Patna High Court
State Govt. Of Bihar And Ors. vs Sunil Kumar Singh And Ors. on 17 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: AIR1998PAT137, 1998(3)BLJR2065, AIR 1998 PATNA 137, 1998 BLJR 3 2065, (1998) 3 BLJ 86, (1998) 1 PAT LJR 922
JUDGMENT B.M. Lal, C.J.
1. The State Government of Bihar and others, who are appellants in this Letters Patent Appeal, have presented this appeal on 2-7-96. The appeal appears to be barred by 146 days i.e. 4 months and 27 days. An Interlocutory application being LA. No. 443 of 1997 has been filed on behalf of the appellants praying for extension of period of limitation.
2. Having heard learned counsel Mr. K. P. Yadav for the appellants and Mr. M. P. Shukla for the respondents, we proceed to examine whether the requirements for extension of period of limitation have been fulfilled by successfully establishing and proving good cause and sufficient cause, which actually prevented the appellants from filing the appeal well within the period of limitation and justifying the delay of 146 days i.e. 4 months and 27 days.
3. To deal with the case, we may mention here that 'sufficient cause' and 'good cause' are not defined under the Limitation Act. But in common parlance one may draw an inference that they mean 'a cause which is beyond control of the party seeking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that is why the term 'sufficient cause' has been couched in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it be construed pragmatic but not pedantic so as to advance substantial justice. With this touchstone each case is to be judged while passing orders on matters relating to extension of period of limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
4. The impugned judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 1050 of 1994 was passed on 5-2-96. It is submitted that on the same day i.e. on 5-2-96 arguments were heard and judgment was dictated in the open Court. It is stated that the letter of the Government counsel with regard to the decision in the case was received in the office concerned on 15-2-96. But surprisingly enough it does not appear that any application was made in time for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment. Thus laches on the part of the appellants began from the date of delivery of judgment itself as nothing has been stated in this regard that at any point of time from the date of delivery of judgment till the dale of filing of the instant appeal, any step has been taken to obtain the certified copy of the order impugned.
5. This legal position is not disputed that while filing Letters Patent Appeal, certified copy of the impugned judgment is not required to be appended with the memo of appeal but in that case the appeal is to be filed within the statutory period of 30 days; but where certified copy of the impugned judgment is appended with the memo of appeal, the period of 30 days limitation is reckoned after deducting the time/period which is spent/consumed in obtaining the certified copy.
6. It is stated that letter of the Government counsel with regard to the decision dated 5-2-96 was received in the office on 15-2-96 i.e. after 10 days. But it is not stated as to on which date the Government counsel wrote letter giving the above said information. Thus this delay of 10 days has not been explained at all by the Department.
7. It appears that on 16-2-96 the office assistant placed the file to the Sectional Officer, who, on the same day placed the file before the Dy. Director (T). The Dy. Director (T) appears to have placed the file before the Director on 24-2-96. Here again a delay of 8 days has been caused without explaining the same satisfactorily. The file was placed by the Director to the Secretary on the same day who passed order on 27-2-96 for obtaining a certified copy of the order impugned dated 5-2-96. The file was return to the dealing assistant on 28-2-96.
8. Now it is clear that on 27-2-96 order was passed by the competent authority for obtaining a certified copy of the order impugned. But it appears that for issuing letter the file was again moved from table to table in order of hierarchy and ultimately on 15-3-96 letter was issued for getting a certified copy. Thus again a delay of 16 days has occurred without furnishing any plausible explanation for the same.
9. It is stated that on 8-3-96 the writ petitioners filed their representation along with a copy of the impugned judgment. The said representation is said to have been received in the office on 16-3-96. It is not stated as to where the same remained lying for 8 days. However, on 20-3-96 the file was placed by the Sectional Officer to the Dy. Director (T) who on 25-3-96 placed the file to the Director, who approved the matter on 27-3-96 and accordingly draft was placed by the dealing assistant on 29-3-96, which was approved by the competent authority on the same day. It appears that on one table the file remained pending for 4 days and on another table it remained lying for 5 days and thus for 9 days there is no explanation at all.
10. It is further stated that information letter was issued to the Principal, M.I.T., Muzaffarpur on 30-3-96 and his reply was received by the Director on 11-5-96. Here again on unexplained delay of 41 days has occurred. The file was placed by the dealing assistant on 14-5-96 to Sectional Officer, who placed the file before the higher officials in order of hierarchy and finally on 20-5-96 the Minister granted approval to file appeal. On 22-5-96 the dealing assistant received the file.
11. Now it appears that approval was granted on 20-5-96 by the competent authority. Now again the file was processed for issuing letter to Government Advocate. On 25-5-96 the dealing assistant moved the file to Sectional Officer who accordingly endorsed the file to higher officials in order of hierarchy and finally the Secretary granted approval on 10-6-96. Here again a delay of 21 days has occurred in merely according approval to a letter for which there appears to be no plausible explanation. Then the file was placed for typing on 11-6-96 and letter was sent to the Standing Counsel No. V to file Letters Patent Appeal on 14-6-96. Here again an unexplained delay of 3 days has occurred in merely sending a letter. It is pertinent to mention here that letter was sent on 14-6-96 and the same is said to have been received on 24-6-96 in the office of the Government counsel. As to where the letter in question remained lying for 10 days has not been explained. In this way the appeal has been filed on 2-7-96 causing an inordinate delay.
12. With the touchstone of pragmatic approach of the term 'sufficient cause' if the detailed descriptions as narrated above, are tested one may come to an irresistible conclusion that the file was moved and processed in a most careless and casual manner disentitling the appellants from taking any benefit for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
13. This is how such a long delay has occurred in filing the appeal by placing the file from one table to another table and from one office to another. Thus it appears that considerably a long period has been consumed in processing the file without satisfactorily explaining each day's delay. The explanation of delay as furnished gives a complete picture of callousness and carelessness on the part of the Department concerned right from lower level up to higher level i.e. from clerk level to officer level. Even in typing letter considerable time was consumed and this shows that the Department has acted in a leisurely and casual manner without caring for the law of limitation as if the law of limitation has no role to play in State cases. The above state of affairs also shows that the head of the department has no control over the subordinate staff. In this way the file has been dealt with without disclosing sufficient cause and good cause and still the State expect that the delay shall be condoned.
14. All that the explanation furnished for such a long delay of 146 days is that official correspondence took time but nothing has been brought on the record or even suggested that diligent and prompt steps were taken by the office and the officers of the appellants to file and prosecute the appeal in time. It is well settled proposition that in such cases each day's delays is required to be explained so as to bring the case within the purview of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay as has been held in the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361. Thus merely by making omnibus statement one cannot satisfy the requirements for condonation of delay.
15. Relying on a decision in the case of Slate of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 : (AIR 1996 SC 1623), it is contended that in State cases collective responsibilily of the officials/officers is to be taken into consideration in the light of the fact that on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing on-the-buck ethos, the delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. But the State represent collective cause of the community, therefore, some degree of latitude is to be given and the delay normally is to be condoned provided it is satisfactorily explained.
16. The submission has no two opinion provided the delay is explained satisfactorily by demonstrating each day's delay and further showing bona fide in taking prompt and diligent steps in filing and prosecuting the appeal. Even in Chandra Mani's case (supra) the dictum laid down in Ram Lal's case (AIR 1962 SC 361) (supra) has been approved. Therefore, it cannot be said that merely by giving reference to Chandra Mani's case (AIR 1996 SC 1623) (supra) the delay in State cases shall automatically be condoned contending that State represent collective cause of the community.
17. No doubt on the basis of ratio laid down in Chandra Mani's case (supra) some degree of latitude in condonation of delay is to be shown provided each day's delay is explained successfully inasmuch as collective responsibility is required to be explained with a degree of reasonableness. In this regard it is needless to-say that the provision of the Limitation Act does not extendany immunity relaxing the law of limitation in favour of the State. On the other hand the State Government is also standing on the same fooling like ordinary litigant.
18- Taking undue advantage of a few judicial pronouncements where sufficient cause has been proved for condonation of delay, upon which, some degree of latitude has been shown Considering collective responsibility of the State, in each and every case the appeals are being filed on behalf of the State taking it granted that the delay shall be condoned. But we may make it clear that it shall depend on the facts and circumstances of each and every case, and in such cases State will have to show that diligent and prompt steps were taken to file the appeal in time and if in that process some delay is, caused then indeed the same will be liable to be condoned extending the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. But where no prompt action is taken showing due diligency on the part of the appellant-State, it is not that still the delay is to be condoned. In (1997) 8 JT (SC) 189 : (AIR 1998 SC 2276) (P. K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala) this is what their Lordships of the apex Court (Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Venkataswami) have held that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
20. We have already observed that under the garb of collective responsibility public servants take undue advantage by moving leisurely and in a careless manner in such matters. It is now high time that the public servants are to be held personally responsible in such matters where State exchequer suffers loss on account of inaction on their parts in discharge of their functions as public servants.
21. In this regard the law laid down by the Apex Court is that the public officers are accountable for their negligence and misfeasance if they commit negligence in discharge of their officials duties. See the decision in the case of Lucknow Development Authority v. M. K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 : (AIR 1994 SC 787). This is based on the principle that the concept of State immunity is diluted and thus the public servants may be liable for the damages for deliberate injurious wrong doings.
22. The inactions on the parts of the public servants in the instant case by behaving in a careless manner amounts to malicious abuse of power. In this regard it will not be out of place to mention that with the change in the socio economic outlook in our democratic set up, public servants are expected to be more attentive to their onerous duties which they must discharge diligently and if public servant is found abusing his office either by an act of omission or commission, and as a consequence of which, there is loss to the public exchequer, action may be taken against such guilty public servant so that no public servant can arrogate to himself the power to act in a manner he likes causing loss to the public exchequer.
23. In a democratic set up, the function of the Government is to extend all possible facilities to its citizen and that is why the State is called a Welfare State which provides a large number of benefits to the citizen. It is, therefore, expected of the Government servants to discharge their official functions/duties in a fair and just manner.
24. In the case at hand the explanation furnished is that simply in making certain correspondence and placing the file from table to table, sufficient time consumed causing inordinate delay in filing the appeal. This explanation, in our considered opinion, can hardly be termed as sufficient and good ground warranting condonation of delay.
25. Under the facts and circumstances, narrated above, we direct that let the department concerned initiate an enquiry into the matter so as to find out the guilty officer/officers or subordinate staff on account of whose fault or inaction the inordinate delay of 146 days occurred in filing the instant appeal so that accountability of the officer/officers may be fixed and necessary departmental action may be taken against them.
26. Recently in the case of State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 430 : (AIR 1997 SC 1390), the Apex Court has ruled that responsibility be fastened on the head of the department unless there is any special circumstance absolving him of the accountability.
27. Thus, it is for the State to take appropriate action against the head of the department concerned, who was in charge of the affairs so that in future the same incident may not be repeated as in almost all cases appeals are being filed after expiry of period of limitation on behalf of the State whereas huge expenses are being incurred in providing paraphernalia to the State Department and its officers.
28. Thus, from the foregoing discussions, no lease is made out for condonation of delay. No sufficient cause or good cause has been shown which prevented the appellants to file the appeal well within the period of limitation. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay is rejected. As a result of this, the appeal is also dismissed being barred by limitation.
29. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, and to the Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Department of Science and Technology, Patna, for their information and needful action in the matter.
S.K. Singh, J.
30. I agree.