Karnataka High Court
Syed Ibrahim Thangal vs State By on 4 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 20.02.2026
Pronounced on : 04.03.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.36302 OF 2025 (GM - RES)
BETWEEN:
SYED IBRAHIM THANGAL
S/O SYED HASAN THANGAL
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
R/AT BIJATHALI HOUSE
KOILA POST, RAMAKUNDA VILLAGE
VIA UPPINANGADI, KADABA TALUK
DAKSHINA KANNADA - 574 211.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE BY
MANGALORE NORTH P.S.,
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
OPP. VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. PRADEEP T. R.,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
2
R/AT PSI NORTH POLICE STATION
MANGALURU CITY,
KARNATAKA - 575 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BNSS, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ARREST MEMO AT ANNEXURE
-E, REMAND ORDER DATED 10.10.2025 AT ANNEXURE -C, AND ALL CONSEQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS ARISING OUT OF CRIME NO. 113/2025 REGISTERED BY MANGALORE NORTH PS PENDING IN THE FILES OF IN THE COURT OF XLIX A.C.C AND S.J., BENGALURU AT ANNEXURE - D. THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 20.02.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CAV ORDER The petitioner, sole accused in Crime No.113 of 2025, now stands at the doors of this Court seeking to immediately set him at liberty, on account of non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.
2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
A suo motu complaint comes to be registered by the jurisdictional police which becomes a crime in Crime No.113 of 3 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 10(a)(i), 13 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. On 09-10-2025 the petitioner was taken into custody and a remand application was presented before the concerned Court and the petitioner is now in judicial custody since 09-10-2025. The sole score on which the petitioner is now before the Court is on the ground that a physical copy of the grounds of arrest was not furnished to him at the time of his arrest and the concerned Court directed that the physical copy shall be served at that time.
3. Heard Sri Mohammed Tahir, learned counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri B N Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents.
4. Learned counsel Sri Mohammed Tahir appearing for the petitioner would take this Court through the documents appended to the petition to demonstrate that, for the first time before the concerned Court, a copy of the grounds of arrest is given to the petitioner, which was in violation of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of VIHAAN KUMAR v. STATE OF 4 HARYANA1 as also in the case of MIHIR RAJESH SHAH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA2. He would submit that on this ground the petitioner may be set at liberty forthwith, failing which, the Constitutional right of the petitioner would be a mirage.
5. Per-contra, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would vehemently refute the submissions contending that grounds of arrest was indeed given to the petitioner and he has signed receiving the said grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest i.e., at 1.00 p.m. on 09-10-2025. He would submit that there is no violation of law as laid down by the Apex Court. Insofar as the judgment in the case of MIHIR RAJESH SHAH, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would submit that the said judgment cannot be pressed into service for arrests that have happened prior to MIHIR RAJESH SHAH. In all, he would submit that there is complete compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court and grounds of arrest is indeed furnished. 1
(2025) 5 SCC 799 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 5
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
7. The issue now lies in a narrow compass. The compass revolves round furnishing of grounds of arrest. A suo motu complaint comes to be registered on 09-10-2025 by the jurisdictional police, Mangalore North. The complaint reads as follows:
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On the registration of the complaint, the petitioner is taken into custody, not just taken into custody, but by furnishing both, the 7 grounds of arrest and the reasons for arrest. The reasons for arrest reads as follows:8 9 10
A copy of the reasons for arrest is furnished to the petitioner and his son against signature. Grounds of arrest is immediately furnished on 09-10-2025 itself. The time and receipt is acknowledged by the petitioner and his son, it reads as follows: 11 12 13 The petitioner is then produced before the Special Judge. The proceedings before the Special Judge is as follows:
"10.10.2025 Accused by name Syed Ibrahim Thangal, aged about 55 years, S/o Syed Hasan Thangal, R/of Bijathali House, Koila Post, Ramakunja Village via Uppinangadi, Kadaba Taluk, D.K District is physically produced in open court today i.e on 10.10.2025 at 11.00 AM by Smt Nalini, Police Sub-
Inspector, Sri Satisha P.S - HC No.663, Sri Mahantesh PC No.3266 and Sri Neelya Naik PC No.3195 of North Police Station, Bunder, Mangaluru alongwith remand application, arrest memo, reasons of arrest form, grounds of arrest form, compliance of 11 guidelines of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Format and photograph of accused Syed Ibrahim Thangal and medical certificate (OPD) issued by Government Wenlock District Hospital, Mangaluru.
On enquiry, accused submits that he was not ill-treated by the police. Accused submits that he was arrested yesterday i.e., on 09.10.2025 at 01.00 P.M. The medical certificate (OPD) issued by Government Wenlock District Hospital, Mangaluru does not disclose any injuries sustained by the accused.
Accused submits that his arrest has been intimated to his son Syed Ismail.
Accused submits that he and his son Syed Ismail have affixed their signature on grounds of arrest and reasons of arrest and also submits that reasons of arrest are not readover to him at the time of arrest. Further accused submits that the physical copy of grounds of arrest has not been served on him.
The learned PP who is present before court now served physical copy of grounds of 14 arrest and reasons of arrest to accused in the open court.
Sri AMK, Adv seeks permission to take signature of accused on vakalath. Permitted. He files vakalath for the accused.
The IO files requisition through learned PP seeking permission to send mobile handset to CEN Lab to extract data from mobile phone. Permitted.
The IO through learned PP files a letter alongwith P.F No.145/2025 and seizure mahazar dated 09.10.2025 alongwith closed cover mentioning CD mailer/Bubble envelope stated to contain DVD-1 of HT company with regard to seizure mahazar photo and videos dated 09.10.2025 and certificate U/sec.63(4)(c) of BSA and HASH values of electronic/digital record generated details. The same are taken on record.
Perused the remand application. The IO has sought remand of accused to Judicial Custody for 15 days.
The offences alleged against the accused are U/secs.10(A)(I), 13 and 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The offences alleged are non- bailable and punishable with imprisonment for life. The investigation is at the initial stage. In the opinion of the court, the detention of the accused in J.C is necessary in the interest of Investigation. Hence, accused is remanded to Judicial Custody till 24.10.2025.
The jail authorities are directed to produce accused through V.C on 24.10.2025."
(Emphasis added) 15 The Special Judge records that the physical copy of the grounds of arrest has not been served upon the accused, therefore, the Court directs serving of the physical copy. Taking cue from this, the learned counsel for the petitioner is now wanting to contend that the grounds of arrest is not furnished to him in terms of the judgments of the Apex Court in plethora of judgments.
8.1. The Apex Court in the case of PANKAJ BANSAL v.
UNION OF INDIA3, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest.This being the fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 PMLA enables the person arrested under Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that unless the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a person would not be entitled to grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the court must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be 3 (2024) 7 SCC 576 16 essential for the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which the authorised officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis for the officer's "reason to believe" that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the 2002 Act. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/she would be in a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there are grounds to believe that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail. Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19 PMLA, is meant to serve this higher purpose and must be given due importance.
39. We may also note that the language of Section 19 PMLA puts it beyond doubt that the authorised officer has to record in writing the reasons for forming the belief that the person proposed to be arrested is guilty of an offence punishable under the 2002 Act. Section 19(2) requires the authorised officer to forward a copy of the arrest order along with the material in his possession, referred to in Section 19(1), to the adjudicating authority in a sealed envelope. Though it is not necessary for the arrested person to be supplied with all the material that is forwarded to the adjudicating authority under Section 19(2), he/she has a constitutional and statutory right to be "informed" of the grounds of arrest, which are compulsorily recorded in writing by the authorised officer in keeping with the mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA. As already noted hereinbefore, it seems that the mode of informing this to the persons arrested is left to the option of ED's authorised officers in different parts of the country i.e. to either furnish such grounds of arrest in writing or to allow such grounds to be read by the arrested person or be read over and explained to such person.
.... .... ....
42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such 17 grounds of arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested person against the word of the authorised officer as to whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims that witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document. Non- compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 :
(2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] . Such a precarious situation is easily avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated very simply by furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorised officer in terms of Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person under due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the authorised officer.
43. The second reason as to why this would be the proper course to adopt is the constitutional objective underlying such information being given to the arrested person. Conveyance of this information is not only to apprise the arrested person of why he/she is being arrested but also to enable such person to seek legal counsel and, thereafter, present a case before the court under Section 45 to seek release on bail, if he/she so chooses. In this regard, the grounds of arrest in V. Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] are placed on record and we find that the same run into as many as six pages. The grounds of arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal have not been produced before this Court, but it was contended that they were produced at the time of remand. However, as already noted earlier, this did not serve the intended purpose. Further, in the event their grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it would be well-nigh impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or Basant Bansal to record and remember all that they had read or heard being read out 18 for future recall so as to avail legal remedies. More so, as a person who has just been arrested would not be in a calm and collected frame of mind and may be utterly incapable of remembering the contents of the grounds of arrest read by or read out to him/her. The very purpose of this constitutional and statutory protection would be rendered nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned to merely read out or permit reading of the grounds of arrest, irrespective of their length and detail, and claim due compliance with the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate under Section 19(1) PMLA."
8.2. The Apex Court in the case of RAM KISHOR ARORA v.
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT4, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
21. In view of the above, the expression"as soon as may be" contained in Section 19 PMLA is required to be construed as -- "as early as possible without avoidable delay" or "within reasonably convenient" or "reasonably requisite" period of time. Since by way of safeguard a duty is cast upon the officer concerned to forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession to the adjudicating authority immediately after the arrest of the person, and to take the person arrested to the court concerned within 24 hours of the arrest, in our opinion, the reasonably convenient or reasonably requisite time to inform the arrestee about the grounds of his arrest would be twenty-four hours of the arrest.
22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] , it has been categorically held that so long as the person has been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient compliance with 4 (2024) 7 SCC 599 19 mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is also observed that the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by the authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering. Therefore, in our opinion the person arrested, if he is informed or made aware orally about the grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest and is furnished a written communication about the grounds of arrest as soon as may be i.e. as early as possible and within reasonably convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only Section 19 PMLA but also of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
.... .... ....
24. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not disputed that the appellant was handed over the document containing grounds of arrest when he was arrested, and he also put his signature below the said grounds of arrest, after making an endorsement that "I have been informed and have also read the abovementioned grounds of arrest." The appellant in the rejoinder filed by him has neither disputed the said endorsement nor his signature below the said endorsement. The only contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi is that he was not furnished a copy of the document containing the grounds of arrest at the time of arrest. Since the appellant was indisputably informed about the grounds of arrest and he having also put his signature and the endorsement on the said document of having been informed, we hold that there was due compliance of the provisions contained in Section 19 PMLA and his arrest could neither be said to be violative of the said provision nor of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India."
208.3. The Apex Court in the case of PRABIR PURKAYASTHA v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)5, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
16. Upon a careful perusal of the statutory provisions (reproduced supra), we find that there is no significant difference in the language employed in Section 19(1) PMLA and Section 43-B(1) UAPA which can persuade us to take a view that the interpretation of the phrase "inform him of the grounds for such arrest" made by this Court in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] should not be applied to an accused arrested under the provisions of the UAPA.
17. We find that the provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43-B(1) UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) PMLA. The contention advanced by the learned ASG that there are some variations in the overall provisions contained in Section 19 PMLA and Sections 43-A and 43-B UAPA would not have any impact on the statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 43- B(1) UAPA at the earliest because as stated above, the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both the statutes. As a matter of fact, both the provisions find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Hence, applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied.
18. We may note that the modified application of Section 167CrPC is also common to both the statutes. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the interpretation 5 (2024) 8 SCC 254 21 of statutory mandate laid down by this Court in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] on the aspect of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest in writing has to be applied pari passu to a person arrested in a case registered under the provisions of the UAPA.
19. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the court that any person arrested for allegation of commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing to the arrested person the grounds of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as this information would be the only effective means for the arrested person to consult his advocate; oppose the police custody remand and to seek bail. Any other interpretation would tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
.... .... ....
24. A Constitution Bench of this Court examined in detail the scheme of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra [Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117] and held that the communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu in writing and in a language which he understands is imperative and essential to provide an opportunity to detenu of making an effective representation against the detention and in case, such communication is not made, the order of detention would stand vitiated as the guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution was violated. The relevant para is extracted hereinbelow : (SCC OnLine SC para 7) "7. ... clause (5) of Article 22 requires that the grounds of his detention should be made available to the detenu as soon as may be, and that the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the 22 Order should also be afforded to him. In order that the detenu should have that opportunity, it is not sufficient that he has been physically delivered the means of knowledge with which to make his representation. In order that the detenu should be in a position effectively to make his representation against the Order, he should have knowledge of the grounds of detention, which are in the nature of the charge against him setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the authorities attribute to him. Communication, in this context, must, therefore, mean imparting to the detenu sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order of Detention is based. In this case the grounds are several, and are based on numerous speeches said to have been made by the appellant himself on different occasions and different dates. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or explanation given by the police officer serving those on the detenu would not amount to communicating the grounds. Communication, in this context, must mean bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the Order of Detention is based."
(emphasis supplied)
25. Further, this Court in LallubhaiJogibhai Patel v. Union of India [Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 427 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 463] , laid down that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands and if the grounds are only verbally explained, the constitutional mandate of Article 22(5) is infringed. The relevant para is extracted hereunder : (SCC p. 436, para 20) "20. ... "Communicate" is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the "grounds" should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the "ground" to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the "grounds" are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a 23 language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed."
(emphasis supplied)
26. From a holistic reading of various judgments pertaining to the law of preventive detention including the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Harikisan [Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117] , wherein, the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India have been interpreted, we find that it has been the consistent view of this Court that the grounds on which the liberty of a citizen is curtailed, must be communicated in writing so as to enable him to seek remedial measures against the deprivation of liberty.
27. Thus, there is no hesitation in the mind of this Court that the submission of the learned ASG that in a case of preventive detention, the grounds of detention need not be provided to a detenu in writing is ex facie untenable in the eye of the law.
28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the "grounds" of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.
29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is 24 sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.
.... .... ....
48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds of arrest". The "reasons for arrest" as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters viz. to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to the investigating officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the "grounds of arrest"
would be required to contain all such details in hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the "grounds of arrest" would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with the "reasons of arrest" which are general in nature."
8.4. The Apex Court in the case of VIHAAN KUMAR v.
STATE OF HARYANA supra, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
18. Therefore, as far as Article 22(1) is concerned, compliance can be made by communicating sufficient 25 knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest to the person arrested. The grounds should be effectively and fully communicated to the arrestee in the manner in which he will fully understand the same. Therefore, it follows that the grounds of arrest must be informed in a language which the arrestee understands. That is how, in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] , this Court held that the mode of conveying the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. However, under Article 22(1), there is no requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing. Article 22(1) also incorporates the right of every person arrested to consult an advocate of his choice and the right to be defended by an advocate. If the grounds of arrest are not communicated to the arrestee, as soon as may be, he will not be able to effectively exercise the right to consult an advocate. This requirement incorporated in Article 22(1) also ensures that the grounds for arresting the person without a warrant exist. Once a person is arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21 is curtailed. When such an important fundamental right is curtailed, it is necessary that the person concerned must understand on what grounds he has been arrested. That is why the mode of conveying information of the grounds must be meaningful so as to serve the objects stated above.
19. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1).It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The procedure 26 established by law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
20. We have already referred to what is held in paras 42 and 43 of the decision in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] . This Court has suggested that the proper and ideal course of communicating the grounds of arrest is to provide grounds of arrest in writing. Obviously, before a police officer communicates the grounds of arrest, the grounds of arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, there is no harm if the grounds of arrest are communicated in writing. Although there is no requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, what is stated in paras 42 and 43 of the decision in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] are suggestions that merit consideration. We are aware that in every case, it may not be practicable to implement what is suggested. If the course, as suggested, is followed, the controversy about the non-compliance will not arise at all. The police have to balance the rights of a person arrested with the interests of the society. Therefore, the police should always scrupulously comply with the requirements of Article 22.
.... .... ....
23. In the present case, the first respondent relied upon an entry in the case diary allegedly made at 6.10 p.m. on 10- 6-2024, which records that the appellant was arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest. For the reasons which 27 will follow hereafter, we are rejecting the argument made by the first respondent. If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document. The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed. Therefore, in a given case, even assuming that the case of the police regarding requirements of Article 22(1) of the Constitution is to be accepted based on an entry in the case diary, there must be a contemporaneous record, which records what the grounds of arrest were. When an arrestee pleads before a court that grounds of arrest were not communicated, the burden to prove the compliance of Article 22(1) is on the police.
.... .... ....
Conclusions
26. Therefore, we conclude:
26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);
26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;
26.3. When arrested accused alleges non- compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the investigating officer/agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);
26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount 28 to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non- compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge-sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of charge- sheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);
26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and 26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.
.... .... ....
30. Thus, the stand taken by Shri Abhimanyu is that the grounds of arrest were explained to the appellant's wife in detail, and when she again came to meet the appellant, she was informed and explained the grounds of arrest. Thus, the stand taken shows that grounds of arrest were not informed to the appellant but to his wife. The contention that the appellant's wife was informed about the grounds of arrest is an afterthought, as no such contention has been raised in the reply filed before the High Court. Communication of the grounds of arrest to the wife of the arrestee is no compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1). As the ground of non-compliance with Article 22(1) has been specifically pleaded in this appeal, this was the second opportunity available to the first respondent to plead and prove that grounds of arrest were informed to the appellant. However, it has not been done, and his contention is that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the appellant's wife.
2931. A contention has been raised in the written argument that the grounds of arrest were incorporated in the remand report. This contention has been raised for the first time in written submissions before this Court. This is not pleaded in the reply filed before the High Court and this Court. The police submit a remand report before the learned Magistrate for seeking remand without serving a copy thereof to the arrestee. The reason is that the police cannot divulge the details of the investigation to the accused till the final report is filed. Mentioning the grounds of arrest in the remand report is no compliance with the requirement of informing the arrestee of the grounds of arrest.
32. The stand taken before the High Court was that the appellant's wife was informed about the arrest. Information about the arrest is completely different from the grounds of arrest. The grounds of arrest are different from the arrest memo. The arrest memo incorporates the name of the arrested person, his permanent address, present address, particulars of FIR and section applied, place of arrest, date and time of arrest, the name of the officer arresting the accused and name, address and phone number of the person to whom information about arrest has been given. We have perused the arrest memo in the present case. The same contains only the information stated above and not the grounds of arrest. The information about the arrest is completely different from the information about the grounds of arrest. Mere information of arrest will not amount to furnishing grounds of arrest.
33. Reliance was placed in this regard on the case diary entry of 10-6-2024 at 6.10 p.m., which records that the appellant was arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest. This was not pleaded before the High Court as well as in this Court in the reply of the first respondent. This is an afterthought. Considering the stand taken in the reply filed before the High Court and this Court, only on the basis of a vague entry in the police diary, we cannot accept that compliance with Article 22(1) can be inferred. No contemporaneous documents have been put on record wherein the grounds of arrest have been noted. Therefore, reliance placed on the diary entries is completely irrelevant.
30.... .... ....
42. The purpose of inserting Section 50-ACrPC, making it obligatory on the person making arrest to inform about the arrest to the friends, relatives or persons nominated by the arrested person, is to ensure that they would be able to take immediate and prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person as permissible under the law. The arrested person, because of his detention, may not have immediate and easy access to the legal process for securing his release, which would otherwise be available to the friends, relatives and such nominated persons by way of engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release of the detained person on bail at the earliest. Therefore, the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue, and in addition to his relatives as mentioned above is not merely a formality but to enable the detained person to know the reasons for his arrest but also to provide the necessary opportunity to him through his relatives, friends or nominated persons to secure his release at the earliest possible opportunity for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.Hence, the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not only to the arrested person, but also to the friends, relatives or such other person as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such arrest may be rendered illegal."
8.5. The Apex Court in the case of KASIREDDY UPENDER v. STATE OF HARYANA6, while considering the judgment in VIHAAN KUMAR supra,has held as follows:
62025 SCC OnLine SC 1228 31 ".... .... ....
18. Thus, the following principles of law could be said to have been laid down, rather very well explained, in Vihaan Kumar (supra):
a) The requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional condition.
b) Once a person is arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21 is curtailed. When such an important fundamental right is curtailed, it is necessary that the person concerned must understand on what grounds he has been arrested.
c) The mode of conveying the information of the grounds of arrest must be meaningful so as to serve the true object underlying Article 22(1).
d) If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1).
e) On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing the grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest would stand vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
f) If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document. The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed.
g) When an arrestee pleads before a court that the grounds of arrest were not communicated, 32 the burden to prove the compliance of Article 22(1) is on the police authorities.
h) The grounds of arrest should not only be provided to the arrestee but also to his family members and relatives so that necessary arrangements are made to secure the release of the person arrested at the earliest possible opportunity so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) meaningful and effective, failing which, such arrest may be rendered illegal.
19. We must clarify one important aspect of Vihaan Kumar (supra). In Vihaan Kumar (supra) the case was that there was an absolute failure on the part of the police to provide the grounds of arrest. In Vihaan Kumar (supra) reliance was placed upon the entry in the case diary which recorded that the appellant therein was arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the grounds of arrest were supplied to the arrestee, however, the case put up is that those grounds are not meaningful and are bereft of necessary essential information."
8.6. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA v. DARSHAN7, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for grant of bail.
20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents - accused contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr.
72025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 33 P.C. (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission, however, is devoid of merit.
20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that "no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice". Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr. P.C. requires that "every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest - but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown.
20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana22, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh23, it was observed that when arrest is made pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these post- Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an inflexible requirement in all circumstances.
20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr. P.C. is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.
3420.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India24 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail."
8.7. The Apex Court in the case of MIHIR RAJESH SHAH v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA supra, has held as follows:
35".... .... ....
66. In conclusion, it is held that:
66.1. The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC, 1860 (now BNS 2023);
66.2. The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the language he/she understands;
66.3. In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it be so done orally. The said grounds be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the Magistrate.
66.4. In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person will be at liberty to be set free.
.... .... ....
68. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline therefore demand that this procedure as affirmed above shall govern arrests henceforth."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance) 36 The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, holds that the grounds of arrest must be furnished to the accused as soon as may be, from the time of arrest and a relative or a friend of the accused is required to be informed of his or her arrest. It is in MIHIR RAJESH SHAH, for the first time, the Apex Court holds that it should be furnished at least 2 hours prior to the production of the accused before the learned Magistrate.
9. It would have been an altogether different circumstance if no grounds of arrest had been furnished to the petitioner, whether it is two hours or otherwise is a matter that is to be examined. But in the case at hand, grounds of arrest are furnished, it is acknowledged, the acknowledgement is by way of a signature. A stray observation in the order of the concerned Court cannot mean that the records would get wiped away. In fact the order itself is contradictory. The concerned Court observes that the grounds of arrest and reasons of arrest were given to the accused, but not read over. The physical copy though given, it was directed that another copy should be given. Though the word another copy is not found in the order, it is ostensible, as the petitioner had 37 received the grounds of arrest as quoted and noted supra. In that light, the arrest of the petitioner cannot be held to be illegal for want of grounds of arrest and he cannot be set at liberty on the said ground.
Finding complete compliance with the judgments of the Apex Court, the petition lacking in merit, stands rejected.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS