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[Cites 11, Cited by 1]

Supreme Court of India

Commissioner Of Income-Taxwest ... vs M/S. Indian Sugar Mills Association on 5 November, 1974

Equivalent citations: 1975 AIR 506, 1975 SCR (2) 605, AIR 1975 SUPREME COURT 506, 1975 3 SCC 479, 1975 TAX. L. R. 232, 1975 SCC (TAX) 44, 97 I T R 483, 1975 2 SCR 605, 97 ITR 486

Author: A.C. Gupta

Bench: A.C. Gupta, Hans Raj Khanna

           PETITIONER:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAXWEST BENGAL-III, CALCUTTA

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
M/S.  INDIAN SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/11/1974

BENCH:
GUPTA, A.C.
BENCH:
GUPTA, A.C.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:
 1975 AIR  506		  1975 SCR  (2) 605
 1975 SCC  (3) 479


ACT:
Income Tax Act; 1922-Section 4(3) (1)-Income held wholly for
religious   or	 charitable  purposes	meaning	  of   Trade
Association  Rules  and	 Regulations-Construction-Rules	  of
construction of wills and deeds inapplicable.



HEADNOTE:
The  Indian  Sugar  Mills  Association	is  a  trade   union
registered  under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.	Its  objects
are, inter alia, to promote and protect the trade,  commerce
and  industries	 of  India  and	 in  particular	 the  trade,
commerce  and industries connected with sugar, to  encourage
friendly feeling and good relations amongst the sugar  mills
in  general and the members in particular and  also  between
producers  of sugar and cane growers, distributors of  sugar
and other dealing with sugar mills and connected with  sugar
industries,  to regulate terms and conditions of  employment
in  the	 mills	and factories,	to  promote  good  relations
between	  the  employers  and  the  employees,	 to   adjust
controversies  between	members of the Association,  and  to
establish just and equitable principles in trade and  impose
restrictive  conditions	 on the conduct of sugar  trade	 and
business.   Rule 4(a) of the Association Provides  that	 the
income	and  property of the Association  shall	 be  applied
solely	towards	 the  promotion of the	Association  and  no
portion	 thereof shall be paid by way of dividend  bonus  or
otherwise  to  the  members of	the  Association.   Rule  64
provides  that	the  profits of	 the  Association  shall  be
applied	 in  such a manner as the Committee  may  think	 fit
provided  that	no distribution of profits  amongst  members
will be made without a resolution of the General Meeting  of
the   Association.   It	 was  claimed  on  behalf   of	 the
Association  that  the	business it carried on	was  in	 the
nature	of property held under trust or legal obligation  to
apply the income for charitable purposes within the  meaning
of  cl. (1) sub-section (3) of section 4 of the	 Income	 Tax
Act,  1922 and therefore was exempted from tax.	 The  income
tax  authorities  and the tribunal rejected the	 claim.	  On
reference the High Court answered in favour of the assessee.
The  High  Court  held	that  the  primary  objects  of	 the
Association were objects of general public utility and	that
the  Association  was under a legal obligation to  hold	 the
income it derived from the business for charitable purposes.
It  was	 of the view that section. 4 (3 )(1)  was  of  wider
amplitude  than	 what was known as religious  or  charitable
purposes  in  English law and a purpose	 of  general  public
utility had to be ascertained with reference to	 conceptions
prevailing in our country.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD  : (i) In the present case no conflict  arises  between
the English and the Indian concept of charitable purposes.
(ii) The  exemption under s. 4(3)(1) can be claimed  if	 the
income is held wholly for religious or charitable  purposes;
this  requirement  is satisfied if the	primary	 purpose  is
religious or charitable and the other purposes, not by them-
selves	religious or charitable are ancillary and  serve  to
achieve the main purpose. [609D-E]
Commissioner  of  Income-Tax, Madras v.	 Andhra	 Chamber  of
Commerce, 55 I.T.R. 722, followed.
(iii)	  Under	 Rule  64 the Committee of  the	 Association
might  decide  to apportion the entire profits	amongst	 the
members	 of  the Association leaving nothing to	 be  applied
towards	 charitable objects.  Rule 64 introduces an  element
of  private  gain which is inconsistent with the  object  of
general public utility.	 It is not possible to hold that all
the  objects of the Association are charitable.	  It  cannot
also be held that the primary purpose of the association  is
charitable  and other objects are ancillary  or	 incidental.
Some  of  the stated objects of the  Association  cannot  be
treated as primary and others in apparent conflict with them
as of no
606
effect.	  It  is not therefore possible to  agree  that	 the
Association held the income derived from its business wholly
for charitable purposes.  All India Spinners Association and
Commissioner  of Income Tax, Bombay 12 I.T.R. 482  followed.
Commissioner  of  Income Tax, Madras v.	 Andhra	 Chamber  of
Commerce 55 I.T.R. 722, distinguished. [609G, 610D; 611C]
(iv) Undoubtedly Rule 4(a) and Rule 64 ace repugnant to each
other.	But the rule	 of construction of deeds and  wills
that in case of repugnancy the first words in	  a deed and
the last words in a will shall prevail, is not applicable to
the  rules  and regulations of a registered trade  union  in
order to find out its real object. [610D]



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1225 to 1228 of 1970.

From the judgment and order dated the 11th July, 1969. of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 213 of 1966.

S. T. Desai, J. Ramamurthi and R. N. Sacthey, for the appellant.

B. Sea and D. Pal, R. S. Tahore, 6. P. Khaitan, B. P. Mahesawari and Leila Seth, for: the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GUPTA J.-The common question arising for decision in these four appeals is whether the income derived by the respondent, Indian Sugar Mills Association, from its sugar export division is exempt from tax under sec. 4 (3) (i) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. 'The assessment. years are 1958- 59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 for which the previous years are respectively the calendar years 1957, 1958, 1959 1960.

The Indian Sugar Mills Association, hereinafter referred to as the Association, which has its office in Calcutta is a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926; any individual, firm or company owning or managing a sugar mill or factory is eligible for membership of the Association. Rule 3 of the Rules of the Association states the various objects for which the Association is established and, of them, the first two, namely Rules 3 (a) and 3 (b). are as, follows "(a) To promote and protect the trade, commerce and industries of India and in particular, the trade commerce and industries connected with sugar.

(b) To encourage friendly feeling and good relations amongst the sugar mills in general and the members in particular and also between producers of sugar and cane-growers, distributors of sugar and other dealing with sugar mills and connected with sugar industry."

It was claimed on behalf of the Association that the business it carried on was in the nature of property held under trust or legal obligation to apply the income for charitable purposes within the meaning of clause (i), sub- section (3) of section 4 of the Income-Tax Act, 1922; the last paragraph of sub-section (3) defines "charitable purposes" as including relief of the poor, education, medical relief and advancement 607 of any other object of general public utility. The claim for exemption appears to have been based on the objects mentioned in Rules 3(a) and 3 (b) and on the first part of clause (a) of Rule 4. Clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 4 regulate the application of the funds of the Association. The first part of Rule 4(a) reads :

"4. (a) Subject to such special rules as may be framed for the purpose, the income and property of the Association whensoever derived, shall be applied solely towards the promotion of the Association as set forth in- these Rules and Regulations and no portion thereof shall be paid cc transferred, directly or indirectly, by way of dividend or bonus or otherwise howsoever by way of profit, to the persons who at any time are, or have been members of the Association or to any of them or to any person claiming through any of them.' Rule 4 (a) has a proviso to which it is not necessary to refer for the present purpose. The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal all rejected the claim though not exactly for the same reasons. At the instance of the Association the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court at Calcutta under sec. 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 :
"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and on proper construction of the Rules and Regulations of the Association, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the in- come of the Association derived from the business of export of sugar and interest from current and fixed deposits were not exempt from tax under section 4(3) (i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922?"

The High Court answered the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. These four appeals preferred by the Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal-III, Calcutta, with certificate granted by the High Court under section 66A(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 are directed against the judgment of the High Court disposing of the reference and relate to the assessment orders made in respect of the aforesaid four years.

The High Court observed that the question referred to it should be decided upon the principles laid down by the Privy Council in re The Trustees of the 'Tribune', 7 I.T.R. 415 and All India Spinners' Association v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, 12 I.T.R. 482 and by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce, 55 I.T.R. 722. Of the several principles stated in the Tribune case (supra), the one to which the High Court made special reference is that in countries to which English ideas may be inapplicable, the courts must in general apply the standard of customary law and common opinion amongst the community to which the parties interested belong in deciding whether an object is of general public utility. Referring to this principle the High Court observed that " section 4 (3) (i) is of wider amplitude than what is known as religious 8-L319SupCI/75 608 or charitable purposes in English Law and a purpose of general public utility has to be ascertained with reference to conceptions prevailing in our country". We are afraid we do not see how this principle has relevance on the question under consideration in the present case because no conflict arises here between the English and the Indian conceptions of charitable purpose. In the Spinners' Association case (supra) the Privy Council found that the primary object of the Spinners Association was the relief of the poor which was a charitable purpose, that the objects of the said Association included the advancement of other purposes of general public utility, and held that as such the income of the Spinners' Association was exempt under section 4(3) (i). Their Lordships further observed that an object of general public utility " would exclude the object of private gain, such as an Undertaking for commercial profit though all the same it would subserve general public utility". This observation, as will appear later, has a bearing on the question that arises for decision in the instant case. The Judgment of the High Court is really based on the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax' Madras v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce, 55 I.T.R. 722; the learned counsel for the respondent also. relied almost entirely on this case. The Andhra Chamber of Commerce was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act (7 of 1913); it was permitted under sec. 26 of the Act to omit the word "limited" from its name by order of the Government of Madras. Of the findings recorded in the, Andhra Chamber of Commerce case, the following are material for the purpose of the present appeal

(i) Advancement or promotion of trade, commerce and industry leading to economic property enures for the benefit of the entire community. That, prosperity would be shared also by those who engage in. trade, commerce and industry but on that account the purpose is not rendered any the less an object of general public utility.

(ii) The expression "object of general public utility" is not restricted to objects beneficial to the whole of mankind or even all persons living in a particular country or province. it is sufficient if the intention is to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from specified individuals. The section of the public sought to be benefited must undoubtedly be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of a public or impersonal nature : where there is no common quality uniting the potential bene- ficiaries into a class, it may not be regarded as valid.

(iii) If the primary purpose be advancement of objects of general public utility, it would remain charitable even if an incidental entry into the political domain for achieving that purpose is contemplated.

609

On the facts of that case it was held that the principal objects of the Chamber of commerce were to promote and protect trade., commerce and industries and to stimulate the development of trade commerce and industries in India or any part thereof and one of the objects mentioned in the Memorandum of Association that the Chamber of Commerce might take steps to urge or oppose legislative or other measures affecting trade, commerce or manufactures was pure ancillary or subsidiary aimed at securing the primary objects. In case before us the High Court held that clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 3 of the Rules of the Association, quoted above, set out the primary objects of the Association which were objects of general public utility, and the other objects appearing from the remaining clauses of Rule 3 were only ancillary. Relying further on a part of Rule 4(a), which we have reproduced above, providing that no part of the income and property of the Association was to be paid or transferred by way of dividend or bonus or otherwise by way of profit to the members of the Association, the High Court came to the conclusion that the Association was under a legal obligation to hold the income it derived from the business of export of sugar for charitable purposes. The exemption under section 4(3) (i) can be claimed if the income is held wholly for religious car charitable purposes; this requirement is satisfied, as Held in the Andhra Chamber of Commerce case (supra), if the primary purpose is religious or charitable and the other purposes, not by themselves religious or charitable, are ancillary and serves to achieve the main purpose. Assuming clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 3 disclosed objects of general public utility, it is necessary to examine some of the other Rules of the Association to find out if it held the income derived from the business wholly for charitable purposes. The general prohibition contained in the first part of Rule 4(a) against sharing of profits by the members appears to have been made almost nugatory by Rule 64 which is as follows

64. Subject to such rules as the General Meeting may frame or prescribe for declaration of dividend and distribution of profits, the profits of the Association shall be applied in such manner as the Committee may in their discretion think fit provided nevertheless that no distribution of profits amongst members will be made unless sanctioned by a Resolution at a General Meeting of the.

Association held for the purpose."

Rule 64 thus permits distribution of profits among the members on a resolution being passed for the purpose at a General Meeting of the Association. Under Rule 64 the Committee of the Association "may in their discretion' decide to apportion the entire profits among the members of the Association leaving nothing to be applied towards the alleged primary objects. We are not prepared to accept the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the power conferred on the Committee by Rule 64 to decide how the profits are to be applied is only incidental to the carrying out of the primary objects. which are charitable. There is nothing in Rule 64 that suggests so; there is no 610 indication that the rules framed or the resolution passed at the general meeting must require a part at least of the profits to be set apart for the charitable purposes. Rule 64 introduces an element of private gain which is inconsistent with the object of general public utility and following the decision in A11 India Spinners' Association v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay (supra) it cannot be said that the Association in the instant case held the income it derived from its business of export of sugar wholly for charitable purposes. This is also what distinguishes the present case from the Andhra Chamber of Commerce case where it was found that the Chamber of Commerce had no profit motive, that its objects were to promote and protect the trade, commerce and industries and to stimulate their development and its other objects were ancillary and incidental to the principal objects.

Dr. Pal for the respondent also submitted that if Rule 64 appeared to be inconsistent with-the primary objects, it should be treated as void and of no consequence. Undoubtedly Rule 4(a) and Rule 64 are repugnant to each other. But the rule of construction of deeds and wills on which Dr. Pal relied, that in case of repugnancy the first words in a deed and the last words in a will shall prevail, is not applicable to the rules and regulations of a registered trade union in order to find out its real object. We have no right to assume some of the stated objects of the Association as primary to declare others in apparent conflict with them as of no effect. Rules 3, 4 and 64, all framed by' the Association as a Trade Union, co-exist. We have no right to rewrite the rules of a registered trade union by deleting any of them.

We also find it difficult to accept that only clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 3 represent the primary objects of the Association and the other Rules are all ancillary and incidental. The Association is a Trade Union. Section 2(h) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 defines Trade Union as meaning "any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relation between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions:" There is a proviso to this definition which is not relevant on the question under consideration. The definition itself sets out the primary purposes for which a trade union can be formed. The objects of the Association listed under Rule 3 include the following :

(c) To regulate terms and conditions of employment in the Mills and Factories.
(d) To promote good relations between the employers and the employees.
(1) To adjust controversies between members of this Association.
611
(n) To establish just and equitable principles in trade and impose restrictive conditions on the conduct of sugar trade and business."

These are all primary purposes of a Trade Union. Rule 3(b) also may possibly be. taken as a trade union object. Assuming Rule 3 (a) could be the primary object of a trade union, the other objects named in clauses (c), (d), (1) and

(n) of Rule 3 also fall in the same category, and it is not possible to speak of one of them as ancillary or incidental to another. These other objects cannot also be called charitable purposes within the meaning of section 4 (3) (i), even assuming that in some remote and indirect manner they might be of some public utility. It is not therefore possible to agree that the Association held the income derived from its business wholly for charitable purposes. For the reasons stated above we allow these appeals, discharge the answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it, and answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this Court as well as in the High Court. One hearing fee.

F.H.P. Appeals allowed.

612