Allahabad High Court
Ishrat Husain Khan vs Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur And ... on 26 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: AIR1992ALL215, AIR 1992 ALLAHABAD 215, 1992 ALL. L. J. 699, 1991 (2) ALL CJ 1127, 1991 ALL CJ 2 1127, (1991) 18 ALL LR 599, 1993 (1) CURCC 368, (1992) 2 ALL WC 818
ORDER
1. The petitioner is defendant in a suit which is pending in Civil Court at Gorakhpur. It appears that a suit for partition was brought by the plaintiffs in respect of middle portion of a house situate at Gorakhpur. The plaintiffs were Amanat Husain Khan Smt. Jannat Bibi. The petitioner was defendant No. 1 in the said suit. The respondent No. 4, who was also a defendant in the said suit, is said to be son-in-taw of Amanat Husain Khan. The plaintiffs case was that one Smt. Asmat Bibi, who was mother of the petitioner and respondent No. 2 herein was the sole owner of three parts of the house in dispute. She had sold northern part of the said house to her daughter Smt. Jannat Bibi, who is respondent No. 3 here in on 26-10-1984 and by an oral gift made in 1972 she had given southern portion of the house to respondent No. 4, who is son-in-law of the respondent No. 2. The central portion of the house in dispute was said to be liable to be partitioned. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 claimed their share from the said portion. A copy of the plaint dated 28-10-1985 is filed as an annexure to the writ petition. The petitioner, who was defendant in the said suit, denied the correctness of the plaint. He denied the factum of sale having taken place and also denied the alleged oral gift in favour of the respondent No. 4. The petitioner had set up a claim to receive his share from all the three portions of the house and had stated that the suit was hit by the doctrine of partial partition. A copy of the written statement is also filed as an annexure to the writ petition.
2. During the pendency of the suit the petitioner moved an application restraining the plaintiff-respondents and their agents from evicting the petitioner or any tenant from the house in dispute and not to sell any portion of the house in favour of third persons. The said application was resisted by the plaintiff-respondents. They stated that they had no intention to dispose of the property but opposed the grant of interim relief in favour of the defendant. The trial Court by its order dated 25-4-1989 allowed the application for grant of interim relief (50/C) and restrained the plaintiff-respondents from evicting any of the tenants from the building and restrained them from selling any portion of the building in favour of third person. A copy of this order is also annexed to the writ petition. The respondents were aggrieved against the order of the trial Court. The respondent No. 1 filed a separate appeal which was numbered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 99 of 1989 and the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who were plaintiffs, filed a joint appeal which was numbered as Misc. Appeal No. 100 of 1989. The two appeals are said to have been decided by a common judgment by the respondent No. 1 vide his order dated 27-7-1990. The appeals were allowed and the present writ petition is filed against the judgment of the appellate court. The petitioner's case is that the appeal was only partially allowed.
3. The petitioner's case is that the interim order was granted by the trial court under Section 151, C.P.C. therefore it was not appealable before the respondent No. 1, It is also stated that the suit was hit by doctrine of partial partition. Therefore, the petitioner's rights were required to be safeguarded as the suit in the ultimate analysis would fail.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the writ petition.
5. The plaintiffs' case is that only middle portion of the building was liable to be partitioned because in respect of other two portions it was stated that the said portions had been gifted away in favour of the respondent No. 4 and sold in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. The partitionable property, according to the petitioner, was only the middle portion of the house. Whether the whole building was liable to be partitioned would depend on the fact as to whether the defendant-petitioner would succeed in proving that no sale or gift had taken place or conversely if the plaintiffs would fail in proving that sale or gift in their favour or in favour of the respondent No. 4 had taken place, in that case whole house is liable to be partitioned. But unless that plea was enquired into, the suit would not be bad on the ground ot doctrine of partial partition. This is a doctrine which bars trial of a suit for partition in certain circumstances. If the court trying the suit is satisfied that the entire property liable for partition was not included in the suit and only a portion of the property is sought to be partitioned, it would decline the relief of partition. It presupposes that the whole properly must be capable of partitioning and if a party applies for partition in respect of a portion of the property and leaves out other portion of the property, such a suit will not be maintainable as docrtine of partial partition would apply to it. So, therefore, the court has to direct an enquiry as to whether the entire property is capable of partitioning or only a portion of it is capable of partitioning and whether or not the plaintiff has left out any portion from the ambit of partition proceedings which was capable of being partitioned. If the court finds that the party seeking partition has left out some property out of the property sought to be partitioned, then it may refuse to grant the relief of partition as the court would not partition the property partially only. So it is imperative for the trial Court to find out whether the whole property is liable to be partitioned or not. In the present case this would necessarily require the court to consider the validity or otherwise of the sale deed and gift deed set up by the plaintiffs in.their favour, and in favour of the respondent No. 4. If those documents are held to be valid, then the middle portion of the house alone is liable to be partitioned, as it has not been tranferred or alienated prior to the institution of the suit. Such an enquiry is not completed. Therefore, the petitioner's contention that no sale or gift had taken place would not make this suit untenable on the ground of doctrine of partial partition. Unless there is some proof about the other portion of the property being available for partition, the doctrine of partial partition cannot be applied to the suit. The trial court has presumed that no sale or gift has taken place. On that basis it has issued interim order in respect of the entire property of which the suit property is only a portion. It could not do so because the entire house was not subject matter of the suit. The trial court could not pass an order in respect of that portion of the property which was not the subject matter of the suit, unless he had given a finding that the sale or gift set up by the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 2 was inoperative or non-existent.
6. As to whether an appeal was maintainable before the appellate court in respect of the ad interim injunction granted by the trial court is only a technical objection. The fact remains that interim injunction was granted which could be granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C, as also under the provisions of Section 151, C.P.C. If the trial Court has granted injunction under Section 151, C.P.C. the import of the injunction is the same which is of the order passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Therefore, the consideration of the appeal against the interim order by the first appellate court was not barred and the appeal could not be held to be untenable merely because Section 151, C.P.C. was invoked by the trial Court. The trial court does not say that such an injunction cannot be passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. Section 151 C.P.C. is generally invoked in the matter of grant of temporary injunction where the case is not covered by Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bhadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 : (1963 All LJ 169) that there being on such expression in Section 94, C.P.C. which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code, the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39, C.P.C. if the court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction.
7. The interim order granted by the trial court could have been granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. also it was not a case where Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. would not apply to the grant of temporary injunction and the court could fall back on its inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C.
The inherent power is not conferred on the court. It is a power inherent of the court by virtue of a duty to do justice between the parties before it. Looking to the nature of the interim order pased by the trial Court it is safe to infer that the trial court had passed the order under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. because the case of the petitioner defendant before the trial court would squarely fall within the ambit of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. By writing that the order was passed under Section 151, C.P.C. it cannot be inferred that such an order was not capable of being passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. That being so, the appeal before the appellate Court was maintainble and the appellate court could examine the legality of the order passed by the trial Court.
8. The reasoning given by the appellate court for setting aside the order of the trial court may not be absolutely correct but the conclusions drawn by the appellate court are warranted under law. No injunction can be issued in favour of the defendant in respect of property, which was not proved to be liable for partitioning when the interim order was passed nor could the trial court grant an injunction restraining the other party from taking recourse to law. These are rudimentary principles which every court has to consider while deciding a matter for grant or refusal of temporary injunction.
9. In respect of the middle portion of the property the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are definitely required to maintain the same position which obtained at the time of'the suit. Any sale made in respect of that portion during the pendency of the suit will always be subject to the result of the suit because a vendee who wants to reap the proceeds ofthe sale is bound by a decree in a partition suit, if passed ultimately. Therefore, it is just that parties are directed not to sell the property which is subject-matter of the partition suit, the temporary injunction cannot be granted in respect of the whole building of which the suit property is only a portion nor can the plaintiffs be restrained from taking eviction proceedings against any tenant in accordance with law.
10. The learned counsel wanted to rely on an authority of this Court, Shiv Ram Singh v. Smt. Mangara reported in 1988 All WC 1459 : (AIR 1989 All 164). The Court was considering the power to grant temporary injunction under Section 151, C.P.C. It was held that temporary injunction can be granted in favour of a defendant also under the inherent powers of the Court. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down in the said authority. The grant of temporary injunction is always in the discretion of the Court. However, that discretion is to be exercised in accordance with well established principles of law and the exercise of discretion must be based judicial considerations alone. If two views can be taken by Civil Court and both are supported by law it is free to take any of the views, either granting the injunction or rejecting the prayer for grant of temporary injunction. However, the appellate court could come to a different conclusion because it has all the powers which are vested in the trial court while deciding the appeal. But when the court is considering the legality of the order of grant or refusal of temporary injunction in its writ jurisdiction, unless there is a fundamental wrong committed by the court below, it is not possible for the High Court to interfere with the orders of the court below which do not suffer from any error of law or infirmity. There is no jurisdictional error in the order of the appellate Court.
11. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed as such. The interim order dated 24-8-1990 passed by this Court is also vacated.
12. Petition dismissed.