has been given specific powers and is entitled to adjudicate on specific aspects only, provided under the Act and Rules. He does not perform all the judicial functions of the State and is also not empowered to take cognizance of any other aspect other than those provided under the provisions of the Act and Rules. In the circumstances, therefore, in our opinion, merely because some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the proceedings before the Commissioner, such as summoning of witnesses, compelling the production of documents and for service of their process etc. and Commissioner discharges functions which are similar to those of the Court and also may have some of the trappings of the Court, that is not enough to hold that he acts as a Court of Justice and is a part of the hierarchy of the Civil Courts.
29. We find it necessary to reiterate that if the intention of the Legislature was not to create distinct forum other than Civil Court for settlement of claims of compensation, there would be no necessity to enact Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and ordinary Civil Courts, even otherwise, would have been competent to decide the claims of the employee against the employer regarding the compensation. Similarly, it is not conceivable that provision of Section 20 of the Act was enacted even though it was not strictly necessary but for the sake of abundant caution or clarification of the position. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the Commissioner appointed under the Act does not constitute a Court which can be said to be part of the ordinary hierarchy of the Courts Civil Judicature maintained by the State under its Constitution to exercise judicial powers of the State.
30. The other point for consideration is, since Section 30 of the Act provides appeal to the High Court against the decision/order passed by the Commissioner, whether the Commissioner is a Court subordinate to the High Court and whether the High Court exercises the appellate jurisdiction and Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable?
31. It is, however, true that in an earlier decision of this Court Mohanlal v. Fine Knitting Mills Co., AIR 1960 Bom. 387 it was held that the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, is a Court subordinate to the High Court and revision lies to the High Court from his order. The earlier decision proceeded on the basis that since an appeal is provided to the High Court against certain orders of the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the orders passed by the Commissioner are subject to appellate jurisdiction of the High Court and the Commissioner is therefore a Court subordinate. In order to be subordinate to the High Court, it must be a Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court, as contemplated under Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have already considered in detail the issue as to whether the Commissioner is a Court at all and already recorded our finding in the negative.
32. The words "Subordinate Court" occurring in the section takes within its ambit only a Court belonging to hierarchy of Courts mentioned in Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the Commissioner, who is discharging functions under the provisions of the Act, may have trappings of the Civil Court, he is not a Court nor a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.
33. Though Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides appeal against the order passed by the Commissioner, however, all the orders passed by the Commissioner are not appealable and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under this Section is limited one and can be exercised when there is a substantial question of law involved in the matter. The High Court will not interfere with the findings arrived at by the Commissioner when the same are not vitiated by substantial error of law. In this context, it appears that at the most appellate remedy provided under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act can be equated for the limited purpose with that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure since in both these cases, interference by the High Court is possible only if there is a substantial question of law involved and not otherwise. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure puts an embargo on any further appeal under Letters Patent against an appellate judgment rendered by the single Judge of the High Court. The object is to minimise delay and give finality to the adjudication. Section 100-A is inserted, by the Amending Act of 1976 and after enforcement of Section 100-A, no appeal would be available from the judgment, decree or order of single Judge in second appeal. Though the decision given by the single Judge of the High Court in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in the circumstances of the case, is not a judgment as envisaged in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay), however, even if we presume it to be so, even then the decision given by the single Judge under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act will have same effect as that of the decision rendered by the single Judge in second appeal and in view of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent Appeal against such decision of the single Judge will not be maintainable. The view expressed by us is also consistent with the aims and objects of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
34. The decision given by Nagpur High Court in the case of Secretary of State v. Mt. Geeta w/o Imam Musalman and Ors., (supra), is of great assistance. The Division Bench of this Court in Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra) appears to have deviated from the ratio laid down by the Nagpur High Court only because no other subsequent judgment following this ratio was placed before Division Bench of this Court. However, Their Lordships in the case of Secretary of State v. Geeta w/o Imam Musalman and Ors., (supra), after due consideration observed thus:
"There is, in our opinion, no judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent from which to appeal. There is only an award made pursuant to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It may be that the result is unfortunate, but that can be set right by legislation. We are not convinced that the result necessarily is unfortunate because in workmen's compensation proceedings, one has, from the very nature of the case, on the one hand, persons unable to sustain (unless supported by a Trade Union) a long continued and expensive litigation and it may well be for ought we know to the contrary that it was the intention of the Legislature to restrict the number of Courts which can consider the comparatively simple points that arise under the Workmen's Compensation Act. If a Letters Patent Appeal lay it could only lie for reasons which would make appeal possible not only to a Division Bench from a single Judge but also from the Division Bench to the Privy Council. That may or may not be desirable. In England three Courts can, and frequently do, consider these workmen's compensation awards: the County Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. If we are right, as the law at present stands only two Tribunals can consider these matters in India : (1) the Commissioner, (2) the High Court
35. The above referred observations of Nagpur High Court clearly show that Their Lordships considered the scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the light of legislative intent and have held that there are only two Tribunals competent to consider the matter under the Workmen's Compensation Act and are entitled to pass an award, i.e. the Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and High Court, which gives decision in the nature of award in an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The decision given by the single Judge, in our opinion, in the circumstances and for the reasons stated hereinabove, cannot be construed to be a judgment as envisaged in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay) and, therefore, Letters Patent Appeal, in our opinion, is not maintainable. The view expressed by us that the Commissioner does not act as a Court subordinate to High Court is also fortified by the Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Baahir Khan v. Ranger, .
36. The Apex Court, in Thakur Jugalkishore Sinha 's case (supra) though held that Assistant Registrar functioning under Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act is a Court subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, has considered the expression 'Court' in the light of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and not from the point of view of word 'subordinate Court' used in Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, held that, "in our view, the sub-ordination for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act means a judicial sub-ordination and not sub-ordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Procedure." We have already stated hereinabove that the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Yashwantrao's case, has considered the judgment of the larger Benches of the Apex Court stated hereinabove and held that the Commissioner is not a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have already expressed our concurrence with the view of the Full Bench.
37. We answer the reference accordingly and overrule the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (supra).